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Foreword
The challenge of economic development is to simultaneously understand both
which policy is the best to resolve a specific development problem and why and
how these policies can be effectively implemented given the political, behavioral,
and economic framework conditions in a specific country. Thus, to do good
economic policies we need to go beyond economics. It draws on the research on
the interface between politics, behavior (i.e., the incorporation of insights from
psychology into policy design), and economics.
Within IFPRI this research has been initiated by Peter Hazell and others in the
early 2000s and led to the development and application of quantitative economic
modeling tools for growth-poverty analysis in an economy-wide framework. The
political process, however, has not been integrated in these economic modeling
approaches. But, in political reality, identifying and pursuing technically sound
policies is further constrained for political reasons, e.g., elected government has
bias incentives to serve particular economic interest at the expense of the general
public, or specific needs of the poor or marginalized groups are not sufficiently
represented in the political process. Rather than lowering expectations when poli-
tics is a problem, technical experts and policymakers can use a better understanding
of political incentives, knowledge, and behavior to improve outcomes. Similarly,
behavioral economics brings new insights into how to craft better policies by
offering new policy tools, improving predictions about the effects of existing
policies, and generating new welfare implications.
This is what this book tries to do closing this research gap via developing and
applying quantitative approaches integrating political decision-making and behav-
ior economics into existing economic modeling tools. In particular, it contains a
selection of tools and methodologies that can help to tackle the complexities in the
analysis of policy processes and outcomes under the implementation of the Com-
prehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) agenda. How-
ever, the various contributions are not targeted only to experts and interdisciplinary
scholars working on empirical or theoretical research using quantitative policy
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modeling and evaluation techniques. They are also intended for technical experts,
including policymakers and analysts from stakeholder organizations, who are
involved in formulating and implementing policies to reduce poverty and to
increase economic and social well-being in African countries.
A lesson for International Development Organizations, like the World Bank,
also comes out of this research. We can do more, through relatively small changes
in what we are already doing, to leverage our technical strengths in generating
credible data and evidence, and to work with our clients to diminish political
constraints to achieving development goals and to better understand what are the
needed conditions, constraints, and predictions of policies. We can provide more
targeted and reliable information via quantitative modeling of the political and
behavioral process that will help societies to build effective political institutions
that are capable of tackling development problems. To do this, we have to over-
come the fear of modeling politics and behavior and confront it as part of the
challenge of development. In this book, the authors have just begun to extend the
influence of modeling politics and behavior over policy design. The glass is only







In 2003, African leaders endorsed the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Devel-
opment Programme (CAADP) as the action plan for putting agriculture back on
Africa’s development agenda. A critical challenge for all policymakers wrestling
with economic development and poverty reduction in Africa—as well as every-
where else in the world—is how to assess which programs and policies actually
work. A corollary to this challenge is to identify, among the programs that do work,
those that provide the best value for money (OECD 2004). A key approach of
CAADP is the promotion of evidence-based policies, where it has been fully
recognized that policy impact evaluation is an important prerequisite for
evidence-based policy processes. In the literature, quantitative policy impact eval-
uation is considered a key method for generating scientific knowledge on which
policies actually work best in a country. However, the incorporation of this knowl-
edge into the political decision-making process is a nontrivial process. Hence,
beyond generating knowledge, incorporating it into the political process is another
prerequisite of an effective evidence-based policy process. In this regard, it is
widely expected that active stakeholder participation will not only increase politi-
cians’ incentives to select the most efficient policies but also increase the capacity
of policy learning inherent in a political system (see, e.g., Ball 1995). The principles
of review, accountability, and inclusivity, which are core principles of CAADP,
reflect the belief that participatory policy processes at the continental, regional, and
national levels lead to improved coordination, mutual learning, and the adoption of
best practices, which together should result in improved policy planning and
execution as well as better growth and poverty reduction outcomes.
Linking economic analysis to policy formulation and outcome is a very complex
and tedious process. The problem is not just one of applying rigorous economic
theory to high-quality data in order to tackle relevant questions. This is difficult
enough but may still be the easiest part. A greater challenge is for the knowledge
and insights generated from policy research and analysis to find their way into the
decision-making process. And even when it does, science-based evidence forms
only one part, and often not the most important part, of the understanding that
vii
influences the decision-making process, where imperfect political competition
often induces biased incentives and incomplete knowledge for politicians, imped-
ing the implementation of available best-practice politics.
This book examines the methodological challenges to analyze and understand
simultaneously both which policies work best and why and how these policies can
be effectively implemented given the political and economic framework conditions
in a country. In particular, this volume contains a selection of tools and methodol-
ogies that can help to tackle the complexities in the analysis of policy processes and
outcomes under the implementation of the CAADP agenda. The various contribu-
tions in these proceedings are not targeted only to experts and interdisciplinary
scholars working on empirical or theoretical research using quantitative policy
modeling and evaluation techniques. They are also intended for technical experts,
including policymakers and analysts from stakeholder organizations, who are
involved in formulating and implementing policies to reduce poverty and to
increase economic and social well-being in African countries.
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Policy Support Through Modeling
and Evaluation: Methodological Challenges
and Practical Solutions
Ousmane Badiane, Christian Henning, and Eva Krampe
In 2003, African leaders endorsed the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Devel-
opment Programme (CAADP) as the action plan for putting agriculture back on
Africa’s development agenda. A critical challenge for all policymakers wrestling
with economic development and poverty reduction in Africa—as well as every-
where else in the world—is how to assess which programs and policies actually
work. A corollary to this challenge is to identify, among the programs that do work,
those that provide the best value for money (OECD 2004). A key approach of
CAADP is the promotion of evidence-based policies, where it has been fully
recognized that policy impact evaluation is an important prerequisite for
evidence-based policy processes. In the literature, quantitative policy impact eval-
uation is considered a key method for generating scientific knowledge on which
policies actually work best in a country. However, the incorporation of this knowl-
edge into the political decisionmaking process is a non-trivial process. Hence,
beyond generating knowledge, incorporating it into the political process is another
prerequisite of an effective evidence-based policy process. In this regard, it is
widely expected that active stakeholder participation will not only increase politi-
cians’ incentives to select the most efficient policies, but also increase the capacity
of policy learning inherent in a political system (see e.g. Ball 1995). The principles
of review, accountability, and inclusivity, which are core principles of CAADP,
reflect the belief that participatory policy processes at the continental, regional, and
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national levels lead to improved coordination, mutual learning, and the adoption of
best practices, which together should result in improved policy planning and
execution, better growth, and poverty reduction outcomes.
Linking economic analysis to policy formulation and outcome is a very complex
and tedious process. The problem is not just one of applying rigorous economic
theory to high-quality data in order to tackle relevant questions. This is difficult
enough but may still be the easiest part. A greater challenge is for the knowledge
and insights generated from policy research and analysis to find their way into the
decisionmaking process. And even when it does, science-based evidence forms
only one part, and often not the most important part, of the understanding that
influences the decisionmaking process, where imperfect political competition often
induces biased incentives for politicians, impeding the implementation of available
best-practice politics.
Contained in the present volume are a selection of tools and methodologies that can
help to tackle the complexities in the analysis of policy processes and outcomes under
the implementation of the CAADP agenda. The contributions go beyond the innovative
methods and tools applied for quantitative policy impact analyses by international
organizations like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), the World Bank or the European Union, as they also to examine the process
behind the choice of policies and the factors that determine the likelihood of their
adoption and implementation. It is the product of a workshop organized by the
University of Kiel (CAU), the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
and thePoverty Reduction, Equity, andGrowthNetwork (PEGNet) of theKiel Institute
of World Economy in 2011. The workshop brought together scholars working in the
field of policy modeling and evaluation at the microeconomic and macroeconomic
level or in the field of quantitative modeling of policy processes.
The various contributions in these proceedings are not targeted only to experts
and interdisciplinary scholars working on empirical or theoretical research using
quantitative policy modeling and evaluation techniques. They are also intended for
technical experts, including policymakers and analysts from stakeholder organiza-
tions, who are involved in formulating and implementing policies to reduce poverty
and to increase economic and social well-being in African countries.
In order to facilitate discussion on the recently developed evaluation methodolo-
gies and their applicability in the context of CAADP and its evaluation mechanisms,
we first develop a general assessment framework. This framework incorporates
guidelines and principles not only for economic policy impact evaluation, but also
for methodological approaches and tools assessing policy processes quantitatively.
1 A General Framework for Policy and Policy Process
Evaluation
1.1 The Basic Setup
At an abstract level, impact evaluation of a given policy instrument, say ‘γ’,
includes two different aspects. First, it is necessary to assess the technical
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transformation of policy γ into relevant policy outcomes z. This transformation is
captured by the technical transformation function T(z, γ), which links specific out-
comes to the policy in question. Second, different policy outcomes have to be
evaluated from the viewpoint of society. Formally, welfare analysis is a tool that
provides for an adequate evaluation criterion, i.e., an index function EC(z). EC(z)
transforms each state of the world z into an index number, and by doing so allows
for a consistent ordering of states. For example, EC(z1)>EC(z2) implies that state
z1 is preferred to state z2. Accordingly, if we were to know both functions, EC and
T, evaluation would be a purely technical task. For a set of available policies γ 2A,
where A is the set of all feasible policies a society can choose from, the policy with
the maximal evaluation value EC would be implemented:
E γð Þ ¼ Max EC zð Þ T z; γð Þ ¼ 0jf g ð1Þ
In reality, however, an empirical specification of both the welfare function EC
and the technical transformation function T is extremely complex and difficult.
Conventional policy impact analyses that focus on identifying the technical trans-
formation function usually assume a welfare function as exogenously given. The
main argument for this assumption is that a comprehensive modeling of the
decisionmakers’ evaluation of his or her preferred outcome and of the political
decisionmaking processes cannot be attained with the research approaches at hand.
A corollary to this argument is that research can at best focus on the technical
relationship (T) between alternative policies and outcomes, thereby offering
evidence-based guidance for decisionmaking.
Even when assuming an exogenously given welfare function (EC(γ)), policy
impact evaluation still remains a quite complex undertaking, because it is by no
means straightforward to specify the technical transformation function. This results
from many different reasons. First, policy outcomes are often formulated in terms
of abstract, higher level policy objectives, e.g., equal quality of life conditions in
rural and urban regions. These objectives need to be transformed into a set of
measurable policy outcome indicators, which then can be systematically related to
policy programs. Second, the relationship between policy programs and lower level
policy objectives, as well as the relationship between the latter and higher level
objectives, all reflect the behavior of people and thus require a theory of human
behavior. Therefore, a quantitative specification and assessment of the technical
relationship between inputs of a policy program and their effects on higher level
policy objectives remains a tricky business. More importantly, disentangling the
effects of a specific policy program becomes more challenging when many policy
programs are implemented simultaneously.
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1.2 Policy Impact Evaluation
The framework includes three major components, which are discussed in the
subsequent sections. They include policy evaluation criteria, intervention logic,
and evaluation methods.
1.2.1 Policy Evaluation Criteria
Clear and relevant evaluation criteria should be the starting point of developing
adequate evaluation tools. Five such evaluation criteria can be distinguished
(European Commission 2004):
– Relevance: What are the general needs, problems, and issues, both short and
long term, that are being targeted under the policy programs? Given the identi-
fied needs, a hierarchy of general, intermediate, and specific program objectives
can be derived, where objectives at a lower-level function as inputs to achieve
objectives at the next higher level.
– Effectiveness: To what extent does a policy program deliver results or outputs
that correspond to program objectives? Effectiveness is a technical relationship
between program objectives and program results.
– Efficiency: To what extent are program objectives achieved at the lowest costs?
Efficiency is a technical relationship between program inputs and program
results.
– Utility: To what extent does a policy program contribute to the identified needs?
– Sustainability: To what extent does the utility of a program last after the program
has been terminated?
1.2.2 Intervention Logic
Any evaluation of policy programs is based on intervention logic, or the systematic
derivation of the hierarchy of measurable objectives relating a policy program, all
the way from specific, operational objectives to more abstract, general policy
objectives. The intervention logic, as a central evaluation tool, thus corresponds
to a set of hypothetical cause-and-effect linkages that describe how an intervention
is expected to attain its global objectives.
To this end, an intervention can be systematically subdivided into specific
elements that are related to each other at specific stages of the project, as demon-
strated in Fig. 1.
In general, we can distinguish program implementation and program effects.
Any policy program starts with its implementation; for example, financial inputs or
administrative capacities are used to realize specific outputs. In an investment
program, for example, the inputs might correspond to a specific amount of financial
resources that are spent to subsidize investment projects on farms. The output of
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this investment project corresponds to the number and type of investment programs
that are actually subsidized. Depending on the applied implementation procedure,
the number and type of investment projects might differ. In particular, if farms are
heterogeneous, the type of farms that will be subsidized under a program might
differ according to applied implementation procedures.
The outputs of a project generate effects, which can be further subdivided into
results (short-term effects that occur at the level of direct target groups) and impacts
(medium- and long-term effects). Medium-term impacts involve effects on both
direct and indirect beneficiaries/recipients of assistance, while long-term effects
correspond to the global impacts of a policy program. Moreover, the global impact
of a policy program is related to the general needs, problems, and issues identified at
a higher policy level, where the program’s utility is defined as its contribution to
identified needs (see Fig. 1).
1.2.3 Evaluation Methods
Any intervention logic for policy programs is based on theory. Two different
evaluation approaches can be distinguished: (1) qualitative and (2) quantitative
models. Qualitative models, for example the logical framework matrix, simply
Fig. 1 Schematic presentation of a policy impact evaluation framework. Source: Authors, based
on European Commission (2004)
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provide a qualitative description of the intervention logic. Quantitative impact
evaluation is based on a quantitative specification of relevant cause-and-effect
linkages. Quantitative evaluation models can be further subdivided into model
based, and econometric policy evaluation approaches.
Model-Based Policy Evaluation
The common approach in economics for specifying an intervention logic of policy
programs is to apply a theoretical model. Different approaches are available for
model-based policy evaluation, ranging from simple incidence analysis, to more
advanced micro and macro behavioral models, to complex micro-macro linkages
models. These approaches differ regarding the set of agents and actions they
consider, as well as the assumed coordination mechanism of individual actions.
The complexity increases with the number of agents and the level of behavioral
response that models explicitly take into account.
Simple Incidence Analysis
Simple incidence analysis ignores any behavioral response of involved actors. For
example, an ex ante evaluation of a planned tax reform or a planned investment
subsidization project may be based on a simple arithmetic representation of the
incidence of a tax or subsidy, without simulating any policy response of involved
agents (Bourguignon et al. 2002). However, policies often have important price or
income effects, which in turn induce changes of agents’ behavior, such as changes
in supply, consumption, or labor demand behavior. A behavioral model is needed in
this case.
Micro-simulation Partial Equilibrium Models
In contrast to incidence models, behavioral models take the policy responses of
involved actors explicitly into account. However, there exist different types of
behavioral models that differ regarding the level of response they take into account.
Micro-simulation models take only the direct policy response of involved actors
into account. Basically, these models are partial equilibrium models that neglect the
indirect effects of policy programs resulting from agents’ interaction at the macro
level. The structure of these models can be described as follows:
xi ¼ F ξ;φi; γð Þ ð2Þ
z ¼ G xi; ξ;φi; γð Þ ð3Þ
where xi denotes the vector of relevant behavioral variables of an individual agent i,
φ and ξ denote the general and agent-specific exogenous variables, respectively,
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that determine individual behavior, γ is the evaluated policy, and z is the policy
outcome.
For a policy evaluation, the behavioral Eq. (2) has to be estimated based on
survey data. Given the specified Eqs. (2 and 3), the impact of different policies can
be simulated. The relevant agents are, for example, all households or firms in a
specific region. Often census data is used to provide information on their individual
characteristics. The response of all relevant agents can be estimated using Eq. (3),
given this information. The behavioral function F() is either specified as a reduced
form or an explicit functional form is derived from the underlying microeconomic
optimization problem.1 All micro-simulation models neglect the interaction of
individual agents. Micro-simulation models are not adequate tools for policy
evaluation if behavioral response at the micro level crucially depends on interac-
tions among actors at the macro level.
Macro or General Equilibrium Models
General equilibrium models are designed to include policy effects at the macro
level (Bourguignon et al. 2002). The most simple general equilibrium models are
linear models, e.g., regional input-output models or social accounting matrices
(SAMs). More advanced (nonlinear) general equilibrium models are standard
computable general equilibrium (CGE) approaches. With the CGE approach,
policy-induced behavioral responses at the micro level are explicitly transmitted
onto the overall economy via induced price changes at the macro level. However,
the explicit inclusion of macro-level effects comes at a cost. Standard CGE models
are highly aggregated, assuming only a small number of representative economic
agents (firms and households). Theoretically, CGE models could be more
disaggregated into a large number of heterogeneous firms and households, but
they become difficult to solve with the computer capacities usually available.
Moreover, the empirical estimation of functional parameters of the CGE model is
also a major problem due to very limited adequate data. Thus, although CGE
models can be linked with a micro-accounting model, if relevant policy evaluation
criteria include distributional effects, aggregated CGE models are less appropriate
tools for an adequate policy evaluation (see Chapter “Sequential Macro-Micro
Modelling with Behavioral Microsimulations” in this volume).
1A very interesting nonparametric approach applies propensity score matching techniques, orig-
inally developed as an advanced ex post evaluation technique, to simulate policy effects at the
micro level (Todd and Wolpin 2006). An advantage of a nonparametric estimation strategy, when
compared to parametric approaches, follows from the fact that the former are less demanding
regarding data requirements and do not require any specific functional form assumptions (Todd
and Wolpin 2006). However, in many cases nonparametric approaches are not applicable to ex
ante policy evaluation, but stronger modeling assumptions, e.g., functional form assumption, have
to be made.
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Micro-Macro Linked Models
In order to deal with computational capabilities and empirical complexity issues,
some authors suggest micro-macro linked models, which combine micro-
simulation models and macro general equilibrium models (Robilliard et al. 2001).
A full integration of micro and macro models is hard to achieve, although techni-
cally possible (Bourguignon et al. 2008). Therefore, often a sequential approach is
applied where first macro models are solved and central variables of the macro
model are then incorporated into corresponding micro models (Robilliard et al.
2001). Standard CGE models assume that interactions among individual agents are
coordinated through perfect markets. In reality, transaction costs as well as market
power imply imperfect competition and thereby perfect markets rarely exist. Of
course, the standard CGE approach can be extended to include market imperfection
due to transaction costs or market power. But these extended approaches are
technically more demanding and therefore have been rarely applied for policy
evaluation. More feasible alternatives include a linked or sequential micro-macro
model, in which different micro-behavioral models can be combined with macro
equilibrium models. Linked micro models include farm-household models incor-
porating non-market activities or nonlinear transaction costs (Singh et al. 1986).
1.3 Econometric Policy Evaluation
A general problem of model-based policy evaluation is that models are often quite
complex, and an empirical specification of the model is often impossible due to
limited data. Central causal relationships assumed by a model cannot easily be
verified or tested empirically. Hence, it is necessary to develop methods that are
able to provide empirical evidence suitable for guiding policy. This is not an easy
task, because it refers to causal inferences that require special research methods that
are not always easy to communicate due to their technical complexity.
This section surveys econometric methods that the economics profession has
used increasingly over the past decade to estimate causal effects of policies. A
causal linkage can be specified as a simple binary relationship between program
participation and a relevant performance variable, e.g., the impact of participation
in a training program on farm profit or employment. The most straightforward way
to measure the policy impact in this context would be to compare the performance
of a program participant with the counterfactual performance of the participant
without participation. A major challenge of this approach is to simultaneously
observe both performances, assuming participation and the counterfactual perfor-
mance. The different methods applied in this area are designed to distinguish
accidental association from causation. They provide empirical strategies to identify
the causal impact of different reforms on any kind of policy outcomes.
The best approach to identifying program impact on a given performance
variable is to conduct field experiments, i.e., to undertake a random selection of
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the units of interest into participating (treatment) and non-participating (control)
groups in a policy program. Based on a comparison of the average performance of
the randomly selected treatment and control groups, the impact of the policy
program can be statistically evaluated. While experimental approaches can be
applied for ex post and ex ante policy evaluation, a huge drawback of this approach
is that it is extremely expensive and, for many policies, it is impossible to design
sophisticated field experiments allowing a quantitative evaluation. In this case,
other econometric procedures based on observational data are available that allow
one to identify the true impact of a policy program assuming a non-random
selection of treatment and non-treatment groups. These econometric approaches
can be subdivided into non-parametric and parametric approaches. An increasingly
popular non-parametric approach to policy evaluation is matching on observable
factors, especially propensity score matching (PSM) (Caliendo and Hujer 2006).
Matching and other econometric methods that build on the idea of controlling for
observable factors have clear limitations. The policy impact is very often deter-
mined by factors that are unobserved by the researcher. This implies that PSM
delivers biased results or that policy impact is heterogeneous across participants. In
order to get around these problems, alternative methods have been developed. They
are used to emulate experimental settings using observational data, i.e., ‘natural’
experiments, such as the instrumental-variable approach and the regression-
discontinuity approach, or panel-data-based methods that aim to account for
endogeneity.
A general cutback of all statistical models, however, is the fact that they are
limited to causal inferences, i.e., empirical testing on the question of whether a
given policy program achieved its intended outcome or not. In general, they are not
alone suitable to elucidate the question of why or how a policy program works.
Therefore, the best approach to policy evaluation is to combine model-based and
econometric methods as complementary approaches, where econometric tech-
niques are applied to identify causal relations between specific policy programs
(γ) and central economic factors (θ), and model-based techniques to analyze the
impact of a change in these economic factors on central outcome indicators (z). The
transformation function T(z, γ) is separated into two parts: (i) a policy impact
function θ¼PI(γ) describing the relationship between policy interventions and
the economic factors θ, and (ii) a policy outcome function PO(z, θ) describing the
linkages between the economic factor θ and policy outcomes z. Econometric
methods are more suitable for tackling the policy impact function, whereas eco-
nomic models do a better job of tracking the policy outcome function.
1.4 Modeling and Evaluation of Policy Processes
Many countries around the globe continue to apply suboptimal policies despite
available scientific knowledge demonstrating the existence of policy instruments
that would lead to more desirable overall economic and social outcomes. For
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example, there is evidence that many developing countries that still largely depend
on agriculture, especially in Africa, underinvest in this sector. They especially
spend too little budget on, e.g., agricultural research and extension which are
areas of public investment with high returns in terms of growth and poverty
reduction (Fan and Rao 2003).
Thus, evidence-based policy formulation includes, beyond the generation of
scientific knowledge, the effective incorporation of this knowledge into the political
decisionmaking process. The latter is by nature complex and dynamic, involves
multiple actors (individuals and organizations), and is defined by local political,
social (cultural and belief systems) and institutional realities (bureaucratic struc-
tures and capacities). Essentially, the policy process corresponds to an aggregation
of the heterogeneous preferences of different stakeholder groups into a common
policy decision. In representative democracies, preference aggregation is
subdivided into two steps. First, heterogeneous voter preferences are transformed
into the corresponding preferences of a subset of political representatives via
democratic elections. A central property of democratic elections is their represen-
tativeness, i.e., the correspondence between the distribution of preferences among
elected representatives with the distribution of preferences among the voting
population. Second, the heterogeneous preferences of political representatives are
aggregated into a final political decision via legislative voting procedures.
The above process can be modeled as follows: Let a society comprise of nI
different groups, where I¼ 1 , . . . , nI denotes the index of stakeholder groups.
Further, let UI(z) denote the utility function of an individual group member i2 I,
and wI denotes the population share of group I. Then, an ideal policy process can be





wIUI zð Þ s:t: T z; γð Þ ¼ 0 ð4Þ
where T(z, γ) is the political technology, that is, the subset of all policy outcomes z
that can be optimally achieved by available policies γ, given existing political
knowledge.
Differences between observed and ideal policy choices result from two different
sources. First, a biased aggregation of society preferences, i.e., real policy pro-
cesses, results in different political weights of groups when compared to the ideal
democratic process. At a theoretical level, existing political economy models
highlight this bias as a main cause of persisting inefficient policies. Biased political
weights correspond to biased incentives of elected politicians, and result from
asymmetric lobbying activities (Grossman 1994) or biased voter behavior (Bardhan
and Mookherjee 2002). More recently, Persson and Tabellini (2000) highlight the
role of formal constitutional rules as determinants of politicians’ incentives to
misrepresent society interests and choose inefficient policies.
Beyond biases resulting from the aggregation of society preferences, a second
source of biased policy is that the true political technology is not fully known by the
relevant political actors. Understanding the complex relationship between policy
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instruments and induced policy outcomes is difficult. As a result, political actors use
simple mental models to understand how policies translate into outcomes. We call
these simple mental models policy beliefs. Based on their policy beliefs, political
actors derive their individual preferences with respect to policies. Similarly, some
authors have recently highlighted the role of biased voter beliefs as a main deter-
minant of inefficient policy choices (Beilhartz and Gersbach 2004; Bischoff and
Siemers 2011; Caplan 2007). In particular, the work by Caplan (2007) has been
highly recognized in public choice literature, as he has collected an impressive
amount of evidence showing persistently biased voter beliefs. Based on his empir-
ical findings, Caplan (2007) draws the rather pessimistic conclusion that democratic
mechanisms of preference aggregation naturally lead to the choice of inefficient
policies.
In this context, two key underlying premises that define the framework of
evaluating policy processes are adopted here. The first premise is that biased
voter beliefs imply biased voter behavior and hence a biased aggregation of
preferences. The second premise is that politicians and lobbyists do not fully
understand the complex relationship between political instruments and desired
policy outcomes. Hence, beyond biased incentives, lack of political knowledge
becomes another important cause of policy failure.
The evaluation of policy processes can be based on the comparison between
actual, implemented policy choice γactual and the ideal policy choice γideal : kγactual
 γidealk . kk is the Euclidian distance. That is, the evaluation of policy processes
should be able to identify political performance gaps as defined above. Policy
diagnosis should also allow for the separation of identified performance gaps into
incentive-induced and knowledge-based gaps. Finally, a comprehensive evaluation
of policy processes should provide the possibility of developing a political therapy,
i.e., the derivation of a strategy to reduce identified performance gaps. The latter in
particular calls for model-based evaluation methodologies.
Our methodology is derived from the model described in Fig. 2.
Schematically, a dynamic policy process includes a sequence of political
decisionmaking based on actors’ policy beliefs, the transformation of the selected
policy into outcomes via induced policy responses in the economic system, the
translation of economic and political outcomes into political support via elections
and lobbying and policy learning, i.e., the updating of policy beliefs (see Fig. 2).
Policy learning occurs via two mechanisms. First, based on observed outcomes,
political actors engage in observational policy learning, i.e., they update their policy
beliefs by comparing observed outcomes with the policy outcomes they expected
based on their initial policy beliefs. Individual observations, however, are noisy and
hence individual observational learning is limited. Accordingly, political actors
engage in communication learning, i.e., they update their policy beliefs based on
political beliefs communicated by other actors. Within policy processes, commu-
nication learning occurs via political mass communications, i.e., the formation of a
public opinion, as well as via exclusive political communication within a political
elite comprising of relevant politicians and stakeholder organizations. Interestingly,
the social organization of political communication processes has a significant
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impact on the speed of policy learning. In particular, the structure of a communi-
cation network has a significant impact on its capacity to aggregate decentralized
information within a political elite. Moreover, network structure also determines
the influence of individual organizations on the policy beliefs of relevant politicians
and hence the direction of the bias of political decisionmaking.
Few studies have explicitly mapped out the above processes in explaining the
poor past performance of policy reforms and investment strategies, particularly in
the agricultural sector. Most have offered narratives based on historical accounts,
pointing to the strong role of powerful personalities, vested interests, corruption,
and external pressures, in influencing policy outcomes (Clay and Schaffer 1984;
Juma and Clark 1995; Keeley and Scoones 2003; Young 2005).
The challenge of analyzing participatory and evidence-based policy processes
empirically is to develop an applicable model framework that allows for quantita-
tive modeling of political decisionmaking and policy-learning processes, including
the endogenous formation of a legislator’s political preferences and policy beliefs.
In this context, four components of a political process framework can be distin-
guished (see Fig. 2): (i) the derivation of politicians’ incentives from electoral
competition and lobbying, i.e., modeling voter behavior and interest group activi-
ties; (ii) modeling legislative bargaining, i.e., the derivation of a collective policy
decision by a set of heterogeneous legislators based on constitutional rules; (iii)
economic modeling of policy impacts, i.e., the transformation of policies into
outcomes; and (iv) modeling of policy learning, i.e., the formation and updating
of policy beliefs via observational and communication learning. The existing
evaluation literature focuses only on the third component, although the other
three components represent aspects of the policy process that play a key role in
explaining why some nations succeed while others fail in adopting efficient and
effective policies.
Fig. 2 Schematic
representation of a policy
process. Source: Authors
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The current volume assembles different contributions, which together provide a
comprehensive set of innovative quantitative approaches that can be used to model
these various aspects of the policy process. In particular, Chapter “Modeling and
Evaluation of Political Processes: A New Quantitative Approach” presents an
evolutionary computable general political economy equilibrium (eCGPE) model,
combining all four components listed above as an integrated quantitative approach
to model and evaluate real policy processes.
2 Contributions to This Volume
Following this overview of methodological approaches to quantitative policy
evaluations, the twelve contributions to these proceedings can be subdivided into
two parts: I. Theory and application of quantitative policy impact evaluation
models, and II. Theory and application of quantitative approaches to model and
evaluate policy processes.
Part I is subdivided into three sections: 1. Macroeconomic Models, 2. Micro-
Econometric Models and 3. Micro-Macro Linked Models. As an opener to Sect. 1,
O. Badiane, S. Odjo and F. Wouterse present their results for CAADP-reform
strategies and the long-term outlook for growth and poverty reduction of Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) member countries
(Chapter “Comparative Analysis of Strategies and Long Term Outlook for Growth
and Poverty Reduction among ECOWAS Member Countries”). They use a recur-
sive dynamic CGE model linked with a micro accounting model, transforming
economic macro shocks into individual household income changes for their anal-
ysis. The second contribution of the section is by M. Wiebelt, K. Pauw,
J.M. Matovu, E. Twinmukye and T. Benson. They provide a comprehensive
analysis of the different policy options to use oil revenues in Uganda
(Chapter “How to Spend Uganda’s Expected Oil Revenues? A CGE Analysis of
the Agricultural and Poverty Impacts of Spending Options”). As their analysis
focuses on the implication on poverty, a recursive dynamic CGE model is linked
with a micro accounting model transferring average income changes of represen-
tative households generated in the CGE model into a corresponding change of
individual household income at the micro level.
Econometric evaluation techniques are applied and discussed by S. Benin et al.
in Chapter “Impact of the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS)
Program of Uganda: Considering Different Levels of Likely Contamination with
the Treatment”. In particular, they develop and apply innovative matching
approaches to assess the impact of an agricultural advisory services program in
Uganda based on observational data.
Furthermore, Sect. 2 contains two innovative micro-macro-linked approaches.
In Chapter “Modeling Agricultural Growth and Nutrition Linkages: Lessons from
Tanzania and Malawi”, K. Pauw applies a CGE model that is sequentially linked
with a microeconomic nutrition demand model to analyze the impact of different
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growth strategies on income growth and nutrition in Tanzania and Malawi. J. Lay
derives and applies a macroeconomic CGE model that is sequentially linked with a
reduced form model of households’ occupational choices on formal and informal
labor markets (Chapter “Sequential Macro-Micro Modelling with Behavioral
Microsimulations”). The micro model explicitly includes household’s fixed effects
to include unobserved heterogeneity among households into the structural labor
market model. The approach is used to empirically analyze poverty and the
distributional implications of Doha round scenarios in Brazil and poverty and the
distributional implications of the Bolivian gas shock.
Part II focuses on innovative quantitative models to evaluate evidence-based and
participatory policy processes under CAADP. In particular, an eCGPE approach is
theoretically derived and empirically applied to the CAADP reform process in
Malawi. It is demonstrated how political performance and incentive gaps can be
identified and quantitatively calculated using an eCGPE. This part opens with the
presentation of the complete eCGPE framework by C. Henning
(Chapter “Modeling and Evaluation of Political Processes: A New Quantitative
Approach”). In particular, the theories used to develop an eCGPE, which includes
an economic, a legislative decisionmaking, an interest mediation, and a political
belief formation module, are explained. The other contributions of the section
present findings from the empirical application of the framework to Malawi’s
policy process.
Chapters “A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory Policy Pro-
cesses: An Application to CAADP in Malawi” and “The Formation of Elite
Communication Networks in Malawi: A Bayesian Econometric Approach” focus
on the findings from the political belief formation module. Applying social network
theory and methods, they analyze collective political belief formation of govern-
mental and non-governmental actors through communication learning in networks.
C. Henning and E. Krampe (Chapter “A Network Based Approach to Evaluate
Participatory Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi”) also
develop an evaluation framework for participatory policy processes based on the
political belief formation module. C. Aßmann, E. Krampe and C. Henning
(Chapter “The Formation of Elite Communication Networks in Malawi: A Bayes-
ian Econometric Approach”) test some theoretical hypotheses on the determinants
of communication ties among key national stakeholder organizations, donors and
central political actors. They apply an adaptation of the Bayesian estimation
scheme for binary probit models, which can deal with missing values inevitably
occurring within survey data.
L. Seide, C. Henning, and S. Petri (Chapter “Voter Behavior and Government
Performance in Malawi: An Application of a Probabilistic Voting Model”) present
an analysis of voter behavior and its impact on governmental accountability and
capture. They derive the implications of voter behavior on governmental account-
ability and capture using probabilistic voting theory.
The final chapter of Part II is by C. Henning, J. Hedtrich, L. Sene, and
E. Krampe. They use the eCGPE model to provide a comprehensive analysis of
the economic impacts of policy options and knowledge and political incentive gaps
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in Malawi (Chapter “Whither participation? Evaluating Participatory Policy Pro-
cesses Using the CGPE Approach: The Case of CAADP in Malawi”).
The book closes with two chapters summarizing the central practical policy
implications of the presented scientific work. In particular, M. Johnson discusses
how quantitative policy monitoring and evaluation systems can be translated into
political action based on the empirical example of the strategic analysis and
knowledge support system (SAKSS) implemented within CAADP
(Chapter “Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support Systems (SAKSS): Translat-
ing Evidence into Action”). In Chapter “Lessons Learned and Future Challenges”,
C. Henning and O. Badiane present lessons learned for practical policy
implementations by highlighting the book’s main findings in the areas of economic
modeling of growth-poverty and policy-growth linkages, as well as political econ-
omy modeling of participatory policy processes. Beyond presenting innovative
methodological approaches, the empirical studies in this book also shed light on
the role of voters, stakeholders, and donors in participatory policy processes, and
provide convincing evidence that beyond constitutional rules, policy beliefs and
policy network structures are important determinants of government performance.
The chapter also highlights the future outlook and challenges to the modeling and
evaluation of policies and political processes.
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Analysis of Strategies and Long Term Outlook
for Growth and Poverty Reduction Among
ECOWAS Member Countries
Ousmane Badiane, Sunday P. Odjo, and Fleur Wouterse
1 Introduction
The Common Agricultural Policy of ECOWAS (ECOWAP) was adopted in
January 2005, following a close consultation among member states and regional
professional organizations. The adoption came <2 years after the launch of the
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) under the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an initiative of the African
Union. In March 2005, ECOWAS organized, in Bamako, Mali, the Regional
Implementation Planning Meeting for CAADP in West Africa. The meeting
reviewed the objectives, targets, and principles of CAADP and their alignment
with ECOWAP, and confirmed the latter as the political as well as institutional
framework for the implementation of the former in the West Africa region. In May
2005, ECOWAS and the NEPAD Secretariat developed a joint ECOWAP/CAADP
action plan for the period 2005–2010 for the development of the agricultural sector.
In adopting CAADP, African governments had, amongst others, set for their
countries a collective goal of achieving a 6% agricultural growth rate as a key
strategy toward achieving the Millennium Development Goal of reducing poverty
to 50% of its 1990 level by 2015. They had also opted for a partnership framework
to mobilize the required funding to achieve the above growth rate, including the
allocation by national governments of a budget share of at least 10% to the
agricultural sector. Finally, CAADP also reflects an option for evidence and
outcome based planning and implementation in support of an inclusive sectoral
review and dialogue process, in line with the broader NEPAD peer review and
accountability principle. A key element of ECOWAP/CAADP is, therefore, to
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support and add value to the efforts of individual member states, where necessary,
to ensure that they meet the above growth, budgetary, and poverty reduction targets
and align with the above principles.
An important part of the planning work carried out by the technical teams in
individual member states consisted of reviewing past, current, and emerging coun-
try efforts against the above objectives. This includes:
1. Examining the recent growth performance of the agricultural sector, as well as
future growth and poverty outcomes based on observed trends;
2. Determining how such outcomes compare with the targets established for the
sector under the ECOWAP/CAADP agenda and how they compare with the
Millennium Development Goal to halve the proportion of people living on less
than a dollar a day (MDG1);
3. Measuring the prospects of meeting these targets and analyzing the implications
for future sector growth and poverty-reduction strategies;
4. Estimating the long term funding needs to accelerate agricultural growth and
achieve the poverty MDG.
The embracing of ECOWAP/CAADP as the centerpiece of poverty-reduction
strategies by member states also implies that agriculture and its individual sub-
sectors must play a primary role as leading sources of pro-poor growth at the
national and rural levels. Successful implementation of the agenda at the country
level should therefore be guided by a good understanding of the impact of sector
wide growth and growth within individual agricultural subsectors on income and
poverty levels among different categories of rural households and across geo-
graphic zones.
To facilitate implementation of ECOWAP/CAADP, the ECOWAS Commission
established a task force and mobilized the necessary technical expertise and funding
for the preparation of regional and national agricultural investment programs,
including US$9 million of its own funds. The technical preparation of the National
Agricultural Investment Plans (NAIPs) was coordinated by the ministries in charge
of integration, led by the ministries in charge of agriculture, and carried out by a
team of national and regional experts, with assistance from the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Regional Strategic Analysis and Knowl-
edge Support System (ReSAKSS), established at the International Institute of
Tropical Agriculture (IITA).
The current report summarizes the content of the NAIPs as well as the findings of
the technical analysis that has guided their formulation. It is organized around the
four main questions that constitute the focus of the analytical work to guide country
level planning processes. These questions deal with the key sources of agricultural
growth and related impact on poverty levels; the extent to which individual
countries are on track to meet the CAADP growth and budgetary targets; the
required growth rates and expenditure levels to achieve alternative growth and
poverty reduction outcomes; and finally the degree of realism of proposed country
investment plans to achieve the CAADP growth and budget targets.
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1.1 What Are the Key Sources of Agricultural Growth
and Poverty Reduction in ECOWAS Countries?
Figures 1 and 2 show the recent growth and poverty reduction performance among
ECOWAS countries compared to other African countries. Figure 1 categorizes
countries in four groups based on the rates of agricultural growth and poverty
reduction at the start of the new millennium. Countries that perform better overall
with higher rates of growth (>6%) and relatively lower rates of poverty (<40%)
would occupy the North-West quadrant. The opposite holds for countries in the
South-East quadrant. On the whole, the ECOWAS region seems to perform better
in terms of recent growth but shows relatively higher average rates of poverty.
Between 1999 and 2005, the agricultural sector in the region grew by 5.0% a year,
well above the African average of 3.3%. However, the average poverty rate in the
region (50.2%) for the same period is higher than the African average (45.6%). As a
result, only two ECOWAS countries, Cape Verde and The Gambia, are found in the
North-West corner of Fig. 1. In contrast, a majority of its member countries, eight in
all, are assembled in the South-East corner. Figure 2 presents a separate distribution
of ECOWAS countries with respect to both past agricultural growth and poverty
outcomes: 54% of countries are in group IV, with growth rates that are below 6%
and poverty rates that exceed 40%.
A recursive dynamic version of the standard IFPRI Lofgren-Harris-Robinson
CGE model coupled with a micro-simulation module is used to simulate future
































































Fig. 1 Position of ECOWAS with respect to CAADP growth and poverty targets (1999–2005).
Source: World Development Indicators (2008). Notes: AF indicates a non-ECOWAS African
country and ECO an ECOWAS member country
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member countries.1 Due to lack of sufficient data, instead of the CGE model a
simplified model was used for The Gambia and Liberia. Table 1 summarizes the
results of the simulation for 13 ECOWAS member countries. The first two columns
compare the simulated reductions in poverty rates resulting from an additional 1%
point increase in the agricultural and non-agricultural rates of growth through to
2015. Although the simulations are run separately for each sector, the prices,
activity levels, and factor incomes in the other sectors also change. Hence, the
observed decline in poverty rates resulting from growth in one of the sectors in
reality also reflects the effect of changes in the remaining sectors. Given that the
latter changes emanate from the intersectoral multiplier effects induced by growth
in the sector under consideration, we attribute the entire reduction in poverty to that
sector. The figures in the Table represent the sectoral shares in the combined
decline in poverty rates. The contribution of agricultural growth is consistently
higher but diverges considerably across countries: from 10–20% higher in Benin,
Ghana, and Senegal to nearly three times higher in Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire,
Nigeria, and Togo. For most other countries, the contribution of agriculture is at
least 50% higher compared to other sectors.
The importance of accelerated agricultural growth for poverty reduction in
individual countries is demonstrated by the figures in the last two columns. They
indicate the contribution by 2015 of an additional 1% point increase in the rate of
agricultural growth to farm incomes and poverty reduction in various ECOWAS
countries. Accelerating the rate of agricultural growth as indicated above would
raise agricultural GDP (value added) by amounts ranging from US$21 million in
the Gambia to as much as nearly $400 million in Mali. The corresponding reduction









Fig. 2 Distribution of ECOWAS countries with respect to CAADP growth and poverty targets
(1999–2005). Source: World Development Indicators (2008). Note: Group I countries have growth
rates <6% and poverty rates <40%; group II countries have growth rates >6% but poverty rates
<40%; group III countries have growth rates >6% and poverty rates >40%; and group IV
countries have <6% growth rates and poverty rates >40%
1See L€ofgren et al. (2002) for description and L€ofgren (2001) and Thurlow (2004) for other
applications of the model.
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most countries. It is highest for Cape Verde, Senegal, and Liberia and lowest for
Ghana, where it amounts to <3%.
Although accelerated growth of the agricultural sector as a whole may be the
most promising strategy currently available to ECOWAS countries for poverty
reduction, such a strategy must also recognize that agricultural sub-sectors do not
contribute to the same extent to growth and poverty reduction. The importance of
the contribution to growth of each subsector is determined by its initial share in
income and employment and its potential for future growth. For each country, the
impact on growth and poverty reduction resulting from an incremental 1% point
increase in the rate of growth by 2015 in individual subsectors was simulated. The
leading sectors in terms of poverty reduction impact are listed in Table 2. For most
countries, the food staples subsector has the greatest potential to contribute to
increases in farm incomes and poverty reduction. Livestock also emerges as a
strategic subsector, in particular among Sahelian countries. The main message
from Table 2 should not be to identify winners but rather to highlight the relative
contribution of various subsectors. Given limited growth potential and the geo-
graphic as well as demographic implications of growth in individual subsectors, the
best strategy would be to marry such concerns with the priority ranking to harness
the contribution of a broad range of subsectors. In fact, results from the same
simulations show that isolated strategies exclusively targeting a commodity or a
subsector would be less effective for poverty reduction than a comprehensive
strategy aiming for largely diversified agricultural and non-agricultural growth.
Table 1 Agricultural growth and poverty reduction in ECOWAS countries
Sectoral contribution to poverty
reduction resulting from an
additional 1% point of sectoral
growth by 2015
Growth and poverty impact of an additional













Benin 52.5 47.5 270.9 10.7
Burkina Faso 60.0 40.0 215.6 10.3
Cape Verde 72.0 28.0 27.5 25.9
Gambia 66.7 33.3 20.8 11.1
Ghana 54.0 46.0 296.2 2.9
Guinea 59.2 40.8 57.0 10.0
Côte d’Ivoire 73.0 27.0 498.5 6.5
Liberia 69.6 30.4 53.0 11.9
Mali 65.2 34.8 389.5 6.7
Niger 60.0 40.0 253.0 6.5
Nigeria 75.0 25.0 NA NA
Senegal 56.6 43.4 132.0 12.6
Togo 75.0 25.0 231.0 9.8
Source: Model simulation results for ECOWAS countries. Figures for Nigeria and Ghana are from
Diao et al. (2010) and Breisinger et al. (2008), respectively
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1.2 Are ECOWAS Countries on Track to Meeting CAADP’s
Growth and Poverty Reduction Targets by 2015?
Under current trends or business-as-usual (BAU), agricultural growth among
ECOWAS countries is projected to stabilize at around 4–5% by 2015, as indicated
in the first column of Table 3.2 Although these rates are high by historical standards
for most countries, they are less than the 6% targeted under CAADP. Mali and
Nigeria are the only countries with expected rates of growth that are close to that
target. It can also be seen from the figures in the third column that the projected
rates of growth under current trends would not allow any county, except Cape
Verde and Ghana, to achieve the MDG1 target of halving poverty by 2015. Senegal
and Sierra Leone and, to a lesser extent, Burkina would come close. In three
countries, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, the rate of poverty in 2015 is expected
to be, respectively, 18%, 37% and 24% higher in 2015 compared to 1990. The
problem in these countries is that poverty has continued to rise after 1990 in the face
of severe economic contraction in the first and prolonged civil wars in the other two
countries. The decline in poverty resulting from projected agricultural growth under
current trends would not be sufficient to offset the increase in the poverty rate by
2015.
Table 2 Strategic agricultural subsectors for agricultural growth and poverty reduction
Benin Food crops (maize, roots and tubers)a
Burkina Faso Cattle and sorghum/millet
Cape Verde Food crops
Côte d’Ivoire Yam, cassava and plantains
The Gambia Cereals (millet/sorghum)a and livestock
Ghana Root crops and fisheries
Guinea Rice
Guinea Bissau Food crops and fisheries
Liberia Food crops
Mali Food crops (rice; millet/sorghum)a
Niger Livestock
Nigeria Cassava, Rice
Senegal Livestock and food crops (millet/sorghum; rice)a
Sierra Leone Cassava, rice
Togo Food crops
Source: Model simulation results for ECOWAS countries. Figures for Nigeria and Ghana are from
Diao et al. (2010) and Breisinger et al. (2008), respectively
aCountry SAMs do not usually disaggregate the food sector. The subsectors in parentheses are
added here only for the purpose of illustrating the leading food commodities in the respective
countries
2Current trends describes the period leading up to the signing of the CAADP compact, which for
most countries refers to the first decade of the 2000s.
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Prior to embracing CAADP, many countries had on-the-shelf strategies that
pre-date the signing of the Compact and were at difference stages of readiness for
implementation. The implied growth rates under these strategies, assuming that
they could be successfully implemented and their declared targets achieved, are
listed in the second column of the Table. The rates are universally higher than
projected rates under current trends. The only exception is Liberia, for which the
scenario under current trends refers to the post-conflict period. For the region as a
whole, the average rate of growth for the agricultural sector would increase from
under 5% under status quo to slightly more than 6%, thus meeting the CAADP
growth target. However, for several of the countries, such as Benin, Nigeria, and
Mali, the implied growth rates are significantly higher than would be expected
based on recent performance, hence suggesting a problem of realism of declared
investment and growth targets under these strategies. The implied rate of growth is
high for Ghana as well, relative to historical records, but is less challenging in
absolute terms than the rates for the other three countries. Nevertheless, the
projected rates of growth for the majority of countries would still fall well short
of the CAADP target of 6%.




























Benin 5.1 14.3 17.7 55.9 9.4
Burkina Faso 5.1 5.3 40.0 44.1 50.5
Cape Verde 2.6 5.0 61.0 75 78.0
Gambia 3.7 3.8 9.8 10.4 11.3
Ghana 4.2 7.5 50.1 54 66.0
Guinea 3.0 3.2 25.9 28.2 42.2
Côte d’Ivoire 2.5 2.6 37.0 35.3 10.0
Liberia 5.0 4.0a 24.3 24.2 22.6
Mali 5.5 8.5 11.0 29 14.1
Niger 4.4 6.2 6.5 17.4 16.6
Nigeria 5.7 9.5 10.0 30.0b c
Senegal 4.1 NA 43.8 NA 49.7
Sierra Leone 4.2 NA 42.5 NA 47.6
Togo 4.7 5.0 17.2 19.4 26.4
Source: Model simulation results for ECOWAS countries. Figures for Nigeria and Ghana are from
Diao et al. (2010) and Breisinger et al. (2008), respectively
NA Not applicable
Notes: a The rate of growth is projected to decline as the country transitions out of the immediate
post-war recovery period (current trends scenario). b The target year chosen by Nigeria is 2017.
cThere were no separate simulations of this scenario, given that the country was already growing
at 5.7% under the current trends scenario
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With respect to the goal of poverty reduction, Benin would be the only country to
join Ghana and Cape Verde in halving poverty rates below the 1990 levels under the
present scenario, as shown in column 4. It is, however, clearly unrealistic to expect
Benin’s agricultural sector to nearly triple its pre-CAADP rate of growth to 14.3% a
year by 2015. Strategies for all other countries would imply changes in poverty
levels that are significantly below the MDG1 target. And for the two post-conflict
countries, Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire, poverty rates would still be considerably
higher than their 1990 levels: by nearly 25% and 35%, respectively. In contrast,
the adoption and successful implementation of strategies and programs that would
enable all ECOWAS member countries to achieve the 6% CAADP growth target
would lead to substantial reduction in poverty rates across the region, although less
than half of the countries would be expected to reach MDG1 by 2015 (fifth column).
The challenge in realizing the poverty MDG by 2015 is made difficult for Benin,
Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia because poverty rates in these countries have continued
to rise after 1990 and have not stabilized or started to decline before the end of that
decade. In the case of Liberia, the poverty rate jumped from 61% in 1990 to 84% in
2007. Under continuation of growth trends during the period leading up to the
signing of the CAADP compact, with a rate of 5%, as shown in the first column, the
rate of poverty by 2015 would have fallen by <10% points to 76%, still close to
25% above the 1990 level. Because the rate of growth under current trends is
already close to the CAADP target and projected to even decline slightly under
implementation of pre-CAADP strategies, the rate of poverty in Liberia is signif-
icantly higher than the 1990 level in all of these scenarios.
In Côte d’Ivoire, the rate of poverty rose by 50% from 32% in 1993 to 49% in
2008. The achievable reduction in poverty under the BAU scenario or the imple-
mentation of pre-CAADP strategies is <5% points for that country. Realization of
the CAADP growth targets would have merely brought poverty levels close to their
levels of the early 1990s. The increase in poverty during the 1990s was less
considerable for Benin. Poverty level estimates in that country rose from slightly
more than 25% in 1990 to 36% in 2006. Under the BAU scenario, poverty levels
would fall to 30% by 2015, corresponding to a decline of about 18% compared to
the 1990 level.
1.3 How Fast Should ECOWAS Countries Grow to Achieve
the Poverty MDG? How Much Would They Have
to Spend?
In order to achieve the goal of halving poverty by 2015, many countries would have
to reach double digit rates of growth in the agricultural sector: between around 12%
and 15% for Benin, Mali, The Gambia, Niger and Côte d’Ivoire, and as much as
26% for Liberia, as shown in the first column of Table 4. A history of civil war
explains the very serious situation in the latter country. These extremely high
growth rates indicate that it will be impossible for these countries to achieve the
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poverty reduction goal by 2015. Some could, however, do so by 2020, namely
Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Niger, although all would require growth rates of
around 9%, which by historical standards are still high (Table 3, second column).
For The Gambia and Liberia, the poverty MDG could not be achieved by 2020 but
could be reached by 2025, if they were to realize agricultural growth rates of nearly
9% and 15%, respectively. While it is true that post-conflict countries can some-
times grow rapidly during the recovery phase, whether Liberia would be able to
sustain such a high growth rate over a long time is questionable.
The extent of the challenge for many countries in achieving the poverty MDG or
the CAADP growth target is also illustrated by the required rise in public funding
for the agricultural sector. As shown in the third column of Table 4, the required
funding growth rate to achieve the poverty MDG by 2015 is prohibitively high for
most countries. The required annual rate of increase in public expenditure remains
still extremely high, even if the target date for achieving MDG1 is moved to 2020.
For six of the eleven countries for which estimates are available, funding for the





































Benin 13.1 9.1 22.8 13.9 7.9
Burkina Faso 7.1 5.9 11.6 9.0 9.1
Cape Verde – – – – 11.2
Gambia 14.4 8.6a 99.3 59.3a 19.6
Ghana – – – – 21.7
Guinea 10.3 7.5 33.5 26.5 12.3
Côte d’Ivoire 14.8 9.0 62.2 25.1 27.0
Liberia 26.1 14.6a 117.7 65.7a 27.0
Mali 12.5 8.1 45.8 13.7 8.2
Niger 11.9 9.0 25.1 18.2 26.5
Nigeria – 9.5a – 23.8a 4.7b
Senegal – 6.8c – 10.0c 7.6
Sierra Leone – – – – 10.0
Togo 9.6 6.9 74.2 43.1 35.4
Source: Model simulation results for ECOWAS countries
Notes: Not applicable as these countries are already on track under current trends to achieving the
poverty MDG by 2015 (Cape Verde and Ghana) or scenarios were otherwise not relevant or
feasible
aProjection years are 2017 for Nigeria and 2025 for The Gambia and Liberia
bFor Nigeria, this is the required agricultural spending growth rate to sustain current growth trends,
which at 5.7% is nearly identical to the CAADP target of 6%
cFor Senegal, the numbers shown correspond to the required agricultural growth rate and funding
growth rate to achieve the government’s objective of the reducing poverty rate to 17% by 2020
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agricultural sector would have to rise by around 20% or more annually. The
remaining countries would still have to expand funding for the sector by double
digit rates or close to that in the case of Burkina Faso. Realization of the MDG
poverty target by ECOWAS member countries is therefore not only a question of
physically achievable agricultural growth but also a question of financial resource
mobilization capacity.
The significance of the financial resources constraint is illustrated by the increase
in funding required for achieving the CAADP target of 6% growth through to 2015.
Although the increase in funding may be feasible for several of the countries, it is
still quite challenging and would nonetheless not be sufficient to allow any of the
countries to realize the poverty MDG, as can be seen from the last columns of
Tables 3 and 4. The only exception would be Burkina Faso. A look at current levels
of sectoral funding sheds light on the feasibility of the pace of funding increase that
is called for under the various scenarios. Figure 3 below presents the share of
agricultural sector funding for the various countries in the latest year for which the
information is available. Several countries such as Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria,
Sierra Leone and Togo are currently allocating the lowest share of country budgets
to agriculture. The scope of raising the level of agricultural funding should, a priori,
be greater in these countries. For instance, achieving the CAADP growth target by
2015 or MDG1 by 2020 in Benin or Mali would call for annual rates of growth in
agricultural funding of around 8% and 14%, respectively. Starting from agricultural
sector budget shares in the range of 9–10%, there may be some room to achieve
such increases in sectoral spending. The scope for expanding agricultural sector






















Fig. 3 Trends in pre-compact agricultural sector budget shares (%). Source: Based on agricultural
budget data survey across West Africa countries
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its budget on agriculture. The required rate of increase of 24% of sectoral funding to
achieve MDG1 by 2017 should be considered realistic and feasible.
The other challenge related to meeting the funding requirement of achieving the
CAADP growth and MDG poverty targets is reflected in the numbers in the last
column of Table 5. Out of 13 ECOWAS countries for which estimates are available,
only three show an elasticity of agricultural growth with respect to public expen-
diture that is above the African average of 0.31 estimated by Fan et al. (2008). For
many of these countries, therefore, achieving the CAADP growth target by 2015 or
MDG1 within the next 10 years would require both an increase in the level and in
the efficiency of agricultural sector funding. This is because these countries are
already spending relatively high shares of their budgets on agriculture and also have
historically recorded relatively lower levels of responsiveness of agricultural
growth to public sector spending. Other countries have very little room to raise
already very high shares of agricultural spending and thus would need to focus
primarily on raising the efficiency of funding to the sector. Burkina Faso, for
instance, would need to expand sectoral spending by <10% annually to meet the
CAADP growth target and realize MDG1 by 2020 (Table 3). However, the country
is already allocating more than 20% of its budget to agriculture (Table 5). On the
other hand, the elasticity of agricultural growth with respect to public funding in
that country is estimated at 0.24 or 20% below the average African estimate.
Gambia, Liberia, and Togo, on the other hand, are currently spending much less
on agriculture but require a significantly larger increase in agricultural spending
(above 20%) to meet either the CAADP growth target or MDG1 by 2020. The three
countries also have historically lower expenditure elasticities of growth compared
Table 5 Public expenditure allocation to agriculture and efficiency
Agricultural sector budget share at time




Burkina Faso 21.2 0.24










Sierra Leone 2.8 0.24
Togo 3.2 0.11
Source: Budget shares are from respective country CAADP Roundtable Brochures No. 4 (http://
www.resakss.org); elasticities are based on model simulation results for ECOWAS countries. The
average elasticity estimate for Africa by Fan et al. (2008) as a whole is 0.31
aCurrent refers to the latest year for which data is available at time of compact signing
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to the African average, with estimates of 0.15, 0.22, and 0.11, respectively. Niger
and Senegal are in a peculiar situation characterized by high sector spending shares
and above-average public expenditure elasticities of growth but still needing to
further increase sectoral funding, albeit moderately in the case of Senegal, to
achieve the CAADP growth and MDG1 poverty targets.
The CAADP target of allocating at least 10% of national budgets to agriculture
translates the conviction that achieving the growth target would require most
countries to significantly raise the level of funding allocated to the sector. The
figures in Table 5 show where individual ECOWAS member countries stand with
respect to the budget target. Although the average agricultural sector budget share
of 11% for ECOWAS as a whole is above the CAADP target, there is a wide
variation across countries with shares ranging from about 3% in Sierra Leone to
22% in Niger.
Five of the 13 countries for which data is available, namely Burkina, Mali,
Ghana, Niger and Senegal, have managed to allocate at least 10% of their budget to
agriculture. The first two have had historically high levels of agricultural funding,
which is primarily explained by heavy subsidies to the cotton sector. Senegal has
recently considerably expanded funding for agriculture under a variety of presi-
dential programs.
The funding levels do not only vary across counties, they have also been
unstable over time. More noticeably, they have trended downwards for most
countries during the decade and a half preceding the adoption of the CAADP
expenditure target. The declining trend has continued in Ghana, Nigeria and Mali
up until the time of compact signing, as shown by a comparison of shares in Table 5
and by considering the shares for the three countries at the end of the period shown
in Fig. 3. In contrast, Senegal, Burkina, and to a lesser extent Benin have raised
sector expenditures going into the CAADP roundtable and the signing of the
compact. On the other hand, Togo went from a stable and rising trend in expendi-
ture levels to a sharp drop by the time of the signing of the CAADP compact. The
change in trends in the latter country can be explained by the political crisis and
interruption of external funding for the sector for most of the 2000s. The continued
decline in sectoral funding in Côte d’Ivoire in the period leading up to the signing of
the compact can also be explained by the political crisis in that country and its
impact on local fiscal resources and domestic services delivery institutions.
The likelihood of countries expanding and sustaining levels of agricultural
sector funding is not only a function of political will but also of domestic fiscal
capacities. Figure 4 presents domestic resources as a share of total agricultural
spending. In most countries, the domestic share represents 60% or less of total
agricultural sectoral spending over the nearly 20 year period covered by the data.
In order to achieve the CAADP budget target by relying only on domestic
sources, most countries would have to nearly double their current share of domestic
resources in total agricultural spending. The mobilization of external funding will
therefore be a critical component of CAADP implementation among ECOWAS
countries. This is particularly so for Niger and Burkina, which already allocate a
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significant share of overall funding to agriculture but rely on external sources for
80% or more of the funding for agriculture.
In addition to the level and efficiency of funding, the degree of actual budget
execution has historically been the third dimension of the problem of effective
financing of agricultural growth among African countries. As shown in Fig. 5, the
average rate of disbursement of agricultural budgets is distinctly lower than the rate
of overall budget execution, which for most countries is in the 80% range or lower.
The exceptions are Burkina and Senegal, which show higher execution rates for
agriculture, although it is to be noted that Burkina exhibits an extremely low rate of
overall budget execution of <50%. High performers in terms of agricultural budget
disbursement include Senegal, Nigeria and Ghana with execution rates exceeding
90%; lagging behind are Burkina, Côte d’Ivoire, and Togo. The key message from
Fig. 5 is that efforts to increase agricultural funding under CAADP will have to
address the constraints to effective budget execution, which appears to be a general
problem and not specific to the agricultural sector.
1.4 How Consistent Are Agricultural Investment Priorities
and Related Growth and Poverty Outcomes Among
ECOWAS Countries?
The National Agricultural Investment Plans (NAIPs) are the next step in the
CAADP implementation process after the agreement around key policy, budgetary,
and partnership priorities during the roundtable. They define specific sub-sector

































Fig. 4 Share of internal resources in agricultural spending (%). Source: Based on agricultural
budget data survey across West Africa countries
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that cut across individual countries are presented in Fig. 6. They cover the follow-
ing: value chain development; food and other emergency crises and disaster
management; research and development, including seeds systems; improved
water and other resources management; as well as capacity building for successful
implementation. The horizontal bars denote the percentage share of each of these
sectors in the overall investment budgets of individual countries. The difference
across countries reflects the diverging priorities accorded to individual investment





























Fig. 5 Agricultural and overall budget disbursement rates (%; latest year). Source: Based on
ReSAKSS survey of agricultural budget data across West Africa countries
IFPRI/Badiane
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Fig. 6 Common priority areas in country investment plans. Source: Authors using information
from various agriculture investment plans
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advances in specific areas by different countries, it is interesting to note the wide
variations between countries. The overall level of planned investments is shown in
the second column of Table 6. It is in the one billion US$ range for most countries,
and double that amount or more for four countries. It is highest for Ghana and
Nigeria, where planned investment levels exceed the US$5 billion mark. The
smallest countries, Cape Verde and Gambia, have, as expected, the smallest levels
of planned investments. In addition to defining priority investment areas and
investment levels, country investment plans in many cases also specify a given
rate of agricultural growth to be achieved. In others, they specify specific invest-
ment outcomes such as total areas of land under irrigation or specific crop yields
that can be converted to corresponding changes in overall output and translated into
sector growth rates.
Ideally, the design of the investment plans should be guided by the results from
the analysis of alternative growth and poverty reduction options. The speed of
planning and implementation was so high that the growth analysis and planning
activities have overlapped, leading to an iterative rather than sequential process in
integrating the two sets of activities. In all countries, however, a key step is a
consistency analysis that takes place after the first version of the investment plan is
completed. The consistency analysis assesses the extent to which investment levels
as well as growth and poverty reduction outcomes that are being pursued in
individual country investment plans are in line with the alternative long term
growth, poverty reduction, and funding requirement scenarios, as well as historical
expenditure levels discussed in the previous sections. In carrying out the analysis,
proposed investment activities and related crop yields and/or target subsectoral
growth rates are fed into the country CGE models to simulate the overall rate of
agricultural growth and reduction in poverty levels that would result from individ-
ual country NAIPs. The results are then contrasted with the outcomes from the
alternative long term scenarios. The comparisons can be as detailed as looking at
differences in subsector growth rates and poverty outcomes among targeted geo-
graphic areas or demographic groups.3
For the current paper, we are considering consistency between target outcomes
under investment plans and long term scenarios at the sectoral or national level. The
results are summarized in Table 6 and Fig. 6. The Table compares the sectoral
growth targets and associated expenditure levels under individual investment plans
(first and second columns) with those of the closest long term growth scenario (third
and fourth columns). The comparison suggests that in some cases there are signif-
icant discrepancies between proposed investment levels and simulated funding
requirements for similar rates of growth. As shown by the ratios in the last column,
the discrepancies are observed in both directions. For countries such as The
Gambia, Mali, Nigeria, and Benin, the investment plans appear to be significantly
underfunded in order to deliver the expected growth outcome. In contrast,
suggested funding levels for the investment plans appear considerably higher than
3See IFPRI Discussion Paper No. 1019 by Badiane et al. (2010)
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required to meet the growth targets in the case of Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea,
and to a lesser extent for Cape Verde, Ghana, and Senegal. Only for Togo and Niger
do the suggested funding levels appear to be consistent with projected long term
growth outcomes.
The consistency analysis also assesses the degree of realism of pursued poverty
reduction outcomes. It does so by comparing targeted poverty reduction levels
under the investment plans with projected outcomes under continuation of
pre-CAADP trends or business as usual (BAU). The results are plotted in Fig. 7.
Benin, Nigeria, and Guinea exhibit the largest potential improvement from suc-
cessful implementation of country investment plans. The first two however appear
to have underfunded their investment plans and are thus less likely to achieve the
expected poverty reduction outcome. Gambia and Mali are other countries with
underfunded NAIPs, which may not achieve the expected improvement in poverty
outcomes. Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Ghana, and Senegal all have seemingly
overfunded NAIPs and should be in a position to realize the expected decline in
poverty levels at a lower cost than budgeted under the current investment plans.



















[1] [2] [3] [4] [2]/[4]
Benin 14.3 884.1 14.3 1276.2 0.69
Cape Verde 6.9 96.4 6.0 51.6 1.87
Gambia 8.0 296.6 8.6 1065.8 0.28
Ghana 5.2 5479.5 6.9 3082.2 1.78
Guinea 10.3 1601.2 10.3 222.0 7.21
Liberia 9.9 947.7 9.4 149.5 6.34
Mali 8.8 727.2 8.5 5376.4 0.14
Niger 7.4 2457.0 6.4 2233.4 1.1
Nigeria 21.0 7535.4 9.5 28563.1 0.26
Senegal 9.7 2727.5 6.8 1771.1 1.54
Sierra Leone 7.0 388.0 7.1 100.6 3.86
Togo 6.8 947.2 6.7 989.3 0.96
Source: Respective country investment plans and CAADP Roundtable Brochures No 4 (http://
www.resakss.org)
Note: The comparable growth scenarios for the different countries are summarized below: Benin
(PSRSA), Cape Verde (ECOWAP/PDDAA), Gambia (MDG1 by 2025), Ghana [MIC (reaching
Middle Income Country status by 2015)], Guinea (MDG1 by 2015), Liberia (MDG1 by 2025), Mali
[SDDR (Schéma Directeur de Développement Rural)], Niger [SDR (Stratégie de Développement
Rural)], Nigeria (Agricultural TFP growth driven by agricultural expenditure only), Senegal
(Government’s objective to reduce poverty rate to 17% by 2020), Sierra Leone [MDG1-2015
(while keeping non-agricultural sectors growing at current rates)], Togo (MDG1 by 2020)
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2 Conclusion
Overall, there were no data to evaluate post-compact food security trends. It is vital
that necessary arrangements are made to regularly update the baseline household
survey information so as to facilitate tracking of poverty, food security and distri-
butional impacts of the investment plans.
To ensure high return, investment commitments under the NAIPs must be
supported by strong governance and monitored in a timely and transparent fashion.
Therefore, it should be of high priority that countries improve policymaking by
adopting an evidence-based approach. Such an approach should include review and
dialogue mechanisms and knowledge support systems to facilitate benchmarking,
mutual learning, and capacity strengthening, which would improve agricultural
policy, program design, and implementation. The data available and the knowledge
flow observed in the course of CAADP implementation suggests an urgent need to
undertake institutional mapping of all actors involved in the policymaking process
in the agricultural sector. This analysis should include data collection/gathering,
policy analysis, and drafting of policy notes or policy dialogues. There is also a
need for a full-fledged monitoring and evaluation framework for the agricultural
sector with clear individual and institutional responsibilities. Such an M&E frame-
work would need to include (i) data processing and policy analysis; (ii) policy
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Fig. 7 Decline in poverty rates by 2015 under investment plans compared to pre-compact pro-
jections under BAU (%). Source: Authors’ model simulation results for ECOWAS countries
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ANNEX
Description of the Model Used to Simulate Long Term Growth
and Poverty Reduction Outcomes
Model Specification and Calibration Data
We used a Dynamic single-country Computable General Equilibrium (DCGE)
model for individual ECOWAS member countries for which a Social Accounting
Matrix (SAM) was available.4 The model is a recursive dynamic version of the
standard IFPRI Lofgren-Harris-Robinson CGE model coupled with a micro-
simulation module.5 Annex provides a mathematical description of the model
specifications. It is designed as a set of simultaneous linear and non-linear equations
that represent the first order conditions of the profit and utility maximization
behaviors of national economic agents, along with key macroeconomic constraints
within a period. The model also specifies the process through which the values of
some selected exogenous variables are updated to account for changes in popula-
tion, labor and land supplies, capital accumulation, total factor productivity and
government expenditures between successive periods. This kind of model is appro-
priate for the analysis of the impacts of alternative policy options on agricultural
growth and poverty reduction outcomes as it explicitly takes into account the
interactions between disaggregated agricultural and non-agricultural sectors and
between the national economy and the rest of world while allowing to follow the
distribution of income among factors and among households and other institutions.
In each activity of the national economy, production is carried out following a
nested technology in which value-added quantity is a Constant Elasticity of Sub-
stitution (CES) function of primary factors, while aggregate intermediate input
quantity is a Leontief function of specific intermediate inputs from different sectors,
and overall activity output is a Leontief function of value-added and aggregate
intermediate input quantities. Primary factors, including land, labor and capital, are
fully employed within a period. Land and labor are mobile across activities while
capital is activity-specific. Household groups receive income from factor remuner-
ation proportionally to their shares of factor endowment. In addition, they may
receive transfers from other household groups, the government and the rest of the
world. They spend their income on direct taxes, transfers, and savings and for the
consumption of different commodities according to Linear Expenditure System
(LES) demand functions, which are derived from maximizing a Stone-Geary utility
function. The model uses a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function to
allocate domestic outputs between domestic sales and exports in shares that reflect
the ratio of prices in domestic and foreign markets. Armington aggregation of
4For The Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Liberia and Sierra Leone for which a SAM was not available, a
simplified model was used, instead of the CGE model.
5See L€ofgren et al. (2002) for a detailed description of the static model version and L€ofgren (2001)
and Thurlow (2004) for dynamic applications of the model.
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imports and domestic sales of domestic output determines the composite market
supply that should meet the sum of demands for private consumption, government
consumption, intermediate input, and investment. Government consumption
demands of different commodities are exogenous while government savings adjusts
to ensure the equality between government expenditures and revenues. Investment
is savings-driven, with fixed marginal propensities to save, a fixed current account
deficit and a flexible exchange rate.
The data used to calibrate the DCGE model for individual countries are largely
derived from their respective SAMs using an income elasticity of 1.0 for household
consumption demand and CES and CET elasticities as summarized in Table 7. As
mentioned above, the model’s dynamics are recursive, in the sense that the model is
run as a repetitive static model while updating some exogenous variables between
successive periods such as to replicate the economy’s observed long term growth
patterns. The rate of changes in population, land use, yields and government
expenditures are projected from the series of data available on national accounts
and agricultural statistical databases over the last decades. These rates are used to
update some exogenous variables, including the LES supernumerary income, land
and labor stocks, total factor productivity, and government consumption of the
different commodities. In each period, the capital accumulation rate is endoge-
nously determined from investment made during a preceding period and new
capital is distributed between sectors proportionally to sectoral capital returns,
taking into account a depreciation rate of 0.1.
This core DCGE model is linked to the microsimulation module in a top-down
relationships (i.e., without feedback effects) through a transmission of changes in
per capita household expenditures to the country’s household survey data, where
standard poverty and inequality measures are re-calculated given a defined
poverty line.
Mathematical Model Description
The Tables 8 and 9 below describe the DCGE model utilized for the analysis of
growth and poverty reduction scenarios for individual ECOWAS member coun-
tries. A comprehensive description of model specifications and closures is provided
in L€ofgren et al. (2002), L€ofgren (2001) and Thurlow (2004).
Table 7 Values of CES and CET elasticities
Substitution between
capital, labor and land
Substitution between
imports and domestic sales
Transformation into
exports and domestic sales
Agriculture 0.61 1.5 5.0
Industry 0.70 4.0 3.0
Services 0.80 2.5 1.2
Source: Based on elasticity estimates found in a broad literature review across developing
countries by Annabi et al. (2006)
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Table 9 Model equations
Production and price equations




PQc  icaca (2)
QVAa ¼ α vaa 
P
f2F





Wf WFDIST fa ¼ PVAa  1 tvaað Þ  QVAa
X
f2F0







 δ vaf a  α vaff a  QFfa
 ρ vaa 1
(4)
QVAa¼ ivaa QAa (5)
QINTAa¼ intaa QAa (6)
PAa  (1 taa) QAa¼PVAa QVAa + PINTAa QINTAa (7)




PXACac  θac (9)







ρ acc 1 (10)













PERcr ¼ pwercr  EXR
P
c02CT
PQc  icerc0cr (12)
QEc ¼ α ec 
P
r2R











δ ecr0  QERcr0ð Þ  ρ ec
 1
 δ ecr  QERcrð Þρ
e
c 1 (14)
PEc ¼ pwec  EXR
P
c02CT
PQc  icec0c (15)
QXc ¼ α tc  δ tc  QEρ
t
c
c þ 1 δ tc












PXc QXc¼PDSc QDc + PEc QEc (19)
PDDc ¼ PDSc þ
P
c02CT
PQc0  icdc0c (20)
PMRcr ¼ pwmrcr  1þ tmrcrð Þ  EXR 
P
c02CT
PQc  icmrc0cr (21)
QMc ¼ αmc 
P
r2R



















PMc ¼ pwmc  1þ tmcð Þ  EXR þ
P
c02CT
PQc0  icmc0c (24)
QQc ¼ αqc  δqc  QMρ
q
c
c þ 1 δqc
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Table 9 (continued)
Production and price equations




icmcc0  QMc0 þ icmrcc0  QMRc0 þ icecc0  QEc0 þ icercc0  QERc0 þ icdcc0  QDc0ð Þ (29)
CPI ¼ P
c2C
PQc  cwtsc (30)
DPI ¼ P
c2C
PDSc  dwtsc (31)




WFf WFDIST fa  QFfa (32)








TRIIii0 þ trnsfri gov  CPI þ trnsfri row  EXR (34)
TRIIii0¼ shiiii0  1MPSi0ð Þ  1 tinsi0






 1MPShð Þ  1 tinsh
   YIh (36)






QINVc ¼ IADJ  qinvc (38)
QGc ¼ GADJ  qgc (39)
EG ¼ P
c2C
PQc  QGc þ
P
i2 INSDNG




tinsi  YIi þ
X
a2A
taa  PAa  QAa þ
X
c2CMNR





tmrcr pwmrcr  QMRcr  EXRþ
X
c2C
tqc  PQc  QQc þ
X
f2F
YFgov f þ trnsfrgov row  EXR
(41)







QHch þ QGc þ QINVc þ qdstc þ QTc (42)
P
a2A
QFfa ¼ QFSf (43)
QFSf =
QFS
f 0 ¼ RWFf =
RWF


























pwercr  QERcr þ
X
i2INSD




MPSi  1 tinsi
   YIi þ GSAV þ EXR  FSAV ¼
P
c2C
PQc  QINVc þ
P
c2C
PQc  qdstc (48)
MPSi ¼ mpsi  1þMPSADJð Þ (49)


































ΔKaf a t ¼ η af a t 
P
c
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Macro-economic Models: How to Spend
Uganda’s Expected Oil Revenues? A CGE
Analysis of the Agricultural and Poverty
Impacts of Spending Options
Manfred Wiebelt, Karl Pauw, John Mary Matovu, Everist Twimukye,
and Todd Benson
1 Introduction
With the recent discovery of crude oil reserves along the Albertine Rift, Uganda is
set to establish itself as an oil producer in the coming decade. Total oil reserves are
believed to be two billion barrels, with recoverable reserves estimated at 0.8–1.2
billion barrels. This is comparable to the level of oil reserves in African countries
such as Chad (0.9 billion barrels), Republic of the Congo (1.9 billion barrels), and
Equatorial Guinea (1.7 billion barrels) but far short of Angola (13.5 billion) and
Nigeria (36.2 billion) (World Bank 2010). Using a conservative reserve scenario of
800 million barrels, peak production, likely to be reached by 2017, is estimated by
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(DFID) of the Government of the United Kingdom through their support to the International
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improvement.
M. Wiebelt (*)
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany
e-mail: Manfred.wiebelt@ifw-kiel.de
K. Pauw
Food and Agriculture Organization, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
J.M. Matovu
Research for Transformation and Development, Kampala, Uganda
E. Twimukye
Economic Policy Research Centre, Kampala, Uganda
T. Benson
International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC, USA
© The Author(s) 2018
C. Henning et al. (eds.), Development Policies and Policy Processes in Africa,
Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-60714-6_3
49
the World Bank to range from 120,000 to 140,000 barrels per day, with a production
period spanning 30 years. A more optimistic scenario in this study is based on 1.2
billion barrels and sets peak production at 210,000 barrels per day (see Wiebelt
et al. 2011). Although final stipulations of the revenue sharing agreements with oil
producers are not yet known, government revenue from oil will be substantial. One
estimate, based on an average oil price of US$75 per barrel, puts revenues at
approximately 10–15% of GDP at peak production (World Bank 2010). The
discovery of crude oil therefore has the potential to provide significant stimulus
to the Ugandan economy and to enable it to better address its development
objectives, provided oil revenues are managed in an appropriate manner.
If the experience of other resource-abundant countries is anything to go by, the
prospects are alarming. Cross-country evidence suggests that resource-abundant
countries lag behind comparable countries in terms of real GDP growth (Sachs and
Warner 1995, 2001; Gelb 1988; IMF 2003); that the negative relationship between
resource abundance and economic growth is stronger for oil, minerals, and other
point-source resources than for agriculture; and that this relationship is remarkably
robust (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003; Stevens 2003). Nonetheless, several
countries have managed to avoid this so-called resource curse. Indonesia’s economy
grew by an average of 4% per year during 1965–1990, while oil and gas exports rose
quickly in the 1970s, reaching 50% of exports in the early 1980s (Bevan et al. 1999).
Botswana achieved double-digit growth in the 1970s and 1980s despite rapidly
growing diamond exports since the 1970s, and this development occurred despite
the enclave character of the mineral industry (that is, low backward and forward
linkages to other sectors) (Acemoglu et al. 2003). Other resource-rich countries, such
as Malaysia, Australia, and Norway, have successfully diversified their production
structures, laying the ground for broad-based balanced growth.
The anxiety about the effects of resource booms partly reflects reservations about
the absorptive and managerial capacity of public sectors—particularly in developing
countries—to manage large-scale investment programs or to rapidly step up service
delivery without a loss in quality. In part, it also reflects even deeper reservations about
resource dependency and the impact of windfall profits on the domestic political
economy (Ross 2001; Leite and Weidmann 1999; Easterly 2001). However, more
traditional concerns about the macroeconomics of resource booms also figure large,
and these are the focus in this study. Dominating these concerns is the fear that the
additional foreign exchange arising from the exploitation and exportation of natural
resources may cause an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Although a strong
domestic currency is good news for importers, Rodrik (2003) warns of the danger an
uncompetitive real exchange rate holds for overall economic growth and development.
The subsequent loss of competitiveness in the nonresource tradable goods sectors—or
Dutch Disease—may hamper growth in traditional export sectors such as manufactur-
ing or agriculture. These sectors are often major employers in developing countries
and serve as the engines of growth. Of course, exportation of natural resources does
not inevitably have negative consequences for the economy; for example, if the
resource flow emanating from the newly exploited natural resource is small relative
to overall trade flows, or there are underemployed factors of production that can be
used in the expanding natural resource exploitation sectors with little opportunity cost,
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or both, an expansion in natural resource exports will not necessarily lead to Dutch
Disease (see Hausmann and Rigobon 2002; Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian 2003).
This study considers the impact of crude oil extraction and exportation on the
Ugandan economy with a specific focus on how it might affect the agricultural sector.
We also consider various options open to the Ugandan government for saving,
spending, or investing forecasted oil revenues over the coming three decades. For
this analysis we modify a recursive-dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE)
model of Uganda by including crude oil extraction and refining industries. These
industries are allowed to grow and shrink over time in line with the forecasted oil
production trend, while oil revenues accruing to government are either saved abroad in
an oil fund (this sterilizes the exchange rate effect) or spent domestically. Several
spending scenarios consider the effects of using the balance of oil funds (that is, after
deducting amounts saved) to develop public infrastructure. Here we consider scenarios
where infrastructure investments only contribute to long-term growth through raising
productive capacity, or where they also have productivity spillover effects in targeted
sectors (for example, in agricultural or nonagricultural sectors specifically). Scenarios
where oil revenues are distributed to citizens in the form of household welfare transfers
or used to subsidize prices (for example, fuel subsidies) are also modeled.
The contribution is structured as follows. We first provide an overview on
spending options. Particular attention is given to infrastructural investments and
their effects in developing countries. Next, we introduce the CGE model and
describes the simulation setup and design, then present and discuss the model
results. Last, we draw conclusions.
2 Investing Oil Revenues: Options and Challenges
For the past two decades Uganda has managed its public finances and the macro
economy in a prudent manner, yet the prospect of a large influx of oil revenue
presents a major challenge to government. Even though Uganda’s oil reserves are
not massive compared to those of the major oil producers of the world, the expected
revenue is still substantial relative to the current size of the economy.
There are at least three dimensions to the oil revenue spending challenge that lies
ahead: First, there is the issue of how to manage oil price volatility. Volatile prices
imply volatile revenue flows from one year to the next, which makes long-term
planning difficult. Second, while increased administrative capacity will be required
to manage a much larger infrastructural and social spending budget, the danger exists
that government becomes too large and undisciplined in its spending. If service
delivery becomes inefficient and administrative expenditures (for example, on sala-
ries) grow too much there will ultimately be less funding available for all-important
infrastructural spending. Third, infrastructural spending itself may be inefficient due
to a lack of administrative or absorptive capacity within government. While spending
will contribute to GDP in the current period, thus creating the perception of growth, it
may not translate into increased production capacity and higher levels of productivity
in future periods, which ultimately hampers the sustainability of oil revenue spending.
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2.1 Revenue Stabilization Options
One way to deal with revenue volatility and concerns about spending inefficiency is
to transfer oil revenues into a foreign “oil fund” from which a smaller or a more
stable revenue flow is extracted. The first option is to set up a budget stabilization
fund (SF), which involves allocating a certain share of government oil revenues to a
fund that can be tapped when low oil prices cause revenues to drop below projected
flows. Examples include the SF of the Russian Federation or the State Oil Fund in
Azerbaijan. When using an SF government may still plan to spend all oil revenues
during the oil extraction period, in which case the SF is only used to smooth the
revenue flow as it deviates from projected revenues. However, such a fund could
also be used to extend the spending period beyond the oil extraction period by saving
a greater share of annual revenue and continuing to draw on accrued savings that
remain at the end of the oil extraction period. A second option is a permanent income
fund (PIF) or heritage fund. Here all revenue from oil is transferred to the fund and
only the interest earned on accumulated funds is allocated to the government budget.
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund and the Kuwaiti Future Generations
Fund are good examples of such PIFs. A PIF provides a much smaller flow of
revenue compared to the default option of spending all revenues immediately, but
the income stream is perpetual, thus having the potential of benefiting future
generations. The revenue stream is also likely to be fairly stable or predictable,
especially when long-term fixed interest rates are earned on the accumulated funds.
Although the development challenges loom large in Uganda, a prudent spending
approach is desirable. This means not succumbing to the temptation of spending too
much too soon. Proponents of a spend-all approach may appeal more to the masses,
with arguments that the country cannot afford to hoard revenue amidst crumbling
infrastructure and developmental backlogs. However, ideally speaking, spending
levels should only gradually increase in line with the pace at which government
capacity grows. Uganda has taken advice of this nature on board in announcing that
an oil fund will indeed be set up and managed by the Central Bank (see Uganda,
Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development 2008). The way in which the fund is
managed (that is, how funds are deposited or withdrawn over time) should be
explicitly governed by the legal and regulatory framework for oil revenue. Such a
framework, combined with a gradually enhanced institutional capacity, should
cushion the country from pressure from those who would want to see quick but
unsustainable gains from oil.
2.2 Investment Spending Options
2.2.1 Investment for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction
The pace at which public infrastructure is developed is an important determinant of
the development process. Numerous studies highlight the importance of the stock of
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public infrastructure as one necessary ingredient for agricultural productivity
growth (Binswanger et al. 1993; Ram 1996; Esfahani and Ramirez 2002). Hulten
(1996) argues it is not only the level of public investment that matters, but also the
spending efficiency and the effectiveness with which existing capital stocks are
used by citizens (see also Calderón and Servén 2005, 2008; Reinikka and Svensson
2002). Microeconomic studies tend to focus more on the latter aspect, and show that
improved access to public infrastructure positively influences the adoption of
productivity-enhancing technologies by farm households or firms (Antle 1984;
Ahmed and Hossain 1990; Renkow et al. 2004). Access to and utilization of public
infrastructure also has important welfare effects, including the reduction of rural
poverty (Fan et al. 2000; Fan and Zhang 2008; Gibson and Rozelle 2003) and rural
inequality (Calderón and Servén 2005; Fan et al. 2003). The strength of these
welfare effects, however, depends on the institutional setup in countries (Duflo
and Pande 2007), while strong complementarities exist between physical and
human capital (Canning and Bennathan 1999). The latter suggests that investments
in education, training, or rural extension services would enhance the effectiveness
of infrastructural investments.
The overwhelming message is that infrastructural investments matter for devel-
opment, especially when measures are in place to improve access to that infrastruc-
ture. However, it is less clear precisely where to invest in order to maximize growth
and poverty outcomes. The agricultural sector stands out as a strong candidate.
Agriculture is an important sector in many developing countries in terms of its share
of national GDP and employment. Agricultural growth is therefore particularly
important in determining the pace of poverty reduction (Diao et al. 2010; Valdés
and Foster 2010). In Uganda the agricultural sector is relatively small, contributing
less than one-third to national GDP. However, it remains a significant employer,
with 81% of the population living in households that are directly involved in
agricultural activities (see Benin et al. 2008). Farming is by no means exclusively
a rural activity in Uganda (27.8% of urban households are engaged in agricultural
activities), but it is clear from population statistics that a focus on rural agriculture is
warranted: 9 in 10 farm households live in rural areas, and one in three rural
inhabitants are poor, compared to 13.8% of urban people. This implies that growth
in the agricultural sector has the potential to significantly reduce poverty in Uganda.
Weak historical agricultural growth, low agricultural yields, and poor infrastructure
in Uganda all point to the great potential for this sector to grow rapidly should
significant public investments, particularly in infrastructure, reach this sector.
Using a recursive-dynamic CGE model, Benin et al. (2008) are able to demon-
strate how rapid agricultural growth achieved through yield improvements under
the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) in
Uganda contributes to overall growth and poverty reduction. CAADP aims to
achieve 6% agricultural growth by committing countries to allocate 10% of their
overall budgets to the agricultural sector in the form of infrastructure investments,
research and development, and extension services. In Uganda the 6% growth target
implies a doubling of the agricultural growth rate, which, historically, has remained
at just below 3%. Benin et al. (2008) show that if agricultural growth is maintained
at 6% over the period 2005–2015, the national GDP growth rate in Uganda will
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increase by 1% point (that is, from 5.1 to 6.1%). Agricultural growth also has
spillover effects into the rest of the economy, with agroprocessing or food-
processing and trade and transport sectors benefiting from more rapid growth.
More importantly, however, are the poverty-reducing effects of rapid agricultural
growth. Benin et al. (2008) show that under an accelerated agricultural growth path
the poverty rate in 2015 will be 7.6% points lower than the forecasted level under
the business as usual growth path. This is equivalent to an additional 2.9 million
people being lifted out of poverty by 2015.
Benin et al. (2008) extend their analysis to focus on specific agricultural sub-
sectors’ effectiveness at reducing poverty and generating growth through size and
economic linkage effects. In this regard they find that horticultural crops, root
crops, livestock, and cereals have the greatest poverty-reducing potential in
Uganda. This is due both to the crop choices of resource-poor farmers and to the
preferences of poor consumers (increased productivity lowers farmers’ unit pro-
duction costs and benefits consumers via price reductions). Given their initial size,
growth potential, and economic linkages, growth in subsectors such as roots,
matooke (cooking banana), pulses and oilseeds, and export crops contribute most
to overall growth.
Using a similar methodology, Dorosh and Thurlow (2009) focus more closely on
the relative impacts of rural versus urban public investments in Uganda. In general,
they find that improving agricultural productivity generates more broad-based wel-
fare improvements in both rural and urban areas than investing in the capital city,
Kampala. Although investing in Kampala accelerates economic growth, it has little
effect on other regions’ welfare because of the city’s weak regional growth linkages
and small migration effects. In a study in Peru, Thurlow et al. (2008) find that by
investing in the leading (more urbanized) region, that country may be undermining
the economy in the lagging (mostly rural) region by increasing import competition
and internal migration. The authors also show that the divergence between the
leading and lagging regions can only be bridged by investing in the lagging region’s
productivity through providing extension services and improved rural roads.
This brief overview suggests that public investments in rural areas and agricul-
ture should be a critical part of the development strategy in Uganda if the country is
to achieve its goals of reducing (rural) poverty and narrowing the welfare gap
between urban and rural areas. Studies cited show that investments in cities or
major urban centers such as Kampala, although good for growth there, may in fact
be harmful or at best neutral for growth or welfare in rural areas. Either way, such
investments will lead to rising rural–urban inequality, which is an undesirable
socioeconomic outcome. The challenge is to be strategic about how and where to
invest so that productivity gains in priority sectors or subsectors are maximized.
Certain types of investments have obvious impacts; for example, investments in
rural roads, irrigation infrastructure, or water storage will benefit agriculture, and
depending on the exact location (or agronomic zone) of those investments, specific
subsectors within agriculture. For other types of investments, such as telecommu-
nications, it is likely that urban-based manufacturing sectors would benefit more,
but there may still be intended or unintended productivity spillovers into other
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sectors. It is also important to realize that there may be a lag from the time the
investment in agriculture is made until productivity spillovers materialize and rural
poverty declines. The immediate beneficiaries of increased agricultural investment
spending are more likely to be those nonpoor workers supplying investment
services or producing investment goods rather than poor farming households
themselves.
2.2.2 Transferring Rents to Citizens
The massive infrastructural spending backlogs in Uganda mean much of the policy
discussion around spending of oil revenue has and will continue to focus on public
investments. However, infrastructural spending is not the only option open to
government. Some argue that oil revenues should be spent on the provisioning of
social protection: Since citizens in effect own the oil resource, the most appropriate
approach is to transfer revenues back to them. Social protection can be broadly
defined. Benefits transferred to citizens can be in the form of tax breaks (for
example, income or consumption tax cuts); subsidies (for example, direct price
subsidies, employment subsidies, or investment subsidies); job creation schemes; or
direct transfers (Gelb and Grasmann 2010). Not all these transfer mechanisms
necessarily involve a direct transfer from government to households; some work
indirectly via employment or consumption.
Gelb and Grasmann (2010, 12–16) briefly review the merits of and justification
for each of these benefits while Gelb and Majerowicz (2011) consider the strengths
and limitations of cash transfers in Uganda. A lower tax burden, they explain, might
reduce the deadweight costs of taxation, provided the quality of tax administration
does not decline at the same time. Lower taxes, in general, will encourage economic
activity, thus compensating export sectors in particular for the adverse effect of a
stronger exchange rate. Domestic price subsidies are popular for obvious reasons. A
common type of subsidy in oil-producing economies is one on petroleum products;
in fact, in many countries petroleum prices are kept far below market levels at a
subsidy cost equivalent to “several percentage points of GDP” (Gelb and Grasmann
2010, 13). An approach that is used “more widely in the Middle East than else-
where” (Gelb and Grasmann 2010, 14) is public-sector job creation. One estimate
suggests that around 80% of jobs in Gulf are in the public sector (for example, in
Kuwait, employment for nationals is virtually guaranteed).
Very few countries have considered the use of oil revenues to finance direct
welfare transfers. However, there is increasing interest in distribution mechanisms
such as those pioneered in Alaska “as the shortcomings of other approaches become
more apparent” (Gelb and Grasmann 2010, 14). Cash transfers or grants have two
primary functions: They reduce short-term poverty and inequality, and they provide
safety nets that enable households to manage risk (Pauw and Mncube 2007). There
are several design options. First, grants can be targeted or universal. Targeted grants
are more costly to administer, but targeting improves efficiency in terms of reduc-
tions in poverty and inequality. Under a universal grant scheme all citizens have
Macro-economic Models: How to Spend Uganda’s Expected Oil. . . 55
access to a grant, irrespective of their socioeconomic status. Second, grants can be
conditional or unconditional. Conditional grants, as the name suggests, are only
accessible by households that comply with certain provisions, such as attending
school or visiting health clinics.
The successes of conditional programs such as Bolsa Familia in Brazil and
Opportunidades in Mexico have been widely reported (see, for example, Adato
and Hoddinott 2010). However, just like targeting, conditionality increases the
administrative burden of these programs, both for administrators who need to
determine eligibility of prospective participants and for health and education
service providers who need to deal with the mandatory increase in demand for
these services. For this reason conditionality may not always be a good idea,
especially in countries where administrative capacity is low or where social service
delivery is weak (Pauw and Mncube 2007). The alternative (that is, a nontargeted
unconditional grant scheme) is costly, but the large influx of oil revenues in Uganda
puts the country in a position where it can probably afford such a basic income
grant. Although a uniformly distributed grant will not improve inequality, it will
reduce poverty, while at the same time policymakers can avoid sensitivities that
may arise when oil revenues—seen by all as a national resource—are unequally
distributed.
3 CGE Model Simulation Setup
3.1 The Ugandan Recursive-Dynamic CGE Model
This study applies a single-country recursive-dynamic CGE for Uganda (also used
by Benin et al. 2008) to investigate the effects of oil production and to consider
alternative options for spending oil revenue. This modeling tool is useful as it
captures the important direct and indirect effects associated with oil production and
the spending of oil revenues. In a similar study to this one, Breisinger et al. (2009)
also use a CGE model to examine the potential trade-offs between spending and
saving of oil revenues in Ghana. The CGE model is a member of the class of single
country neoclassical CGE models first developed by Dervis et al. (1982) and
features endogenous prices, market clearing, and imperfect substitution between
domestic and foreign goods. Below we highlight some of the key features of the
Ugandan model. A detailed model description and equation listing can be found in
Thurlow (2004).
3.1.1 Private Production and Consumption
Producers and consumers in the model are assumed to enjoy no market power in
world markets, so the terms of trade are independent of domestic policy choices.
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Firms in each of the 52 economic sectors (or activities) are assumed to be perfectly
competitive, producing a single good that can be sold to either the domestic or the
export market. Production in each sector i is determined by a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) production function of the form.
Qi ¼ Ai Σf δfiFfiρi
 1=ρi
, ð1Þ
where f is a set of factors consisting of land, cattle, capital, and different labor
categories; Qi is the sectoral activity level; Ai the sectoral total factor productivity;
Ffi the quantity of factor f demanded from sector i; and δfi and ρfi are the distribu-
tional and elasticity parameters of the CES production function, respectively. Only
agricultural crop production requires land. Sectoral supply growth of land is fixed.
Sector capital endowments are fixed in each period but evolve over time through
depreciation and investment. Capital and labor markets are competitive so that
these factors are employed in each sector up to the point that they are paid the value
of their marginal product. Private-sector output is also determined by the level of
infrastructure, which is provided costless by the government. We assume that total
sector factor productivity Ai depends on the availability of public infrastructure.
Consumption for each household type is defined by a constant elasticity of
substitution linear expenditure system, which allows for the income elasticity of
demand for different goods to deviate from unity. The CGE model endogenously
estimates the impact of alternative growth paths on the incomes of various house-
hold groups. These household groups include farm and nonfarm households and are
disaggregated across rural areas, the major city of Kampala, and other smaller urban
centers. Each of the households questioned in the 2005/06 Uganda National House-
hold Survey (UNHS5) are linked directly to their corresponding representative
household in the CGE model. This is the microsimulation component of the
Ugandan model. Changes in representative households’ consumption and prices
in the CGE model are passed down to the corresponding households in the survey,
where standard poverty measures and changes in poverty are calculated.
3.1.2 Macroeconomic Closures and Dynamics
The model has a neoclassical closure in which total private investment is
constrained by total savings net of public investment. Household savings propen-
sities are exogenous. This rule implies that any shortfall in government savings
relative to the cost of government capital formation, net of exogenous foreign
savings, directly crowds out private investment. Likewise, any excess of govern-
ment savings directly crowds in private investment.
The model has a simple recursive-dynamic structure. Each solution run tracks
the economy over 40 periods. Each period may be thought of as a fiscal year (that is,
from year 2007 to 2046). Within-year capital stocks are fixed, and the model is
solved given the parameters of the experiment (for example, exogenous growth in
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the oil production or refining sector, or changes in import tariffs on fuels). This
solution defines a new vector of prices and quantities for the economy, including the
level of public- and private-sector investment, which feed into the equations of
motion for sectoral capital stocks. The equation is specified as
Ki,t ¼ Ki,t1 1 μið Þ þ ΔKi,t1, ð2Þ
where Ki,t is the capital stock, μi denotes the sector-specific rate of depreciation, and
t 1 measures the gestation lag on investment.
The final element is an externality resulting from public investment in infra-
structure. Public investment is assumed to generate an improvement in total factor
productivity. Specifically, equation (1) assumes that Αi,t¼Αi for nonspillover
sectors, whereas in the spillover sectors, denoted s, total factor productivities evolve
according to




where g denotes a set of public investments defined over rural and urban infra-
structure, health and education, and so on; Ig andQs are real government investment
and sectoral output levels; and Ig0 and Qs,0 are the correspondingly defined public
investments and output levels in the base period. The terms ρsg measure the extent
of the spillovers. If ρsg¼ 0, there is no spillover from public investment in infra-
structure or health and education. The higher ρsg, the higher are spillovers.
The total population, workforce, area of arable land, number of livestock, and
income from abroad are examples of other variables that evolve over time
according to exogenously defined assumptions. The growing population generates
a higher level of consumption demand and therefore raises the supernumerary
income level of household consumption within the linear expenditure system
(LES) specific to each household and subject to the constraints of available income




The baseline scenario serves as the counterfactual against which other scenario
results are compared. Scenarios are solved over the period 2007–2046, which
roughly coincides with the forecasted crude oil extraction period. The baseline
(simulation name BASELINE) is a no oil scenario, which assumes a continuation of
the business as usual growth path for Uganda over the coming decades (that is,
without the establishment of crude oil extraction and refining industries). Growth
rates for total factor productivity, factor supply, foreign capital inflow, and real
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government consumption follow recent historical trends or are set at levels such that
GDP at factor cost is targeted to grow at an annual average rate of 5.1% until 2046
(see Table 2: Part A). The table further provides a breakdown of this growth into its
different components. Absorption, which includes private consumption (5%),
investment expenditure (4.4%), and government expenditure (exogenously set to
grow at 3%), grows at 4.7% per year. Export growth outpaces import growth,
mainly due to domestic factor productivity growth, which makes exporters more
competitive in international markets. The result is a declining trade deficit, while
the exogenously imposed 3% growth in foreign capital inflows causes the real
exchange rate to appreciate on average by 0.9% per year.
The results in BASELINE reveal the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect, where
tradable sectors with higher than average productivity increases and lower income
elasticities of demand grow less than nontradable sectors, such as services. Thus, as
expected under this growth scenario, the economic structure will continue to change
in favor of services and industry. Table 2 (Part B) shows that the share of the
agricultural sector in total GDP decreases from 22.6% in 2007 to 15.8% in 2046,
which is a result of a relative decline in agricultural prices driven primarily by
relatively lower domestic demand for agricultural products and domestic terms of
trade effects, which cause an appreciation in the real exchange rate. In contrast, the
services sector continues to expand, contributing 62.5% of GDP by 2046.
3.2.2 Modeling Oil Production and Refining
Several oil production and refining scenarios are modeled. All involve the same
fairly rapid growth path for oil production. Growth is fastest between 2007 and
2017 when peak oil production is reached. Peak production levels are then
maintained for about a decade, before production is gradually phased out over the
next two decades until recoverable reserves are exhausted by 2046. The expansion
is simulated by exogenously raising or lowering the level capital stock available to
the crude oil refining sector. The implicit assumption is that capital stock expansion
is funded (almost) entirely by foreign direct investment. However, although the
decision to invest is made exogenously by foreign investors, the oil sector still has
to compete with other sectors for intermediate inputs and, to a much lesser extent,
for labor resources. Furthermore, depending on how government spends its oil
revenue (for example, government may spend more on public infrastructure or
government services), the demand for labor will rise rapidly in those sectors
required to satisfy government demand (for example, suppliers of machinery and
equipment, construction services, or public service providers). All crude oil is
supplied to the refining sector. Supply bottlenecks are avoided by applying a similar
capital stock growth rate to the refining sector as the one that determines crude oil
production levels.
Profits—or returns to capital stock—generated in the oil production and refining
sectors are shared between the foreign owners of capital (their share is repatriated)
and the Ugandan government (revenue is transferred via a 74.4% tax on returns to
capital). All crude oil is supplied to the oil refineries, and for the sake of simplicity
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all refined oil is assumed to be exported. Domestic demand for petroleum products
is, in turn, met by imports. In reality, some of the refined oil product will be retained
for domestic consumption and the country will cease to import petroleum products,
but modeling it in this manner is simpler and does not affect results since the
balance of payments effect is symmetrical.
3.2.3 Oil Simulation Experiments
In all the oil simulations, oil production and refining capacity is increased and then
gradually phased out to replicate the forecasted production path, which assumes
peak production of about 210,000 barrels of oil per day between 2017 and 2025. The
main objective in this study is not to compare the contributions of alternative oil
production and revenue scenarios to the economy, but instead to evaluate economic
and socioeconomic outcomes under alternative spending options. All oil simulations
therefore assume the same oil production path and government revenue stream, but
they differ in terms of how government saves or spends the revenue. A total of six
oil scenarios are modeled. We elaborate below, and Table 1 summarizes.
We start off with a set of basic investment scenarios where we assume all oil
revenue is invested domestically, or, alternatively, part of oil revenue is invested
and the balance is transferred to a foreign oil fund. Also included in this set of
scenarios is one where part of the revenue is transferred to households in the form of
a welfare grant. The first simulation, named FND00INV, is a typical Dutch Disease
scenario. It assumes that all public revenue is immediately used to finance public
infrastructure investment spending. This means none of the government oil revenue
is saved abroad in a fund. In general, in this scenario, additional foreign exchange
revenue from oil production and exportation increases national income, which is
used by private and public agents for consumption (this is an endogenous effect)
and investment (via increased private savings, or by design via the government
closure selected). The latter increases the economy’s total capital stock until peak
oil production is reached, but the increased public capital does not sustain signifi-
cantly higher output over the entire simulation period, as the capital stock in the oil
sector is subsequently reduced to replicate declining output as oil reserves are
gradually depleted. The simulation therefore allows the pure demand-side effects
of the price boom to be isolated: Absorptive capacity constraints are binding and the
demand effects lead to a real appreciation and the typical restructuring of produc-
tion observed during an oil boom.
We start off with a set of basic investment scenarios where we assume all oil
revenue is invested domestically, or, alternatively, part of oil revenue is invested
and the balance is transferred to a foreign oil fund. Also included in this set of
scenarios is one where part of the revenue is transferred to households in the form of
a welfare grant. The first simulation, named FND00INV, is a typical Dutch Disease
scenario. It assumes that all public revenue is immediately used to finance public
infrastructure investment spending. This means none of the government oil revenue
is saved abroad in a fund. In general, in this scenario, additional foreign exchange
revenue from oil production and exportation increases national income, which is
60 M. Wiebelt et al.
used by private and public agents for consumption (this is an endogenous effect)
and investment (via increased private savings, or by design via the government
closure selected). The latter increases the economy’s total capital stock until peak
oil production is reached, but the increased public capital does not sustain signifi-
cantly higher output over the entire simulation period, as the capital stock in the oil
sector is subsequently reduced to replicate declining output as oil reserves are
gradually depleted. The simulation therefore allows the pure demand-side effects
of the price boom to be isolated: Absorptive capacity constraints are binding and the
demand effects lead to a real appreciation and the typical restructuring of produc-
tion observed during an oil boom.
The second simulation, FND50INV, examines the case where only half of the oil
revenue is invested immediately in public infrastructure while the remainder is
deposited in a foreign oil fund. Government may choose this option in an attempt to
mitigate or sterilize the Dutch Disease effects associated with a spend-all approach.
Sterilization will reduce the growth effects relative to the experience of a massive
spending boom, but at the same time the real exchange rate appreciation will be less
pronounced since not all oil revenue from exports is brought back into the domestic
economy. Although this may benefit export sectors in the short run, the net effect in
the long run is not certain since investment flows and capital stock formation is
lower in this scenario.














0. BASELINE “Business as usual” baseline
scenario with no oil production
and refining capacity
N/A N/A N/A
Public investment scenarios with no productivity spillover
1. FND00INV Fund 00 investment scenario 100% No 0%
2. FND50INV Fund 50 investment scenario 50% No 50%
3. FND00I&H Fund 00 investment and house-
hold transfer scenarioa
50% No 0%
Public investment scenarios with productivity spillover effects













Notes: (a) Uniform cash grant; 50% of oil revenue distributed to citizens
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A third simulation, FND00I&H, investigates the option of using oil revenues to
finance an unconditional uniform cash transfer scheme. This simulation assumes no
deposit in a foreign oil fund; instead, half of oil revenue is spent on infrastructural
investments (as in FND50INV) and the remainder is distributed equally among
Uganda’s citizens. The cash transfer is modeled as a nonuniform income tax cut
across all household groups. The extent of the tax break varies across household
groups in the model such that each citizen, irrespective of his or her age, receives
the same per capita transfer in absolute terms (that is, initial average income tax
rates and the size of household groups are taken into account in the calculation of
the applicable tax cuts). In relative terms, therefore, poorer citizens receive a much
larger welfare transfer than wealthy citizens. Since average tax rates are low in
Uganda, several household groups end up with a negative tax rate, which effec-
tively means their earnings from welfare transfers exceed income tax payments. If
such a uniform grant scheme ever became a reality in Uganda it could be justified
on the basis that each citizen in Uganda is entitled to an equal share of oil revenue.
The design of the transfer mechanism implies that household incomes will rise
across the board by the same absolute magnitude, causing poverty rates to decline,
but income inequality will remain virtually unchanged. In contrast to the earlier
scenarios, this simulation will lead to a significant increase in private disposable
income, which is used by households to increase consumption and savings. The
latter, in turn, finances private investment formation. Low savings rates, however,
suggest that most of the additional income will be spent on household consumption.
Whereas the first set of oil simulations assume zero productivity spillover effects
from public investments, the second set of simulations explore the importance of
such productivity spillover. The aim here is to demonstrate not only the importance,
in general, of ensuring that public investments are indeed productivity-enhancing,
but also to show how investments that aim to raise productivity in specific sectors in
the economy (for example, through direct targeting of agricultural or
nonagricultural sectors) may ultimately have important growth and welfare or
distributional implications. The scenarios all follow the same basic setup as
FND50INV (that is, half of revenues are saved abroad and the other half is allocated
to public infrastructure investments), but now assume that government infrastruc-
ture investment raises productivity relative to the growth already assumed in
BASELINE. In FND50NTR the productivity-enhancing effect is uniform or neutral
across sectors, whereas in FND50AGR and FND50NAG total factor productivity
growth is biased in favor of agricultural/food-processing and nonagricultural sec-
tors, respectively.
The extent of the total factor productivity spillover effects in each sector is
linked directly to the level of spending on each of several budget items. Equation
(3) defines this relationship. Thus, as explained before, any increase (or decrease) in
the real government investment index Igt/I
g
0 in relation to the sector production
index Qs,t/Qs , 0 raises (or reduces) sectoral total factor productivity As,t, with the
extent of the increase (reduction) determined by the spillover parameter ρsg. In the
first set of investment simulations ρsg was set to zero, whereas in the spillover
simulations ρsg¼ 0.1. Since the structure of government spending is likely to have a
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bearing on sectoral productivity spillover effects (Fan et al. 2009), FND50AGR and
FND50NAG assume both an increase in total government investment spending
(as in FND50INV) and also a change in the composition of that spending. Data
on the current budget composition are obtained from Sennoga and Matovu (2010)
and Twimukye et al. (2010). In FND50AGR we increase the allocation to agricul-
ture by 20% (or 0.8% points) from 3.8 to 4.6% of total budgetary resources, while at
the same the expenditure share to roads is reduced by 0.8% points. In FND50NAG
we assume the opposite, that is, the expenditure share on agriculture is reduced by
0.8% and vice versa for roads. Next, growth-expenditure elasticities (from Benin
et al. 2008) are applied to calculate the marginal effect of the absolute and
compositional shift in public expenditure sectoral productivity. The growth-
expenditure elasticity for agricultural spending is 1.4, whereas it is 2.7 for roads.
The result is that total factor productivities in agriculture and food-processing
sectors increase by about 25% in FND50AGR, while they decrease by about 10%
in other manufacturing and trade and transport sectors (these changes are relative to
the growth rate in BASELINE). The effects are the exact opposite in FND50NAG. In
the neutral spending scenario (FND50NTR) there is no compositional shift in
spending, hence productivity across all sectors grows by the same margin.
4 Model Results
4.1 Public Investment Scenarios with No Productivity
Spillover Effects
4.1.1 Spending All Revenues on Infrastructure (FND00INV)
The major effects and transmission channels of the oil boom in Uganda are
described with reference to the results of scenario FND00INV, which serves as
the benchmark for other oil scenarios. Public investment expenditures are linked
directly to government oil revenue and will therefore increase until peak oil
production is reached in 2017. Thereafter these expenditures gradually decline
due to declining government oil revenues (which in turn is linked to the real
exchange rate appreciation) and the gradual winding down of oil production
activities.
Under FND00INV the Ugandan economy grows rapidly at 6.9% per year until
2017, mainly because of the large increase in real public-sector investment (see
Table 2: Part A). Overall investment grows at 9.5% per year over this period.
Household income also rises in these scenarios, which leads to an increase in
private consumption (by 5.1% during 2007–2017) and savings. However, private
savings as a share of GDP actually declines (not reported in Table 2), which
suggests the oil boom crowds out private-sector investment, at least in relative
terms. A further factor is the real exchange rate appreciation. Although in general
such an appreciation would mean imported capital goods become less expensive,
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capital formation in Uganda is in fact intensive in nontradable goods (for example,
nontradable construction goods make up 78% of investments). This means that
foreign capital inflows, which are assumed to grow at 3% annually in all scenarios,
finance less and less real investment over time. Diminishing oil reserves means the
real exchange rate appreciation weakens over time, but this is not sufficient to
reverse the trend of declining non-oil exports. In fact, the initial welfare gains
associated with the surge in public-sector investment weaken over time as other
components of GDP (for example, private investments, consumption, and exports)
fail to grow more rapidly when public investments eventually decline.
A comparison of FND00INV with BASELINE reveals the typical characteristics
of Dutch Disease. The consumer price index increases at an average annual rate of
1.2% during 2007–2046, while the (trade-weighted) real exchange rate appreciates
by 1.3% between 2007 and 2017 or by 1.2% per year over the entire 2007–2046
period. Relative to BASELINE, the spending of windfall revenues leads to a 0.2 and
1.5% point contraction in agriculture and services, respectively, in the medium
term. As a result, these two sectors’ shares of GDP also decline dramatically by 4.6
and 16.4% points relative to the base (2007–2017; see Table 2: Part B). The services
sector regains growth momentum in the long run, but agricultural growth only
improves marginally relative to the base. Thus, while real GDP at factor cost
increases, the agricultural sector actually suffers a decline in GDP, both absolutely
(compared to BASELINE) during the oil expansion period and relative to other
sectors over the total oil extraction period (Table 2: Part B). The services sector also
realizes absolute income losses in the medium term, but a reversal of fortunes sees
this sector become the engine of long-term growth.1
Table 3 presents more disaggregated sectoral production results (GDP at factor
cost), focusing on changes during the oil expansion period (2007–2017). The first
column shows the average annual change in BASELINE, and the remaining col-
umns show the percentage point changes in production in the various oil scenarios
relative to BASELINE. The results for FND00INV corroborate the picture of Dutch
Disease. Crude and refined oil production expand tremendously, while less tradable
subsectors in agriculture, industry, and services also expand production. Within
agriculture, export-oriented crops and other agriculture (which includes fisheries, a
fairly significant exporter) suffer the greatest declines relative to the base, mainly
due to the adverse real exchange rate effects on the trade competitiveness of these
subsectors. The same is true for sectors such as fish processing and hotels and
catering, both of which are highly export-oriented.
Government spending patterns also determine different sectors’ relative perfor-
mance under FND00INV. Increased government expenditure on investment goods
leads to a sharp increase in demand for construction services (nontraded) and
machinery (mostly imported) in particular. This in turn leads to an indirect increase
in demand for intermediate input goods typically supplied by manufacturing and
1Of course, the observed structural shift is also a feature of the BASELINE scenario, and is, to a
large extent, a natural outcome for any developing country’s growth path.
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services sectors. Despite increased economic activity in nonagricultural sectors
(that is, industry in particular), the knock-on effects for nontradable agricultural
subsectors is almost negligible.
The contraction of production under FND00INV is most pronounced in cotton;
tobacco; flowers; coffee; and tea, cocoa, and vanilla, where most or all of total
production is exported. These sectors do not benefit from higher prices as a result of
increasing domestic demand but are negatively affected by higher factor costs and
higher prices for intermediate inputs. The latter also holds true for import-
competing cereals (maize, rice, other cereals), pulses (oilseeds and beans), and
livestock. Though these sectors are more oriented toward the domestic market and
therefore benefit from generally higher domestic income, demand elasticities are
fairly low and the demand effect is not strong enough to compensate for the
negative supply effect. Moreover, producers of maize, rice, other cereals, and
oilseeds face competition from foreign suppliers. Given the high substitution
possibilities for agricultural goods in domestic demand, the expansion of domestic
demand is insufficient to counter the substitution effect. The assumption of zero
productivity spillover effects in this scenario also explains the weak performance of
nontradable agricultural subsectors. As later results show, these adverse effects can
be offset by using oil revenues to raise agricultural productivity. The contraction of
fisheries results from strong forward linkages to fish processing, a highly export-
oriented food-processing sector, which suffers from Dutch Disease effects.
Only a select few agricultural subsectors (root crops, matooke, and horticultural
crops) and forestry realize an increase in production in FND00INV relative to
BASELINE. These benefit from increasing domestic private demand as a result of
higher private income. In the former three sectors, private demand expansion is
sufficiently strong to induce price increases, which overcompensate cost increases.
Forestry is also a pure nontradable, and though not directly consumed, benefits from
its forward linkages to the furniture industry, which is an investment-goods industry
and therefore directly affected by increased public investment demand.
We next turn to welfare and household poverty results. The equivalent variation
(EV) measures welfare improvements after controlling for price changes (see
Table 2: Part C). Under BASELINE there is a marked improvement in the EV
measure, with all household groups experiencing an increase in EV of between 4.8
and 5% on average per year over the 2007–2046 period (or 520–575% on aggre-
gate). Gains are also fairly equally distributed, with rural farm households gaining
slightly more thanks to a relatively rapid agricultural productivity growth rate
assumed in BASELINE. Sustained GDP growth of just over 5% per year will
virtually eliminate poverty by 2046 (Table 4: Part D); the national poverty
headcount (P0) drops to about 3.5% from 31.1% in the base.2
The introduction of oil (FND00INV) sees more rapid improvements in EV for
higher income urban and nonfarm households than for rural farming households.
2Similar rates of decline are observed for the depth of poverty measure but are not reported in
Table 2.



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































70 M. Wiebelt et al.
This relates to oil production, construction, and nonfood manufacturing being more
capital and skilled-labor intensive, which means increases in factor returns in these
sectors tend to benefit higher income and urban households. Self-employed family
labor in the agricultural sector is furthermore assumed to remain in the agricultural
sector, which means farm households do not benefit much from increasing labor
demand and higher wages in nonagricultural sectors, yet they face the same
consumer price increases as all other households in the economy. The uneven
distributional outcomes under FND00INV are also reflected in poverty outcomes.
Although the oil boom leads to a larger overall reduction in poverty relative to
BASELINE, urban poverty declines faster than rural poverty. For example, by 2017
rural poverty is 22.6% in FND00INV, an 8.8% drop from the BASELINE rate of
24.8%. In contrast, the urban poverty rate is 16.1% lower by in FND00INV relative
to BASELINE by 2017.
Summing up, channeling windfall oil revenue into the Ugandan economy poses
a number of challenges. The first one is the likely appreciation of the real exchange
rate—the increase in the price of nontradable goods and services, in particular
construction—as demand for them increases with windfall revenue in the face of a
limited supply response, and its corollary in terms of lost export competitiveness in
agriculture and food processing. The second one is the likely drop in overall
productivity, as more factors get concentrated in nontradable sectors where poten-
tial productivity gains are much scarcer. The third one is the existence of
reallocation (investments, migrations) and transition costs (lost markets and
know-how), which can make temporary specialization costly overall if the society
has to return to its previous specialization patterns. This risk exists with oil in
Uganda, given its exhaustible nature, the shape of the likely extraction path, and the
possibility that it conducts to an untenable pattern of specialization if government
oil revenues are immediately invested and public investments do not confer any
spillovers on private-sector productivity.
4.1.2 Transferring Oil Revenues to a Foreign Oil Fund (FND50INV)
In the face of severe Dutch Disease effects, Uganda could consider fixing the share
of oil revenue to be transferred to the budget and investing the remainder abroad.
The impact of such a sterilization strategy is analyzed in scenario FND50INV,
which assumes that only half of current oil revenue is used to finance public
infrastructure investment while the other half is saved in an oil fund abroad. This
fund is assumed to be some variant of a permanent income fund (PIF) from which
no withdrawals are made during the simulation period. Since none of the invested
oil funds make their way back into the economy over the simulation period, we do
not explicitly account for interest earned when calculating the cumulative fund
value. However, with the nominal exchange rate as numéraire in the model all
deposits into the fund are real values; hence, the fund also does not depreciate in
value. As a share of GDP the fund reaches more than 50% of GDP by about 2030.
After this the fund as a share of GDP declines as no additional oil revenues are
deposited into the fund but GDP continues to grow exponentially.
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Sterilizing part of the oil revenue and reducing government investment spending
leads to less overall investment, less capital accumulation, and lower private
consumption and absorption in the medium term (2007–2017). This causes GDP
growth to decline marginally in FND50INV compared to FND00INV, although
growth still exceeds that observed in BASELINE (Table 2: Part A). Capital outflows
(that is, deposits into the oil fund) cause a much smaller real exchange rate
appreciation in FND50INV, which means the restructuring of supply from trade-
oriented sectors with relatively higher total factor productivity growth (for exam-
ple, agriculture and certain services sectors) toward domestic-market-oriented
industrial sectors with lower total factor productivities is less pronounced. This
relative productivity gain coupled with the improved export performance almost
entirely makes up for the GDP loss associated with the 50% reduction in oil funds
invested and the lower level of capital accumulation, at least in the medium term. In
the long run, however, total factor productivity effects in FND50INV are insuffi-
cient to compensate for the lower levels of capital accumulation, with overall GDP
growth now deviating more from that in the previous scenario. At the 3% real
government consumption growth rate imposed in all these scenarios the adjustment
cost falls on private households, with private consumption growing by only 0.2 and
0.3% points more than in BASELINE during 2007–2017 and 2007–2046, respec-
tively, compared to 0.5% points in FND00INV (both periods).
Tradable and nontradable agricultural subsectors are affected differently by the
sterilization of oil revenues. Relative to FND00INV, the lower real appreciation
improves the competitiveness of export-oriented and import-competing agricultural
subsectors. In both types of subsectors, lower costs for nontradable intermediate
inputs improve these sectors’ domestic terms of trade. In addition, lower price
increases on domestic markets, due to less expansion of private domestic consump-
tion, imply that the spread between domestic prices and import and export prices is
less pronounced. Thus, on the supply-side, the extent of export reduction is lower in
all export-oriented subsectors, whereas on the demand-side, part of the substitution
of domestic supply by imports is avoided. Both types of adjustments—export
penetration and import substitution—benefit agricultural producers of export
crops and agricultural import substitutes. As a result, the contraction of production
in these sectors is less pronounced in FND50INV compared to FND00INV (see
Table 3). In contrast, agricultural nontradable goods, such as root crops, matooke,
and horticulture, are negatively affected by lower private consumer demand, the
latter being the result of lower overall income in the Ugandan economy compared
to the full spending scenario.
The welfare (EV) results for FND50INV in Table 2 (Part C) indicate that, while
all households suffer from welfare losses as a result of sterilization, nonfarm
households in Kampala and other urban areas will lose out most from the resultant
lower levels of public investment. There are two reasons for this result: First, the
positive income effect of a higher capital rental rate (for now scarcer capital) is
more than offset by lower capital availability; second, wage increases for skilled
labor, which is another primary source of income for urban households, are also
lower compared to FND00INV. The rate of poverty reduction is also lower in all
72 M. Wiebelt et al.
household groups if part of the oil revenue is sterilized (Table 2: Part D). Thus,
while sterilization counters Dutch Disease and possibly allows future generations to
benefit from increased spending of oil revenues that are saved now, it also means
that fewer benefits are transferred to citizens in the medium term.
4.1.3 Transferring Rents to Citizens (FND00I&H)
We next consider a scenario where poverty is targeted directly by redistributing part
of oil revenues directly to citizens rather than saving funds in an external oil fund.
As a variation of FND00INV, FND00I&H evaluates the option of investing half of
oil revenue in infrastructure while the other half is distributed to citizens as a direct
welfare transfer. Each citizen receives the exact same per capita transfer. House-
holds use this windfall to finance additional consumption spending or to save,
depending on the average savings propensities specified for different household
groups in the CGEmodel. The grant being uniformly distributed implies that poorer
households receive a larger relative transfer. Figure 1 shows the impact of the
welfare grant on average per capita income in 2017 when peak production is
reached and the transfer value is at a maximum.
The figure shows that prior to receiving the welfare grant, rural farm households
have a per capita income of USh900,000 per year in 2017 (approximately $375, or
just more than $1 per person per day). The welfare transfer, modeled as a tax rebate,
adds a further USh129,000 to their income ($50–60 per person per year); thus, as a
share of income the transfer is worth 14.4% to these households. At the other end of
the income spectrum are citizens of Kampala with a per capita income of USh5.4
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Fig. 1 Average per capita income and per capita transfer values (FND00I&H), 2017. Source:
CGE model results
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income. About three-quarters of Ugandans live in rural farm households; hence, the
national average per capita income is only slightly above that of rural farm
households (USh1.4 million), whereas the transfer is worth 9% of income.
Despite price increases, the expansion of private household consumption bene-
fits the agricultural sector as a whole, with overall agricultural GDP growth in
FND00I&H marginally higher than in BASELINE (agricultural growth declined
relative to BASELINE in both FND00INV and FND50INV). However, the real
exchange rate appreciation accompanying the expansion of private consumption
induces structural changes both across and within agricultural subsectors in terms of
production for the domestic and world markets. In particular, the expansion of
private consumption benefits producers of nontradable agricultural goods such as
root crops, matooke, horticulture, livestock, and forestry. Export agriculture is now
even more negatively affected compared to FND50INV due to production cost
increases and a stronger real exchange rate. Similarly, import-competing agricul-
tural subsectors, such as cereals and oilseeds, also contract as a result of production
cost increases and stronger competition from abroad. In all these subsectors, the
demand effect from increased private consumption is not sufficiently strong to
compensate for the negative import substitution effect that results from the real
exchange rate appreciation. With relatively inelastic demand and strong substitu-
tion possibilities between domestic and imported agricultural foodcrops, the sub-
stitution effect overcompensates the demand effect.
Compared to the first two experiments, the redistribution of rents creates more
employment opportunities in agriculture and leads to significantly higher land
rentals and prices for livestock. Thus, a larger share of factor income accrues to
rural households, who in turn spend a larger share of their incomes on goods
produced domestically and in rural areas. This is corroborated by changes in the
EV presented in Table 2 (Part C). These results indicate that welfare improves more
rapidly for lower income rural and urban farm households than for higher income
nonfarm households. Of course, this result also stems directly from the welfare
transfer itself, which in relative terms causes incomes of poorer households to
increase more than that of wealthier households (Fig. 1). Moreover, the redistribu-
tion of oil rents leads to more consumption by all households, and since production
of consumption goods (agricultural and food products in particular) is more land
and unskilled-labor intensive, the resulting increases in these factor returns benefit
lower income and rural households more.
The uneven distributional impacts are also reflected in poverty outcomes
(Table 2: Part D). Between 2007 and 2017 the redistribution of oil rents leads to
a significant decline in poverty at the national level, and also relative to BASELINE
and the first two oil production scenarios. Moreover, rural poverty declines more
rapidly than urban poverty. In fact, redistribution is twice as effective at reducing
poverty among rural households compared to other rent spending options consid-
ered. By 2046, however, poverty outcomes under FND00INV are superior to those
under FND00I&H. This suggests that investments have longer lasting benefits in
terms of production capacity and employment in the future. This benefits the poor
more in the longer term than welfare handouts in the medium term. Of course, there
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are several caveats, one of which is the fact that we assume households’ expenditure
patterns remain unchanged after receiving welfare transfers. In reality, households
may choose to invest extra income earned in (say) education, which will raise their
productivity and future employability. We also do not consider productivity spill-
over effects of the investments themselves, which is the focus of the next set of
experiments.
4.2 Public Investment Scenarios with Productivity Spillover
Effects
In this set of simulations we once again model an increase in public investments,
now assuming that these investments have productivity spillover effects in the
private sector. All scenarios use FND50INV as the basis, with productivity spillover
effects determined by both the level of investment spending and its structure. The
first simulation, FND50NTR, assumes a neutral allocation of public investment
spending. This assumes increased spending has a uniform productivity-enhancing
effect across all sectors of the economy, that is, total factor productivity in all
sectors grow by the same margin, in percentage terms, over and above the growth
already defined in BASELINE. In the second simulation (FND50AGR) we model
the effect of agricultural-biased public investment spending. This means spending
is targeted toward improving agricultural productivity relative to nonagricultural
productivity through investing relatively more in (for example) rural and agricul-
tural infrastructure. In this scenario the productivity effects of government infra-
structure are restricted to agricultural value-added chains (agricultural sectors and
food-processing sectors) and core agricultural inputs, such as communications,
banking, and real estate services (this serves to alleviate possible supply constraints
in input markets). Finally, FND50NAG investigates a restructuring of public
investment expenditures toward urban infrastructure at the expense of agriculture-
related infrastructure.
In the discussion of results it is important to note that the three scenarios are not
necessarily directly comparable as far as overall performance of the economy is
concerned. Although a formulaic approach is adopted for determining the produc-
tivity shock associated with a certain level and structure of public investment, we
do not consider the efficiency of such public spending across different sectors. In
reality, cross-sectoral differences in initial productivity rates and productivity
growth potential imply that the cost of achieving (say) a 1% increase in productivity
may differ from one subsector to the next. What we can (and indeed do) compare
are structural differences between the different scenarios. We also compare eco-
nomic performance in the three productivity spillover scenarios to the no produc-
tivity spillover scenario (FND50INV).
Table 4 presents the simulation results. Here we only focus on the 2007–2026
period, which includes the run-up to peak oil production as well as the decade
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during which peak production levels are sustained. All three productivity spillover
scenarios assume the same increase in public infrastructural investments as in
FND50INV. Initially, as public infrastructural investments rise in line with oil
revenue increases, the productivity spillover scenarios are exactly the same as
FND50INV. It is only by 2020 that we assume the productivity spillovers take
effect (that is, we allow for a 3-year lag from the time public investments peak in
2017 until a higher level of productivity growth is reached). At this point we
observe a fairly substantial additional GDP growth impact in all three scenarios
relative to FND50INV, such that growth over the 2007–2026 period exceeds growth
in FND50INV by between 0.3 and 0.6% points across the three productivity
spillover scenarios. Even though the same level of oil-funded public investment
is assumed in all these scenarios, the increased economic activity means that there
is a marked rise in total annual investment as private savings increase.
Real exchange rate and price impacts differ substantially across the three
scenarios. Although the real exchange rate appreciates in all these scenarios, it
depreciates relative to BASELINE, and in FND50NTR and FND50AGR the real
exchange also depreciates relative to FND50INV. In contrast, the real exchange rate
in FND50NAG is virtually unchanged from what was observed in BASELINE and
FND50INV. The combined effect of increased productivity and more favorable
terms of trade in at least two of the scenarios mean that export volumes increase in
all three productivity spillover scenarios. This is illustrated by the improved
performance of sectors such as export-oriented agriculture, livestock, other agri-
culture, and food processing, all of which grow relative to the decline in GDP
observed in FND50INV (see Table 3). Other major exporters such as fish processing
and hotels and catering show a relative improvement compared to FND50INV.
We have previously established that public investment spending in an oil
production context and the assumption of no productivity spillovers tends to benefit
urban nonfarm households more than rural farm households, since the latter group
is largely bypassed as a result of missing backward linkages from rapidly growing
industrial and services sectors. The productivity spillover scenarios now suggest a
rapid improvement in the outcomes for rural farm households. All households still
enjoy increases in welfare (EV) over time if public investment spending does not
discriminate between sectors (FND50NTR), but, interestingly, the absolute and
proportionate gains are now highest for rural farm households (Table 4: Part C).
These altered distributional impacts are also reflected in the poverty results
(Table 4: Part D), which show that rural poverty declines slightly faster than
urban poverty. This relates to the Ugandan economy’s ability to produce more
tradable and nontradable goods as a result of productivity increases, whereas the
reversal of the real exchange rate appreciation shifts the domestic terms of trade in
favor of export-oriented and import-competing producers of tradable goods and
against producers of nontradable goods. All agricultural sectors now expand their
production, whereas export-oriented agricultural sectors increase their export sup-
ply. Thus, although many agricultural sectors shrank when public investments were
unproductive (for example, in FND50INV), the sector is able to expand as a result of
productivity spillovers, even when not targeted directly as is the case in
FND50NTR.
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In the case where nonagricultural sectors are targeted (FND50NAG), additional
public investment spending on urban road infrastructure increases total factor
productivity growth in the tradable nonfood-manufacturing sectors (that is, textiles,
wood and paper, other manufacturing, machinery, and furniture) and in the trade,
hotel and catering, and transport services sectors. At the same time we assume
lower levels of spending on rural infrastructure, which reduces total factor produc-
tivity growth in all agricultural and food-processing sectors as well as in the less-
tradable communications, banking, real estate, and community services sectors. As
expected, when productivity growth is lower in sectors that predominantly supply
goods for the domestic market (these are also goods that cannot easily be
substituted by imports), the spending of oil revenues causes a larger (relative)
appreciation of the real exchange rate than in the case of neutral productivity
spillovers. Hence, although the manufacturing export performance is slightly stron-
ger in machinery and equipment, hotels and catering, and transport, the agricultural
sector is hit relatively hard when productivity gains are biased against it. At 4.1%
per year, average agricultural growth in FND50NAG is half a percentage point
lower than in FND50NTR, and the agricultural sector’s share in GDP declines by
more than a percentage point by 2026 vis-a-vis a neutral allocation of investment
spending.
When public investment spending is biased in favor of agriculture and food
processing (FND50AGR), outcomes are markedly different. Increased supply of
agricultural goods and food items is sufficiently strong to more than offset the
demand effects of the oil boom, such that the initial real exchange rate appreciation
observed in FND50INV is reversed within a relatively short time. The effects on
exports are a mirror image of those in FND50NAG; agriculture exports recover
more strongly than in the former experiment, but lower productivity growth in
nonfood manufacturing results in a more sluggish recovery in manufacturing
exports.
The most striking difference between the two public investment options, though,
is the effect on real household disposable incomes, welfare and poverty (Table 4:
Parts C and D). Compared to FND50NTR, a manufacturing bias (FND50NAG)
sharply moderates real income and welfare growth in the economy. The total rise in
EV relative to FND50INV is only 12.7% points in FND50NAG compared to 23.7%
points in FND50NTR. Moreover, the income gain is spread somewhat unevenly
across household groups, with rural farm households now faring worse than Kam-
pala households. This contrasts sharply with the outcome under FND50AGR, which
generates markedly higher aggregate real income gains in the medium term (29.8%
points), and one that benefits poorer rural households more. Poverty outcomes for
rural and urban households improve in the agricultural-biased scenario relative to
the neutral scenario, whereas in the manufacturing-biased scenario poverty rates are
higher compared to the neutral growth scenario. In all productivity scenarios,
however, poverty rates decline more rapidly than in FND50INV.
Given the significant impact on agricultural growth and on the welfare of rural
households of the agricultural productivity spillovers from the increased public
investments arising from Uganda’s oil revenue, it is critical that the Government of
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Uganda put in place mechanisms by which these productivity spillovers can be
maximized. What is needed, in particular, is a well-coordinated set of interventions
aimed at improving competitiveness in the agricultural sector, which would serve as
a platform sustainable growth in the economy. However, at 3.8% of the budget,
current spending on agriculture in Uganda is well below the 10% target committed
to under the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program
(CAADP). Research by Fan et al. (2009) suggests that agricultural research and
development, infrastructure (such as rural roads), and investments in education and
skills have the highest payoffs in terms of agricultural productivity gains and
increased competitiveness of the sector.
5 Conclusion
Even at conservative prices of $70–80 per barrel, future oil revenue in Uganda will
be considerable, potentially doubling government revenue within 6–10 years and
constituting an estimated 10–15% of GDP at peak production. The economic
impact of oil production on the country’s agricultural performance and the liveli-
hood of rural households could be profound, particularly during the first phase of
the projected extraction when massive additional inflows of foreign exchange need
to be managed by the Ugandan government. The so-called Dutch Disease effects
may affect the international competitiveness of export sectors, such as agriculture
in particular, and it is likely to make the country’s growth strategy—with its
emphasis on value-added, export diversification, and manufacturing—harder to
achieve. This would threaten to increase, rather than decrease, the urban–rural
income gap.
Agriculture and related processing currently contribute about 27% to GDP. Food
and agriculture-related processing make up about 50% of household consumption
expenditure. Poverty is higher in rural than in urban households and within rural
households it is highest among nonfarm households. Even with no oil revenue,
agriculture’s share of GDP is projected to decrease by 6.8% points from 22.6% in
2007 to 15.8% over the next 40 years, as increasing factor productivities in tradable
sectors and increasing per capita income and consumption will be leading toward a
restructuring of production in favor of services.
It is important to differentiate between medium- and long-term impacts of oil
revenue spending, since structural impacts differ and asymmetric adjustment flex-
ibilities (ratchet effects) in factor markets (investments, migrations) and foreign
trade (lost markets and know-how) can make temporary specialization costly if the
Ugandan society has to return to its previous specialization patterns because of the
exhaustible nature of oil reserves.
The impacts of oil extraction will be felt by Uganda mostly indirectly through
higher government expenditures on consumption (largely administration) and
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investment; direct effects through higher domestic factor income in oil extraction
and refining and through backward linkages will be minimal given production
technologies and the economic enclave character of the oil industry. Results of
this chapter suggest that the extraction and refining of oil will increase overall GDP
growth, increase national and rural real household incomes, and benefit the poor in
Uganda. In the medium term, that is, from the starting of oil extraction (2011 in this
analysis) until reaching peak production (2017), overall average annual GDP
growth will be between 2.3 and 3.3% points higher than in a comparable baseline
projection without oil. In the long term over the total extraction path of 40 years, the
average growth rate will be between 0.2 and 0.5% points higher. The differences
depend on how oil revenues are spent, on whether public infrastructure confers any
spillovers on private-sector productivity, and in which sectors these spillovers
occur.
Several conclusions emerge from the simulations presented in this paper. First,
with the projected oil extraction path and recently high oil prices, a real apprecia-
tion of the Uganda shilling is almost inevitable. Although policies designed to limit
absorption through tight fiscal and monetary policies would reduce the pressure on
the exchange rate over the short to medium term, they are unlikely to be sufficient to
eliminate it. A rapid buildup of foreign exchange reserves and the accumulation of
government oil revenue in some kind of external resource fund could mitigate the
pressure but at the expense of domestic investment, the fiscal position, and private
household welfare and consumption, as well as poverty reduction. In any case,
agriculture and the rural population will be discriminated against by the expected
oil boom. As net producers of tradable goods and net consumers of nontradable
goods they suffer twice, from increased production costs and higher prices for
consumer goods. Only a few select agricultural subsectors that produce exclusively
for the domestic market, such as root crops, matooke, and horticulture, realize
income gains as a result of generally higher income and consumption. Transferring
part of the oil rent to citizens—rather than to a foreign oil fund—would directly
increase household welfare and accelerate poverty reduction efforts. Moreover,
agriculture as a whole would regain growth momentum. However, the real appre-
ciation accompanying the oil-rent-financed expansion of private consumption
would induce strong structural changes both across and within agricultural sub-
sectors, which might be difficult to reverse once oil revenues dry out. Thus, there is
the real danger of losing long-run competitiveness vis-a-vis foreign suppliers both
on world markets for agricultural export commodities as well as on domestic
markets for food products.
Second, Uganda’s oil discovery comes at an opportune moment as the country
battles with the challenges of marked infrastructural backlogs. In this situation of
initial scarcity of public infrastructure, oil-funded increases in public infrastructure
may lead to potentially large medium-term welfare gains, despite the presence of
Dutch Disease effects. This is particularly true when public infrastructure augments
the productivity of private factors. Yet, the sectoral and distributional consequences
of these investments are highly sensitive to the structure and quality of public
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investment spending, which has an influence on the location of productivity effects,
as well as the characteristics of demand.
Third, a neutral allocation of investment spending, which leads to a balanced
sectoral supply response, is broadly beneficial to the Ugandan economy in terms of
boosting aggregate growth and investment, welfare, and exports while moderating
appreciation of the real exchange rate and reducing poverty on a significant scale,
with rural poverty declining even faster than urban poverty. This relates to the
Ugandan economy’s ability to produce more goods—both tradable and
nontradable—as a result of productivity increases, whereas a reversal of the real
exchange rate appreciation shifts the domestic terms of trade in favor of export-
oriented and import-competing agriculture. Thus, even though many agricultural
subsectors would be indirectly discriminated against if there were no productivity-
enhancing public infrastructure, these sectors are able to expand as a result of
productive public investment, even when not targeted directly. In contrast, agricul-
ture is hit relatively hard when a reallocation of public investment spending leads to
a nonagricultural bias in the supply response.
Fourth, outcomes are markedly different when public investment spending is
biased in favor of agriculture and food processing. In this case results suggest that
(1) the supply response of agriculture would be sufficiently strong to more than
offset the demand effects of the oil boom; (2) agriculture exports would recover
more strongly than with a neutral or a nonagricultural, industry-biased allocation of
investment spending; (3) the supply response would generate higher aggregate real
income gains; and (4) poorer rural households will benefit the most, but without
sacrificing urban poverty reduction. With respect to the latter, a highly significant
outcome is that poverty falls for both rural and urban households under an
agriculture-biased public investment spending scenario (relative to a neutral spend-
ing strategy), whereas industry-biased spending would lead to comparably higher
poverty in both regions.
Although direct comparisons of scenario results should be done with great
caution, a simple ranking of public spending options according to growth, real
income, and poverty reduction effects suggests an agriculture-biased investment
strategy is the preferred option. Such a strategy would not only increase agricultural
growth and rural incomes most, but would also have significant and positive
spillover effects into the rest of the economy, thereby benefiting all segments of
society. The recommendation is less clear in the zero-spillover scenarios. In this
case, there is a trade-off between increasing investment (and therefore relatively
higher overall growth) and increasing consumption (and therefore relatively higher
agricultural growth). The latter (increased consumption), which is achieved by
redistributing oil revenues to Uganda’s citizens via a welfare transfer scheme, is
associated with larger reductions in poverty, at the national level and particularly in
poorer rural areas.
These conclusions must, of course, be qualified by a number of caveats. Among
these is that absorption capacity and, consequently, the quality and efficiency of
public investments for economic growth are critically important. Having oil reve-
nues but then having to incur high economic and social costs in attempting to spend
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these revenues will lower the net benefits of oil. For balanced growth and poverty
reduction to materialize a well-coordinated set of interventions aimed at improving
competitiveness in the agricultural sector is needed. These may include investments
in agricultural research and development, infrastructure (such as rural roads), and
education and skills, with priority afforded to those investment areas that have the
highest payoffs in terms of agricultural productivity gains and increased competi-
tiveness of the sector. Any further analysis of the impact of oil in Uganda must pay
closer attention to issues of spending efficiency and spending priorities.
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Micro-econometric and Micro-Macro Linked
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of Uganda—Considering Different Levels
of Likely Contamination with the Treatment
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Joseé Randriamamonjy, Edward Kato, Geofrey Lubade,
and Miriam Kyotalimye
An important problem in causal inference and estimation of treatment effects is
identifying a reliable comparison group (control observations) against which to
compare those that have been exposed to the treatment (treated observations). It is
common knowledge that the estimate obtained by the difference in the values of the
indicator of interest associated with the two groups could be biased due to lack of
overlap in the covariate distributions or common support between the treated and
control observations (Dehejia and Wahba 2002; Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). This
is especially problematic with non-experimental control observations (Dehejia and
Wahba 2002) in which case combining propensity score matching and regression
methods has been suggested to yield more consistent estimates of the treatment effect
than using either method alone (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). Matching removes
self-selection bias due to any correlation between the observable (pre-treatment)
covariates and the dependent variable, while regression isolates the effect of change
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in the covariates on change in the dependent variable over the period of the treatment.
Using the combined approach, this paper discusses the effect of using different sets of
control groups on estimates of treatment effects of the agricultural extension system
in Uganda, the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) program.
The goal of the NAADS program, which was initiated in 2001, is to increase
incomes through increased adoption of profitable agricultural enterprises and
improved technologies and practices, agricultural productivity, and marketed out-
put. The program aims at targeting the economically-active poor—those with
limited physical and financial assets, skills and knowledge—through farmer groups
based on specific enterprises identified by farmers (NAADS 2007). Although the
program is a public intervention, farmers have to decide whether to participate in
the program or not. When a farmer decides to participate, he or she has to do so
through membership of a NAADS-participating farmer group. Then, together with
the members of the group, and with members of other NAADS-participating
groups, they request for specific technologies and advisory services associated
with their preferred enterprises and obtain grants to procure those technologies
and related advisory services. The grant is initially used to finance the establishment
of a technology development site (TDS) for demonstrations and training, and
proceeds (outputs or sale of outputs) from the TDS become a revolving fund for
members of the group. The main channel of impact of the program is thus via
farmers’ access to this grant. Knowledge and skills gained from the activities
surrounding the TDS, as well as from select farmers trained to provide follow-up
advisory services [community-based facilitators (CBFs)], are also very important.
The program is expected to generate indirect or spillover effects to the extent
that the TDSs, NAADS service providers and CBFs are accessible as sources of
knowledge and skills to other farmers in the community where the program is
implemented. Estimating these indirect effects involves identifying farmers that
have benefited from the program in such a manner, which is potentially challenging
due to possible misclassification of service providers. For example, the govern-
ment’s regular extension service and NGOs operated in the same areas as the
NAADS program. Since some ex-government extension workers and NGOs are
occasionally contracted to provide NAADS services, it is possible for them to be
wrongly associated with the NAADS program even when they are operating outside
the NAADS framework. Spillovers across program boundaries or communities
through information flow among farmers and from non-NAADS service providers
using the NAADS framework are also possible. We discuss the implications of
these from using different controls groups. Next, we present the data and evaluation
method, followed by the results, conclusions, and implications.
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1 Data and Methods
1.1 Data
The data are from two rounds of household surveys conducted in 2004 and 2007.
The 2004 survey served as the baseline on which a stratified sample was based
according to the year when the NAADS program was first implemented in the
community (sub-county) where the program: began in 2001/02; began in 2002/03;
began between 2005 and 2007; or had never been implemented at the time of the
2007 survey. This was done to account for the effect of the rollout of the program
that may result in a modified treatment among later entrants to the program due to
learning from previous treatments among earlier entrants of the program (supply-
side effects of the program), as well as from nonrandom preparedness of later
entrants prior to receiving the treatment (demand-side effects). About 400, 300,
100, and 100 households were surveyed from each of the four strata (see Benin et al.
2011 for details). This paper is based on the panel of 719 household observations.
The indicator of interest for estimating the treatment effect is agricultural income
(INC)—details of this and other variables used are presented later.
1.2 Estimation Approach
What we are interested in is the average treatment effect of the treated (ATTj):
ATTj ¼ E INC1jjNAADSj ¼ 1
  E INC0jjNAADSj ¼ 1  ð1Þ
where INC1j is agricultural income of farm household j due to participation in the
program and INC0j is agricultural income of the same farm household j if it did not
participate in it. Although, we cannot observe the counterfactual, the underlying
estimation problem can be represented as a treatment-effects model of the form:
INCjt ¼ αj þ τt þ δNAADSj þ β0xjt þ Ejt ð2Þ
NAADS∗j ¼ γ0wj þ uj ð3Þ






where: NAADS∗j is a latent unobserved variable whose counterpart, NAADSj, is
observed in dichotomous form; xj and wj are vectors of variables determining
agricultural income and the decision to participate in the program, respectively;
NAADSj¼ 1 and NAADSj¼ 0 represent participation (or treatment) and
non-participation (or control), respectively; α and τ capture the individual and
time specific effect, respectively; β and γ are the vectors of parameters measuring
the relationships between the dependent and independent variables; E and u are
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the random components of the equations with joint normal distribution of means





We apply a two-stage weighted regression (2SWR) method (e.g. Robins and
Rotnitzky 1995). In the first stage, we estimate Eq. (3) by probit to obtain propen-
sity scores, which are used in selecting a matched sub-sample of treatment and
control observations. In the second stage, the propensity scores are used as weights
in a weighted least squares regression of Eq. (2) on the matched sub-sample
according to:
ΔINCj ¼ α̂ þ δ̂ BNAADSj þ INCjt0 þ ej ð5Þ
ΔINCj ¼ α̂ þ δ̂ FNAADSj þ INCjt0 þ β̂ 02SWRTΔxj þ ej ð6Þ
where: ΔINC¼ INCt1 – INCt0, and INCt0 and INCt1 are the incomes in the initial
(2004) and later (2007) periods, respectively; Δx¼ xt1 – xt0, and xt0 and xt1 are the
initial and later period values of the covariates, respectively. Equations (5) and (6)
represent specifications without and with the covariates, and the impact of the
program is measured by δ̂ B and δ̂ F for the two model specifications, respectively.
In any two-stage estimation procedure, it is important to address the identification
of the second-stage regression or endogeneity of the first-stage regression. A
common procedure used is excluding some of the explanatory variables used in
estimating the first-stage probit from the second-stage regression (i.e. having xw
or x 6¼w and corr (w, ε/x)¼ 0). In general, nonlinearity of the first-stage probit
model renders exclusion restrictions unnecessary (Wilde 2000). Further, since we
apply a fixed-effect or difference estimator in the second-stage regression, the
condition is satisfied in the sense that Δx 6¼w.
Participation is measured using the status observed in 2007 to avoid crossover in
different years so that a treatment household is always a treatment household and
cannot switch status; the same for a control household. Of the 719 observations,
66 are treated and 653 are controls, which we split into three. The first control
sub-group is made up of those in the same area where the program is implemented
and claimed to have benefited indirectly from the program, labeled NAADSNON-1.
The second sub-group also is made up those in the area where the program is
implemented but did not claim any benefits (labeled NAADSNON-2), while the third
sub-group is made up those in areas where the program was never implemented
(labeled NAADSNON-3). These three sub-groups make up 256, 284, and 113 obser-
vations, respectively. Because matching with the nearest neighbor only can limit
any potential gain from matching participants with more than one non-participant
with similar attributes, we consider and report estimated treatment effects based on
matching with one, three, and five nearest neighbors.
1.2.1 Variables
Agricultural income (INC) is agricultural income per adult equivalent and mea-
sured as the total gross value of households’ crop, livestock, beekeeping and
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aquaculture output (or agricultural gross revenue) divided by the total number of
adult equivalents in the household. The choice of covariates was guided by the
principles and design of the NAADS program as well as the literature on agricul-
tural household models (e.g. Singh et al. 1986) and adoption of agricultural
technologies (e.g. Feder et al. 1985). The variables used include: human capital
(gender, age, education and size structure of household); financial capital (liveli-
hood and income strategies); physical capital [land owned and value of agricultural
productive assets (e.g. equipment, livestock, etc.)]; social capital (membership in
other organizations); access to infrastructure and services (distance to nearest
financial services, road, market); location in the four administrative regions of
Uganda (Central, Eastern, Northern and Western); and dummy variables
representing the year when the NAADS program was introduced in the
sub-county. Physical capital may be potentially endogenous and so we estimate
the second-stage regression with and without them to analyze the effect of this
problem. All monetary values were converted into year 2000 constant prices to help
exclude the influence of inflation and other temporal monetary and fiscal trends.
To improve matching, it is common practice to try different variables and
transformations of the variables such as logarithms and higher order and interaction
terms, because matching is a nonparametric method of preprocessing data to reduce
imbalance between treated and control groups (Imbens and Wooldridge 2009). We
follow this practice and use: histograms of the propensity scores between the two
groups to select the sub-sample with adequate common support; and balancing tests
to check the extent to which any differences that existed between the two groups
prior to matching have been reduced in the matched sample.
2 Results
2.1 Determinants of Participation in the Program: Overlap
in Covariate Distributions
Selected results on common support and balancing tests for different combinations
and transformations (squared and interaction terms) of the covariates using
matching with three nearest neighbors are shown in Fig. 1 and Table 1, respectively.
We find that different covariates and transformations yield different outcomes of
common support and balance between the two groups after matching. The general
pattern is a skewness of the propensity scores toward one for participants and zero
for non-participants. The situation is most perverse when no transformations of the
variables are included or when the covariates on the length of program presence are
included (Fig. 1a–c). Regarding the latter, different propensity scores are generated
for different controls who are identical in all aspects except location in a NAADS
sub-county and several treated observations have to be dropped to improve
common support. The models associated with the probits when we include trans-
formations of the covariates and exclude the covariates on the length of program
presence are preferred because their results show that there is greater common
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support and only up to six treated observations have to be dropped in any
sub-sample (Fig. 1d–f). The sample characteristics in Table 1 also show that any
statistically significant differences that existed between the treated and control
groups prior to the matching were eliminated or reduced. Together, the results
suggest that pooling observations for the different unique control groups as done in
Benin et al. (2011) could lead to different policy implications and, as we shall see
next, limit any potential gain in knowledge from matching each participant with
multiple non-participants that are similar in several attributes but different in others.
2.1.1 Estimated Treatment Effects of the Program on Agricultural
Income (INC)
Estimates of the treatment effect are summarized in Table 2 (detailed selected
second stage regression results are shown in the annex Table 3). The results show
that the NAADS program has had positive impact on agricultural revenue per AE,
particularly when participants are compared with those who did not claim any
benefits (NAADSNON-2) or with those located where the program was never
implemented (NAADSNON-3). The estimated impacts are statistically weak for the
former and insignificant for the latter, however. The positive effect on agricultural
revenue per AE is consistent with the estimated effects on other outcomes such as
adoption of crop and livestock improved varieties, crop and livestock productivity,
Table 2 Estimated treatment effects (% difference between participants and non-participants in
2004–2007 change in agricultural revenue per adult equivalent)
Sub-sample of control observations
NAADSNON-1 NAADSNON-2 NAADSNON-3
2SWR (without covariates)
1 nearest neighbor 9.3 59.9* 90.3*
3 nearest neighbors 5.0 47.5* 64.4
5 nearest neighbors 19.1 40.6* 50.2
2SWR (with covariates, including change in physical capital)
1 nearest neighbor 10.5 56.0* 58.7
3 nearest neighbors 24.2 45.5* 30.4
5 nearest neighbors 31.1 36.7 30.4
2SWR (with covariates, excluding change in physical capital)
1 nearest neighbor 5.8 53.1* 69.7
3 nearest neighbors 7.3 53.3** 30.5
5 nearest neighbors 10.4 48.1** 30.5
Source: Based on model results. Number of observations: NAADSNON-1 40, 93 and 119 for
matching with nearest one, three and five neighbors, respectively; NAADSNON-2 53, 125 and
164; and NAADSNON-3 32, 55 and 69. *, ** and *** means statistical significance at the 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively. Detail 2SWR results based on model with covariates, excluding change
in physical capital, and matching with nearest three neighbors are presented in the annex, Table 3
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and sale of output; although the statistical significance of the estimates are
reversed for NAADSNON-2 and NAADSNON-3 however, which is surprising (see
annex Table 4). The estimated effects when direct participants are compared with
NAADSNON-1 were consistently negative for the different outcomes analyzed,
suggesting that the impacts of the program on direct participants were not as large
Table 3 2SWR results of Δ Ln agricultural revenue per adult equivalent
Variable NAADSNON-1 NAADSNON-2 NAADSNON-3
Participation in NAADSa 0.08 0.43** 0.27
Δ Gender of head 0.07 0.46 0.56
Δ Ln Age of head 0.09 0.26 0.24
Δ Education (reduction) 0.50 0.26 0.37
Δ Education (improvement) 0.14 0.31 0.33
Δ Ln household size 0.12 0.04 0.49
Δ Income strategy (to crops) 0.30 0.41 0.89**
Δ Income strategy (to livestock) 0.53 1.25** 1.10**
Δ Income strategy (to other ag) 0.37 0.16 1.76**
Δ Income strategy (to non-farm) 0.12 0.31 0.39
Δ Ln Distance to credit 0.05 0.40** 1.10*
Δ Ln Distance to all-weather road 0.47** 0.81*** 1.12***
Δ Ln Distance to markets 0.23 0.90* 0.15
Ln Agricultural revenue per AE_2004 0.68*** 0.83*** 0.90***
Intercept 8.45*** 9.92*** 10.71***
R-squared 0.34*** 0.49*** 0.46***
Source: Based on model results using matching with nearest three neighbors. Ln is natural
logarithm. Δ is difference in 2004 and 2007 values. *, ** and *** means 10%, 5% and 1%
statistical significance, respectively
aPercentage change in agricultural revenue per AE associated with participation is calculated by:
(exponent (coefficient)  1)  100
Table 4 Estimated treatment effects in other selected outcomes
Outcome Variable NAADSNON-1 NAADSNON-2 NAADSNON-3
Adoption of improved crop varietiesa 0.19 0.24 0.31*
Adoption of livestock improved breedsa 0.12 0.18 0.18
Value of crop output per hectareb 44.46** 9.53 140.50*
Value of livestock output per tropical livestock
unitb
38.43 33.78 166.45**
Percent of crop output that is sold on the marketb 1.11 1.01 5.06
Percent of livestock output that is sold on the
marketb
0.09 3.61 7.82***
Source: Based on model results of second stage regression with covariates, excluding change in
physical capital, and matching with nearest three neighbors
aPanel random-effects probit regression results of adoption in 2004 and 2007; estimates are
difference between participants and non-participants in probability of adoption in 2004 and 2007
bWeighted regression results of change between 2004 and 2007 in logarithm of outcome; estimates
are % difference between participants and non-participants in 2004–2007 change in outcome. *, **
and *** means 10%, 5% and 1% statistical significance, respectively
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as the change observed for indirect participants. Because farmers in this group are
not very familiar with the NAADS program, theymay have confusedNAADS service
providers with agents of other programs, leading to an overestimation of NAADS
program effects for this group, as was likely the results in Benin et al. (2011).
The estimates from the model specification without the covariates are generally
larger, suggesting that changes in other factors have been important, particularly
changes in sources of income and access to infrastructure and services, particularly
roads and markets (see annex Table 3).
The lower estimates associated with the model specification with the covariates
including change in physical capital suggest that the impact of the program was also
via its effect on these assets. The u-shaped or inverted u-shaped relationship
between the estimates and increasing number of nearest neighbor matches is
consistent with the literature that greater number of matches generally increases
precision, but at the cost of increasing bias (Dehejia and Wahba 2002).
3 Conclusions and Implications
In this paper we used different sets of control groups and different propensity score
matching specifications combined with regression to estimate the average treatment
effect of the agricultural extension system in Uganda on households’ agricultural
revenue. By breaking up the control observations into sub-groups reflecting likely
differences in potential contamination with the treatment, we show how matching
each treatment observation with multiple controls that are similar in several attri-
butes but different in others can yield more insights on estimates of average
treatment effects. Unfortunately, the results were mixed and weak, in terms of
consistent sign and statistical significance across the different methods, model
specifications, and outcomes analyzed, making it difficult to draw definitive con-
clusions regarding the direct impact of the program and, particularly, its indirect
impact. Our underlying assumption was that participation in the NAADS program
confers benefits via material inputs that will lead to subsequent outcomes. But this
assumption was not consistently validated in the results obtained. While changes in
other factors (sources of income and access to road and market) are important in
raising agricultural revenue, a major limitation with the study is our inability to
capture the separate effect of access to non-NAADS extension services.
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Micro-econometric and Micro-Macro Linked
Models: Modeling Agricultural Growth
and Nutrition Linkages: Lessons from
Tanzania and Malawi
Karl Pauw, James Thurlow, and Olivier Ecker
1 Introduction
There is widespread agreement that growth is a necessary condition for poverty
reduction, although the extent to which poverty declines depends on the level and
the structure of growth, and characteristics of the poor (Dollar and Kraay 2002;
Ravallion and Datt 1996; Mellor 1999). Agricultural growth has been shown to be
particularly effective at contributing to overall growth and reducing poverty in most
developing countries, and hence this sector is often afforded priority as a growth
sector in developing countries (Diao et al. 2010; Valdés and Foster 2010). This
“agricultural growth hypothesis” largely serves as the justification for the Compre-
hensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), in terms of which
signatories agree to allocate at least ten percent of their government budgets to the
agricultural sector (for example, in the form of spending on extension services, rural
infrastructure, research and development, and so on) with the aim of achieving a
target of six percent annual agricultural growth.
While poverty-reduction is one objective of CAADP—and most of the CAADP
country-analyses conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute
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(IFPRI) in recent years used this as one of the key benchmarks against which the
policy was evaluated (see Diao et al. 2012)—improved food and nutrition security
is arguably equally important as a development goal.
Because agriculture implies food production and because agricultural growth
benefits the poor disproportionately in developing countries, there exists a percep-
tion among policymakers that the links between agricultural growth and nutrition
are inevitably strong. In fact, growth in general is believed to be good for reducing
malnutrition in as far as it raises household incomes, thus allowing households to
access better or more nutritious food. However, some countries have seen nutrition
deteriorate despite growth.1 In India, for example, rapid income growth has not
translated into nutritional improvements, with stunting and wasting remaining
widespread and per capita caloric availability declining (Deaton 2010). This is
puzzling and hard to explain, confirming, as Timmer (2000) argued a decade
before, that the mechanisms through which growth impacts on nutrition are not
yet well understood analytically or quantified empirically.
The obvious conclusion is that improved nutrition is not a necessary conse-
quence of growth-induced increases in incomes or reductions in poverty. This
reflects the fact that the concept of “food and nutrition security” has several
dimensions: “availability” of sufficient quantities of domestically produced or
imported food; “access” to sufficient resources to acquire a nutritious diet; and
“utilization” of food through adequate diet, water, sanitation and health care
(Heidhues et al. 2004). In order to understand how growth impacts on nutrition it
is necessary to consider how growth affects all of its dimensions.
This paper compares and summarizes findings from two recent papers, by Pauw
and Thurlow (2011) and Ecker et al. (2012) in which at least two of the dimensions
of food and nutrition security were modeled (i.e., availability and access). Both
studies used a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model complemented with
microsimulation nutrition models, and specifically consider how alternative eco-
nomic growth paths ultimately impact on nutrition. The paper is structured as
follows. It first compares the methods used in the respective studies and next
summarizes the key results. The chapter ends by drawing general policy conclu-
sions and outlining the way forward for these types of analyses.
2 Methods
2.1 IFPRI’s Standard Recursive-Dynamic CGE Model
Both Pauw and Thurlow (2011) and Ecker et al. (2012) use IFPRI’s standard
recursive-dynamic computable general equilibrium (CGE) model to capture the
impact of alternative sectoral growth paths on different households and regions in
1See for example Ecker et al.’s (2012) cross-country analysis.
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the respective countries.2 The economywide impact of growth depends largely on
the inter-sectoral linkages and the way in which households are linked to different
sectors via employment and consumption demand linkages. The social accounting
matrix (SAM) underlying a CGE model captures these linkages.
The Tanzania model identifies 58 sectors, 26 of which are in agriculture and
10 in downstream agro-processing. Agriculture is further disaggregated across
20 sub-national regions, which captures variation in agro-ecological conditions
and rural livelihood/cropping patterns. The Malawi model, in turn, includes 36 sec-
tors (17 agriculture, 9 industry, and 10 services), while the agricultural sector is
disaggregated across eight agroecological zones, urban areas, and small, medium,
and large-scale farmers. In both models producers in each sector and region
maximize profits when combining intermediate inputs with land, labor and capital.
Production is specified using nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) func-
tions, which reflect region-specific technologies and allow for imperfect substitu-
tion between factors. In the Tanzanian model labor markets are segmented into four
education groups (i.e., uneducated, primary, secondary, and tertiary), while the
Malawi model includes elementary (farm) workers, unskilled workers, and skilled
workers.
Economic outcomes are also affected by trade and movements in market prices.
The standard CGE model assumes that producers in each region supply their output
to national product markets (using a CES aggregation function), which avoids
having to model inter-regional trade flows for which data is often unavailable.
However, transaction costs separate regional producer and national consumer
prices. International trade is captured by allowing production to shift imperfectly
between domestic and foreign markets depending on the relative prices of exports
and domestic products (constant elasticity of transformation function). Similarly,
consumers choose between imported or domestically supplied goods depending on
relative import prices (CES Armington function). Since both Tanzania and Malawi
are small economies, world prices are fixed. The current account balance is
maintained by a flexible real exchange rate.
Household income and expenditure patterns are important in determining how
growth and relative price changes affect household incomes in the model. Both
models identify farm and non-farm households in rural and urban areas, with further
disaggregation by region, per capita expenditure quintiles (in the case of Tanzania)
and the extent of households’ land holdings (in the case of Malawi). The Tanzania
model is highly detailed with 110 representative household groups, while the
Malawian model includes 28 household groups. Factor incomes are distributed
among households based on their factor endowments. Households save and pay
taxes (at fixed rates), and the balance of income is used for consumption expendi-
ture. The latter is based on a linear expenditure system (LES) of demand, which
allows for non-unitary income elasticities and fixed marginal budget shares. Income
2For a detailed specification of this class of CGE model, see Dervis et al. (1982) and L€ofgren
et al. (2002).
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elasticities determine the responsiveness of demand for different household con-
sumption items to income changes, and are therefore important for determining the
nutrition effects of household income changes, at least in the Tanzania model, as we
explain further below.
2.2 Macro-Micro Linkages and Microsimulation Modeling
Household poverty and nutrition are affected through both income and expenditure
channels. When agricultural production expands, farm households, who derive
income from land ownership and on-farm employment, are more likely to benefit
from higher crop revenues, although this may be partially offset by falling producer
prices and lower returns to factors. Falling prices, in turn, benefit consumers,
particularly nonfarm households, but also net-consuming farm households (i.e.,
those producing less than they consume). We therefore expect that agricultural
growth will lead to a decline in both rural and urban poverty, with the relative
magnitudes of the changes depending on consumption patterns and price changes
faced by either producers or consumers.
In general, however, the use of aggregate household groups in CGE models
prevents a nuanced analysis of the differential poverty effects on households. Both
the Tanzanian and Malawian models therefore incorporate a poverty module in
which changes in prices and consumption at the representative household group
level (i.e., as observed in the CGE model) are linked to corresponding member
households in the underlying survey data, where changes in standard income
poverty measures are computed.
The two studies, however, adopt different approaches to measuring nutrition
changes. The Tanzania nutrition module developed by Pauw and Thurlow (2011) is
similar to the poverty module already embedded in the CGE model. Specifically,
food consumption changes (rather than changes in overall consumption values as in
the poverty module) in the CGE model are linked top-down to the household data
where changes in caloric availability at the household level are computed based on
the nutritional characteristics of different food types. Caloric availability within
each household is then compared against a measure of the daily energy require-
ment, which depends on a household’s size and demographic structure. Households
below this requirement are deemed calorie deficient or undernourished. The main
“nutrition” result in Pauw and Thurlow’s (2011) model is therefore changes in the
calorie deficiency rate—the term nutrition is therefore used fairly loosely as it only
refers to this one dimension—which is expressed either at the national level or for
different household subgroups.3
3Nutritional characteristics of different food groups are derived from detailed Tanzania-specific
data in Lukmanji et al. (2008). Equivalence scales in the nutrition module are from UNU, WHO,
and FAO (2004). The Household Budget Survey (HBS) 2001 (NBS 2002) forms the basis of both
the poverty and nutrition microsimulation modules.
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The UNU, WHO and FAO (2004) recommend that energy needs cannot be
considered in isolation of other nutrients as “the lack of one will influence the
others.” Ecker and Qaim (2011) maintain that micronutrient deficiencies, espe-
cially in minerals and vitamins, are often even more widespread in developing
countries than calorie deficiencies, which contributes to severe health problems
in these countries. Looking beyond caloric availability is therefore critical,
particularly when people suffer from multiple nutritional deficiencies as is often
the case in developing countries, Malawi included. Hence, in the Malawi
microsimulation model, Ecker et al. (2012) focus on a wider range of nutritional
indicators.
Rather than using consumption changes observed in the CGE model directly in
the nutrition model, Ecker et al. (2012) adopt the two-stage micro-econometric
model developed by Ecker and Qaim (2011) to first estimate consumption
changes in response to household income changes.4 In the first stage food demand
elasticities are estimated assuming a quadratic almost ideal demand system
(QUAIDS). In the second stage the technical coefficients from the first-stage
estimation are translated into own-price, cross-price and income elasticities for
different nutrients, including calories, protein, iron, zinc, and vitamins A, B3
(riboflavin), B9 (folate), B12, and C. Elasticities are estimated separately for
rural and urban households across the different household quintiles. These form
the basis of the microsimulation model: CGE results on income changes for
different household groups are now fed into the microsimulation model where
elasticities are applied to estimate new deficiency levels across the various
nutrients.
From the discussion it should be apparent that the main difference between the
two model frameworks lies in the specification of the microsimulation components
and the way in which results from the “macro” model are linked to the “micro”
level. In the Tanzania model caloric availability is calculated directly on the basis of
changes in consumption quantities for different consumption items included in the
CGE model. As discussed, these consumption changes are determined in an LES
demand system, subject to relative price and income changes. In contrast, in the
Malawi model, only changes in real household income are passed down to the
micro-level. Changes in nutrient availability are calculated on the basis of income
elasticities derived from a QUAIDS, a somewhat more flexible and advanced
demand system, but one that stands distinct from the CGE model’s LES demand
system.
4The Integrated Household Survey (IHS) of 2004/05 (NSO 2005) is used as the basis of the
microsimulation model (the poverty module embedded in the CGE model also uses the HIS 2004/
05).
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3 Country Case Studies
3.1 Tanzania5
Although Sub-Saharan Africa experienced unprecedented economic growth in
recent decades, this did not always translate into less poverty or improved nutrition.
The Tanzanian economy is one example of a country that failed to reap the benefits
of sustained rapid growth. National gross domestic product (GDP) grew at 6.6% per
year during 1998–2007 (MOFEA 2008), while agricultural growth, often regarded
as instrumental in lowering poverty rates in agrarian-based developing countries,
averaged a respectable 4.4% over the period. Yet, between 2001 and 2007
Tanzania’s poverty rate only fell from 35.7 to 33.6%, while the share of the
population consuming insufficient calories declined marginally from 25.0 to
23.6% (NBS 2002, 2010).
This outcome raises two questions. First, why did rapid growth not translate into
more rapid reductions in poverty and malnutrition? And second, what is the
contribution of agricultural growth in reducing poverty and malnutrition in Tanza-
nia? To address these questions, an economywide model of Tanzania is linked with
poverty and nutrition modules to (i) show how the current structure of growth
resulted in the weak poverty and nutrition outcomes; and (ii) examine how accel-
erated, broad-based agricultural growth can contribute to higher overall growth and
more rapid reductions in income poverty and hunger. Finally, the growth, poverty,
and nutrition contributions of agricultural subsectors are examined more closely in
order to identify priority sectors.
3.1.1 Notes on the Methodological Framework
The general equilibrium framework used for the Tanzania study incorporates both
commodity demand and supply, with the latter made up of domestically produced
and imported goods. This means the model is useful for considering the availability
and access dimensions of food security. Prices are furthermore treated as endoge-
nous in such models, which is important from a consumption modeling perspective.
Consumption behavior is modeled on the basis of income and price elasticities
estimated for each household group and commodity type. Both poverty and nutri-
tion are affected by changes in income and relative prices. An analysis of nutrition
impacts, however, requires a more in-depth look also at relative food price move-
ments. If, for example, the price of calorie-rich maize increases and that of protein-
rich meat declines such that the overall food price index does not change, the calorie
5This section was originally published as Chap. 7 of the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) book Reshaping Agriculture for Nutrition and Health, and is included
with permission from IFPRI. The original publication is available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.
2499/9780896296732 (see Pauw and Thurlow 2012).
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deficiency rate might decline and the protein deficiency rate might increase, even
though the poverty rate remains unchanged. The rich (food) commodity–household
specification in the CGE model is useful in this regard, as it captures important
differences in consumer spending preferences and responsiveness to income and
relative price changes across household types.
To avoid the feeling of hunger poorer consumers often allocate a larger share of
their income to food types with high calorie contents and lower costs per calorie.
Table 1 compares the calorie content of different foods in Tanzania. It shows how
the price per 100 kilocalories (kcal) varies by product, and shows average calories
available from different food products for poor and nonpoor households. Livestock
products have a higher average calorie content per 100 g serving compared to most
other food types, but they also have a higher price that makes them an expensive
energy source. Cereals offer a similar amount of calories per serving, but cost
considerably less than livestock products.
3.1.2 Tanzania’s Recent Growth Performance
An examination of recent production trends suggests that although the agricultural
sector as a whole grew rapidly during 1998–2007 (at 4.4% per year), growth has
been volatile, while the source of this growth has been concentrated among a few
crops. Rice and wheat, for example, dominate cereals production trends, and cotton,
tobacco, and sugar production grew almost 10% per year. Larger-scale commercial
farmers grow these well-performing crops on farms heavily concentrated in the
northern and eastern periphery of the country. In contrast, yield for maize, the
dominant staple food crop grown extensively by subsistence farmers, remained low








Cereals 294 6.3 1390 1885 1687
Root crops 178 5.5 424 423 423
Pulses and oilseeds 443 10.9 196 411 325
Horticulture 49 19.8 106 240 186
Livestock and
processed meat
266 26.0 125 318 241
Sugar and other foods 181 23.5 119 424 302
Source: Pauw and Thurlow (2011), based on Lukmanji et al. (2008)
Notes:
aNo consumption weights were applied in calculating average calories per food group
bMean price is the total expenditure divided by total calorie content per food item
cPoverty line is the 40th percentile of per capita expenditure; kcal kilocalories; TSh Tanzanian
shilling
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due to primitive farming methods. Despite rice and wheat expansion and generally
favorable agroecological conditions, Tanzania remains a net cereals importer
because production has failed to keep pace with rising consumer demand.
Roots, such as cassava and potatoes, are also important food sources and account
for almost 15% of Tanzania’s harvested land. Root crops have performed well
recently with more than 4% annual growth. By contrast, higher-value pulses and
vegetables have stagnated, with pulses production declining by more than 4% each
year. This was partly offset by expanded oilseeds production throughout the
country and by fruit production in the northern and eastern regions. Non-cereal
food crop production has therefore been characterized by slow growth in widely
produced crops, and fast growth in regionally concentrated crops.
Some of the fastest growth rates during 2000–2007 were for export-oriented
crops, such as cotton, sugarcane and tobacco. However, these crops are highly
concentrated in specific regions. Cotton is mainly produced by smallholders in the
western and lake regions (81.5% of national output). Tobacco, another smallholder
crop, is produced in the western and highlands regions (82.8%). Sugarcane is
mostly produced by larger-scale commercial farmers in the eastern and northern
regions (83.8%). Together these three crops generated 17.4% of total merchandise
exports in 2007. Coffee and tobacco are also major export crops, but their produc-
tion has declined in recent years. Growth in export agriculture has therefore been
driven by the strong performance of a few regionally concentrated crops. Thus,
though the aggregate agricultural sector’s substantial expansion in recent years
suggests broad-based agricultural growth in Tanzania, a closer examination of
agricultural production data suggests the opposite.
3.1.3 Comparing Business-as-Usual Growth to Broad-Based
Agricultural Growth
To better understand the poverty and nutritional implications of Tanzania’s histor-
ical growth path, the CGE model is used to produce a baseline scenario that
assumes recent production trends continue over the period 2007–2015. These
results are compared to a hypothetical scenario with accelerated agricultural growth
(“agriculture scenario”) in which agricultural GDP growth averages 5.3%. This
scenario assumes a more broad-based agricultural growth path, with yields for
crops that have performed well in the past (e.g., rice, wheat, and certain export
crops) improving only marginally, while poor-performing crops (e.g., maize,
pulses, and vegetables) experience larger yield gains, reflecting their greater growth
potential.
The effectiveness of growth achieved under the two scenarios is measured with
the aid of two types of elasticity: the poverty–growth elasticity and the calorie–
growth elasticity. The poverty-growth elasticity is defined as the percentage decline
in poverty caused by a one percent increase in per capita GDP. Similarly, the
calorie–growth elasticity is the percentage change in the calorie deficiency rate
104 K. Pauw et al.
divided by the percentage change in per capita GDP. Table 2 reports the
deprivation–growth elasticity results from the baseline and agriculture scenarios.
Average annual per capita GDP grew by 3.6 and 4.1% under the two scenarios
respectively, while poverty declined by 3.7 and 5.4% respectively. This suggests a
poverty–growth elasticity of 1.03 in the baseline scenario. In the agriculture
scenario the poverty–growth elasticity increases to 1.32. The nutrition module,
in turn, shows declines in the malnutrition rate of 3.54 and 4.84% in the two
scenarios. This yields a baseline calorie–growth elasticity of 0.99, while in the
agriculture scenario the calorie–growth elasticity improves significantly to 1.57.
The results confirm that broad-based agricultural growth greatly strengthens the
impact of growth on poverty. The calorie–growth elasticity also rises substantially
under the broad-based agricultural growth scenario, which is a reflection of the
increased production and consumption of calorie-rich maize, sorghum, millet, and
pulses.
3.1.4 Identifying Priority Sectors for Agricultural Growth
While the previous section illustrated the benefits of broad-based agricultural
growth, ascertaining whether certain agricultural subsectors are more effective
than others in improving the poverty and nutritional outcomes of agricultural
growth requires further modeling. Growth within different agricultural subsectors
can have different impacts on development outcomes for various reasons. First,
poorer households may be more intensively engaged in the production of certain
crops or agricultural products. Similarly, some subsectors produce products that
poorer households consume more intensively. Growth or price fluctuations in these
sectors will therefore have a greater impact on poverty than growth or price
fluctuations in other sectors. Second, some subsectors produce products that are
particularly important for households’ nutritional status, such as those that represent

















Poverty rate 40.0 29.6 3.7 3.6 1.03
Calorie
deficiency
23.5 17.6 3.5 3.6 0.99
Agriculture scenario
Poverty rate 40.0 25.7 5.4 4.1 1.32
Calorie
deficiency
23.5 13.8 4.8 4.1 1.57
Source: Results from the Tanzania CGE model and poverty/nutrition modules
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low-cost sources of calories or are consumed intensively by nutrient-deficient
households. While these elasticities are by definition growth neutral, growth itself
is crucial for reducing poverty and malnutrition. Thus, a third factor concerns
growth itself, and the fact that some sectors, due to their initial size in the economy,
downstream production linkages (such as their production multiplier effects), or
growth potential (signified by current yield gaps) can have a greater impact on
overall growth. These three criteria are taken into account when identifying sub-
sectors most effective at reducing poverty and malnutrition in Tanzania.
Comparative results are presented in Table 3. The simulated growth in each
subsector achieves the same target agricultural GDP by 2015 in each simulation,
thus ensuring that the poverty– and calorie–growth elasticities are directly com-
parable across subsectors. The three highest poverty–growth elasticities are for
growth led by maize, root crops, and pulses and oilseeds. These crops are impor-
tant expenditure items for households just below the poverty line and are grown
more intensively by poorer farm households. In contrast, the poverty–growth
elasticity for rice– and wheat–led growth is lower, mainly because these crops
are grown in less poor regions of the country and, in the case of wheat, by larger-
scale farmers who are less likely to be poor. The calorie–growth elasticities
indicate that maize, sorghum and millet, and root crops raise household caloric
availability per unit of growth most effectively. Although pulses and oilseeds have
high calorie contents, the poor consume these less intensively since the crops are a
fairly expensive source of calories. Livestock products have the lowest elasticity—
in spite of the relatively high calorie content of meat products—because they are
an expensive source of calories and calorie-deficient households consume them
less intensively.
Production multipliers provide a useful indicator of the growth linkages of
different subsectors. Multiplying each sector’s production multiplier by its initial
share in agricultural GDP constructs a simple index of the contribution each unit of
additional growth within a sector makes to overall GDP. This index, shown in the
last column of Table 2, identifies horticulture, livestock, and maize as sectors with







Maize-led growth 1.174 1.477 0.152
Sorghum and millet–led growth 1.139 1.348 0.033
Rice and wheat–led growth 1.106 1.147 0.106
Root crops–led growth 1.184 1.350 0.106
Pulses and oilseeds–led growth 1.146 1.161 0.101
Horticulture–led growth 1.126 1.092 0.186
Export crops–led growth 1.097 1.057 0.098
Livestock-led growth 1.084 0.977 0.204
Source: Results from the Tanzania CGE model and poverty/nutrition modules
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the greatest potential to have a meaningful effect on national GDP in Tanzania
within the 8-year timeframe of our simulation analysis.
3.1.5 Policy Recommendations
The analysis here suggests Tanzania’s low poverty–growth elasticity results from
the current structure of agricultural growth, which favors larger-scale production of
rice, wheat, and traditional export crops in specific geographic locations. Acceler-
ating agricultural growth in a wider range of subsectors than those currently leading
the growth process can strengthen growth’s effectiveness at reducing poverty.
Faster agricultural growth would also benefit urban and rural households by
increasing caloric availability and the ability to pay for food. Such nutritional
improvements are best achieved by improving production of key calorie-laden
food crops. The staple maize, already grown extensively by subsistence small-
holders in Tanzania, has important size and growth linkages in the economy in
addition to having large poverty–growth and calorie–growth elasticities. The anal-
ysis therefore identifies this sector as a priority sector for achieving growth,
poverty, and nutrition objectives.
The modeling analysis by Pauw and Thurlow (2011) did not explicitly consider
how increased agricultural productivity might be achieved or what the cost might
be in terms of investments, extension services, or subsidies. However, studies for
Tanzania and elsewhere have identified various interventions required to improve
smallholders’ crop yields, such as investing in rural infrastructure, researching and
adopting improved seed varieties, and providing extension services. In recent years
the Tanzanian government has allocated a relatively small share of its budget to
agriculture. However, current development plans indicate a reprioritization of
agriculture as a driver of economic growth and socioeconomic development.
Pauw and Thurlow’s (2011) results provide some indication of which agricultural
sectors should be prioritized within this development plan in order to maximize
national growth, poverty, and nutrition outcomes.
3.2 Malawi
While economic growth is generally acknowledged as a necessary precondition for
reducing poverty, relatively little is known about how growth and nutrition are related.
Therefore, questions persist regarding how to leverage economic policies so that they
have a larger impact on nutrition. In recent years theMalawian government allocated a
large share of its resources to the Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP). Subsidized
fertilizer and seed mainly for maize production led to rapid GDP growth during
2005–2010. It is obvious that an abundant supply of the calorie-laden staple maize
is good for reducing calorie deficiency; however, it is less clear how FISP has affected
micronutrient deficiencies, which are high in Malawi. This section explores diverse
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poverty and nutritional outcomes of recent maize-led growth in Malawi, drawing on
the analysis by Ecker et al. (2012). Their study comprises two components: first, a
cross-country analysis of the links between growth and nutrition outcomes; and
second, a modeling analysis which includes case studies on Yemen and Malawi. We
focus on those findings that are relevant to Malawi.
3.2.1 Cross-Country Evidence on the Relationship Between Growth
and Nutrition
Ecker et al.’s (2012) cross-country analysis reveals that while some countries have
been successful in leveraging growth for improved nutrition outcomes, others have
seen nutrition deteriorate despite growth. In general, economic growth positively
influences nutrition, but it is often not sufficient. During the early stages of
development growth helps reduce calorie deficiency rates in particular, and, in
most countries, agricultural growth plays a key role.
Calorie deficiency rates become less responsive to growth as its prevalence
declines, and at this stage in the development process economic diversification
into manufacturing and services is often necessary to leverage further economic
growth, especially as rural-to-urban migration intensifies. Growth is generally
insufficient to address all aspects of malnutrition, including child undernutrition
and micronutrient deficiencies. Strategic investments and special programs are
needed in sectors such as health and education.
3.2.2 Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Program
The Malawian economy is agriculture-based and features limited economic diversity.
Maize and tobacco are dominant subsectors, jointly contributing almost 15% to
national GDP, and hence the performance of the agricultural sector and the economy
as a whole is highly dependent on these sectors. Growth in the predominantly rainfed
agricultural sector is volatile due to frequent droughts and floods. During 1990–2005
Malawi suffered at least three severe droughts and four major floods, with the
agriculture sector contracting during 4 of these 15 years. The country has experienced
at least two major food deficits since the turn of the millennium, leading to famine in
2002 and a serious food emergency in 2005. Frequent poor harvests combined with
poor management of grain stocks contribute to food insecurity in Malawi.
During the 2005–2006 growing season, and in response to particularly severe
food supply problems experienced in 2005, the government of Malawi initiated the
Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP), a large scale subsidy scheme that significantly
reduces fertilizer and hybrid maize seed costs faced by resource-poor smallholders.
The program has been lauded for its success in raising maize yields and contribut-
ing to overall economic growth, despite legitimate concerns about its fiscal sus-
tainability (program costs have ranged from 5–16 percent of GDP since inception).
Rapid maize output growth improved food security and raised caloric availability.
108 K. Pauw et al.
However, it is less clear how FISP may have impacted on micronutrient deficien-
cies in iron, zinc, vitamin A, and folate, which historically have been high.
The Malawi case study in Ecker et al. (2012) assesses the ways and extent to
which FISP-led growth has contributed to nutrition outcomes in the country, and
also considers nutritional outcomes under future growth scenarios. In this analysis,
they use an economywide (“macro”) model which is linked to household and child
nutrition simulation (“micro”) models. The combined analytical framework thus
permits analyses of the effects of policy shocks on sector-level economic growth
and household incomes, and how this in turn affects nutritional status.
3.2.3 Modeled Scenarios and Results
Three scenarios are explored. In the first, the period of rapid maize-led agricultural
growth experienced under FISP during 2005–2010 is replicated. Under this sce-
nario national GDP growth averages 6.8%, with growth in cereals driving overall
economic growth (Table 4). These estimates are largely consistent with preliminary
GDP growth estimates from Malawi national accounts.
Two future scenarios (2010–2020) are also modeled. The first assumes a return
to long-term growth of around four percent experienced in the decade prior to FISP.
This scenario, which serves as the baseline scenario, assumes the country will be
unable to maintain the maize-led growth momentum generated under FISP. A
second more optimistic scenario assumes a broad-based agricultural growth path
as provided for under Malawi’s Agricultural Sector-Wide Approach (ASWAp).
This policy document outlines Malawi’s vision of transforming the agricultural
sector from its current overreliance on maize and tobacco to a more diversified one
where a broader range of food and export crops are prioritized, and where rapid
growth in downstream industrial and service sectors is encouraged through
productivity-enhancing investments.








2005–2010 2010–2015 2015–2020 2010–2015 2015–2020
National GDP 6.8 4.0 4.1 6.4 6.0
Agriculture 8.5 3.3 3.4 6.5 5.1
Cereals 17.3 3.0 3.0 8.9 4.4
Export crops 4.9 4.1 4.0 5.2 7.7
Industry 5.4 4.6 4.5 6.2 6.8
Services 5.7 4.6 4.6 6.3 6.8
Source: Ecker et al. (2012)
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Figure 1 shows changes in poverty and nutrition levels for the historical and
future scenarios. Maize is grown extensively by poorer smallholder farmers; hence
maize-led growth under FISP contributes to the rapid decline in poverty during
2005–2010. The poverty estimate for 2010 is close to the current official poverty
rate of 39% (see NSO 2012). Under the slower growth scenario no further signif-
icant reductions in poverty emerge; in contrast, the broad-based growth scenario is
associated with significant further reductions in the poverty rate, which drops below
30% by 2020.
The remaining panels in Fig. 1 show changes in calorie and various micronutri-
ent deficiency rates. Historical maize-led growth reduces calorie deficiency from
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Fig. 1 Poverty and nutritional changes (2005–2020). Source: Based on results in Ecker et al.
(2012). Notes: Deficiency rates shown on left axes; percentage point difference between slow-
growth and accelerated growth paths shown on right-hand axes
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deficiencies also decline in both absolute and relative terms (i.e., by more than
one-third). Vitamin A deficiency, on the other hand, does not decline as rapidly,
which reflects limited quantities of meat, fish, vegetable, and fruit in the average
diet. In fact, the absolute number of vitamin A deficient people increases by
400,000 over the period. Thus, FISP, coupled with favorable weather conditions,
is likely to be successful in reducing calorie and micronutrient deficiencies in
relative and absolute terms, with the exception of vitamin A.
The scenarios for 2010–2020 show continued declines in malnutrition rates,
albeit generally at a slower pace compared to the historical period. In the baseline
scenario the proportion of calorie deficient people drops to under 10% after 2015,
while iron, zinc, and folate deficiencies are all estimated to affect less than 15% of
the population by 2020. The absolute number of people deficient in calories and
most micronutrients also continues to decrease. Vitamin A deficiency, however,
remains a concern, with the absolute number of vitamin A deficient people con-
tinuing to rise even though their proportion in the total population drops to well
below 50% by 2020.
Under the broad-based growth scenario for 2010–2020 nutritional deficiency
rates decline considerably faster than in the baseline. Micronutrient deficiencies
tend to decline more rapidly than calorie deficiency, at least in percentage point
terms. This relates to the high initial incidence of micronutrient deficiencies. From
2015 onwards the rate of decline in calorie deficiency remains stable at around 2%
points below the baseline (see bar chart). In contrast, iron, zinc, and vitamin A
deficiencies continue to decline at an increasing rate relative to the baseline, such
that by 2020 micronutrient deficiency rates will be about 4–5% points below the
rates in the baseline. By 2020 the number of people deficient in calories, iron, zinc,
and folate is more than one-third lower than in the baseline.
3.2.4 Policy Recommendations
Ecker et al.’s (2012) analysis shows that economic structure and the characteristics
of poor or malnourished people determine whether agricultural or nonagricultural
growth is more effective at reducing poverty and malnutrition. In countries such as
Malawi where agriculture contributes significantly to national income and where
the majority of poor people earn a living from farming, agriculture has an important
role to play. Nutrition improves not only for those rural households linked to
agriculture; urban households also benefit from agricultural productivity growth
and the associated reduction in food prices.
However, cross-country evidence shows how the role of growth shifts during the
development process. The comparison between the broad-based growth and base-
line scenarios for Malawi confirms this and shows how calorie and micronutrient
deficiencies become less responsive to growth as prevalence rates decline, at which
point economic diversification is needed to leverage further growth and reductions
in malnutrition.
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Ultimately, however, neither agricultural nor nonagricultural growth is sufficient
to eliminate poverty, hunger, or micronutrient malnutrition. For example, in the
modeled scenario for Malawi, even after a 15-year period of sustained and rapid
agriculture-led economic growth, poverty remains close to 30%. This in part reflects
the failure of economic growth to trickle down to all the poor and malnourished
households; many individuals simply lack access to jobs or markets and hence fail
to benefit from growth. As far as nutrition is concerned, the result also reflects lack
of access to information and knowledge about proper nutrition, which diminishes
the effect of growth-induced changes in household incomes on nutrition. Individual
health status and access to healthcare are equally important for nutrition; if growth
is not associated with improvements in health service delivery the nutritional effects
of growth will be limited, even if higher incomes mean people can better afford
health services. This highlights the need for strategic investments and targeted
programs that are complementary to growth policies but explicitly aim to improve
health and nutrition outcomes and thus strengthen the growth-nutrition linkages.
4 The Way Forward
The studies by Pauw and Thurlow (2011) and Ecker et al. (2012) are fairly similar
in their approach to measuring the links between (agricultural) growth, poverty, and
nutrition. The Tanzania analysis explicitly aimed at identifying agricultural sub-
sectors that are most effective at reducing poverty and hunger, while the Malawi
study was more focused on how plausible future economic growth paths might
affect nutrition across multiple nutrition indicators. Both studies highlight the
importance of the structure of growth in determining the pace of poverty reduction
and nutritional improvements, with agricultural growth identified as a particularly
important sector given its strong ties with rural poor households. Urban households,
however, also benefit from increased availability of cheaper food, which is impor-
tant for countries such as Tanzania where malnutrition levels are higher in urban
areas.
Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses. Missing from both is an
assessment of how growth affects the “utilization” dimension of food security
and nutrition. For example, more rapid growth may be associated with (or the result
of) improved infrastructure and better government service delivery in health and
education, which either improves nutrition outcomes or raises the responsiveness of
nutrition to higher incomes. Such effects are not easily modeled as endogenous
outcomes of growth in standard CGE models; moreover, these models typically
assume no changes in household consumption behavior over time and hence also
not the way in which food is utilized. Analyses that incorporate the utilization
dimensions may therefore require a different modeling framework altogether.
A limitation particular to the Malawi study is that it does not consider how
consumption responses in the LES (CGE model) compare with those of the
QUAIDS (nutrition module); in fact, even the income elasticities are defined and
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estimated separately. The nutrition module is also not set up to deal with relative
price changes (i.e., only real disposable income changes are passed down to the
micro-model). Relative prices are therefore implicitly assumed to be unchanged;
hence the microsimulation model also disregards changes in the composition of
consumption, even if the CGE model’s demand system suggests they do change.
The model is therefore more suited to analyses of growth-nutrition linkages under a
“balanced growth” scenario where relative prices do not fluctuate too much. In
essence, therefore, the combined Malawi model framework only considers the
demand-side in detail; the supply-side of the nutrition story is reduced to a single
measure of income change. In contrast, the Tanzania model explicitly accounts for
relative price changes by using the demand system embedded in the CGE model.
However, the assumption that all products are gross complements (i.e., cross-price
elasticities are negative) is an important limitation of the LES, which means the
model is not well suited to analyzing policy shocks leading to large fluctuations in
relative prices.
There are, however, some advantages to using a separately-defined demand
system for calculating nutrition changes. Whereas demand elasticities in
recursive-dynamic CGE models are typically not permitted to change over time,
the nutrition demand elasticities in the Malawi microsimulation model are adjusted
to account for changes in income levels and the associated behavioral changes (i.e.,
nutrient demand elasticities are updated to match those of the income cohorts the
households move into as their incomes rise). Ecker et al. (2012) are thus able to
demonstrate the effect when calorie and micronutrient deficiencies become less
responsive to growth as prevalence rates decline over time.
Maize is a widely grown crop in both Tanzania and Malawi, and hence has the
potential to significantly contribute to growth and reductions in poverty and calorie
deficiency. However, an important question for future research is how a maize-led
growth strategy, such as the one followed in recent years in Malawi, might impact
on crop diversification and nutrition outcomes across multiple nutrition indicators.
The Tanzania study with its narrow focus on calories only cannot answer this
question, but neither can the Malawi study, given that the supply of nutrients is
not properly accounted for in the microsimulation model (as discussed).
Many of the model limitations can be overcome. Several attempts are underway
to introduce a more appropriate demand system into CGE models, specifically one
which allows for consumer goods to be treated as genuine substitutes, or a system in
which parameters and elasticities can be updated over time to reflect changing
consumption behavior (i.e., in recursive-dynamic models). The ultimate aim would
be to fully embed a detailed demand system in the CGE model that can be used to
evaluate nutrition changes. In the meantime simple model improvements include,
in the case of the Malawi model, linking both price and income changes in the CGE
model with the microsimulation model, and applying the same set of demand
elasticities in both models. The Tanzania model, in turn, can easily be extended
to measure changes in the availability of micronutrients as well (data is already
available to do so). Ultimately, these studies represent an important step towards
better understanding the growth-nutrition linkages.
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Analyzing the poverty and distributional impact of macro events requires under-
standing how shocks or policy changes on the macro level affect household income
and consumption. It is clear that this poses a formidable task, which of course raises
the question of the appropriate methodology to address such questions. This paper
presents one possible approach: A sequential methodology that combines a mac-
roeconomic model with a behavioral micro-simulation. We discuss the merits and
shortcomings of this approach with a focus on developing country applications with
a short to medium run time horizon.1
Most analyses of the poverty and distributional impact of macro shocks have
turned to Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models, which typically incor-
porate different representative household groups with a given within-group income
distribution. Yet, recent empirical findings on distributional change indicate that
changes within household groups distributions account for an important share of
overall distributional change (Bourguignon et al. 2005a, b). At first sight, an
obvious solution to this problem seems to increase the number of household groups,
or even to incorporate all households from representative household surveys into
This chapter is a re-print of: Lay, J. (2010). Sequential macro-micro modelling with behavioural
microsimulations. International Journal of Microsimulation, 3(1), 24–34.
1Davies (2009) reviews applications linking macro models to micro-simulation models in devel-
oping and transition country contexts. His focus is on the applicability of different types of such
models to specific questions and contexts. A more technical survey including applications is
provided by Colombo (2010) who concentrates on alternative methods to link macro and micro
models.
J. Lay (*)
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany
e-mail: jann.lay@giga-hamburg.de
© The Author(s) 2018
C. Henning et al. (eds.), Development Policies and Policy Processes in Africa,
Advances in African Economic, Social and Political Development,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-60714-6_6
117
the CGE model. Similarly—yet without providing heterogeneous feedback into the
CGE model—micro-accounting techniques on the basis of household survey data
that apply changes in factor prices at the individual level using household survey-
data could be used to increase household heterogeneity. In an assessment of
Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), Harrison et al.
(2000) however find differences in poverty and distributional outcomes between a
model with ten representative household groups and a model with 55,000 house-
holds to be negligible.
Such evidence does not imply that household heterogeneity would not matter for a
true understanding of the poverty and distributional impacts of macroeconomic
shocks. It merely shows that even full heterogeneity of households in terms of factor
endowments and consumption patterns does not make a difference in a standard CGE
model. Microeconomic evidence on the drivers of changes in income distributions
however suggests that applied CGE models (including those combined with
household-survey-based micro-accounting models) may fail for a different reason:
The importance of individual heterogeneity and decisions taken at the individual
level for distributional and poverty outcomes; in other words, the importance of
“individual behavior.” On the labor market, individual decisions include entry into
the labor market, falling into unemployment or switching between sectors or occu-
pations. Of course, CGE models can be extended to include for example unemploy-
ment and/or endogenous labor supply. Yet, in order to capture the income
distribution implications, decisions would have to be taken by “real” individual
household members. This implies to introduce individual “fixed effects” and even-
tually requires the estimation of structural labor market models (Bourguignon et al.
2005a, b) that would need to be integrated in a general equilibrium framework. The
estimation of such structural labor market models is by no means a trivial exercise
and embedding them into a general equilibrium framework an additional challenge.2
This paper presents a less ambitious and more pragmatic approach. The sequen-
tial macro-micro approach that links a macroeconomic model, for example an
applied CGE model, to a behavioral micro-simulation model has two distinguishing
features. First, it is sequential. A counterfactual scenario is generated in the macro
(CGE) model. Then, specific poverty and distribution-relevant link variables, for
example wages and employment, are passed to a micro-simulation model. Second,
the micro-simulation has behavioral components. For the micro-simulation, indi-
vidual and household decisions are modeled using microeconometric techniques on
household and employment survey data. Through the micro-simulation, the com-
bined model hence incorporates individual “fixed effects” into the analysis.
The paper is structured as follows. We first outline some important characteris-
tics of macro models used as part of a sequential model and present a stylized
specification of a labor market that produces the link variables for our illustrative
macro-micro model. We then provide a simple representation of household income
2See Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a survey of structural labor supply models and Creedy and
Duncan (2002) for a discussion of their application in micro-simulation models. See Cogneau
(2001) and Cogneau and Robilliard (2001) for attempts to integrate such models into general
equilibrium models.
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generation that forms the core of the of our prototype behavioral micro-simulation.
We describe the simulation mechanics of the micro model. The next section pre-
sents two applications of this approach before we assess its strengths, weaknesses,
and challenges. The final section concludes.
2 A Stylized Macro-Micro Model with a Behavioral Micro-
simulation
2.1 The Macro Model and the Link Variables
The sequential approach presented in this paper requires a macro model that pro-
duces changes in distribution and poverty-relevant (aggregate) variables that are
passed to a micro-simulation model. These variables, which we label “link vari-
ables,” are prices and quantities on factor and goods markets. Link variables from
factor markets include real wages for different types of labor, returns to land and
different types of capital. Factor quantities, for example the sectoral composition of
labor, may also be passed from a macro model to a micro-simulation. Finally, goods
prices and quantities may operate as link variables. The developing country appli-
cations presented in this paper use applied trade-focused CGE models.3 Yet, other
types of macro models with very different foci and features, including other forms
of general equilibrium models (real business cycle models, and stochastic dynamic
general equilibrium models) and macroeconometric models, may be more suitable
in different contexts and for different questions. The illustrative framework
presented in the following is general enough to allow the reader to imagine the
application of a sequential macro-micro approach using very different models both
at the macro and micro level, and different link variables.
If a macro model is built as part of a sequential macro-micro model, its labor
market specification is the key component and will have to be compatible with the
micro-simulation model that we present below. The following representation of a
labor market should be thought of as being embedded, for example, in an applied
multisectoral CGE model that distinguishes between formal and informal produc-
tion sectors. The associated labor markets are assumed to exhibit structural imper-
fections with different clearing mechanisms for these sectors. For the simplicity of
exposition, we abstract from other factors of production and assume that the formal
and informal sector produce the same good. Let total employment be fixed and
assume that factors are fully employed. Hence, total employment will be the sum of
formal and informal employment, L¼ Lf+ Lif. In a simple neoclassical world with
full mobility of labor between formal and informal sectors, wages in the formal and
informal sectors, which produce with different technologies ( ff(L
f), fif(L
if)), will be
the same. Employment in formal and informal sector, respectively, and hence the
3See Robinson (1989) for a survey and van der Mensbrugghe (2003) and Lofgren et al. (2002) for
standard applied model in the tradition of Dervis et al. (1982).
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formal labor share in this economy will be determined by the equation of marginal






¼ f 0f Lf
  ¼ f 0if Lif  ð1Þ
Now assume that different wage setting mechanisms exist: In the formal sector,
wages are rigid, for example due to the presence of bargaining by trade unions or
efficiency wages. This rigidity can be represented by a “wage curve,” as in Eq. (2)









Without unemployment, the informal sector will now absorb the remaining
workforce and the informal sector wage will adjust such that labor demand by the
informal sector equals “residual” labor supply. This is depicted in Fig. 1 below
where Ec illustrates the competitive equilibrium and wc/p0 the corresponding
wage. With WC, the wage curve, the equilibrium wage and employment levels
are represented by E0. The formal sector wage w
f
0 =p0 will now be higher than the
informal sector wage wif0 =p0. Accordingly, formal sector employment L
f
0 will be
lower than in the competitive case Lfc .
Real wages and employment in formal and informal sector, respectively, con-







We now consider a policy experiment that shifts formal labor demand and leads
to a new equilibrium in E1. The formal sector wage increases to w1f/p1 and formal
employment to Lf1 . The informal sector wage will increase as well from w
if
0 =p0 to
wif1 =p1. Hence, the counterfactual values for our link variables
4 that will be passed









4With real data, the base values for wages and employment levels will typically not be empirically
consistent between the macro model, i.e. the SAM, and the micro-simulation model. This
inconsistency is “resolved” by passing relative changes from the macro to the micro model.
In the simple representation here for example an x percent increase in formal employment and
a y(z) percent increase in formal (informal) sector wages.
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2.2 A Prototype Income Generation Model: The
Micro-simulation
This section describes a prototype micro-simulation model that can be used in
combination with the above CGE model to simulate the poverty and distributional
impacts of shocks. The basis of the micro-simulation is a household income
generation model that needs to be compatible with the above CGE model. For
good reasons, we avoid the term consistency here and refer to compatibility instead,
as the macro and micro models will not be strictly consistent, neither theoretically
nor empirically. We will return to this very important issue in more detail later. The
household income generation model is estimated from household survey data with
individual-level employment information.
In the micro-simulation, we hence model the household income generation
process.5 This implies that individuals make occupational choices and earn wages
or profits accordingly. These labor market incomes plus exogenous other incomes,
such as transfers and imputed housing rents, comprise household income. The
components of the income generation model are thus an occupational choice and
an earnings model. In the choice model, individual agents can choose between
wage-employment and self-employment.6 We thus ignore labor market
Fig. 1 Formal and informal labor markets. Source: Authors compilation
5The following section borrows from Robilliard et al. (2002). A more detailed discussion of a
similar labor market specification can be found in Alatas and Bourguignon (2005).
6We will use self-employment and informal sector employment interchangeably.
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participation choice in this illustrative model. The occupational choice model is
assumed to be slightly different for household heads other household members.
Once occupational choices are made, earnings are generated accordingly either in
the form of wages or as profits for the self-employed. Being self-employed means
being part of what might be called a “household-enterprise,” in which all self-
employed members of a household pool their incomes. The wage-employment
market is segmented: the wage setting mechanisms are assumed to differ for skilled
and unskilled labor as well as for females and males, which implies that there are
four wage labor market segments.
The following set of equations describes the household income generation
model. Household income Yhh is earned by khh members, who are (and remain)
active on the labor market [Eq. (3) below]. They are active either in the formal (with
DFi¼ 1, a dummy variable for formal sector employment) or informal sector
((DFi 1)(1)¼ 1 if DFi¼ 0) and earn the corresponding wages wfi ,wifi . In
addition, the household receives an exogenous nominal income yhh, for example
transfers or remittances. All these components are real values, i.e. deflated with
prices p. In practice, p will be assumed to be one in the initial situation. Per capital
income yhh is obtained by dividing household income by household size Yhh/hsize
so that (y1, y2, . . . , yn) denotes the distribution of income when each observation is





w fi DFi þ wifi DFi  1ð Þ 1ð Þ þ yhh
 
ð3Þ
Individual occupational choices—between informal and formal activities—
can be described by the following functions, which are assumed to be different
for household heads (h) and other household members (o). We suppress the
individual index here. Equation (4) shows that the household head’s probability
of being employed in the formal sector is a function of a linear expression
with a constant term ch and personal and household characteristics Xh,
which can include for example education, age, and households composition
variables.
P DFh ¼ 1jXh  ¼ gh ch þ Xhαh  ð4Þ
The choices of other household members are assumed to depend not only on
their own individual characteristics Xo, but also on the household head’s occupa-
tional choice.
P DFo ¼ 1jXo;DFh  ¼ g co þ Xoαo þ γoDFh  ð5Þ
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Equations (6) and (7) express wages w in the formal (f) and informal (if) sectors,









¼ cif þ Xβif þ uif ð7Þ
The model just described gives the household income as a non-linear function of
observed and unobserved individual and household characteristics. This function
depends on two sets of parameters, which include the parameters of the wage
equations for informal and formal activities and the parameters in the utility
associated with different occupational choices for household heads and other family
members. The occupational choice equations as well as the corresponding wage
equations can be estimated from standard household survey data. Estimating
Eqs. (4) and (5) using discrete choice models (with dichotomous choices hence
logit or probit models) and (6) and (7) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
(or other adequate estimation techniques7) yields the following parameter vector:
bch; bαh;bco; bαo; γo;bcf ; bβ f ;bcif ; bβ if :
In addition, we obtain buf and buif as observed residuals from the wage equations.
However, we only observe formal wages for individuals employed in the formal
sector. As the micro-simulation will allow individuals to switch between formal and
informal activities, we simulate a residual for the non-observed wage, here by a
random draw from a normal distribution with the respective (formal or informal)
observed variance.8 We face a similar problem in the latent utility models necessary
to estimate Eqs. (4) and (5). In these models, residuals cannot be observed and are
hence generated from the distribution underlying the respective model, here either a
normal (probit) or logistic (logit) distribution. Residuals have to be drawn consis-
tent with the observed occupational choice, i.e. the utility an observed formal wage
earner relates to formal employment has to be higher than the utility associated with
informal employment. Statistically, this implies to draw these residuals conditional
on the observed choice. These simulated residuals are denoted u1i and u0i. With
7Selection bias is a problem in estimating earnings equations in different sectors/occupations
(corresponding to different labor market choices) that is difficult to resolve. We return to this point
later.
8This number does not have to be a random number. It may be reasonable to assume that the
observed residual has important informational content with regard to unobserved characteristics,
such as ability. A possible alternative to a random draw is then to scale the observed residual in
accordance with the observed variances of formal and informal wages, respectively.
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ind, an indicator function that assumes a value of 1 (0) if the condition in brackets is
(not) fulfilled, we thus have.
DFhi ¼ ind bch þ Xhi bαh þ u1i > u0i  ð8Þ
DFoi ¼ ind bco þ Xoi bαo þ γoDFh þ u1i > u0i  ð9Þ
Here DFhi and DF
o
i will hence assume their observed values. This implies that
the sum of these two dummies—defined either for household heads or other
household members—over all individuals will give the total number formal sector
employees Lf0 , consistent with the initial value of this link variable from the macro

















   exp bcf þ Xibβ f þ bu fi h i
Lf0
ð11Þ
Similar expressions can be written down for informal sector employment and the







0 . Remember that this replication is based on the observed
characteristics of the individuals (all X), unobserved and partially simulated char-
acteristics (all u), and the estimated parameters.
Based on this micro replication of the initial situation, we can now micro-
simulate the distributional and poverty implications of the changes in the link










1 will hence be used as target values. This implies that individual
earnings and occupational choices have to change such that they reproduce these
targets on the aggregate level. There are a number of ways how this can be
achieved. Obviously, the required individual changes in occupational choices can
be obtained by varying the coefficients or the observed or unobserved individual
characteristics. A typical choice in applied micro-simulation models is to vary the
constant(s). Hence, the chosen parameters are adjusted and occupational choices
change accordingly, until the results of the micro-simulation are consistent, at an
aggregate level, with the given aggregates. Formally, the following constraint
describes the consistency requirement where ch1 is the constant in the heads’







ind ch1þXhi bαhþu1i>u0i   ind bcoþXoi bαoþγoDFh1þu1i>u0i   	
ð12Þ
Varying only the constantbch (to ch1) implies that we assume that the macro shock
only induces household heads to switch occupation. Other household members’
occupational choices are only affected through the possible change in the head’s
occupational choice, i.e. in the case of DFh1 6¼ DFh. As this kind of behavior may
not be realistic, we can alternatively assume that the constants of both the heads and
other household members vary. However, without an additional restriction, changes
in the two constants cannot be uniquely determined. A possible solution is to add a
variable Δ to the constant term. In practice—when such equations are solved for
real households from a household survey—we will typically be able to find a unique






ind bch þ Δ þ Xhi bαh þ u1i > u0i  




Using either approach to adjust the constant (or both constants) in the occupa-
tional choices, will thus enable us to replicate the changes in formal as well as
formal employment given by the CGE model. Our very simple income generation
model allows us to proceed step-wise. We first solve for changes in occupational
choices, and simulate wages in the next step. The reason is that wages do not enter
the occupational choices of individuals, as they might in a more complex—or
structural—income generation model. However, changes in occupational choices
enter the equation for aggregate wages, as the (observed and unobserved) charac-
teristics of the individuals in the respective sectors change. As in the case of
occupational choices, we can vary the constants in the respective sectors to equate
wages given by the CGE model and those in the micro-simulation.9 For the formal











i  DF1 oi
   exp c f1 þ Xibβ f þ bu fi h i
Lf1
ð14Þ
The equation for the average informal sector wage can be derived accordingly.
The solutions for the constants in the choice Eq. (13) and the wage Eq. (14) can
be obtained using numerical solution algorithms, for example Gauss-Newton tech-
niques. With counterfactual occupational choices and corresponding wages DF1 ,w1,
9Alternatively, we may choose to vary the coefficient for education implying that we expect the
macro shock to affect wages through its impact on returns to education.
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we can now compute the counterfactual household income Y1hh, as illustrated in





wf1iDF1i þ wif1i DF1i  1ð Þ 1ð Þ þ yhh
 
with DF1
¼ DF1 hi  DF1 oi ð15Þ
With constant household size these counterfactual household incomes now yield
a counterfactual income distribution that can be described by (y11, y12, . . . , y1n).
3 Applications
The above prototype macro-micro model is intended to provide an introduction into
the basic mechanics of a macro-micro model with a behavioral micro-simulation.
Which macro model to choose and which transmission channels to highlight
eventually depends on the research or policy question and the context, in which it
is placed. The two applications that we present in the following are based on
recursive-dynamic, trade-focused national CGE models.10 The first application
examines the possible poverty impacts of a Doha round scenario of further multi-
lateral trade negotiations for the case of Brazil. The second assesses the poverty and
distributional implications of the Bolivian gas shock.
As in the above model and most developing country applications, the focus is on
the labor market, as reflected by the link variables that include average wages in
different labor market segments, employment levels and the occupational compo-
sition of employment. The respective specification of the labor market represents
the transmission channels considered to be of particular relevance for the policy and
shock under consideration. The Brazilian model focuses on movements between
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, while the Bolivian model concentrates on
formal-informal segmentation in the urban labor market. In both applications, the
labor market is further segmented along skill levels.
The micro-simulation models used in the subsequent applications share the
reduced-form character of the above prototype model. Employment volumes in
the respective labor market segments, for example unskilled agricultural employ-
ment, and wages are adjusted according to the results from the macro model. These
adjustments are not triggered by individual responses to prices, for example relative
wages—as they would in a (more) structural labor market model. As above,
adjustments are obtained by changing the parameters of the estimated household
income generation model.
10See van der Mensbrugghe (2003) for a technical description of the basic characteristics of the
CGE model used in both applications.
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3.1 The Poverty Impacts of Trade Liberalization in Brazil
Using this type of sequential model, Bussolo et al. (2006) ex-ante assess the poverty
and distributional impacts of different uni- and multilateral trade liberalization
scenarios for Brazil.11 The labor market specification of the CGE model distin-
guishes between skilled and unskilled labor. While skilled workers are fully mobile
across sectors, the labor market for the unskilled is segmented between agriculture
and non-agriculture. This dual labor market for unskilled workers is modeled
following a simple Harris-Todaro specification where the decision to migrate is a
function of expected income in the non-agricultural sectors relative to the expected
income in the agricultural sectors.
The micro model is linked to the macro model through changes in the following
set of variables: First, changes in agricultural and non-agricultural labor income of
unskilled labor; second, changes in labor income of skilled labor; third, changes in
the sectoral (agriculture vs. non-agriculture) composition of the unskilled work-
force. In addition, the micro-simulation takes into account that unskilled and skilled
labor supplies grow at different rates. These rates—also assumed to be exogenous
in the CGE model—are derived from past trends of labor supply growth in the
respective categories.
In accordance with the structure of the CGE model, the micro model thus
simulates the decision to move from agriculture into non-agricultural sectors
(or vice versa) only for unskilled workers. This simulation is based on a sectoral
mover-stayer model that is estimated for heads and non-heads separately—as in the
above prototype model. For this estimation, Bussolo et al. (2006) make use of a
distinguishing feature of the PNAD.12 In contrast to many other household surveys,
the PNAD provides information on employment histories, which allows the authors
to identify movers between sectors and their characteristics at the time of moving.
These characteristics include the type of land right the movers held or whether they
were self-employed before they moved out of agriculture. These characteristics
enter as explanatory variables into the mover-stayer model. As in the prototype
model, the household income generation model is completed by Mincer-type wage
equations for unskilled labor in agriculture and non-agriculture as well as for skilled
labor. Individual labor incomes are aggregated as described above.
The mover-stayer model can be used to illustrate the behavioral content of the
micro-simulation model. For example, Bussolo et al. (2006) find a strong negative
influence of own landholdings on the propensity to move. In contrast, higher
educational achievements are making individuals more likely to move into
non-agricultural employment. In addition, occupational choices of members of
the same household are strongly correlated. In the simulation, individuals with no
11Changes in global prices and trade flows following multilateral liberalization scenarios are
derived from global models. For details see Bussolo et al. (2006).
12The Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicı́lios (PNAD) is a regularly conducted represen-
tative household survey
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landholdings, better education and—in case of non-household heads—and moving
household heads will hence be the first ones to move from agriculture into
non-agricultural employment. Which individuals (landless, but better educated)
move first, can make a difference in distributional outcomes. The movers’ charac-
teristics will determine the composition of those who remain in agriculture (more
with own landholdings, but less educated) as well the earning prospects in the
non-agricultural sector (ceteris paribus better with better education).
With these components, the micro-simulation involves two steps: First,
unskilled labor moves out of agriculture until the new share of unskilled labor in
agriculture given by the CGE is reproduced. Second, wages/profits are adjusted
according to the CGE results taking into account the sectoral movements of
unskilled labor from agriculture into non-agricultural sectors. Adjustments are
achieved through the same procedures as in the above prototype model, i.e. the
computation of new constants in the choice and wage equations, respectively, using
numerical solution algorithms.
The analysis suggests that the economic effects of multilateral liberalization are
rather limited for Brazil. Accordingly, poverty would remain largely unaffected by
such reforms. In contrast, a full liberalization scenario implies quite substantial
welfare gains that are concentrated among some of the poorest groups of the
country, in particular those in agriculture. This scenario is also most interesting
from a methodological viewpoint, as it highlights the benefits of a behavioral
micro-simulation. Under full liberalization, the rural poor benefit more than pro-
portionately, a result driven—on the macro level—by an export boom in agriculture
and agricultural processing industries, growing labor demand and associated higher
wages. However, following full liberalization, a larger number of workers remain in
agriculture compared to the baseline scenario. Given that moving out of agriculture
may substantially improve the income situation of a household, one may expect full
liberalization to weaken poverty reduction, an expectation supported by the obser-
vation that moving households are on average poorer than those remaining in
agriculture (for example because they are landless). However, this is not the case,
as the gain in agricultural incomes more than compensates the reduced benefits
from lower migration flows (for example because they are better educated than
those who stay in agriculture).
3.2 The Poverty Impacts of the Bolivian Gas Boom
Lay et al. (2008) examine the poverty effects of the gas boom Bolivia experienced
in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Their analysis attempts to disentangle the effects
of the resource-boom/bust from other shocks that the Bolivian economy experi-
enced at the same time. The market for unskilled labor is segmented between rural
and urban areas. The two segments are linked through rural-urban migration,
modeled as in the Brazilian case as a function of the corresponding wage differen-
tial. In contrast, skilled labor is assumed to be fully mobile across all production
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sectors. Within the urban economy, unskilled workers are mobile between formal
and informal sectors, but wage differentials observed in the base period are
assumed to persist. These differentials point to systematically lower labor produc-
tivity in informal sectors.
Almost as in the prototype model, the macro model is linked to the micro-
simulation through the following set of variables: (1) the share of unskilled workers
in the formal sector, (2) the share of skilled workers in the formal sector, (3) mean
wages for skilled workers, (4) mean wages for unskilled workers, and (5) mean
informal profits.13 Informal profits are understood as mixed income received by
self-employed workers. Accordingly, they are calculated as the sum of skilled and
unskilled labor income as well as informal capital income.
The two basic components of the income generation model in the Bolivian
application are again a model of occupational choices that represents the choice
between formal and informal employment as well as earnings functions that
correspond to the respective sector of employment. Employment is assumed to be
informal if the individual is self-employed/non-remunerated household member
and/or works in an enterprise with less than five employees. If individuals happen to
be in (or switch to) the formal sector they are assumed to earn a wage, whereas
individuals in the informal sector are assumed to be (or become) part of a household
enterprise and contribute to the profits earned by this enterprise. The choice
between informal and formal activities is modeled separately for household
heads, spouses, and other household members. In contrast to the above specifica-
tions, the equations of the choice model are interrelated through the head’s wage
(and choice) that enters the occupational choice model of spouses and other
household members. Again, occupational choices are hence assumed to be sequen-
tial with the household head deciding first. In line with the CGE model, the micro-
simulation distinguishes between unskilled and skilled labor. Separate wage equa-
tions for skilled and unskilled labor, respectively, hence describe earnings for
individuals employed in the formal sector.14 The micro-simulation again adjusts
the constants to produce counterfactual occupational choices, earnings, and, even-
tually, household incomes and the corresponding distribution of income.
As in the Brazilian case, the micro-simulation reveals the importance of indi-
vidual characteristics that determine the sign and the strength of distributional
change. Lay et al. (2008) find that—for both unskilled and skilled labor—the
very poor are affected most by increasing informality. These results can be ratio-
nalized by looking at, first, who moves into informality and, second, the size of the
income loss for movers relative to both their initial income and the income losses
incurred by other individuals. The size of the income loss depends on individual
13The authors note on formal profits (Lay et al. 2008): “Although formal profits account for an
important share in value added, they are not passed to the micro-simulation for two reasons. First,
most formal profits are retained and invested. Second, capital income is likely to be measured very
poorly in household surveys. As formal profits increase considerably during the gas boom, we may
systematically ignore an inequality-increasing factor.”
14Rural incomes are taken into account through a simple micro-accounting exercise.
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characteristics (as the returns to these characteristics differ between formal and
informal activities) and on whether an individual joins an already existing house-
hold enterprise or establishes a new one. The estimation, which underlies the micro-
simulation, shows that less educated younger (and hence poorer) individuals tend to
move into informality first. With regard to the size of the income losses, the
estimation results for wages and profit functions indicate that the income loss of
moving into informality is higher for more educated individuals, at least in absolute
terms, when they move into an existing household enterprise. However, it may also
happen that establishing an informal enterprise increases earnings for a skilled
individual—conditional of course on other individual characteristics. For an
unskilled individual, by contrast, moving into informality will always imply an
income loss.
Overall, Lay et al. (2008) find that the gas boom has both unequalising and
equalising distributional impacts that tend to offset each other. As net distributional
change is limited, growth generated by the boom also reduces poverty and the boom
hence does not completely bypass the poorer parts of the Bolivian population.
Poverty reduction with little distributional change can be observed despite increas-
ing informality. Additional stylized micro-simulations by Lay et al. (2008) illustrate
that lower formal employment can lead to a significant rise in urban poverty and
that the very poor are affected most by increasing informality. Yet, considerable
overall increases in informal profits compensate this possible negative impact.
3.3 Strengths and Weaknesses
The macro-micro approach presented above and illustrated by the two case studies
brings together two strands of literature, macro models, here applied CGE models,
on the one hand, and microeconometric poverty and distributional analyses, on the
other, which were largely separated from each other. While CGE analyses tend to
suffer from being too stylized and not being well informed by micro data, poverty
and distributional analyses are often merely descriptive and lack an assessment of
the causes of distributional change and the related transmission channels. The
sequential approach that combines a CGE model and a behavioral micro-simulation
attempts to get the best out of these two “modeling worlds.”15
A general advantage of a sequential over more complex models is its tractability:
While it remains tractable both at the macro and the micro level, it still allows for
sufficiently detailed and disaggregated analyses. This is of course more so when the
micro model has behavioral components. The case studies above have illustrated
the value added of introducing behavior or “individual fixed effects” into the micro-
simulation model. In such a micro-simulation, the poverty and distributional impact
of policies, as in reality, depend on the characteristics of the households or even
individuals.
15This section borrows heavily from Lay (2007).
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However, getting the best of two fairly different modeling worlds comes at the
cost of a lack of both theoretical and empirical consistency. Sequentially combining
a macro and micro model typically implies the imposition of a number of ad-hoc
assumptions that are not satisfying from a theoretical perspective. While the
“degree of consistency” between the macro and the micro model however differs
between applications, the combined model will lack the theoretical consistency of a
general equilibrium model and it is difficult—if not impossible—to resolve all the
data discrepancies between national accounts, on the one hand, and household
survey data, on the other. Individual responses from estimated relationships may
not be conforming to theoretical expectations and the combined model may have
leakages—in contrast to the consistent system of flows of an applied CGE model.
Theoretically, changes in the behavior of economic agents are driven by relative
price changes, whereas the micro-simulation typically only features a reduced-form
representation of labor market behavior where prices do not appear as explanatory
variables. Empirically, problems arise from the large differences in national
accounts and household data, in particular with regard to labor value added,
although some authors, e.g. Robilliard et al. (2002), manipulate survey weights to
reach “empirical consistency.”
Furthermore, quite a few economists may argue that the combination of an
applied CGE model with a micro-simulation based on a reduced-form labor market
representation may not be a good idea after all. Both types of models suffer from
serious shortcomings and combining the two may compound these problems by
adding new problems and distracting the researcher from the shortcomings of the
“single” models. This is a critique that should be taken seriously. From our own
experience in building sequential models, we have become increasingly aware that
the additional problems that arise from combining the models, for example in terms
of empirical consistency, leave less time for the scrutiny needed to estimate a
household income generation model from household survey data or less time to
do the sensitivity analyses so often called for in applied CGE analyses (Harrison
et al. 1993). We therefore dedicate the following paragraphs to the weaknesses of
the single components of a combined macro-micro model without, however,
forgetting about their strengths.
The shortcomings of the income generation models are very specific to the
respective application and they are discussed at length elsewhere, for example in
Bourguignon et al. (2005b). We just want to highlight two typical problems:
Selectivity and parameter validity. Estimating earnings equations that correspond
to different sectoral or occupational choices entail selection problems. In the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity, for example in terms of entrepreneurial
ability, it is fairly likely the same unobserved characteristics that make you choose
a specific sector also determine the earnings in the respective sector. This selection
on unobservables biases the coefficients of an Ordinary Least Squares estimation of
the respective equations and would have to be accounted for. It is not trivial to
correct for selectivity bias, although the so-called Heckman correction or one of its
variants is very common in applied work. To be empirically valid, however, an
instrument is needed that explains the sectoral choice, but not earnings in the
respective sectors. Such a variable is typically very difficult to find.
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There may also be reasons for challenging the validity of the estimated param-
eters in the household income generation model. Typically, the behavioral equa-
tions, e.g. those governing occupational choices, are estimated from cross-sectional
data. It is hence assumed that the observed variation in behavior between individ-
uals is used to simulate behavioral change of (other) individuals in time, for
example in the Bolivian case study.16 The Brazilian model relies on employment
histories and therefore avoids this problem, but the type of information used reflects
to a certain extent short-term behavior. Even if panel data was available, constant
parameters would have to be assumed for the simulation period, which apparently
becomes an increasingly problematic assumption the longer time horizon of the
analysis.
Despite these problems, micro-simulation models based on household income
generation models provide a powerful tool to assess the final distributional impact
of changes in “distributional drivers,” as they reflect the welfare implications of
discrete changes in individual behavior, such as labor market entry or sectoral
movements. The impact of individual transitions out of agriculture in the Brazil
study demonstrates the possible magnitude of these discrete individual changes on
household welfare. Finally, it should be stressed that the household income gener-
ation models of the type presented in this paper have been shown to do fairly well in
reproducing historical patterns of poverty and distributional change (Lay 2007).
The applications from above both use CGE models to trace the transmission
channels and quantify the magnitude of the effects of the respective shock.
Although widely applied, these models have been criticized for a number of
reasons. Analytically, most CGE models rely on the neoclassical framework,
although a number of structural characteristics and rigidities are incorporated in
most developing country applications. Whether and how structural characteristics
and rigidities are taken into account differs between country applications and the
research question at hand, as illustrated by the case studies above. Two areas where
applied CGE models do not capture the economic realities very well, are the rural
and the urban informal sector. It is well known that neoclassical price setting and
supply responses in agriculture, is at best a very rough approximation of the reality
in most developing countries. In addition, disaggregated input-output data for
agriculture are typically not available and agricultural surveys suffer from a lot of
problems related to measurement, seasonality, and temporary shocks. Furthermore,
the insights from agricultural household models regarding non-separability of
production and consumption in rural households (Singh et al. 1986) have not yet
entered standard models.17 More research effort also needs to be dedicated to
modeling the informal urban sector. Its heterogeneity in terms of technology,
16Although this assumption seems to be very restrictive, it can be plausibly made e.g. in the
context of occupational choices, which are explained mainly by individual educational attainment,
age, and household composition variables.
17See Lofgren and Robinson (1999), who integrate a rural household model into a standard CGE
model, for an exception.
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import penetration, export orientation, and linkages to the formal sector are not
reflected in applied CGE models.
However, even with all these improvements, eventually the results of a CGE
model will be driven by the assumptions made.18 Econometricians challenge the
empirical relevance of applied CGE models on grounds of the calibration technique
based on very restricted functional forms, typically (nested) CES functions.
McKitrick (1998) shows the choice of the functional form to make a considerable
difference in the results. Yet, in the developing country context, data to estimate
these functions is typically not available and the calibration approach overcomes
these data restrictions. Furthermore, it is well known that model results are very
sensitive to the assumed trade and production elasticities. Harrison et al. (1993)
therefore suggest to perform systematic sensitivity analyses and to provide confi-
dence intervals for the results. Such sensitivity analyses, however, are not common
in applied work.
Finally, an assessment of the validity of CGE model results also depends on the
purpose of the model. If the analysis is expected to provide a precise numerical
estimate of the effects of a specific policy change, the above criticisms have to be
taken very seriously. In contrast, if CGE models are seen as a rather stylized, yet
empirically underpinned, analytical tool to better understand the transmission
channels of a shock through counterfactual analysis and approximate their relative
importance, the critique is less relevant. This is not to say that the numbers resulting
from CGE models are without meaning. They should be taken as the results of a
model, given a specific set of assumptions.19
4 Conclusions
We have presented and discussed a sequential methodology that combines a
macroeconomic CGE model with a behavioral micro-simulation. More specifically,
we have shown how micro-simulations based on household income generation
models allow the researcher to incorporate individual fixed effects into macro-
micro analysis. This is achieved by linking aggregate drivers of poverty and
distributional change, such as wages and sectoral employment, to a micro-
simulation that is being “forced” to reproduce the changes given by the macro
18See De Maio et al. (1999) and the reply by Sahn et al. (1999) for an exemplary discussion on
specific aspects of CGE models applied to developing countries. These aspects include the
macroeconomic and labor market closures as well as the assumption on price setting mechanisms.
De Maio et al. (1999) challenge the results of a study by Sahn et al. (1997) on the poverty impacts
of structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Africa as reflecting only the assumptions made in the CGE
models, and not reality.
19In some CGE applications, including some of those presented in this paper, there is a tendency to
treat CGE results as forecasts.
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model. We also explain common empirical operationalizations of this link and the
micro-simulation procedures commonly used in the literature.
The presented sequential macro-micro approach has been illustrated using two
case studies that examine the poverty and distributional impact of macroeconomic
shocks, the typical research and policy research to which this kind of model is and
should be applied. Examples from these applications have demonstrated the impor-
tance of individual heterogeneity in the analysis of these shocks and have
underpinned the value added of such methods with behavioral components.
Beyond its ability to capture individual heterogeneity, one of the merits of the
approach is its flexibility. However, this flexibility—embodied in a number of fairly
ad-hoc assumptions—comes at the cost of theoretical inconsistency. While the
macro models rely on consistent theoretical frameworks, the reduced-form models
underlying the micro-simulation do not fulfill the requirements, for example in
terms of functional forms. Furthermore, empirical inconsistency between national
accounts and household survey data that becomes apparent in macro-micro appli-
cations is known to be notorious (Round 2003; Robilliard and Robinson 2003).
Finally, we have argued that combining an applied CGE model and a micro-
simulation model does not resolve the problems associated to either of those
techniques. These problems include a number of typical microeconometric prob-
lems that arise from the estimation of income generation models, the basis of the
micro-simulation model. Similarly, CGE models suffer from well-known, often-
discussed, but less frequently addressed shortcomings. Despite these problems and
challenges, the alternative to the proposed models can only be a general equilibrium
model that incorporates heterogeneous individuals. As argued in the introduction,
researchers are still far from building an applied model based on a micro-based
general equilibrium theory. On the route to building such a model, it may be helpful
to improve existing macro-micro models through more and better validation exer-
cises. In addition, micro-simulations may also be linked to more different types of
general equilibrium models with a more explicit focus on the operation of labor
markets.
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Modeling and Evaluation of Political
Processes: A New Quantitative Approach
Christian Henning and Johannes Hedtrich
1 Introduction
A paradox of low political performance exists in many countries (i.e., suboptimal
policies persist despite the existence of specific policy instruments that could
generate more desirable outcomes). For example, many developing countries that
continue to depend largely on agriculture, particularly countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa, underinvest in this sector. Especially in areas of public investment that have
high returns in terms of growth and poverty reduction, such as agricultural research
and extension, public investments remain below the optimal level (Fan and Rao
2003). Accordingly, in addition to an understanding of socioeconomic responses to
new policies, avoiding suboptimal agricultural policy choices requires an under-
standing of the underlying political processes. An improved understanding of the
policy process, including the relevant political institutions and their link with the
overall political economy, is essential to determining how the participation of
stakeholder groups and the use of credible scientific evidence can be promoted in
the design and implementation of efficient, pro-poor agricultural strategies. Filling
this gap can help identify practical solutions and tools for reducing political
performance gaps and facilitate the implementation of improved policies for reduc-
ing poverty and promoting growth.
However, policy processes are complex and dynamic by nature; these processes
involve multiple actors (i.e., individuals and organizations) and are defined by
national political, social, cultural and institutional realities (e.g., constitutional
rules), bureaucratic structures and capacities, and the informal participation of
stakeholder organizations. Few studies have explicitly mapped these processes to
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explain the poor past performance of policy reforms and investment strategies,
particularly in the agricultural sector. Most of these studies have offered narratives
based on historical accounts, emphasizing the strong role of powerful personalities,
vested interests, corruption, and external pressures in influencing policy outcomes
(Clay and Schaffer 1984; Juma and Clark 1995; Keeley and Scoones 2003; Young
2005). However, theoretical approaches that analyze determinants of policy pro-
cesses and their impact on poor political performance also exist. One field of the
political economy literature holds that biased incentives are the main source of low
political performance. Biased political incentives result from asymmetric lobbying
activities (Grossman 1994) or biased voter behavior (Bardhan Mookherjee 2002).
Further, Persson and Tabellini (2000) emphasize the role of formal constitutional
rules as determinants of politician incentives for choosing inefficient policies.
In addition to biased incentives, the lack of adequate political knowledge has
also been considered as an explanation for the poor political performance of
countries. For example, Beilhartz and Gersbach (2004), Bischoff and Siemers
(2011) and Caplan (2007) emphasize the role of biased voter beliefs about policy
impacts as a main determinant of inefficient policy choices. Voter beliefs are
defined as agents’ simplified mental models to approximate the complex true
relation between policy instruments and induced policy outcomes. The work of
Caplan is highly recognized in the public choice literature, as he collects an
impressive amount of evidence for persistently biased voter beliefs. Based on his
empirical findings, Caplan draws the rather pessimistic conclusion that democratic
mechanisms of preference aggregation naturally lead to the choice of inefficient
policies. However, beyond voters, politicians and lobbyists may also fail to fully
understand the complex relation between policy instruments and desired policy
outcomes. Hence, the lack of political knowledge (i.e., biased policy beliefs) is
another important cause of policy failure.
In response to persisting policy failure in many developing countries, participa-
tory and evidence-based political processes are increasingly promoted as an omnip-
otent tool/mechanism for guaranteeing unbiased political incentives for political
agents and allowing the full use of all available political knowledge at both the
academic and practical levels. However, designing such ideal-typical policy pro-
cesses is challenging in political practice. An applicable model framework must
first be developed to not only enable a political diagnosis (i.e., the identification of
existing incentives and knowledge gaps) but also allow the development of a
political therapy (i.e., the derivation of adequate strategies for reducing the iden-
tified political performance gaps). The latter criterion requires quantitative model-
ing of political decisionmaking and policy learning processes, including the
endogenous formation of legislator’s political preferences and policy beliefs. In a
dynamic context, explaining the persistence of a lack of political knowledge
requires a further explanation of the reasons for which policy learning fails.
In this context, we suggest an evolutionary Computable General Political Econ-
omy Equilibrium Model (eCGPE) as a quantitative approach to modeling and
evaluating policy processes. This chapter is focused on the derivation of the
eCGPE approach, and the chapters that follow use the implementation of the
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Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) reform in
Malawi to demonstrate how the eCGPE approach can be applied empirically. This
chapter is structured as follows: we describe the main structure of an eCGPE
approach, then derive the individual modules of the eCGPE in detail, and conclude
by providing an outlook on future research.
2 The Evolutionary Computable General Political
Economy Equilibrium Model: An Overview
2.1 General Structure and Characterization of an eCGPE
The eCGPE (Henning and Struve 2008) basically follows the logic of a political
economy equilibrium, as proposed by Binswanger and Deininger (1997). This
framework makes it possible to examine the economic, political and institutional
factors that shape agricultural policy processes. Moreover, the framework allows
for the simulation of future policy developments under various economic, political
and institutional scenarios.
The CGPE model includes the following modules:
I. A legislative decisionmaking module describing how policy preferences are
aggregated to form a final policy choice γ.
II. An economic module describing the transformation of policies γ into
outcomes z.
III. An interest mediation module describing the transformation of society’s wel-
fare V(z) into political support W(V(z)) via electoral competition and
lobbying.
IV. A belief formation module describing how political agents and voters update
their political beliefs via communication.
A non-evolutionary (i.e., static) version of a CGPE model is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The evolutionary CGPE approach is a recursive dynamic model that combines the
static CGPE (i.e., modules I–IV) with a dynamic political belief updating and
adaptive policy learning model. Thus, the evolutionary CGPE approach includes
a fifth module:
V. A policy learning module describing how political agents and voters update
their political beliefs based on observational learning across time periods.
Figure 2 presents the eCGPE model. The derivation of an eCGPE includes five
stages: (1) Economic modeling of policy programs, (2) Modeling of voter behavior
and lobbying activities and the derivation of political support functions, (3) Deriva-
tion of agents’ policy preferences based on political beliefs, (4) Modeling of
legislative bargaining determined by agents’ policy preferences and constitutional
rules, (5) Modeling of belief updating based on observed policy outcomes and
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political communication in networks. The sections that follow will provide the
theoretical background required for deriving an eCGPE. However, we will first
explain how the tool can be used for policy process evaluation and design.
2.2 What Is the Purpose and Advantage of a Quantitative
Policy Analysis Tool?
Based on the empirically specified eCGPEmodel, policy processes can be analyzed,
i.e. a political diagnosis identifying political performance gaps can be under-
taken. Based on this diagnosis, alternative therapeutic strategies can be simulated.
Specifically, political diagnosis based on a calibrated eCGPE model includes the
following steps:
I. Identification of the political performance gap:
• Calculation of the political equilibrium path of sequential eCGPE solutions
γ∗∗, where γ∗∗ denotes the vector of policy instruments selected over a
given simulated time period.
• Calculation of an optimal policy γopt derived from the maximization of the
social welfare function W(z) subject to a “best-estimate” political
technology.
Fig. 1 Computable general political economy equilibrium. Source: Henning (2000)
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• Calculation of the total performance gap, which is measured as the differ-
ence: W (γopt∗)W(γ∗∗).
II. Identification of the source of the political performance gap:
• Calculation of the knowledge gap as the difference:WðγoptÞ Wðγ∗1 Þ, where
γ1
∗ is the policy outcome resulting from the eCGPE simulation runs, assum-
ing all politicians know the “best-estimate” political technology.
• Calculation of incentive gaps as the difference:WðγoptÞ Wðγ∗2 Þ, where γ2∗
is the policy outcome resulting from the eCGPE simulation runs, assuming
all politicians have unbiased support functions that correspond to the social
welfare functions.
III. Identification of the main determinants of performance gaps:
• Impact of formal legislative rules and informal lobbying networks
– Simulating policy outcomes and the corresponding political performance
under various legislative rules.
– Simulating policy outcomes and the corresponding political performance
under various lobbying network structures.
• Impact of policy beliefs of politicians and stakeholders
– Simulating policy outcomes and the corresponding political performance
under various political belief formation mechanisms (i.e., changed political
communication networks).
• Impact of policy beliefs of voters
– Simulating policy outcomes and the corresponding political performance
under various mass political belief formation mechanisms (i.e., changing
political communication network structures of different voter groups).
• Impact of innovative policy evaluation and monitoring systems
– Simulating policy learning and implied political performance, assuming
the implementation of an effective Monitoring & Evaluation system.
3 Theoretical Background of the eCGPE
3.1 Module I: Legislative Decisionmaking
A policy decision is the result of legislative bargaining among a set of legislators
g2Ng with heterogeneous policy preferences Ug(γ).
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Technically, the political decisionmaking model corresponds to the mapping of
legislators’ policy preferences, Ug, and constitutional rules for legislative
decisionmaking, φ, into the final policy decision, γ∗:
γ∗ ¼ Γ Ug γð Þ;φð Þ, ð1Þ
where the properties of the function Γ correspond to a specific political
decisionmaking model. A number of different models have been proposed [see
for example the literature review of Binswanger and Deininger (1997)]. In partic-
ular, two models have become work horse models in political economy: the
legislative bargaining model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) and the interest group
model of Grossman (1994). While the latter model has been frequently applied in
empirical studies of agricultural protection (Anderson 2010; Rausser et al. 2011),
the former model has become a work horse model in theoretical studies of com-
parative political economy. However, one advantage of the Baron/Ferejohn model
(BF model) is that political decisionmaking is explicitly modeled as a collective
decision of many legislators, where constitutional legislative decisionmaking rules
are explicit determinants of final political decisions. In contrast, the Grossman/
Helpman model (GH model) focuses on the government or a state agency as a
common agent controlling policy choices. Accordingly, this model neglects funda-
mental collective choice problems that are inherent in real political
decisionmaking. The advantage of the GH model compared to the BF model is
that it can be applied empirically; in contrast, the BF model is a complicated game-
theoretical model that cannot be easily applied to real legislative systems.
To combine the advantages of both of these approaches, we suggest a cooper-
ative legislative bargaining model, which can be derived from a modified
non-cooperative legislative bargaining model of the Baron-Ferejohn type (Henning
2009). In the following, we briefly describe the main components of the legislative
bargaining model; for a more detailed description of the model, we refer the
interested reader to our previous work (Henning 2009; Pappi and Henning 1998).
Finally, the integration of the GH model into the modified legislative bargaining
model is described below in the section that describes Module III.
3.1.1 The Mean Voter Rule
Each agent has spatial preferences, where bγg denotes agent g’s ideal policy position
(i.e., the policy he or she wants to be implemented). However, based on constitu-
tional rules, individual legislators need the support of a winning coalition to make
their ideal policy positions the final policy choice. Hence, legislative bargaining
corresponds to a competition that involves the formation of winning coalitions
among political agents. Following the seminal approach of Baron and Ferejohn
(1989), we assume that legislative bargaining is a sequential procedure, as
described in Fig. 3.
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Thus, in each bargaining round, a legislator is randomly selected to formulate a
policy proposal. This proposal is submitted to the complete legislature for a
majority vote. If the proposal wins a majority of votes, it becomes the new policy;
if the proposal fails to win a majority of the votes, the legislative bargaining
procedure continues (i.e., a new legislator is randomly selected to formulate a
proposal, and the process starts over). However, in contrast to the original BF
model, we make two different assumptions. First, we assume that voting on a
submitted policy proposal is probabilistic and not deterministic, as assumed by
Baron and Ferejohn. In the general approach, the voting probabilities of individual
legislators for or against a policy proposal are derived from a probabilistic utility
function. To demonstrate the main implications of this assumption, we assume for
simplicity in this paper that each legislator h votes for any policy proposal γg with a
fixed probability Pgh¼ 0.5. Second, following Henning (2000), we assume that the
time to draw a legislative decision is typically limited. This assumption implies that
the legislature will not consider proposals regarding a specific decision infinitely.
Thus, ex post the number of proposals that have been made is always limited, while
the number of proposals that will be considered is ex ante not known by individual
legislators. Therefore, it is assumed that after each round, there exists a fixed
probability pT that legislative bargaining continues (i.e., another round will
occur). Thus, after each round, the legislative decision procedure stops with a
probability (1 pT) and the status quo policy sustains.
As we previously described in more detail (Henning 2000), the outcome of the
modified BF model corresponds to a lottery of the ideal points of individual
legislators and the status quo, where the ex ante probability that the ideal point of
an individual legislator g will be the outcome of the non-cooperative bargaining is
determined by the constitutional rules, and the probability that the legislative
Fig. 3 Game-tree of the modified non-cooperative legislative bargaining game of Baron/
Ferejohn. Source: Henning (2000)
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bargaining procedure continues, pT. Let Qg denote the ex ante probability that agent
g succeeds in forming a winning coalition for her policy proposal, while Qs denotes
the probability that the outcome of the legislative bargaining is the status quo “s”.
Under these specific assumptions, the outcome of non-cooperative legislative
bargaining corresponds to a lottery over agents’ ideal positions and the status
quo, where Qg and Qs equal the probability that agent g’s ideal policy and the
status quo s are selected as the final policy choice, respectively. Assuming that
politicians are risk-averse, non-cooperative legislative bargaining is rather ineffi-
cient. Hence, agents have an incentive to agree ex ante on cooperative policy
formulation mechanisms that guarantee each political agent a higher pay-off.
In particular, it is straightforward to demonstrate that assuming risk-averse
legislators, the following mean voter decision rule is a cooperative decisionmaking
procedure that ex ante guarantees each individual legislator a higher expected
utility than the expected utility derived from the lottery outcome of the








Qhγh þ Qss: ð2Þ
Although the mean voter decision rule is ex ante Pareto-dominant compared to
non-cooperative legislative bargaining, the mean voter decisionmaking rule does
not generally lead to a Pareto-optimal outcome. In particular, from the viewpoint of
a legislative majority, the mean voter decision might still be improved. As can be
seen from our simple example below, this assertion follows from two facts. First,
even if it is assumed that the legislature continues bargaining with a high proba-
bility (i.e., pT is significantly larger than 0.5), the ex ante probability that the
outcome of legislative bargaining will be the status quo is still not negligible.
Thus, the mean voter position implies that the new policy is still relatively close
to the status quo, where the status quo bias does not necessarily correspond to
legislatures preferences but results from the fact that the legislature is busy and has
only limited time for bargaining on a specific decision. Second, even if the
probability Qs is very low, the mean voter might still be rather inefficient due to
the fact that the relative preference intensities for different policy dimensions of
different legislators have not been sufficiently taken into account. This scenario is
illustrated in Fig. 4, where the mean voter position remains quite distant from the
Pareto frontier. Accordingly, Henning (2000) discussed two alternative mecha-
nisms by which legislators can improve the mean voter outcome. As demonstrated
in Fig. 4, changing the status quo policy can be considered a two-step procedure,
where legislators agree on the direction in which the status quo policy will be
shifted in the first step and agree on the distance the status quo policy is shifted
towards the agreed direction in the second step. In this context, we suggest the
following cooperative policy formulation mechanisms. In a first step, legislators
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agree on the direction in which the status quo policy will be shifted. In particular, at





φgbγg  γ0: ð3Þ
Δγ∗ denotes the collectively selected direction, where
P
g
φgbγg is the mean voter
position that corresponds to a compromise of legislators’ ideal positions. φg corre-




that the proposal of a legislator will be the
outcome of the non-cooperative legislative bargaining procedure. Hence, φg is
determined by formal constitutional rules φ and φg can be interpreted as the relative
political power of a legislator. Technically, under our simplified assumptions, φg
equals the ratio of the number of winning coalitions in which an agent g is a
member and the sum of these numbers for all relevant political agents. Please
note that under this assumption, the political power φg is quite similar to the
classical normalized Coleman-Banzhaf voting power index (Henning et al. 2006).
Given the directionΔγ∗, legislators decide on the distance λγ at the second stage via
voting. As long as legislators’ policy preferences, Ug(γ), are quasi-concave, it
follows that legislators have single-peaked preferences regarding the distance λγ.
Accordingly, at the second stage, a unique voting equilibrium outcome results.1
Fig. 4 Utility frontier of a modified non-cooperative legislative bargaining game of the Baron/
Ferejohn type. Source: Author
1The proof of single-peakedness is straightforward (Shepsle 1979). Further, please note that even
if alternative and more complex voting mechanisms than simple majority voting are assumed, a
unique equilibrium outcome results as long as legislators have single-peaked preferences.
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3.1.2 How the Mean Voter Rule Works: An Illustrative Example
To demonstrate how this model works, we use a simple example comprised of five
legislators g ¼ 1, .., 5. The legislature must make a two dimensional policy choice,
where j ¼ 1,2 denote the index of the two policy dimensions (e.g., the policy
dimension 1 corresponds to a policy program promoting technical progress in the
agricultural sector, while policy dimension 2 corresponds to a policy program
promoting technical progress in the non-agricultural sector). Each legislator has a
spatial utility function, where Ug γð Þ ¼ 
P2
j¼1 θgj γ  bγg 2.
Following the non-cooperative legislative bargaining model of Baron and
Ferejohn, legislators are randomly selected, where qg¼ 0.2 is the probability that
a legislator g is selected to formulate a policy proposal. Legislators vote on a
suggested policy proposal with a simple majority, where legislators have different
voting weights, wg. Hence, a proposal is accepted if the sum of the voting weights of
the legislators voting in favor of the proposal exceeds 0.5. For simplicity, we
assume that legislators always vote in favor of their own proposal with probability
1 and that legislators vote with a probability of 0.5 for any other policy proposal2.
Based on these assumptions, the probability that the proposal suggested by a
legislator g will be accepted by a legislative majority depends on the number of
winning coalitions of which the proposing legislator is a member. In detail, let wc
denote the index of a winning coalition and WC denote the set of all winning
coalitions (i.e., all subsets of legislators for which the following holds:
∑g2wcwg> 0.5). The number of winning coalitions, ncg, of which a legislator g is
a member depends on her voting weight. The voting weights assumed for legislators
in our simple example are presented in Table 1. Thus, the number of winning
coalitions of which an individual legislator is a member can be calculated as
presented in Table 1. Further, given our assumptions, the probability that a specific
winning coalition is formed uniquely equals 0.54 for all winning coalitions.
Accordingly, the conditional probability that the proposal of a legislator g who
was selected to formulate a proposal becomes the final policy outcome can be
represented as: Pg¼∑i2wc0.54¼ ncg0.54. Please note that under these specific
assumptions, legislators will always propose their ideal policy when selected to
formulate a proposal.
Furthermore, given the structure of the modified legislative bargaining game, the
ex ante probability Qs that the status quo will be the policy outcome is (for further
details, see Henning 2000):
2Please note that in the original approach suggested by Henning (2000), the legislators’ probability
of voting for or against a proposal are endogenously derived from a probabilistic utility function.
To simplify the analysis in this paper, we assume that legislators vote for any proposal with a fixed
probability of 0.5.
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Qs ¼
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As demonstrated in Table 1, given the assumed voting weights, we can calculate
the equilibrium outcome of the modified BF model. Further, we can calculate the
mean voter position (i.e., the direction in which the status quo will be shifted).
Finally, given the direction Δγ∗ ¼ (0.127, 0.070), we can also calculate the
legislators’ preferred distance λg
4:











coalitions PT Pg Qg
Power
(φ)
1 0.2 0.5 0.36 12 0.750 0.206 0.245
2 0.2 0.5 0.35 11 0.688 0.189 0.224
3 0.2 0.5 0.15 10 0.625 0.172 0.204
4 0.2 0.5 0.08 8 0.500 0.137 0.163
5 0.2 0.5 0.06 8 0.500 0.137 0.163
Status-
quo
0 0 0 0 0.160 0.000
Total 1 1 49 0.70 1.000 1
Source: Author









4Please note that Eq. (6) directly follows from the maximization of agent’s g spatial policy
preferences, assuming each policy proposal must lie on the line connecting the status quo to the
mean voter position.




θgj bγgj  γ0j Δγ∗jP
j
θgj Δγ∗j
h i2 : ð6Þ
The voting outcome at the second stage corresponds to the preferred distance of
the median legislator, where the median legislator is the legislator for whom it holds
that the sum of the voting weights of legislators preferring a lower distance and the
sum of the voting weights of legislators preferring a higher distance are both lower
than 0.5. In our example, legislator 1 is the median legislator (i.e., the outcome in
the second step will be to shift the policy by a distance λ∗¼ 1.598). Accordingly,
the final policy outcome of our bargaining equilibrium will be (see also Table 2 and
Fig. 4):
γ∗ ¼ γ0 þ λ∗Δγ∗ ¼ 0þ 1:598∗0:480, 0:360 ¼ 0:768; 0:567ð Þ ð7Þ
Please note that our example demonstrates the inefficiency of non-cooperative
bargaining (e.g., in Fig. 4, the mean voter position remains rather distant from the
Pareto frontier). In general, policy outcomes are stochastic under non-cooperative
bargaining (i.e., risk-averse legislators prefer the mean voter rule as a deterministic
cooperative decisionmaking procedure). Further, legislators are less able to coor-
dinate their actions under the one-step mean voter rule than under the two-step
procedure (e.g., legislators collectively prefer a shift of the status quo beyond the
mean voter position (i.e., λg is larger than 1 for all legislators) (see Table 2).
3.1.3 Endogenous Derivation of Legislators’ Policy Preferences
To calculate legislative bargaining outcomes, the policy preferences of legislators
must be known. Legislators’ spatial policy preferences Ug(γ) are derived from
political support maximization:
Table 2 Outcomes of the simple voting game example
Player
Policy position Policy interest Direction Final Outcome
Issue 1 Issue 2 Issue 1 Issue 2 λ Issue 1 Issue 2
1 1 0 0.7 0.3 1.678
2 1 0 0.65 0.35 1.598
3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.166
4 0 1 0.2 0.8 1.922
5 0 1 0.3 0.7 1.576
Status quo 0 0
Total 0.480 0.360 1.598 0.768 0.576
Source: Author
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Ug γð Þ ¼ Max Wg zð Þ T z; γð Þ  0jf g, ð8Þ
where Wg(z) denotes the political support function and T(z, γ) denotes the political
technology transforming policy γ into political outcomes z.bγg denotes legislator g’s
ideal point [i.e., the policy that maximizes Eq. (8)]. The political technology T is
determined by the economic system and is modeled in Module II, while the political
support function W is determined by voter behavior and lobbying activities, as
described below in the section that describes Module III.
In most existing legislative decisionmaking models, legislators’ preferences are
exogenously given. However, to derive legislators’ spatial policy preferences
endogenously from the political support maximization in Eq. (8), we apply a second
order Taylor approximation developed at the legislator’s ideal position:





θgjk γj  bγgj  γk  bγgk : ð9Þ
θgjk are the weighting factors of the interaction term of the deviation of the
policies j and k, which are technically derived from the second order derivations of
the maximization problem in Eq. (8). Please note that this approach for deriving
endogenous policy preferences follows Henning and Struve (2008) and that similar
approaches exist in the literature (de Gorter and Swinnen 1998; Fafchamps et al.
1993). However, the latter approaches fail to derive complete endogenous policy
preferences for individual political agents and integrate them directly into a legis-
lative decisionmaking model.
A simple approach for deriving endogenous policy preferences results from a
linear approximation of the political technology:
T z; γð Þ : z ¼ z0 1þ wzð Þ , wz ¼ AΔγ þ a0 ð10Þ
a0 denotes the vector of the growth rates of policy concerns z, which are realized
assuming the status quo policy sustains, while AΔγ¼A(γ γ0) denotes the vector
of growth rates of policy concerns z, which are induced by a change from the status
quo policy γ0 to the policy γ.
Please note that the linear approximation of the political technology (i.e., the
matrix A) changes with changing economic framework conditions. Hence, the
impact of different economic framework conditions (e.g., changed world market
prices) on endogenous policy preferences can be analyzed within this approach
(Henning and Struve 2008).
Overall, legislators’ policy preferences depend not only on political technology
but also on the properties of the political support function (i.e., voter behavior and
lobbying activities), which we will discuss in further detail in Module III below.
Finally, as we will discuss in more detail in Module IV below, we assume that
legislators have very limited knowledge regarding the true political technology.
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Accordingly, legislators form political beliefs to approximate the unknown political
technology.
3.2 Module II: Transformation of Policy Choices into Policy
Outcomes
3.2.1 Computable General Equilibrium Model (CGE)
The economic module corresponds to any economic model that characterizes the
general structure and economic responses of the national economy that is under
consideration to policy changes. By default, we use the standard recursive dynamic
CGE model suggested by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)
(L€ofgren 2001). As the model is fully described elsewhere, we will not provide a
detailed description of the model here. Interested readers are recommended to read
the relevant literature (L€ofgren 2001).
3.2.2 Policy Impact Function
The core of a standard CGE application corresponds to the simulation of shocks,
where shocks are defined as exogenous shifts in policies or economic framework
conditions. To simulate policies within a CGE approach, the policies must be
implemented into the CGE model. Some policies (e.g., direct and indirect taxes
or tariffs) are already directly implemented in the standard CGE model. However,
other policies, (e.g., structural adjustment policies, policy programs aiming to
increase technical progress in economic sectors or policies aiming to improve
market access for enterprises [i.e., reducing transaction costs]), must be translated
into CGE parameters. Dynamic CGE models explicitly incorporate parameters
representing sector-specific technical progress, as well as sector-specific transaction
costs, subsidy payments and tariffs (see L€ofgren 2001). While modeling the impact
of technical progress in different economic sectors on the growth of the average
per-capita income, on income distribution and on poverty is straightforward, the
translation of different policy instruments into sector-specific technical progress or
transaction costs is by no means straightforward within a CGE approach.
In this context, we suggest the implementation of a policy impact function. This
function is defined as a transformation of policy instruments into relevant CGE
parameters that correspond to sector-specific technical progress or transaction
costs. Specifically, let β denote the vector of relevant CGE-parameters
corresponding to sector-specific technical progress or transaction costs, while γ
denotes the vector of relevant policy instruments. We then define a policy impact
function as the mapping of policy instruments into relevant CGE parameters:
β¼PIF(γ).
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To demonstrate how policy impact functions can be applied within the frame-
work of our CGPE approach, we focus below on technical progress, which is a
major determinant of future poverty reduction and economic growth (Diao et al.
2007; Fan and Rosegrant 2008). Fan and Rosegrant (2008) emphasize that many
African countries spend far too little on the promotion of technical progress in the
agricultural sector compared to the non-agricultural sector. The overall effective-
ness of total spending depends on the allocation of funds across different policy
programs. For example, within the Comprehensive Agricultural Development Plan,
four different pillars are specified, including a wide range of policy programs (for
details, see Chapter “The Formation of Elite Communication Networks in Malawi:
A Bayesian Econometric Approach” below). Moreover, total welfare is also deter-
mined by the provision of public goods, such as health, education and other social
services. Therefore, at the country level, the overall budget allocation must include
the distribution of total financial resources to policy programs promoting economic
growth in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, as well as the allocation of
financial resources for the provision of public goods. For example, Badiane et al.
(2011) clearly demonstrate that budget allocation among policies promoting future
economic growth and the provision of public goods has a significant impact on
present and future welfare developments.
Thus, to identify optimal government budget allocations that promote maximal
economic growth within our CGPE framework, we suggest the following two-stage
policy impact function approach. Total government expenditure Bgov results as the





The effective impact of total government spending on the technical progress tps
that is realized in a specific economic sector s depends on the allocation of spending
across policy programs. All other things being equal, technical progress in the
agricultural sector is higher with higher spending on agricultural policy programs.
However, total agricultural spending is subdivided across different agricultural
policy programs. For example, within CAADP, four key focus areas for agricultural
improvement and investment are formulated: (1) Sustainable Land and Water
Management, (2) Market Access, (3) Food Supply and Hunger, and (4) Agricultural
Research. To account for the effects of different policy programs p2P on the
technological progress realized in a specific sector s, the following two-stage policy
impact functions PIFs(γ) are defined for each sector s:
PIFsðγÞ ¼ tps
expðasBef fs  bsÞ
1þ expðasBef fs  bsÞ
, ð12Þ
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According to the assumed two-stage function, it follows that for each sector, an












shsp ¼ 1: ð14Þ
Assuming that ωs is accordingly normalized implies that for an optimal
budget allocation, the effective budget equals total budget
Beffs γð Þ ¼ Btot γð Þ ¼
P
p
γp. In contrast, for any nonoptimal budget allocation, the
effective budget is lower than the total budget. At the lower stage, budget allocation
is transformed into effective budget allocation following a CES-function specifica-
tion. At the upper stage, an effective budget is translated into technical progress
according to a logistic function (i.e., the maximal technical progress that can be
achieved via governmental policy is determined by tps, where the marginal impact
of additional effective budget spending is diminishing and approximates zero for a
sufficiently large effective budget). Please note that optimal budget allocation
across the total set of policy programs varies across different sectors. This scenario
implies that the same budget allocation across policy programs in different sectors
translates into different effective budgets that induce different rates of technical
progress tp.
The suggested policy impact function basically follows the work of Fan and
Zhang (2004). However, in contrast to that original approach, our two-stage
approach is more general and implies a nonlinear relationship between governmen-
tal spending and induced sectoral growth. Moreover, this approach explicitly
considers the composition of budget spending for different policy programs. Fur-
ther, a similar approach was also suggested by Bourguignon et al. (2008a, b) in their
MAM model (Maquette for MDG Simulations), which models the impact of
different policy instruments on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
3.3 Module III: Interest Mediation Module
Module III captures the two main channels for the mediation of society’s interests
in a democracy: electoral competition and lobbying. We apply a modified Baron-
Grossman Helpman model to simultaneously capture both voter behavior and
lobbying activities.
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3.3.1 Modeling Voter Behavior
Voter behavior corresponds to voters’ electoral response to governmental policies.
According to the probabilistic voter theory, electoral competition implies that
legislator g’s political support functions, Wg(z), correspond to the weighted social







In Eq. (15), v denotes the index of voter groups and wgv dentoes the political
weight of an individual voter v for the political agent g. In general, the probability
that a voter of group v votes for a candidate or party in an election depends on the
expected utility Vv(z) that the voter perceives assuming the candidate will be
elected.
In a perfect political world, electoral competition would be based on the policy
platforms, γA and γB, suggested by candidates A and B, respectively. Voters would
evaluate candidates based on their policy platform (i.e., voters transform policy
platforms into their individual welfare according to the political technology, T(Z, γ),
and vote for the candidate whose policy platform implies the highest utility).
However, because in the real world, the transformation of policies into welfare is
rather complex, the calculation of expected utility is also rather complex from the
viewpoint of individual voters. Hence, voters apply simple heuristics to estimate
their expected utility.
In general, voters apply different types of policy and non-policy indicators to
estimate the expected future utility, assuming a candidate is elected. Non-policy-
oriented indicators correspond to the concept of valence (Groseclose 2001; Scho-
field 2004; Stokes 1963), which is based on specific characteristics zI, such as
appearance, charisma, occupation or ethnicity. Based on these characteristics,
voters perceive a specific competence or popularity of candidates and parties.
Moreover, following Grossman and Helpman (1996), we also assume that voters
are at least partially swayed by the relative campaign spending of different parties.
These effects may reflect the influence of election advertisements or other efforts
made to mobilize support (e.g., election rallies, door-to-door visits by campaign
workers, etc.). Assuming, for simplicity, a two-party (i.e., two-candidate) setup
below implies that voters perceived the following utility based on non-policy
indicators and the relative campaign spending of the candidates:
V vI zI;C





gð Þ is the ideological component of voters’ perceived utility, where Cg
denotes the campaign spending of party g and Cg’ denotes the campaign spending of
party g’.
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In addition to non-policy indicators, voters also base their votes on policy
indicators. A set of policy indicators corresponds to the concept of retrospective
voting (Paldam and Nannestad 2000) (i.e., voters use observable welfare indicators
(e.g., income growth or other well-being indicators) that were realized in the past
period when an incumbent was in office to update their evaluation of the compe-
tence/popularity of the incumbent). Please note that retrospective voting can be
interpreted as reinforcement learning. Let V vR zrð Þ denote the retrospective compo-
nent of voters’ perceived utility.
To the extent that valence indicators and campaign spending are not correlated
with political competence, non-policy voting implies a bias. Moreover, non-policy
voting implies no incentives for legislators to prefer efficient policies. In contrast,
retrospective voting implies such incentives (i.e., based on retrospective voting,
support-maximizing legislators prefer policies that lead to a maximal observable
social welfare). However, retrospective voting becomes problematic when techno-
logical relations between policies and social welfare become more complex (e.g., if
time lags occur between the adoption of a policy and its impact on measurable
welfare indicators). Public investment in education is a good example, as these
investments will increase long-term welfare growth, but positive welfare impacts
will not be realized for a decade or more. In the short run, these investments might
even reduce welfare. Thus, assuming long-term welfare growth with short-term
costs, retrospective voting undermines the incentives for support-seeking legisla-
tors to implement long-term growth policy strategies. Analogously, the implemen-
tation of environmental policies that promote sustainable welfare growth in the long
run might be undermined by retrospective voting.
Therefore, a third component that determines voter choices corresponds to
voters’ perceived utility that is derived directly from the observed policy platforms
of candidates. However, voters have very limited knowledge regarding the true
political technology. Accordingly, voters form beliefs (i.e., they apply simple
mental models that approximate the true political technology).
In particular, we assume that voters reduce the multi-dimensional policy space γ
to a lower dimensional macro-policy space zp. For example, pro-poor growth policy
or agricultural-driven growth can be interpreted as macro-policy strategies. Specific
policies γ (e.g., agricultural sector polices, as defined within CAADP) can be
mapped into these strategies. At a second stage, voters transform macro-policies
into utility, again applying simple linear mapping as a mental model. Under these
assumptions, the policy-oriented component of voters’ utility can be represented by
a spatial utility function V vp zp
 
, which is defined in the macro-policy space.
Overall, voter behavior is determined by the importance of the non-policy,
retrospective and policy-oriented components of voters’ perceptions of their utility,
which are derived from the election of different candidates or parties. In general, it
is possible to estimate the importance of the different utility components by
econometrically applying a probabilistic voter approach (for example, see Schofield
2007) Based on the empirically specified probabilistic voter model, we derive the
political support function of political agents as follows:
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0 zIð Þ þ V vR zRð Þ þ V vP zPð Þ
 þ χ Cg  Cg0 : ð17Þ
3.3.2 Lobbying Activities
Following the Grossman-Helpman model (1996), lobbying groups J ¼ 1,..,nJ
contribute to the campaign finances of the relevant parties; these contributions are
conditioned on party platforms C
g
J γ
gð Þ. The lobbying game has two stages. In the
first stage, the lobby offers nonnegative conditional contributions C
g
J γ
gð Þ. In a
second stage, each party selects a policy to maximize its vote share. In this stage,
a party g selects a policy γg to maximize:





J γð Þ s:t:T z; γð Þ ¼ 0: ð18Þ
Further, it can be demonstrated that when the lobbying game is in equilibrium,
each lobby group will select a support schedule for each party that induces a policy
choice to maximize the net expected utility of a contributing member. Because the
legislative bargaining among legislators is a lottery of legislators’ ideal points, the
net expected utility of changing party g’s platform can be expressed as:
φgVJ γ
gð Þ  1nJ C
g
J γ
gð Þ, where nJ denotes the number of members of interest group
J. Therefore, in this case, the policy choice bγ of a legislator g is selected to
maximize:







gð Þ s:t:T z; γð Þ ¼ 0: ð19Þ
Furthermore, in a one-shot game, as originally assumed by Grossman and
Helpman, interest groups have an incentive to renege on their contribution offers
once legislators have announced their platforms. Similarly, legislators have no
incentives to pursue their announced positions once the campaign contributions
have been paid. Hence, Grossman and Helpman motivate the keeping of premises
in a repeated game, where agents would be punished for failure to fulfill their
promises. However, even in a repeated game, the potential of agents to commit to
their premises is limited and the commitment power depends on the frequency of
interaction and the possibility of exchanging information with other agents regard-
ing the opportunistic behavior of an individual agent (Dixit 2003). Accordingly, as
long as both participation in the lobby game and reliable information relations with
other agents differ across lobby groups and legislators, it follows that not every
lobby group can engage in a lobby game with every legislator. Empirically, the
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access structures among lobbying groups and legislators can be measured via
corresponding political network data (Pappi and Henning 1998, 1999; Henning
2009). Formally different access structures are reflected in the relative weights, χ gJ .
3.4 Module IV: Belief Formation Module
To cope with complexity, laymen, politicians and representatives of interest groups
apply naive mental models to understand how policies translate into policy out-
comes (i.e., agents form political beliefs). Some scholars (Blendon et al. 1997;
Caplan 2002; Rhoads 1985; Walstad 1996) compared the policy beliefs of laymen
to the corresponding expert beliefs of trained economists. Based on comprehensive
statistical analyses, Caplan concluded that laymen beliefs systematically differ
from experts beliefs. In particular, Caplan concluded that these differences result
from judgmental anomalies of the general public. In contrast, on average, economic
experts hold unbiased and true beliefs. Interestingly, Caplan and other scholars
(Akerlof 1989; Caplan 2001; Sachs and Williamson 1994) further concluded that
political failure is more likely to be a byproduct of the electorate’s systematically
biased beliefs about economics than a product of special interest politics.
The mechanism by which actors form their beliefs is of interest. The modeling of
belief formation and belief updating has recently become an increasingly acknowl-
edged field of research in economics and social science (see Acemoglu and
Ozdaglar 2010; Golub and Jackson 2009; Jackson 2008). Following the relevant
literature, we distinguish two types of belief formation: observational and commu-
nication learning. Dynamic policy learning corresponds to observational learning,
where, as will be shown in detail below, from the viewpoint of an individual actor, it
often makes sense to combine observational learning and communication learning.
As will be shown in more detail in the following subsections, in our theory, a central
determinant of policy learning corresponds to communication structures among
agents, which are encapsulated in communication networks. The question of which
specific network structure implies effective policy learning and thereby guarantees
more efficient policy decisions is central to our theory. In this paper, we focus our
analysis on the belief updating of governmental and nongovernmental organiza-
tions, leaving the analysis of voter belief formation and updating for future work.5
5The main reason for not explicitly taking voter beliefs into account at this point follows from the
difficulty of collecting reliable data concerning voter communication networks and voter behavior
that allow for the estimation of the underlying voter beliefs and the process of voters’ belief
formation. However, the analysis of political elite networks is a well-established field in the
empirical policy network literature (Knoke et al. 1996; Henning 2009; Henning and Krampe
2011; Pappi and Henning 1998; Pappi and Henning 1999).
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3.4.1 Communication Learning
Collective belief formation via communication learning corresponds to the map-
ping of agents’ initial individual beliefs ~A0 into final beliefs, as follows: ~A ¼ϒ ~A0 ,
where ϒ corresponds to a specific communication mechanism. Following recent
studies (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2010; Golub and Jackson 2009), we assume that
agents form their beliefs via communication in local networks. To consider com-
munication structures, we define a binary networkM1 over a set of agents N, where
M1ij ¼ 1 indicates that agent i and agent j have an established communication tie.
Accordingly, we define the subset Mi ¼ j 2 N;M1ij ¼ 1
n o
as the neighborhood of
agent i and M¼ [mij] as a communication network, where mij> 0 indicates that
actor i pays attention to actor j. M is a stochastic matrix; for each actor, the sum of
the total weights equals 1:
X
j2Mi





Within one period, a political communication process occurs, where agents
repeatedly update their political beliefs by taking weighted averages of their
neighbors’ beliefs, with mij being the weight or trust that actor i places on the
current belief of agent j when forming his or her belief for the next period (see also
Golub and Jackson 2009). If we let r¼ 1 , . . ,R denote the communication round,
then it follows that:






Rewriting Eq. (21) results in the following:




with : mij ¼ mijð1 miiÞ,
ð22Þ
where ~A ri is the political belief of agent i that results after r communication rounds,
and A0i denotes agent i’s initial beliefs prior to communication. The parameter mii
represents the weight actor i puts on her own initial belief. AsM is row normalized
to one, (1mii) is the aggregated weight for all neighbors (i.e., the influence or
communication field of other agents). Writing Eq. (22) in matrix notation results in
the following, after further rearrangements:
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~A ¼ I  1 mdiag
 
M
 	1  mdiag  ~A0, ð23Þ
with bM ¼ I  1 mdiag  M 	1mdiag being the network multiplier, which is similar
to the Hubbell index (Hubbell 1965). Please note that the belief updating in Eq. (23)
corresponds to the Friedkin model (Friedkin and Johnsen 1990) and includes the
DeGroot model analyzed by Jackson 2008 as a special case. In particular, for any
row stochastic matrix bM, belief formation converges to a well-defined limit ~A.
Accordingly, the limit beliefs of each agent that are reached via communication
correspond to the weighted average of the initial beliefs of all agents prior to
communication ~A0, where the weight of agent j’s initial opinion ~A0j determining
agent i’s belief after communication ~Ai equals the element bmij of the multiplier
matrix bM. The multiplier bmij defines the field strength of agent j’s initial belief
operating on agent i’s final belief.
Note that the multiplier includes all communication loops among actors (i.e., all
direct and all indirect effects of j’s initial belief on the belief of agent i that result
from communication). Overall, the efficiency of communication learning is deter-
mined by the extent that communication network structures imply that the relative
weights of agents’ initial opinions correspond with the agents’ relative political
knowledge. For the deGroot model, this issue has been analyzed by Golub and
Jackson (2009) (see also Jackson 2008). Golub and Jackson (2009) demonstrated
that c.p, a random communication process (i.e., agents update their beliefs ran-
domly based on the communicated beliefs of all other actors) implies unbiased
beliefs, assuming the number of agents approximates infinity. In contrast, assuming
communication is structured in such a way that the weight of an individual agent
will not approximate zero when the number of agents approximates infinity implies
biased beliefs. However, Golub and Jackson failed to analyze the impact of
communication network structures on communication learning in finite societies.
Thus, in the following section, we will analyze this interesting relation by applying
a simple example.
4 Communication Networks and Policy Learning:
A Simple Example
To demonstrate how communication network structures impact the efficiency of
policy learning, consider the following simple example of a political elite system
comprised of the simple legislative system introduced above and five stakeholder
groups. The legislators are labeled L1 to L5, and the stakeholder groups are labeled
IG1 to IG5.
For simplicity, we assume that legislators must decide on the expenditure for a
specific policy program X. Let X correspond to financing for agricultural extension
services. The legislators and stakeholders are concerned about the impact of the
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policy program X on a political objective Z. Let Z be the reduction of poverty.
Assume that a simple linear technical relation describes the impact of
budget allocation to agricultural extension services X on poverty reduction Z:
Z¼ aX.
Further, assuming quasi-linear preferences V(Z,B):
V Z;Bð Þ ¼ Zη þ θ B Xð Þf g, ð24Þ
where B denotes the state budget and θ is a parameter determining the marginal
utility of budget expenditures. The optimal expenditure that results from the
maximization of V(Z,B) can be expressed as:
bX ¼ θ 1η1η 11ηa η1η: ð25Þ
All other things being equal, the more efficiently the program X impacts poverty
reduction (i.e., the larger a becomes), the larger is the amount of financial resources
that legislators want to invest into this program. For simplicity, we assume specific
parameter constellations (η¼ 0.5 and θ¼ 0.0625), such that it follows that: bX ¼ a.
As described above, the fundamental uncertainty of the technological impact of
policy programs on policy targets is a major problem in political decisionmaking.
Thus, agents must form beliefs. In particular, we assume that agents observe a
signal from which they derive their initial beliefs. The signals are independently but
not necessarily identically distributed. As a result, it holds that:
ai ¼ aþ εi: ð26Þ
εi is the bias, which is symmetrically distributed with a mean of zero and a
variance σ2i . Accordingly, the initial belief is a random variable bai that is distributed
with mean a and a finite variance σ2i . Thus, the expected error an agent makes when
deriving her policy position form her initial beliefs equals E εi2ð Þ ¼ σ2i .
Next, we analyze the manner in which belief updating via political communi-
cation, as described above, impacts the bias of legislators’ beliefs and the subse-
quent error that results for the preferred policy position, bX. As described above,
following our model of communication learning, the final belief of an individual
agent corresponds to a weighted mean of legislators’ initial beliefs, where the
weight of the position of an agent j for the final belief of agent i equals the network











bmijεj as the bias of agent i’s belief after communicational
learning. Then, the error an agent i makes when deriving his policy position from
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his final beliefs corresponds to the weighted sum of the individual errors of all
agents:
E Εið Þ2 ¼
X
j
bmij2 σ2j : ð28Þ
Hence, optimal weights (mij

















Please also note that if individual biases, εi, are drawn from an identical
distribution with variance σ2, it directly follows that the optimal weights equal
1 n= , where “n” is the number of political agents. Accordingly, communication
learning reduces the policy bias by an order of n when compared to an individual
updating. Specifically, it holds: E Εið Þ2 ¼ 1n σ2. This process basically corresponds
to the wisdom of the crowd effect, which was initially identified by Francis
Galton (1907).
More generally, we can conclude from our analyses above that an essential
precondition for efficient communication learning in networks is that actors’
communication structures guarantee that the relative political knowledge of agents
is reflected in their relative network multipliers. As can be seen from eq. (29) the
relative political knowledge of actors is measured by the ratio of their
corresponding error variances. Hence, it is important to identify a strategy for
designing policy network structures that imply efficient policy learning. In partic-
ular, we must determine under which conditions a stronger participation of stake-
holder organizations in the political communication process implies more efficient
learning. To this end, we apply our network model to simulate policy learning under
different conditions of political knowledge distribution among legislators and
stakeholder groups and under different communication network structures. In
detail, we simulated three ideal-typical policy network structures corresponding
to (1) top-down communication (i.e., stakeholders update based on the communi-
cated beliefs of politicians, not vice-versa); (2) bottom-up communication (i.e.,
politicians update based on the communicated beliefs of stakeholders, not vice-
versa and (3) equal participation of stakeholders (i.e., politicians update based on
the beliefs of stakeholders, and stakeholders update based on the beliefs of politi-
cians). The blocked network structure of the three scenarios is presented in Table 3.
The assumption that politicians put a lower weight on their own beliefs (i.e.,
politicians are generally more open to influence from other actors compared to
interest groups) implies the average network multipliers for the three network
constellations that are presented in Table 4.
Finally, we assume that the individual bias is the same for all political actors in
the scenario “equal-know” and that the relation of the variance of the individual
error terms is 4 times higher for the politician than for the stakeholder organizations
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in the scenario “IG-expert”. We also assume that the average variance across all
political actors remains constant. In contrast, we assume in the scenario “pol-
expert” that the politicians exhibit a fourfold lower error term variance than the
stakeholder organizations. We again assume that the average variance across all
agents remains constant.
Following our exposition above, we calculated the average expected belief bias
of the legislators for all 9 network and knowledge constellations. Further, we
calculated the optimal weighting of agents’ initial individual beliefs for all knowl-
edge scenarios. Based on these calculations, we computed the average additional
bias that will be realized for a given policy network constellation and a specific
knowledge scenario compared to the corresponding optimal communication struc-
ture. We expressed this additional bias as the percentage of the bias that is realized
under conditions of optimal belief updating. Analogously, we calculated the rela-
tive efficiency gain obtained via communicational learning for all three network
structures in comparison to individual belief formation. In particular, we compared
the average error that results from communication learning to the average error that
results assuming individual belief formation among politicians.
Figure 5 clearly demonstrates that the efficiency of policy learning depends on
the combination of a specific knowledge distribution and communication structure,
where a mismatch between these two components implies extreme losses of
efficiency. Assuming that interest groups have more political knowledge than
politicians, a top-down communication structure implies an average error due to
biased beliefs that is 400% higher than the error that results from an optimal
communication structure. However, the corresponding efficiency loss amounts to
only 62% when assuming a balanced communication structure. In contrast, assum-
ing politicians have significantly higher knowledge implies an increase in the policy
error of 150% for a bottom-up communication structure and 51% for a balanced
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Source: Author
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Further, a comparison of the policy errors that result from communication
learning to the corresponding errors that are implied by individual belief formation
emphasizes the efficiency of communication learning. Specifically, communication
learning reduces the policy error by over 90% compared to individual learning for
all scenarios.
Overall, this simple simulation study implies that stakeholder participation
significantly increases the efficiency of communication learning. The ignorance
of stakeholder organizations, as assumed for the top-down scenario, only increases
the efficiency of policy learning when the relative political knowledge of stake-
holder organizations is much lower than that of politicians.
In contrast, focusing policy learning solely on stakeholder organizations, as
implied by the bottom-up communication structure, would only be justified if
stakeholders have significantly higher knowledge than politicians.
Finally, it is also interesting to identify the conditions under which evidence-
based political processes that focus policy learning on a small subset of political
experts (e.g., research institutions) increase the efficiency of policies. To this end,
we calculated the optimal relative weight of one policy expert, assuming that this
expert’s relative political knowledge compared to the average agents in the network
increases from 1 (i.e., equal knowledge) to 100 (i.e., the error variance of the
average agent is 100 times higher than error variance of the expert). Moreover,
we calculated the efficiency gain as a percentage comparing the relative error that
results under an optimal communication structure to that of a balanced communi-
cation structure. The simulation results are presented in Fig. 6. Figure 6 demon-
strates that the efficiency gain that results from a focus on political experts increases
in a concave manner with the relative expertise of the expert and is dependent on the
Fig. 5 Efficiency loss resulting from communication policy learning in different knowledge and
policy network scenarios. Source: own calculation
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size of the total policy elite network. For a small network that includes only ten
governmental and nongovernmental organizations, the relative gain amounts to
only 10%, assuming that the expert’s knowledge is threefold higher. In contrast, the
relative gain amounts to nearly 90%, assuming that the expert’s knowledge is
100-fold higher.
These gains are significantly lower for larger networks (e.g., for an elite network
with 100 organizations, a maximal efficiency gain of 50% is realized, but for an
elite network comprised of 1000 organizations, the maximal efficiency gain is
reduced to only 9%).
Accordingly, the optimal centralization of political communication on experts
decreases significantly with the size of the elite network. Assuming a network size
of 10 implies that the optimal communication structures correspond to a significant
centralization of the political communication on political experts, with a Herfindahl
index ranging from 0.1 for equal knowledge to 0.89 assuming political knowledge
is 100 times higher for the expert. In contrast, the corresponding Herfindahl indices
range from 0.01 to 0.25 for a network size of 100 and from 0.001 to only 0.009 for
an elite network size of 1000 (see Fig. 7).
4.1 Observational Policy Learning
While communication learning is possible within a static CGPE approach, belief
updating might also occur dynamically (e.g., across time periods). Dynamic policy
learning corresponds to a belief updating process that is based on observed policy
outcomes. These outcomes can be realizations of political targets (e.g., in our
















Fig. 6 Efficiency gain resulting from optimal centralization of communication on political
experts according to the size of the elite network. Source: Author
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constituency after a specific policy X has been implemented). Agents compare the
observed policy outcome with the policy outcomes they expected based on their
original policy beliefs. Hence, if the observed outcomes differ from the expected
outcomes, the agents have an incentive to adapt their beliefs to ensure that expected
outcomes match observed outcomes:
ZEit ¼ bait1Xt1, ð30Þ
Δbait ¼ ϕΔZt ¼ ϕ ZOit  ZEit , ð31Þbait ¼ bait1 þ Δbait: ð32Þ
Thus, agents update their political beliefs proportional to the relative difference
between observed ZO and expected ZE policy outcomes, where ϕ denotes the speed
of adjustment parameter. Hence, we assume a Nerlovian belief updating process.
Nerlovian policy learning that is based on individual observation of policy out-
comes becomes complex when more than one policy program impacts policy
outcomes. In this case, politicians might update based on available scientific policy
evaluation studies (e.g., impact evaluation studies for specific policy programs).
These studies deliver direct estimates of specific technical parameters, a.
4.2 Reinforcement Learning
While observational policy learning based on observed policy outcomes z implies
that political agents actually apply a mental model, which may be simple, to
estimate how policies translate into outcomes, reinforcement learning does not















Fig. 7 Optimal centralization of communication on political experts according to the size of the
elite network, as measured using the Herfindahl index. Source: Author
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Reinforcement learning implies that agents choose their future behavior based
on the perceived gratification received from past behavior (i.e., if this gratification
is positive, agents repeat or intensify their past behavior, but agents stop or reduce
their past behavior if the perceived gratification is negative). Retrospective voting is
a prominent example of reinforcement political learning. In this scenario, a voter’s
probability of reelecting the government depends on the voter’s perceived welfare
that was realized while the government was in power. However, in contrast to
voters, politicians are interested in reelection. Hence, their observed political
support triggers reinforcement learning.
To explain how reinforcement learning works in a policy choice setting, please
note that according to the two-stage legislative bargaining procedure described
above, politicians perceive multidimensional policy choices in a one-dimensional
macro-policy space. The macro-policy space corresponds to the direction in the
multidimensional policy space in which agents agree to shift the status quo policy.
Given the direction Δγ∗, agents decide on the distance λγ, where legislators have
single-peaked preferences for this distance, with bλg denoting an agent’s ideal
distance. Let λ∗t denote the final policy choice in period t that results from majority
voting at the second stage of legislative bargaining. Then, legislators observe the
political support feedback that results from the implementation of the policy
γ∗t ¼ γ0 þ λ∗t Δγ∗. If the feedback is positive, politicians have an incentive to
shift the status quo even further in the same direction Δγ∗, but if the support
feedback is negative, legislators have an incentive to move the policy back towards
the direction of the status quo. Formally, we assume the following reinforcement
learning mechanism:
γt ¼ γ0 þ λ∗t ∗ Δγ∗ð Þ: ð33Þ
Updated policy choices are based on observed changes in political support:
λ0 ¼ 0; 0 < λ1 << 1, ð34Þ
dλ∗t ¼ λ∗t  λ∗t1, dbλ gt ¼ bλ gt1  λ∗t1, ð35Þ
dWt ¼ Wt γtð Þ Wt1 γt1ð Þ, ð36Þ
Δλt ¼ sgnðdWt ∗ dλtÞ, ð37Þ
λgtþ1 ¼ λ
g
t þ ϕΔλtλ1, if dλ∗t dbλ gt < 0
λgt , otherwise
: ð38Þ
where ϕ is again a parameter determining the speed of adjustment. Because
political support is a single-peaked function of λ, reinforcement learning will
gradually identify the optimal policy strategy. In more specific terms, without an
adequate stop strategy, reinforcement learning will lead to an oscillating process in
which policy decisions oscillate between (λ∗ϕλ1, λ∗+ϕλ1), where λ∗ is the
support-maximizing policy decision. Thus, the finer the adjustment (i.e., the
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lower the step length ϕλ1) the closer reinforcement learning mechanisms mimic
optimal policy choices.
4.3 Combination of Observational and Communication
Learning
Analogously, observations of policy outcomes zt by individual agents are noisy.
Thus, if we again assume idiosyncratic measurement errors, which are independent
draws from a distribution with a zero mean, the aggregated measurement of policy
outcomes is almost correct, but individual measures might be highly biased.
Therefore, agents might be willing to combine their individual observational
learning with communication learning. To describe the combined learning process,
let Δ~a0it denote the individual parameter update that results from the observational
learning of an agent i in period t. Then, combined observational and communication
learning implies that the final parameter updates correspond to:
Δ~a1it ¼ MΔ~a0it: ð39Þ
Based on the updated beliefs, a new political decision results from legislative
bargaining in period t + 1.
5 Summary and Conclusion
This chapter develops the eCGPE as a theoretical framework and an empirically
applicable tool for defining, evaluating and designing efficient participatory and
evidence-based policy processes. The eCGPE is a sequential dynamic political
economy equilibrium model that incorporates five modules that model legislative
decisionmaking, the transformation of policies into socioeconomic outcomes,
interest mediation via voting and lobbying, political belief formation and policy
learning. In contrast to existing political economy models, which highlight the
biased incentives of politicians as a main cause of persisting inefficient policies, the
CGPE approach explicitly incorporates the lack of adequate political knowledge as
another important source of inefficient policy choices. In particular, the CGPE
approach incorporates a model of political belief formation and updating to explain
how political agents use a combination of observational and communication learn-
ing processes to improve their political knowledge. According to our model, the
main determinants of the speed of knowledge are the structures of policy networks
that reflect communication patterns between governmental and nongovernmental
organizations. Based on empirical policy network data, relevant communication
structures can be identified. Combining the identified network structures with the
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relative political knowledge of the involved governmental and nongovernmental
organizations allows for an assessment of the impact of stakeholder participation on
the efficiency of policy learning. The knowledge of the involved organizations is
derived from the specified economic model, specifically from the political impact
function. Moreover, within an extended Grossman-Helpman approach, the impact
of lobbying activities and voting behavior on politician incentives is modeled. In
this model, the asymmetric lobbying activities of vested interest groups are deter-
mined by limited access to powerful politicians. The latter can be empirically
identified by applying social network analysis. Furthermore, we demonstrate that
based on the eCGPE approach, a political diagnosis can be made (i.e., existing
incentives and knowledge gaps can be identified). Furthermore, a political therapy
(i.e., adequate strategies for reducing existing political performance gaps) can be
derived via simulation analyses based on the eCGPE. To empirically apply a CGPE
approach, all five modules must be specified, the model parameters must be
empirically estimated and the specified modules must be implemented using an
adequate programming framework. In the four sections that follow, we will
describe how the CGPE approach can be empirically applied using the policy
network study on the CAADP reforms in Malawi as an example. In Chapter “A
Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes: An Applica-
tion to CAADP in Malawi”, the empirical application of the political belief
updating module and the legislative decision-making module is described, while
Chapter “The Formation of Elite Communication Networks in Malawi: A Bayesian
Econometric Approach”, describes the econometric estimation of the network data-
generating process of relevant policy networks in Malawi. In Chapter “ Voter
Behavior and Government Performance in Malawi: An Application of a Probabi-
listic Voting Model”, a probabilistic voter model is estimated using Afrobarometer
data from Malawi. Finally, in Chapter “Whither participation? Evaluating partici-
patory policy processes with the CGPE approach: The case of CAADP in Malawi”,
the complete eCGPE approach is applied to the recent CAADP reform in Malawi to
demonstrate how this approach can be applied as a practical tool for analyzing
policy processes empirically.
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A Network Based Approach to Evaluate
Participatory Policy Processes: An Application
to CAADP in Malawi
Christian Henning and Eva Krampe
1 Introduction
Donor organizations recently engaged in promoting participatory policy processes
as a tool for designing efficient policy programs. Participatory policymaking is a
process through which stakeholders influence and share control over priority-
setting and policymaking (World Bank 2011). The implementation of participatory
processes is promoted to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of policy choices,
particularly in developing countries. In general, more effective and efficient policy
choices are induced via specific mechanisms: 1. Increasing governmental account-
ability (Keefer and Khemani 2005) (i.e., incentives for governmental agents to
serve societal interests and needs). 2. Reducing government capture (Bardhan and
Mookherjee 2002) (i.e., government incentives to serve vested interests at the
expense of the general public). 3. Increasing evidence-based policy processes
(i.e., the degree to which political actors use available political knowledge for
making policy choices. Political knowledge is knowledge about the technical
relation between policies and induced policy outcomes). 4. Increasing policy
ownership (i.e., citizens [civil society] identify with and feel committed to govern-
mental policy); policy ownership implies a higher citizen compliance with the
established policy framework and can significantly reduce political implementation
costs (Adsera et al. 2003; Jones 2013; Chambote and Shankland 2011).
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Accordingly, it is widely accepted that the ownership of policy programs that
occurs as a result of participation in policy program formulation leads to more
effective implementation and adoption of the policy programs (World Bank 2011).
Understanding the nature of participatory policy processes is not only high on
the research agenda at the academic level but also increasingly recognized as a key
condition for efficiently providing support for the formulation of effective policy
programs in political practice. The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Develop-
ment Programme (CAADP), which was initiated by the African Union, is a good
example of these new developments. The inclusion of local stakeholder organiza-
tions in the planning, formulation and evaluation of sector-specific growth policies
is a key principle of the program (NEPAD 2010). However, a CAADP task group
focused on the evaluation of non-state actor participation reported that stakeholders
had only a limited ability to use the newly created opportunities for participation.
Based on information collected via a qualitative stakeholder survey and desk
research, the task group emphasized that CAADP has not yet consistently achieved
a high quality inclusion of non-state actors at the national, regional or local levels
(Randall 2011, p. 2).
Nevertheless, although participatory policy processes are intuitively convincing as
a tool for the evaluation of existing policy processes and for the design of more
efficient policy processes in the future, the development of a measurement tool that
allows for the comprehensive characterization of participation structures inherent to
real policy processes that are ongoing in political practice is necessary. Ideally, this
measurement tool is grounded in political theory to guarantee that empirically iden-
tified participation structures can be consistently related to an intervention logic (i.e.,
the derivation of a causal link between specific properties of the policy process and
desirable policy outcomes). The latter criterion implies that the impact of the identified
structures of a policy process on governmental accountability and capture and on the
effective use of political knowledge and political ownership can be directly derived.
However, to the best of our knowledge, a comprehensive, micro-political-
founded and quantitative evaluation framework for participatory policy processes
is not currently available. In this context, the Advocacy Coalition Framework
(ACF) proposed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) has attracted attention as
an approach for analyzing policy processes, particularly among political scientists
at the academic level. More recently, the ACF has been increasingly recognized by
development economists (Birner and Resnick 2010). This framework includes a
number of interesting aspects (e.g., this framework explicitly identifies beliefs as
drivers of coalition formation and final political decisionmaking). Moreover, this
framework provides a systematic approach for analyzing stakeholder interactions.
However, the ACF is a qualitative approach and provides neither a theoretical
model of political decisionmaking nor a theoretical model of belief formation
among the actors involved in policymaking. In particular, a quantitative description
of real policy processes is a necessary condition for a comprehensive evaluation of
the impact of these processes on the effectiveness and efficiency of policy outputs.
Hence, the ACF in its present form is not yet an appropriate tool for policy learning
(i.e., a tool that is ready to identify causal links between specific patterns of
stakeholder interactions and induced governmental performance).
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In this context, the aim of this chapter is to initiate the development of a
theoretically founded framework for analyzing participatory policy processes that
can be applied empirically. In particular, following the literature on policy network
analyses (Lauman and Knoke 1987; Pappi et al. 1995; Knoke et al. 1996; Pappi and
Henning 1998, 1999; Henning 2000, 2009), we apply social network analysis
(SNA) to measure complex interactions among stakeholder and governmental
organizations. Moreover, we derive a theoretical framework for the incorporation
of policy network theory into political economy models of lobbying and legislative
decisionmaking. As we demonstrated in Chapter “Modeling and Evaluation of
Political Processes: A New Quantitative Approach”, we incorporate a network
model of political belief formation into a political bargaining model (see Henning
in this volume). The latter model combines a generalized Grossman-Helpman
lobbying model and a modified legislative bargaining model of the Baron and
Ferejohn type. The central component of such an integrated model corresponds to
a generalized mean voter decision rule, where in addition to legislators, interest
groups also have political control over policies (Pappi and Henning 1998; Henning
2000, 2009). Political control of nongovernmental organizations results via two
different mechanisms: lobbying and communication learning. The first mechanism
is determined by the political access structures via which nongovernmental orga-
nizations access powerful governmental organizations, and the second mechanism
is determined by political communication among organizations. Empirically, the
equilibrium outcome of the complete model can be derived from observed political
support and communication networks.
Based on our theoretical framework, we undertake a descriptive analysis of the
central components that determine policy choices. This analysis includes a network
analysis of the underlying communication and access structure, which is encapsu-
lated in the communication network and the political support network. In this
regard, social network analyses provide a wide range of local and global network
tools and methods for describing the characteristics of an individual network
(Wassermann and Faust 1994). Previous political sociology reports demonstrated
that network analysis can be used to systematically describe interaction structures
among nongovernmental and governmental organizations that are engaged in a
specific policy domain (Lauman and Knoke 1987; Knoke et al. 1996; Pappi et al.
1995; Pappi and Henning 1998, 1999; Henning 2000; Henning and Wald 2000).
However, with a small number of exceptions (e.g., Pappi and Henning 1998;
Henning 2000, 2009), these studies used SNA to describe policy domain network
structures without relating the identified structures to political performance. In
contrast, our framework offers innovative network tools (i.e., the network multi-
pliers derived in Chapter “Modeling and Evaluation of Political Processes: A New
Quantitative Approach”) that go beyond a pure descriptive analysis. The framework
will allow us to make direct conclusions concerning the impact of the identified
network structures on different aspects that determine governmental performance.
Specifically, we describe the four previously mentioned aspects of government
performance and use our network-based indicators to measure these factors
empirically.
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The case country selected for the empirical application of our framework is
Malawi. Malawi approved a policy reform, the sector investment program Agri-
cultural Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp), based on the principles of CAADP in
2010. Data was collected via a policy network study in 2010.
In the next section, we briefly summarize the theoretical framework for model-
ing participatory policy processes. We describe in detail the design of the network
study, including the collected data and the central network theoretical tools/mea-
sures used in our analyses. We then present the principal empirical results, and we
conclude by providing an outlook on future research.
2 A Theoretical Framework for Evaluating Policy
Processes
In general, we apply the theoretical framework developed in Chapter “Modeling
and Evaluation of Political Processes: A New Quantitative Approach”. We focus
specifically on the combination of a modified legislative bargaining model and the
political belief formation model in a policy elite network. This approach considers
the political decisionmaking process as an aggregation mechanism of the policy
preferences of the involved political actors. In essence, this aggregation mechanism




φTj bγ0j , ð1Þ
where γ∗ denotes the final policy decision, φTj denotes the total political power andbγ 0j denotes the initial preferred policy position of actor j. The total political power







where mgj denotes the political influence of actor j on agent i. As demonstrated in
Chapter “Modeling and Evaluation of Political Processes: A New Quantitative
Approach”, mgj is the network multiplier derived from the communication network
among governmental and nongovernmental actors. Accordingly, mgg denotes the
weight that a legislator g puts on her own initial position, while φLi is the political
power of agent i that is derived from the lobbying game, as described in
Chapter “Modeling and Evaluation of Political Processes: A New Quantitative
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As described in Chapter “Modeling and Evaluation of Political Processes: A
New Quantitative Approach”,mSgi is the support network multiplier that corresponds
to the outflow of legislative power from legislator g to actor i, resulting in the
equilibrium of the lobbying game. Hence, the better access an interest group i has to
powerful legislators, the more successful are the lobbying activities of this organi-
zation. Further, φg denotes the legislative power of legislator g that is derived from
the modified legislative bargaining game, as described in Chapter “Modeling and
Evaluation of Political Processes: A New Quantitative Approach”. Equations (1, 2,
and 3) constitute the theoretical backbone of our policy process framework, which
we have also illustrated in Fig. 1 below.
As is illustrated in Fig. 1, based on our theory, the policy process corresponds to
an aggregation mechanism of the policy positions of the involved governmental and
nongovernmental organizations, where the individual weight of an organization is
jointly determined by political communication network structures that determine
political influence mij, informal access structures m
S
gi that determine lobbying power
and constitutional rules that determine legislative decisionmaking powerφg
1.
Based on our theoretical framework, the underlying communication and access
structures, which are encapsulated in the communication network MC and the
political support network MS, are central components that determine final policy
choices. To describe these networks, we apply social network analysis tools,
including methods for identifying overall network structures (e.g., block model
analysis) (Wassermann and Faust 1994). However, our framework offers innova-
tive network tools that go beyond a pure descriptive analysis to allow us to draw
direct conclusions concerning the impacts of the identified network structures on
different aspects that determine governmental performance (i.e., the network mul-
tipliers derived in Chapter “Modeling and Evaluation of Political Processes: A New
Quantitative Approach”. Specifically, we develop the network-based indicators
Fig. 1 Overview of the
framework. Source:
Authors
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described below to empirically measure different aspects of governmental
performance.
2.1 Government Accountability
The successful functioning of any government depends on the ability of citizens to
hold politicians and public administrators accountable for their actions. The
existing literature on political accountability describes the machinery of govern-
ment as a game between a principal (i.e., the public) and an agent (i.e., the
politicians or public administrators) in which the former delegates to the latter a
given set of instruments to execute certain goals (Adsera et al. 2003). In this game,
the principal and the agent may have opposing interests (i.e., even while partially
acting based on the interests of their potential electorate, political agents are likely
to pursue their own political agenda [e.g., political agents may be interested in
enriching themselves while in office or political agents’ strategies for enhancing the
welfare of the public may differ from the desires of the public]). Hence, with self-
interested political agents, the delegation of decisionmaking and policy implemen-
tation responsibilities automatically provides the opportunity for significant ineffi-
ciencies and corruption among politicians. One could argue that electoral
competition induces governmental incentives for acting in line with society’s
interests; thus, the high concentration of political power in governmental organi-
zations does not contradict political accountability. Though this argument could be
true in general, this reasoning is limited because elections fail to guarantee/imply
strong governmental accountability. The citizens’ (i.e., voters’) information
concerning governmental policies and their consequences for society’s welfare is
a factor that impacts the functioning of free and regular democratic elections as an
effective mechanism for guaranteeing political accountability. If citizens lack this
information, they base their votes on non-policy indicators. As demonstrated in
Chapter “Voter Behavior and Government Performance in Malawi: An Application
of a Probabilistic Voting Model”, this statement is especially true for Malawi,
where non-policy voting motives are the principal determinants of vote choices,
particularly within the rural population. Thus, voters are swayed by the relative
campaign spending of different parties, which reflects the influence of election
advertisements more than high governmental performance (i.e., serving voters’ true
desires and needs). Hence, in addition to elections, the participation of stakeholder
organizations in the political process is a second mechanism for holding public
officials accountable. The more domestic stakeholder organizations control gov-
ernmental actions and policy choices via lobbying and political communications,
the more these actions and choices correspond to the desires of society.
Therefore, we use the sum of the total political power of national
nongovernmental organizations (NGO) as a general indicator of government
accountability (GA-total):





Moreover, to understand how policy network structures interact with constitu-
tional rules, we use the power outflows from central political institutions to national
NGOs (i.e., from the government, including the president and the ministries, and
from the parliamentary parties) as two additional sub-indicators of governmental
accountability (i.e., GA-Gov and GA-Par, respectively).
2.2 Government Capture
According to the relevant political economy literature (Bardhan and Mookherjee
2002), governmental capture corresponds to the concept that governmental political
actions and policy choices are biased towards the particular interests of organized
social groups at the expense of the general public. Thus, even if the government is
fully accountable to its electorate, it might respond asymmetrically to the specific
interests of particular social groups. In this context, electoral competition induces
governmental capture because some social groups are less informed than others
(see also Chapter “Voter Behavior and Government Performance in Malawi: An
Application of a Probabilistic Voting Model”). However, beyond democratic elec-
tions, stakeholder participation is a second channel/mechanism for relaying
society’s interests to public officials. Hence, the determination of the extent to
which this mechanism is biased in favor of the particular interests of vested groups
is of interest. Accordingly, we calculate the quadratic distance between the relative
total political power of a stakeholder organization and its corresponding share of
represented society members in the total population Popj and take the square root of
the sum of these distances over all relevant stakeholder organizations as an indica-










To guarantee that our capture index GC lies in the [0,1] interval, we normalize
GC as follows: GCn ¼ GCGCþ1. Further, we take the square root of the sum of the
calculated distances for specific population subgroups that represent specific inter-
ests (e.g., small-, medium- and large-scale farmers or urban consumers) as
sub-indicators of capture, namely GC-farm and GC-urban.
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2.3 Political Knowledge
Understanding the complex relation between policy instruments and induced policy
outcomes is difficult; thus, politicians use simple mental models (i.e., political
beliefs) to describe the manner in which policies translate into outcomes. Because
voters, politicians, and lobby and stakeholder organizations fail to fully understand
the complex relation between political instruments and desired policy outcomes,
inefficient policy choices are implied. As described in the introductory chapter of
this book, an increasing number of publications emphasize the role of biased policy
beliefs as a main determinant of inefficient policy choices (Beilhartz and Gersbach
2004; Bischoff and Siemers 2011; Caplan 2007). Hence, beyond biased govern-
mental incentives caused by low accountability or high governmental capture, the
lack of political knowledge becomes another important source of policy failure. As
described in Chapter “Whither participation? Evaluating participatory policy pro-
cesses with the CGPE approach: The case of CAADP in Malawi”, the individual
political knowledge of an actor can be measured by comparing the stated ideal
policy positions of an organization with the optimal policy position of an organi-
zation. The latter position results from maximizing an organization’s support,
assuming perfect political knowledge (i.e., CAADP policies translate into policy
outcomes based on the specified Computable General Political Economy
Equilibirum (CGPE) model, denoting the stated and optimal policy positions bybγ i and bγ opti and the Euclidian distance, which is a measure that corresponds to the
error variance, as derived in Chapter “Modeling and Evaluation of Political Pro-
cesses: A New Quantitative Approach”, by ψ i ¼ bγ opty  bγ i  ). As explained in
Chapter “Modeling and Evaluation of Political Processes: A New Quantitative
Approach”, based on our belief updating model, comparing the total political
power distribution to the distribution of political knowledge across organizations
allows an assessment of the extent to which the identified participation structures
promote or impede evidence-based policy processes. Moreover, we can identify
power structures, φoptj ψð Þ, that imply an optimal use of political knowledge in the
policy network ψ and calculate the loss of efficiency that results under the actual
communication structure compared to the optimal communication structure. We
take this relative loss as an indicator of the impact of existing policy structures on
evidence-based policy (PK-use):



















Tð Þ and σ2ε φoptð Þ denote the error variance that results from the mean voter




is the relative political knowledge of an organization j compared
to a reference organization 0. Further, we take the Euclidian Distance between the
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actual and optimal political power distribution and the sum of the total political
power of the domestic research organizations as two additional sub-indicators (i.e.,
PK-dpow and PK-Res) of the degree of political knowledge use.
2.4 Political Ownership
Political ownership corresponds to the concept that a society identifies with a
specific policy and is committed to accomplishing the envisaged policy goals.
Hence, a lack of ownership corresponds to an incentive problem on the side of
the society. Technically, ownership is related to the involvement of national
nongovernmental organizations in political communication. Political ownership
increases citizen compliance with policies, decreasing implementation costs and
increasing the effectiveness of the implemented policies. In contrast to governmen-
tal accountability, the ability of nongovernmental organizations to exert influence
on governmental organizations is less important for achieving political ownership.
In contrast, even a top-down communication system (i.e., the policy beliefs of civil
society are primarily influenced by governmental organizations) implies political
ownership because the citizens feel involved in policy formulation. Accordingly, all
other things being equal, the higher the level of consensus achieved through
stakeholder participation, the higher the political ownership of citizens in the
decided policies will be. To measure the political ownership implied by stakeholder
participation, we define the following political conflict index from the viewpoint of





θik bγ ik  γ∗k 2
s
, ð7Þ
where θik denotes the interest of actor i in the policy dimension k, bγ ik denotes the
ideal position of actor i with respect to dimension k, and γ∗k is the final policy
decision for the dimension k. Accordingly, the average political conflict for all







Hence, we can calculate the final policy outcome that would result from legis-
lative bargaining, assuming no lobbying and no belief updating occur. Let γ#denote
this policy outcome. We can then analogously define the average political conflict
CONNGO(γ
#). The lower the political conflict when including political communi-
cation and lobbying in comparison to the political conflict without communication,
the higher the involvement of the nongovernmental organizations; thus, we define
the following indicator of political ownership (PO-Consens):
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PO Consens ¼ 1 CONNGO γ
∗ð Þ
CONNGO γ#ð Þ : ð9Þ
Further, because political ownership generally decreases with the dominance of
donor organizations in the political process (Chambote and Shankland 2011; Jones
2013), we take the total political power of a donor organization as an additional
sub-indicator of ownership (PO-Donor). Moreover, we use the density of the
communication network between the national nongovernmental and governmental
organizations as a measure of political involvement that corresponds to ownership
(PO-involve).1
Overall, within our framework, we can first use standard network analysis tools
to describe the interaction structures among governmental and nongovernmental
organizations that are involved in the political decisionmaking process. Second, we
can apply innovative network-based indicators to evaluate the extent to which the
identified participation structures impact political performance (i.e., governmental
accountability and capture, effective use of political knowledge and political
ownership). Please note that trade-offs generally exist among the different aspects
of political performance. For example, an increase in the participation of civil
society organizations in political communication might increase the governmental
accountability and political ownership and simultaneously decrease the effective
use of political knowledge. Consistent with this reasoning, Ball (1995) demon-
strated that lobbying implies a trade-off between the effective use of political
knowledge and government capture. Analogously, an increase of donor involve-
ment in political communication might increase the effective use of political
knowledge while reducing political ownership and political accountability.
Finally, we must note that the empirical relevance of this assessment depends on
the assumption that our theoretical model accurately describes real political
decisionmaking processes. In this regard, we use the empirical prediction power
of our theoretical model as a test of the empirical relevance and applicability of our
framework.
1Please note that the involvement of civil society is also related to accountability. Even if
stakeholder organizations monitor governmental actions without controlling these actions,
accountability might be increased because stakeholders inform voters. Thus, voter choices are
c.p. more informed, strengthening voters’ ability to hold the government accountable. Therefore,
one could also use the density of political communication between national stakeholder organi-
zations and governmental organizations as a sub-indicator of accountability. However, in this
paper, we use this factor as a sub-indicator of political ownership.
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3 Analyzing the CAADP Policy Processes in Malawi
3.1 Policy Reform Context
In 2010, the Malawi government approved the sector investment program Agricul-
tural Sector Wide Approach (ASWAp) (The Ministry of Agriculture and Food
Security, Republic of Malawi 2010). ASWAp is based on the principles of CAADP.
The principal goal of the program is to achieve agricultural growth and poverty
reduction using investments in the agricultural sector and reforms of the
corresponding institutional framework as the central policy instruments. Moreover,
the Government of Malawi follows the comprehensive participatory approach
elaborated within CAADP (i.e., the Malawi government attempted to design a
CAADP policy process characterized by high involvement of local stakeholder
organizations in the design, monitoring and evaluation of all activities and policies
decided within ASWAp). Thus, in addition to political actors and donor organiza-
tions, the umbrella organizations of the food security civil society organizations and
farmer organizations (i.e., CISANET and FUM, respectively) signed the CAADP
Compact in April 2010. Despite the potential of CADDP reform processes, the
extent to which the real CAADP policy process in Malawi promotes participatory
and evidence-based policies remains unclear. We apply our framework to elucidate
this issue in the following sections.
3.1.1 Study Design and Data Collection
To collect relevant data, an elite network study was organized. Such a study
involves a survey containing questions about networks, policy positions and inter-
ests. The survey was completed via personal interviews using carefully constructed
survey questionnaires in May 2010. Interviews with representatives of relevant
nongovernmental and governmental organizations were conducted in Lilongwe and
Blantyre.
The unit of observation in an elite network study is an organization, which is
interpreted as a corporative actor (Coleman 1990). The respondents are considered
experts of the organizations they represent in the specific policy field. Following an
established approach that is used in policy network studies, relevant organizations
were identified using a two-step procedure (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Laumann
et al. 1989; Pappi et al. 1995; Pappi and Henning 1999). In the first step, a list of
potentially relevant organizations was compiled based on desk research and expert
interviews.2 This list included 60 nongovernmental organizations and
2In particular, we used available information concerning stakeholder participation in agricultural
policy workshops published on the internet. Moreover, we used a list of stakeholder organizations,
donors and politicians engaged in the formulation of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP),
which was included in a previous study by IFPRI in 2010 (Aberman et al. 2012).
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35 governmental organizations. Based on this list, personal interviews were
conducted with representatives of the preselected organizations, beginning with
governmental organizations (i.e., Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security
(MoAFS) and subordinate agencies) and the most important interest groups (i.e.,
farm organizations). A reputation question was asked during the interview, and
interviewees were instructed to mark all influential organizations on the identified
list. Based on the reputation question, new organizations that received more than
3 nominations were interviewed. Overall, we interviewed 17 governmental orga-
nizations and 20 nongovernmental organizations.
The elite questionnaires included three parts: (a) policy networks, (b) policy
preferences (i.e., information concerning interest and position with respect to
relevant ASWAp policy issues, and 9c) organizational characteristics.3 In the
network portion of the questionnaire, we collected data on reputation, expert
information, monitoring, social relation and organizational membership networks.
To collect reliable networks, we designed our network questions using a format that
was extremely helpful in previous network studies (Pappi and Henning 1999; Pappi
et al. 1995). Interviewees were asked to check those organizations on the list with
which they maintain a specific relation. To facilitate orientation, the list of organi-
zations was organized according to the type of organization or the branch of interest
represented by the respective organizations (see Table 5 in the appendix).4 In the
following sections, we describe in more detail the reputation and expert information
networks, as these networks are used for the empirical application of the proposed
policy framework. Based on our theoretical framework, political support networks
are also relevant. However, in the Malawi case study, we did not include political
support networks in our policy network survey. Accordingly, we will simulate the
support network using collected policy network data.5 Therefore, we will only
briefly describe the simulated political access network structures.
As described above, the reputation network is used to specify the network
boundary from the actors’ point of view. Respondents were asked to mark organi-
zations on the list that according to their opinion, stand out as especially influential
with respect to the agricultural policy process.6 The expert information network is
3Data collection for part (c) is described in detail in Chapter “The Formation of Elite Communi-
cation Networks in Malawi: A Bayesian Econometric Approach”.
4As we did not know in advance whether we identified all relevant organizations, we provided a
hybrid type of list. That is, interviewees were presented with a roster of organizations and given the
option to add additional organizations that they believed to be important. This approach addresses
two problems: under-reporting in a free recall interview and failures in setting the theoretical
network boundaries.
5Please note that we explicitly collect policy support network data in other empirical applications
[e.g., for the European Union (Pappi and Henning 1998, 1999) and within the PEBAP-project for
Ghana, Uganda and Senegal (https://pebap.agrarpol.uni-kiel.de/)].
6The question was framed in a way that instructed interviewees not to exert great effort on a
detailed investigation but to mark those organizations that came to mind instantly. This framing
assumes that highly important organizations will come to mind quickly. Further, the interviewees
had the option to use blank lines to add missing influential organizations.
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the centerpiece of our belief formation model for characterizing the policy process.
We consider expert information to be any kind of information about policy impacts
that an actor can communicate to another actor (e.g., knowledge about the impact of
farm input subsidies on central policy outcomes, such as the welfare of different
social groups). To collect data on the information flow in the elite network, the
interviewees were asked to check those organizations on the list of organizations
with which they share information about the consequences of agricultural policies.
Specifically, expert information transfers were collected from a supplier perspec-
tive (i.e., an organization delivers information to another organization) and a
demander perspective (i.e., an organization receives information from another
organization). Therefore, we could construct a confirmed expert knowledge net-
work, which is more reliable from a network theoretic point of view (Pappi et al.
1995). A particular knowledge transfer is considered ‘confirmed’ if both the
supplier and demander of knowledge independently report the transfer.
The weight that an actor places on her own initial belief is another key input in
our model. To identify an actor’s level of own control, interviewees were asked to
ascertain the extent to which they use externally provided expert information as
opposed to their own expertise when formulating policy strategies. In detail, the
respondents were asked to divide 100 points to indicate the relative importance of
external versus internal expert information. Own control is then calculated as the
relative importance of own internal expertise.
In part (b), we collected data on the policy preferences of organizations. We
asked for the relative interest and the preferred position of an organization with
respect to relevant ASWAp policy issues. Specifically, we assumed a nested
structure of policy preferences. At the top level, we asked for the relative interest
in and preferred position regarding relevant policy concerns z. These policy con-
cerns are relevant policy outcomes determined by ASWAp, including Z1 the
welfare of small scale-farmers, Z2 poverty reduction, Z3 state budget expenditures
and Z5 the welfare of urban consumers (see Chapter “Whither participation?
Evaluating participatory policy processes with the CGPE approach: The case of
CAADP in Malawi” for a full list of relevant policy concerns). At the second level,
we considered interest and positions in specific policy programs formulated in
ASWAp. Specifically, ASWAp includes the following four pillars, which are
formulated as focus areas in official documents (The Ministry of Agriculture and
Food Security, Republic of Malawi 2010): pillar I is “Food security and risk
management;” pillar II is “Agri-business and market development;” pillar III is
“Sustainable land and water management;” and pillar IV is “Technology generation
and dissemination/Institutional strengthening and capacity building.” According to
the official documents for each pillar, two alternative subprograms are formulated.
For example, for pillar I, the first subprogram corresponds to fertilizer subsidy
payments for maize; in the alternative subprogram, input subsidies are paid for all
crop production to increase the diversification of agricultural production. The sub-
programs of ASWAps are described in Chapter “Whither participation? Evaluating
participatory policy processes with the CGPE approach: The case of CAADP in
Malawi”. For each pillar and each subprogram, we collected the policy positions
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preferred by an organization, where a policy position corresponds to the amount of
budget expenditures allocated to a specific subprogram or pillar. To obtain a
complete picture, we also included budget expenditures allocated to
non-agricultural policy programs. Overall, the collected data on policy positions
included the allocation of total state budget expenditures to the 8 ASWAp subpro-
grams and to non-agricultural policy programs. Subtracting the sum of the budget
expenditures for agricultural and non-agricultural policy programs from the total
state budget results in the budget expenditures that are available for the provision of
public goods, such as health or other social security services. Within the survey, we
collected the interest θ and position bγ in all nine policy programs. Accordingly, we
were able to derive the spatial policy preferences of individual organizations,
Ui γð Þ ¼ 
P4
k¼1 θik bγ ik  γkð Þ2. To describe the different policy preferences of
organizations, we further reduce the nine-dimensional policy space to a
two-dimensional policy space by applying a principal component analysis using
the collected policy positions as inputs. Based on a factor loading matrix, we
interpreted the first principal component as the budget allocation between agricul-
tural and non-agricultural programs, where a high factor score on the first compo-
nent implies a high budget share for agricultural programs and a negative score
implies a high budget share for non-agricultural policy programs. The second
component can be interpreted as a budget allocation within ASWAp programs,
where a positive factor score corresponds to the reallocation of budget expenditures
from pillar I (i.e., input subsidies) and to a lower extent, from pillar III (i.e., water
and land policy programs) in favor of pillar II (i.e., programs promoting rural
infrastructure) and pillar IV (i.e., extension services and agricultural research).
The positions of individual organizations in the two-dimensional macro-policy
space are presented in Fig. 9 below.
4 Analyzing the CAADP Policy Process in Malawi:
A Network Approach
4.1 Relevant Organizations in the CAADP Policy Domain
Table 5 in the appendix lists the 37 interviewed organizations and their indegree
centrality in the reputation network. The indegree centrality summarizes an orga-
nization’s received nominations, which are standardized by the number of maximal
possible nominations (Wassermann and Faust 1994). Overall, our sample repre-
sents the top most influential organizations in Malawi, and MoAFS stands out as an
especially influential organization, with a maximal indegree centrality of 1.
In Table 5, the stakeholder organizations are further subordinated into different
categories according to the social groups they represent. In detail, we consider
farmer (farm), agribusiness (AB) and non-agricultural interest group
(NA) organizations, as well as research (RES) and civil society organizations.
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The latter group includes consumer (con) and church organizations (chur). To
facilitate the presentation of the results of our network analyses, we combine the
civil society organizations and the NA organizations into one civil society category
(CSO) in the following section.
4.2 Identified Network Structures of Political Participation
in Malawi
4.2.1 Political Communication
Political communication in the CAADP policy domain is comparatively intensive,
with a global density of 0.23 for the confirmed expert network. For example, in the
policy domain of the European Common Agricultural Policy of the EU-27, the
confirmed expert network exhibited a global network density of only 0.11; even for
the EU-15, the corresponding density is only 0.14 (Henning 2009).
However, a block model analysis of the political communication network7
reveals that political communication is clearly structured in Malawi, with a political
core (i.e., block 1) that includes central governmental organizations and donor
organizations and a political periphery (i.e., block 3) comprised of primarily
national civil society organizations (see Fig. 2 and Table 5).
Interestingly, in addition to the leading ministries that determine agricultural
policy in Malawi (i.e., MoAFS and Ministry of Finance [MoF]), all seven donor
organizations are part of the political core. In contrast, the only national
nongovernmental organizations that are part of the political core are the two
agribusiness interest groups (i.e., Farmer’s world and STAM) and the national
peak civil society organization CISANET. The farm interest group FUM in block
4 plays a key role in political communication. This interest group is highly
integrated in political communication and functions as a broker between the civil
society periphery and the political core. A second broker block (i.e., block 2) that
connects civil society with the political core is formed around Bunda College,
which is the main research organization involved in the CAADP process. In
addition to Bunda College, block 2 also includes the public agency ADD and the
ministry of irrigation and water development (MoIWD). Given the specific com-
position of blocks 2 and 4, block 2 can be interpreted as a technical leader, and FUM
functions as the central political link connecting the political core to the civil
society periphery. Please note that the periphery is not only weakly connected
with the political core, as indicated by a density of only 0.12 between block 1 and
7A block model analysis identifies actors in a network that are structurally equivalent (i.e., they
have the same pattern of relation to all other actors in the network). Structurally equivalent actors
are grouped into the same block, where members have a specific relational pattern to other blocks.
Please note that in contrast to a cluster analysis, block members are not necessarily related to each
other (Wassermann and Faust 1994).
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3, but even internally peripheral organizations do not communicate with each other
very much, as indicated by an internal density of only 0.11 for block 3 (see Table 1).
The office of the president (OPC) is a key player within the periphery. The OPC is
central within the internal communication of the political periphery, as it is
connected to over 30% of the organizations in the periphery. Moreover, the OPC
is a strategic link between the periphery and the political core, as it is connected to
the political brokers (i.e., blocks 2 and 4) and to MoF in the political core.
4.2.2 Lobbying
According to our modified Grossman-Helpman model, the central determinant of
lobbying power is the access of an organization to powerful politicians. Empirically
relevant access structures are identified via political support networks. Following
Pappi and Henning (1999), we focus on direct access, leaving the analysis of
indirect brokerage relations for future work (Henning 2009). The densities of the
support network are reported in Table 2. As demonstrated in Table 2, donor
organizations have good access to the most powerful governmental organizations,
especially MoF and MoAFS, but national stakeholders only have access to MoAFS,
MoIWD and the president (i.e., OPC). Interestingly, access to legislative parties is
dominated by national stakeholder organizations, primarily CSO, and farm organi-
zations; donors have no access to legislative parties. Moreover, political institutions
depend on their mutual political support, and most political institutions exhibit
relatively high densities above 0.5 (see Table 2). The mutual dependence of the
Fig. 2 Block model structure of political communication in Malawi. Source: Authors
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political support among political institutions is also a common feature in industri-
alized countries, where in addition to lobbying groups, political parties have a high
potential for generating electoral support. The potential of donors to generate
political support can be explained by the funds donors provide to national govern-
ments, which give the governments leeway to generate electoral benefits.
4.3 Political Influence and Power
According to our network model of political belief updating, communication
structures determine political influence among governmental and nongovernmental
organizations. Hence, at a descriptive level, an analysis of the ways in which
organizations are influenced by each other is of interest. Beyond a descriptive
analysis, it is especially interesting to evaluate the impact of political influence
structures on different aspects of political performance. For example, evaluating the
extent to which the final policy positions of governmental organizations are
influenced by the political views of nongovernmental organizations by measuring
the effective participation using political power indices. Or, evaluating the extent to
which central organizations take political leadership vis-a-vis civil society in a
top-down political process using network multipliers. Moreover, a high political
influence exerted by donor organizations would characterize a donor-led policy
process, which might undermine political ownership if national stakeholder orga-
nizations feel ignored. Furthermore, an analysis of the extent to which the identified
political influence and power structures reflect the political expertise of the
Table 1 Block densities of
the political communication
network in Malawi
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3 Block 4
Block 1 0.56 0.39 0.12 0.42
Block 2 0.39 1.00 0.37 1.00
Block 3 0.12 0.37 0.11 0.52
Block 4 0.42 1.00 0.52 –
Source: Authors
Table 2 Block densities of the political support network in Malawi
MoF MoAFS MoIWD MoDPC OPC DPP MCP
Farm 0.000 0.400 0.200 0.000 0.400 0.200 0.000
Donor 0.571 0.429 0.286 0.143 0.286 0.000 0.000
CSO 0.000 0.143 0.571 0.000 0.429 0.000 0.000
Gov 0.500 0.000 0.750 0.500 0.750 0.600 0.200
Leg 0.500 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.500 1.000 1.000
PUB 0.400 0.600 0.400 0.200 0.400 0.200 0.000
AGIND 0.000 0.167 0.333 0.000 0.333 0.167 0.000
Source: Own calculations based on simulated support network data
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involved governmental and nongovernmental organizations is of interest. To assess
these interesting questions, we provide a descriptive analysis of the identified
political influence and power structures in the following section, and we evaluate
the impact of the identified structures on political performance in the next section.
The network multipliers derived from political communication, as described in
Chapter “Modeling and Evaluation of Political Processes: A New Quantitative
Approach” above, are the centerpiece of our political influence model. Table 3
presents the communication network multipliers that were calculated for specific
categories of governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
The network multipliers presented in Table 3 correspond to the aggregated
weight of the policy positions of the row category in determining the final policy
position of an average individual organization of the column category. For exam-
ple, the first column presents the average influence of the row categories on the
Ministry of Agriculture (MoAFS). As demonstrated in the first row in Table 3, the
final policy position of MoAFS after communication is determined 71% by
MoAFS’s own initial position; the aggregated weight of the initial position of the
donor organizations is 7% compared to only 2.3% for the civil society organizations
(CSO). Please note that the relatively high own network multipliers on the diagonal
of Table 3 result from the high own control of organizations. Hence, political
influence exerted via communication is relatively low in the policy domain of
CAADP in Malawi, with own network multipliers ranging from 0.52 for the office
of the president (OBC) to 0.91 for the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Interestingly, in
Malawi, a particularly high own control was reported by governmental organiza-
tions, with own control values above 70% for all organizations expect OBC.
Stakeholder organizations are more open to expert information provided by other
organizations, with own network multipliers below 65%. Civil society organiza-
tions exhibit a relatively low average own control of 56% (CSO in Table 3), while
interest groups of the agribusiness and farm sectors exhibit a mid-range average
own control of approximately 65%. These structures are partially in contrast to the
Table 3 Communication network multipliers
Gov Leg PUB don Res AGIND farm CSO Sum
MoF 0.934 0.009 0.016 0.026 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.003 1.000
MoAFS 0.736 0.002 0.063 0.076 0.012 0.036 0.052 0.025 1.000
oMin 0.832 0.027 0.041 0.032 0.010 0.018 0.013 0.028 1.000
OBC 0.645 0.030 0.051 0.067 0.036 0.030 0.067 0.074 1.000
Leg 0.181 0.733 0.038 0.012 0.006 0.007 0.011 0.012 1.000
PUB 0.108 0.007 0.727 0.059 0.012 0.056 0.019 0.012 1.000
don 0.106 0.002 0.021 0.724 0.034 0.045 0.035 0.034 1.000
Res 0.091 0.003 0.064 0.107 0.530 0.063 0.050 0.091 1.000
AGIND 0.104 0.004 0.068 0.045 0.031 0.701 0.027 0.022 1.000
farm 0.096 0.003 0.055 0.047 0.031 0.034 0.700 0.034 1.000
CSO 0.135 0.004 0.038 0.063 0.086 0.034 0.061 0.579 1.000
Source: Own calculations based on own network survey data
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influence structures in the European Common Agricultural Policy domain (CAP),
where elected governmental organizations are particularly open to learning from
nongovernmental organizations that represent relevant interests of their electorate
(i.e., in the EU, the average reported own control is below 60%). In contrast, interest
groups involved in CAP decisionmaking reported a comparatively high average
own control of over 70% (Henning 2009); these groups are primarily interested in
influencing powerful political actors and less interested in learning about the
underlying technological relations. A second interesting feature of the influence
structures in Malawi corresponds to the relatively low own control of international
donor and national research organizations, with own network multipliers ranging
between 66% and 53%, respectively (see Table 3). Like public agencies (Pub-AG),
these organizations are supposed to be technological leaders with high political
knowledge; hence, these organizations should pay less attention to others’ organi-
zational point of view. However, Bunda college (BC) reports a particularly low own
control of only 54%. Although public agencies and international donor organiza-
tions have significantly higher own control values of 69% and 66%, respectively,
these values are relatively low compared to the values reported by the Ministries.
This finding indicates that neither research nor public agencies perceive themselves
as strong political experts in the field of agricultural policy and development in
Malawi.
Beyond own control, the influence profiles of organizations are interesting.
Influence profiles identify influential organizations and describe the extent to
which other organizations influence the initial policy position of an organization.
Formally, influence profiles can be described by the vector of relative network
multipliers that operate as an influence field on an organization. Based on our belief
formation model, the influence field operating on an actor is determined by her local
communication structures. Hence, the more actors are structurally equivalent in the
communication network, the more similar c.p. are their influence fields. Accord-
ingly, we conducted a cluster analysis using the influence profiles of the identified
organizations. Based on the reported statistical fit values, we preferred a four cluster
solution. As expected, cluster membership corresponds nicely to the identified
block model structure (see Table 1). Thus, cluster 1 corresponds to the political
core (i.e., block 1), while cluster 3 corresponds to the political periphery (i.e., block
3) and the two broker blocks (i.e., blocks 2 and 4) correspond to clusters 2 and
4, respectively. The specific influence profiles of the clusters are described in Figs. 3
and 4.
Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that on average, governmental organizations exert
the highest influence on other organizations, with an average influence share of
39%, followed by donor organizations, with an average influence share of 18%. On
average, agribusiness, farm and civil society interest groups exert only moderate
influence on other organizations, with shares ranging from 8% (IG-AB) to 12%
(IG-farm). A more detailed analysis of the influence of governmental organizations
reveals that the main influence on other organizations is exerted by public agencies
and other ministries (i.e, MoIWD and MoDPC). In contrast, the central govern-
mental institutions (i.e., MoAFS, MoF and the president) exert little influence on
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other organizations (see Fig. 4). A comparison of the average influence across
clusters reveals interesting characteristic patterns. Cluster 1, which corresponds to
the political core, is strongly influenced by donor organizations, with a share of
32%. Governmental organizations have a particularly low influence compared to
the average influence in the network, with a share of only 33% compared to an
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Fig. 4 Relative influence of governmental organizations in profile clusters. Source: Authors
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While it is conceivable that donor organizations that represent the majority in the
political core primarily influence each other, please note that the MoF is also highly
influenced by donor organizations, which have a share of 30%. Analogously,
CISANET and NASFAM, which are both members of cluster 1, are characterized
by high influence shares of 31% and 25%, respectively, for donor organizations.
In contrast, cluster 3, which corresponds to the political periphery (i.e., block 3),
is extraordinarily influenced by governmental organizations, with a share of 51%
compared to an average share of 39% in the entire network. Within governmental
organizations, the “other ministries” MoIWD and MoDPC exert a particularly
significant influence on the periphery (i.e., cluster 3), with an average share of
27%. Moreover, cluster 3 is the only cluster that is characterized by a significant
influence of civil society organizations, with a share of 15% compared to an average
of only 10% for all organizations. A significantly different influence profile was
observed for the most important national farmer organization (i.e., FUM in cluster
4). Cluster 4 is characterized by a particularly high influence of farm organizations,
with an average influence share of 55%. Please note that this share includes only the
influence of other organizations. Thus, the farm organizations FUM, TAM and
CAMAL in cluster 4 are dominantly influenced by other farm organizations. In
contrast, governmental and donor organizations have significantly lower influences
of 20% and 8%, respectively, compared to the average influence in the network.
Finally, cluster 2 is characterized by an extraordinary influence of national research
organizations and a lower influence of public agencies, with an influence share of
15% for both categories. Moreover, agribusiness has a slightly higher influence on
cluster 2 compared to the average of all organizations (see Figs. 3 and 4).
Interestingly, although cluster 2 corresponds to the technical block (i.e., block 2)
and includes 2 of the 3 members of block 2, some interesting differences can still be
observed. In particular, MoAFS is a member of cluster 2. Hence, although MoAFS
is an important member of the political core, the influence field operating on
MoAFS differs significantly from the influence field operating on the other core
members. First, in contrast to MoF, donor organizations exert comparatively less
influence on MoAFS. Instead, agribusiness and farmer interest groups exert a
significantly higher influence. Second, domestic research organizations exert
more influence on MoAFS than MoF.
Overall, the identified influence structures reveal that governmental actors
heavily influence other nongovernmental organizations. Interestingly, the main
influence is exerted by the ministries MoIWD and MoDPC and organizations in
the political periphery, while none of the central governmental institutions (i.e.,
MoAFS, MoF or the president [OPC]) exert significant influence on other organi-
zations. Moreover, we found clear evidence for a donor-led policy process, where
donors exert influence on the lead ministries MoF and MoAFS. Furthermore, public
agencies, particularly ADD, take a technical leadership role, exerting relatively
high political influence on the political periphery, including OBC, and on the lead
ministries (i.e., MoF and MoAFS) in the political core. In comparison to public
agencies and donors, the technical leadership of the national research sector (i.e.,
BC) is less pronounced, with a significant influence on only public agencies and the
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agribusiness organizations in cluster 2. In contrast, BC’s influence on the ministries
is rather low. From a society perspective, only agribusiness and farm organizations
exert political influence; however, these organizations primarily influence them-
selves. In contrast, with the exception of MoAFS, governmental organizations are
not significantly influenced by agricultural interest organizations. Civil society
organizations clearly lag behind other organizations and only exert influence in
the political periphery, and the parliamentary parties are completely negligible,
with only minor relative influence shares below 3% for nearly all organizations.
Thus, in contrast to many parliamentary systems in Western Europe, party leader-
ship of the public political discourse can clearly be denied in Malawi.
It is also important to determine the impact of these specific influence structures
on political performance. To answer this question, we must combine the network
multiplier with political decisionmaking power to derive the total political power of
organizations. As described in Chapter “Whither participation? Evaluating partic-
ipatory policy processes with the CGPE approach: The case of CAADP in Malawi”,
we measure political decisionmaking power by applying a composite political
bargaining game that includes a modified legislative bargaining game and a mod-
ified Grossman and Helpman lobbying game. The solution of the composite game
corresponds to a two-step procedure, where we first derive the legislative
decisionmaking power of the involved legislators from the modified BF game and
subsequently derive the lobbying power of the political agents by applying a
generalized political exchange model, as suggested by Pappi and Henning (1998,
1999) and Henning (2009), in a second step. In the modified BF model, legislative
power is derived from the set of winning coalitions, where this set is determined by
formal constitutional rules and informal legislative norms. By constitution, Malawi
is a presidential democracy, where legislative regulations are decided by the
parliament under a simple majority rule. By constitution, the president lacks a
binding veto power and the government has no binding agenda-setting power
vis-a-vis the parliament. Nevertheless, in political practice, the parliament exerts
no significant legislative power and is reduced to a pure acclamation machine; the
real legislative power rests in the government (Patel and Tostensen 2006). Accord-
ingly, we constructed relevant legislative games, accounting for the dominant role
of governmental institutions as legislative norms. However, the literature is ambig-
uous regarding the specific role of different governmental institutions, namely the
power of the involved ministries and the president. Therefore, we constructed
different legislative games. In particular, we assumed that agricultural policy in
Malawi is decided following the principle of departmental responsibility (PDR)
(i.e., MoAFS has agenda-setting power vis-a-vis the cabinet, including the presi-
dent, and the cabinet decides with a simple majority). Alternatively, in the power
scenario PA, we assume that the president functions as a “primus inter pares” in his
cabinet (i.e., we assume that the president has agenda-setting power vis-a-vis his
cabinet). Furthermore, we assumed that the ministry MoF dominates the political
process (i.e., MoF has agenda-setting power vis-a-vis the cabinet [FA]). For all
scenarios, we assume that within the cabinet, only the president, MoAFS, MoF and
the ministries MoIWD and MoDPC have effective voting power. Please note that
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according to interviewed experts, other ministries that are official members of the
cabinet play a minor role in the agricultural process. Therefore, these ministries are
excluded from our analysis. Finally, in a contrasting scenario, we assume that
legislative decisionmaking in Malawi is characterized by party leadership
(PL) (i.e., policies are decided by a majority in the parliament, as foreseen in the
constitutions, and the government is not involved). Table 4 summarizes the calcu-
lated Banzhaf indices for the different constructed legislative scenarios. This table
demonstrates that for the 3 government-led scenarios, legislative decisionmaking
power is shifted among MoAFS, MoF and the president. In contrast, assuming party
leadership, total legislative power is concentrated on the majority party in the
parliament (i.e., DPP).
Following Eq. (3), combining legislative decisionmaking power with the polit-
ical support network multipliers derived from the political support network gener-
ates the political decisionmaking power of an organization. In Fig. 6, we present the
simulated support network multipliers assuming different support network struc-
tures and varying interest of politicians in political support. In particular, we
simulated scenarios in which politicians have no, low and high interest in political
support, which are labeled as the autarkic, strong and weak state scenarios, respec-
tively, in Fig. 5. Further, we simulated scenarios in which political access is
dominated by donor, farm and CSO organizations, which are labeled as donor,
farm and CSO lobbying dominance, respectively, in Fig. 5.8 Thus, we simulated a
total of 4 legislative scenarios for each of the 9 lobbying scenarios. Thus, we
simulated a total of 36 political power scenarios, where we used the prediction
power of the corresponding political decisionmaking model as a criterion for
selecting the empirically relevant model. The best fit to the observed ASWAp
decision is achieved by assuming a strong state and donor-dominated lobbying
scenario in combination with agenda-setting power for MoAFS (PDR).
Table 4 Banzhaf power
indices
PDR PA FA PL
President 0.1765 0.2941 0.1765 0
MoAFS 0.2941 0.1765 0.1765 0
MoF 0.1765 0.1765 0.2941 0
MoDPC 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 0
MoIWD 0.1765 0.1765 0.1765 0
DPP 0 0 0 1
MCP 0 0 0 0
∑ 1 1 1 1
Source: Calculated by the authors using IOP 2.0 by Thomas
Bräuninger and Thomas K€onig
8Technically, we incorporated the dominance of a specific nongovernmental organization category
by multiplying the interest in political support provided by the dominating category by 2 and
renormalizing accordingly to derive the corresponding support network multipliers.
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In Fig. 5, the support network multipliers for different organizational categories
are presented for the empirically best-fit scenario (i.e., assuming a strong state with
low politician interest in political support and a political support network that is
dominated by international donor organizations).9
Figure 5 demonstrates that all governmental organizations, especially MoF and
MoAFS, strongly depend on the political support provided by international donors.
Basically, this pattern reflects the fact that the Malawi government depends on the
financial resources provided by donor organizations; in exchange, the government
is willing to make political compromises favoring the position of the donors. In
contrast to the government, the legislative parties rely less on donor support and
more on domestic stakeholder organizations, especially farm interest groups. Over-
all, the average power outflow from governmental and legislative organizations is
approximately 55%, which is moderate compared to other political systems (e.g.,
for the European Union, an average power outflow of 70% is observed for national
members of the agricultural council) (Pappi and Henning 1999).
Following Eqs. (1, 2, and 3), we calculated the total political power by combing
the political power derived from the political bargaining game, including lobbying,
with the political influence derived from political communication networks. We
calculated the total power distribution across organizational categories for the best-
fit scenario (i.e., PDR and a donor-dominated lobbying structure) assuming no (i.e.,
autarkic state), medium (i.e., strong state) and high (i.e., weak state) interest of
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Fig. 5 Network multipliers for the political support network of the CAADP process in Malawi.
Source: Authors
9Please note that the average network multipliers calculated for all 9 lobbying scenarios do not
significantly differ from the values presented in Fig. 5.
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Figure 7 demonstrates that excluding lobbying, the total political power would
be highly concentrated on governmental organizations, where MoAFS and MoF are
particularly powerful ministries, with individual total powers of 17.5% and 21.2%,
respectively. The other two involved ministries (i.e., MoIWD and MoDPC) are
comparatively less powerful as individual institutions, with a joint power of 29.8%.
In Fig. 6, we interpreted the OBC as the institution representing the president.
Following this interpretation, for all lobbying scenarios, the president has a signif-
icantly lower total political power than the ministries, ranging from only 5.1% for
the weak scenario to 10.3% for the autarkic scenario.10 Without lobbying, the total
legislative power outflow from governmental to nongovernmental organizations is
relatively low at approximately 20% (see the autarkic scenario in Fig. 6). Including
lobbying power, the outflow increases significantly to 50% assuming a medium
interest in political support (i.e., the strong state scenario) and to nearly 70%
assuming a high interest (i.e., the weak state scenario). Power outflows directed
to national stakeholder organizations are even lower, ranging from only 12% to
34%. International donor organization exhibit nearly the same amount of power
outflow as all national stakeholder organizations combined (see Fig. 6). A smaller





















MoF MoAFS otherMin Pre Pub_AG Donor Res Farm AB CSO
weak 7.1% 7.6% 12.7% 5.1% 9.7% 23.7% 2.9% 10.0% 7.4% 7.6%
strong 10.8% 12.1% 19.1% 7.1% 7.5% 16.8% 2.3% 7.4% 5.4% 5.8%
autark 17.5% 21.2% 29.8% 10.3% 3.7% 5.0% 1.4% 3.2% 2.3% 3.0%
Fig. 6 Total political power distribution in Malawi according to lobbying scenario. Source:
Authors
10In Malawi, a special case occurred in 2010 in which the President of Malawi and the minister of
agriculture were present simultaneously. However, in our analyses, we do not focus on persons but
on institutions; therefore, we interpreted MoA and the president as two independent corporate
actors. Following this interpretation implies different total political power for the president and the
MoA, as reported in Fig. 6.
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5 Evaluating Identified Participation Structures
In this section, we discuss how the identified participation structures impact polit-
ical performance. In particular, we assess governmental performance by applying
the derived indicators to measure political accountability, capture, and ownership
and effective use of political knowledge. To evaluate different dimensions of
political performance, it is important to define adequate benchmark levels. Because
by construction, all indicators lie in the [0–1] interval, 1 is a default benchmark
value for all indices. However, for some indices, different benchmark values appear
to be more appropriate. For example, when measuring accountability by the total
political power of national stakeholder organizations (GA-total), it appears unreal-
istic to assume that perfect accountability corresponds to a situation in which
stakeholders control 100% of the total power. Depending on the degree to which
democratic elections imply incentives for politicians to represent society’s interests,
the optimal level of accountability induced through stakeholder participation
varies. Given a relatively low level of government accountability induced by
elections, as is the case in Malawi (see Chapter “Voter Behavior and Government
Performance in Malawi: An Application of a Probabilistic Voting Model”), we
assume a benchmark value of 0.5 for all three accountability measures. Analo-
gously, when measuring political knowledge used in the policy process by the
power share of national research organizations, it also appears adequate to take a
benchmark value below 1. The latter inference results from the fact a benchmark
value of 1 implies that the political knowledge of research organizations is infinitely
higher than that of other political organizations. Hence, because Bunda College is
the only national research organization in Malawi, we took 0.05 as an appropriate
benchmark value for our knowledge indicator “PK-research”. Finally, when mea-
suring the involvement of national stakeholder organizations in political commu-
nication using the network density as an indicator, a benchmark value of 0.5
appears to be more appropriate. Please note that a density of 1 implies that every
stakeholder organization communicates with every governmental organization,
which would be rather unrealistic and inefficient. This inefficiency results from
the fact that brokerage via national peak organizations and subordinated state
agencies allows for more efficient communication between government and stake-
holder organizations.
Renormalizing the calculated performance indices to the [0–1] interval using
appropriate benchmark values, we present the calculated performance indices in an
evaluation wheel, as demonstrated in Fig. 7 below. We consider the evaluation
wheel a helpful tool for illustrating the impact of the identified participation
network structures on the different dimensions of political performance. A closer
evaluation of Fig. 7 reveals that overall, the policy process in Malawi implies only a
moderate achievement of political performance, where most indicators values reach
50% or less of their benchmark values (see Fig. 7). At first glance, government
capture appears to play only a minor rule in the CAADP policy process in Malawi,
with a performance level for total capture (GC-total) reaching over 70% of the
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benchmark value, which corresponds to a complete avoidance of capture. However,
a close evaluation partially reverses this conclusion. In particular, to construct the
capture index, we used the different household types that have been separated in the
Malawi CGE (i.e., small-, medium- and large-scale agricultural households and
urban consumer households). To calculate the representation of different household
types in the political process, we calculated the relative shares of household types in
the value-added share of each economic subsector. The higher the value-added
share of a subsector that is allocated to a household type, the more the socioeco-
nomic interest groups representing this subsector represent this household type in
the political process. Therefore, we matched all agricultural, agribusiness and
non-agricultural interest groups in our policy network with economic subsectors.
Based on these matches, we could calculate the representation rate of different
household types for each organization. Finally, weighting these organizational
representation rates by the total power of organizations generates the representation
share of a household type in the political process. These shares are compared to the
corresponding population shares of household types to derive our capture index.
For example, agricultural export crops (i.e., tobacco, coffee and tea) are primarily
produced by large-scale farm households (i.e., 30% of the total value-added share
of these sectors ends up in the pocket of large-scale farm households, but only 3%
of all Malawian households are in this household category). Thus, interest groups
like TAM, CAMAL and TAMA that focus on representing these subsectors over-
represent large-scale farm households, and general farm organizations, such as
FUM, that represent all agricultural subsectors proportionally represent all farm
households. A special case corresponds to the National Smallholder Farmers’


























Fig. 7 Participation structures and political performance in the CAADP process of Malawi.
Source: Authors
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medium-scale farmers. Therefore, we exogenously assume that NASFAM only
represents these two household types. Interestingly, overall, medium farm house-
holds (e.g., households that operate farms with a size between 0.75 and 3 hectares of
land) are extremely underrepresented, as indicated by a difference of approximately
26 percentage points between the population share and the political representation
share for this household type. In contrast, urban households are extremely over-
represented in the political process, with the same difference of approximately
26 percentage points between the representation share of urban households and the
urban population share. Thus, political participation is clearly biased against rural
households and in favor of urban households. This bias can be observed in the
relatively low value of the capture sub-indicator GC-urban. In absolute terms, the
share of the total political power that represents the interest of urban households is
nearly 3 times higher than the urban population share. However, because urban
households comprise only 9% of all Malawian households, the total capture
remains low.
Finally, we would like to make one further comment on the interpretation of the
impact of the identified participation structures on the achievement of a political
consensus. Compared to the benchmark level of 1, the current participation struc-
tures imply only a moderate potential for generating a political consensus, as
indicated by a level of 41% for the central ownership indicator Ownership. How-
ever, as demonstrated in Fig. 8, political communication implies a remarkable
reduction of political conflict in the complete network. This reduction is demon-
strated in Fig. 8, which compares the range of the convex hull that covers all
preferred policy positions before and after communication (see the outer and
medium set, respectively, in Fig. 8). Moreover, Fig. 8 demonstrates that the
Fig. 8 Participation structures and political consensus in the CAADP process of Malawi. Source:
Authors
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influence fields that operate on the different organizations imply extremely homog-
enous policy positions (see the set covering the inner dots in Fig. 8). Thus, if
governmental organizations were more open to the opinions and viewpoints that
other organizations communicate in the political discourse, the communication
network structure in Malawi would imply a political consensus. Therefore, an
evaluation of the identified communication structures against a benchmark of
1 might lead to result that is too pessimistic with regard to the potential to achieve
political ownership via political consensus.
6 From Diagnosis to Therapy: Lessons Concerning
Efficient Design of Participatory Policy Processes
To identify potential strategies for improving participatory and evidence-based
policy processes, we simulated the variation of political performance indicators
assuming changed formal and informal rules determining participation structures.
We simulated political performance for all 45 legislative and lobbying scenarios;
however, in the following section, we focus on the most relevant results. First, for
both types of participation, we change the level of participation intensity without
changing the participation structure. With respect to lobbying, the level of politician
interest in political support is changed, keeping both the relative interests of
politicians and the access to politicians constant. Accordingly, with respect to
political communication, we change the level of own control of politicians, keeping
the communication network structure and the relative own control among politi-
cians constant. Second, we change the participation structure (i.e., we shift the
participation bias from the identified donor-dominated participation structure to a
CSO- and farm-dominated participation structure. Finally, we simulated how polit-
ical performance changes assuming a constitutional reform from the present PDR to
party leadership. We present the results for these four scenarios in Fig. 9. In detail,
it is assumed in the “no lobby scenario” that politicians have no interest in political
support. In contrast, improved access of national stakeholder organizations is
simulated in the “CSO lead” scenario. Technically, the latter scenario is generated
by recalculating the support network multipliers under the assumption that the
relative interest of politicians in political support provided by national stakeholder
organizations11 is increased. In the “open discourse scenario,” we multiplied the
own control of politicians by 0.7 and recalculated the communication network
multipliers. Finally, in the “party leadership” scenario, we simulated a constitu-
tional reform of the legislative process from the PDR to party leadership (PL).
Please note that with respect to content, such a reform might correspond to a formal
constitutional reform from a presidential to a parliamentary system. However, such
11Compared to the best-fit scenario, we multiplied the interest in political support of national
stakeholders by 2 and divided the interest in support of donor organizations by 2.
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a reform might also result from changed legislative norms without a formal change
of the constitution.12
For all simulation scenarios, we take the best-fit scenario (see Fig. 7) as a base-
run scenario and present the percent change in political performance indicators in
comparison to their corresponding values in the base-run in Fig. 9.
As demonstrated in Fig. 8, lobbying has a significant positive impact on nearly
all political performance indicators. Only the dominance of international donor
organizations is less pronounced assuming no lobbying occurs (i.e., without lobby-
ing, international stakeholder organizations would not be able to gain much polit-
ical influence, and Malawi’s civil society would take more ownership in CAADP
reforms due to a feeling that these reforms are less imposed by the international
donor community). However, as demonstrated in Fig. 9, without lobbying, the final
political decision regarding CAADP would also be more distant to the desires of
Malawi civil society, implying a lower political consensus and less political own-
ership, as indicated by a decrease of approximately 30% in the indicator Ownership
for the “no lobbying scenario” (see Fig. 9). Moreover, increasing the importance of
lobbying without changing the relative lobbying power of organizations implies
that there will be no impact on capture. Accordingly, for the no lobbying scenario,
all capture indices remain unchanged in comparison to their base-run values. The
main positive impacts of increased participation via lobbying can be observed for


























Fig. 9 The impact of changed participation structures on political performance in Malawi, as
indicated by percent change in comparison to the base-run scenario. Source: Authors
12By constitution, even in most presidential systems, the official legislative power resides entirely
in the parliament.
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knowledge decreased by nearly 60% when comparing the no lobby scenario to the
base-run scenario (see Fig. 9).
Analogously, government accountability increases significantly with lobbying,
with the accountability level decreasing by approximately 50% for the no lobbying
scenario compared to the base-run scenario (see Fig. 9). Interestingly, the positive
impact of lobbying does not change significantly if different lobby structures are
assumed. Hence, as demonstrated in Fig. 9, for the CSO scenario, the majority of
performance indicators remain unchanged (e.g., they lie on the 0% line in Fig. 9).
The only exemptions are accountability (GA-total), which improves by 20%, and
the dominance of donor organization (PO-donor), which is significantly reduced
when changing form donor-dominated to CSO- or farm-dominated lobbying
structures.13
As described above, the high own control of politicians is a characteristic feature
of the CAADP policy process in Malawi, which implies that politicians rely
primarily on their own expertise when making policy choices. As demonstrated
in Fig. 9, increasing the importance of public discourse for the political belief
updating of politicians would imply that wisdom of the crowd effects can be better
exploited in Malawi. Thus, in particular, the effective use of political knowledge
would increase significantly. Please note that in this context, increasing the physical
participation of stakeholders fails to automatically guarantee higher political influ-
ence of stakeholders because the political influence of stakeholders only results if
politicians in fact update their beliefs based on the political views and opinions
communicated by national stakeholders. Thus, as long as stakeholder participation
is only formally imposed, as is partially true for the CAADP process in Malawi, the
impact on performance is rather limited. A change in the political culture such that
politicians increasingly consider the potential political expertise of national stake-
holders is needed. However, in this context, a warning also appears necessary. An
increase in the effective participation of national stakeholders in political commu-
nication only triggers wisdom of the crowd effects and improves political perfor-
mance if stakeholders have a relatively high political knowledge in comparison to
their total political power. Our analysis indicates that this scenario is relevant for
Malawi, but this scenario does not necessarily hold true for other countries.
Finally, shifting legislative power from the government to the parliament implies
a trade-off between increased political ownership and sharply decreased effective
use of political knowledge. In contrast, political incentives (i.e., accountability and
capture) are only slightly changed by this power shift (see the party leadership
scenario in Fig. 9). Basically, this result follows from the fact that in contrast to
governmental organizations, parliamentary parties have significantly less political
knowledge (see Fig. 10 in the appendix). Hence, although these parties are gener-
ally more open to political opinions communicated by other organizations in the
political discourse (i.e., parties have a lower own control), the overall effect of this
13Please note, however, that shifting the dominance from donor to farm organizations has a
positive impact on government capture, as farmers are better represented.
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scenario is negative in Malawi. In contrast, party leadership has a strong positive
impact on political ownership. First, deciding budget allocations for CAADP policy
programs under a party leadership implies that these allocations would be much
closer to the allocations preferred by civil society organizations (i.e., political
ownership in CAADP reforms would significantly increase), as indicated by a
nearly 60% increase in the indicator Ownership (see Fig. 9). Moreover, the political
power exerted by international donor organizations would be significantly lower for
the party leadership scenario than for the base-run scenario. Thus, under party
leadership, the civil society of Malawi would be less likely to perceive that CAADP
reforms are imposed by international donors.
7 Conclusion
Although participatory and evidence-based policy processes are increasingly pro-
moted at the academic level and in political practice, the current understanding of
the impact of these processes on political performance is still in its infancy. In this
context, this paper proposes a network-based framework for analyzing and evalu-
ating participatory and evidence-based policy processes. Specifically, we consider
the following points to be the main contributions of our approach:
1. The approach is theoretically founded. In particular, we derive our theoretical
framework by incorporating a network model of political belief formation into a
political bargaining model of the Baron-Grossman-Helpman type (BGH). The
latter model combines a generalized Grossman-Helpman lobbying model and a
modified legislative bargainingmodel of the Baron and Ferejohn type. The central
component of this integrated model corresponds to a generalized mean voter
decision-rule, where in addition to legislators, interest groups also have political
control over policies (Pappi and Henning 1998; Henning 2000, 2009). Within our
approach, the political control of nongovernmental organizations results from two
different mechanisms: lobbying and communication learning. The first mecha-
nism is determined by the political access structures by which nongovernmental
organizations access powerful governmental organizations, and the secondmech-
anism is determined by political communication among organizations.
2. Our approach is empirically applicable, where the equilibrium outcome of the
extended BGH-model can be derived from observed political support and
communication networks. Technically, political decisions are determined by
three components in equilibrium: constitutional rules and legislative norms
captured by legislative decisionmaking power indices, political access structures
captured by support network multipliers and political communication structures
captured by communication network multipliers. Accordingly, standard social
network tools, such as block modeling, can first be applied to describe basic
participation structures quantitatively. Second, innovative network-based tools
(i.e., network multipliers and total political power) are derived to describe
essential participatory structures.
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3. Further, based on our model, political performance indicators can be theoreti-
cally derived and empirically measured. In particular, based on the empirical
application of our approach to the CAADP reform process in Malawi, we can
draw the following general conclusions regarding the impact of participation
structures on political performance:
a. Political performance is a multidimensional concept that includes well-
established governmental incentive problems (i.e., governmental account-
ability and capture), as reported in the political economy literature. In addi-
tion, the lack of political ownership that corresponds to an incentive problem
of the society or to the lack of political knowledge is another important source
of policy failure.
b. We demonstrated that a trade-off typically exists between different aspects of
political performance (i.e., a participation structure favoring one specific
aspect of political performance simultaneously impedes another). For exam-
ple, in Malawi, we found a trade-off between political ownership and the use
of political knowledge, shifting the legislative power from the government to
the legislative parties. Moreover, the high political influence of international
donor organizations increases the use of political knowledge but simulta-
neously decreases political ownership.
c. The impact of participation structures on political performance depends on
specific framework conditions (i.e., the same structure can enhance political
performance in one country and impede performance in another). For example,
an increase in the political influence of national civil society organizations via
lobbying or political communication has a significant positive impact on the
effective use of political knowledge in Malawi. However, this positive impact
depends on the fact that in Malawi, national stakeholders have relatively high
political knowledge in comparison to their actual political influence. Accord-
ingly, no blueprint participation structures are optimal for all countries.
4. Because our approach is theoretically founded, we can perform simulations to
identify participation structures that imply higher political performance. How-
ever, a concrete strategy for implementing the identified improved participation
structures in political practice cannot yet be derived from our approach. With
respect to changed policy network structures, such a strategy demands a theory
that explains the network-generating process. We address this very interesting
topic in Chapter “The Formation of Elite Communication Networks in Malawi:
A Bayesian Econometric Approach”. However, beyond network structures,
participation is also determined by the own control and interest in political
support of politicians. Improving our understanding of the determinants of
these components is an interesting topic that we leave for future work.
5. Finally, we must admit that the relevance of our assessments to political practice
depends on the assumption that our theoretical model correctly describes polit-
ical decisionmaking in real political systems. In this regard, we use the predic-
tion power of our approach to assess its empirical relevance. With respect to the
CAADP reform in Malawi, our best-fit specification nicely predicts the empir-
ically observed budget allocations, with an average prediction error below 20%.
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Appendix
Fig. 10 Average political knowledge in Malawi according to organizational category. Source:
Authors
Table 5 Organizations in Malawi: acronym, type and name
Acronym Type Name Reputation Block Cluster
MoF GOV Ministry of Finance 0.79 1 1
MoAFS GOV Ministry of Agriculture and Food
Security
1.00 1 2
MoIWD GOV Ministry of Irrigation and Water
Development
0.67 2 3
MoDPC GOV Ministry of Dev. Planning and
Cooperation
0.45 3 3
RB PUB Reserve Bank 0.27 3 1
OPC GOV Office of the President and the
Cabinet
0.48 3 3
SFFRFM PUB Smallholder Farmers Fertilizer
Revolving Fund
0.45 3 3
LU PUB Logistics Unit 0.30 3 1
DPP LEG Democratic Progressive Party 0.70 3 3
MCP LEG Malawi Congress Party 0.33 3 3
ADD PUB Agricultural Development Divisions 0.67 2 2
DADO PUB District Agricultural Development
Offices
0.52 3 3
DFID DON Department for International Devel-
opment UK
0.82 1 1
Irish Aid DON Irish Aid 0.67 1 1
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The Formation of Elite Communication
Networks in Malawi: A Bayesian Econometric
Approach
Christian Aßmann, Eva Krampe, and Christian Henning
1 Introduction
Lobbying is commonly recognized as a public mechanism to induce policy makers
to follow the interests of well-organized groups. Therefore, lobbying is criticized
for distorting policies in favor of specific interests at the expense of society.
Nevertheless, such political influence activities can also be understood as a mech-
anism by which interest groups signal their policy preferences. That is, lobbying
conveys socially valuable information about the consequences of policies from
society to political agents. If better-informed political agents now choose policies
that increase social welfare, the provision of strategic information through lobbying
can outweigh the negative distortionary effects (Ball 1995 and literature cited
therein). Such arguments for the informational benefits of lobbying are also in
line with the so-called wisdom of the crowd hypothesis. The wisdom of the crowd
hypothesis suggests that a group of relatively uninformed individuals will collec-
tively have much more knowledge than will any single member of the group
(Galton 1907). Such a situation would enable political agents to choose better
policies if they receive individual information via communication in elite networks.
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The major factor determining whether the informational benefits in fact out-
weigh the distortionary costs is the structure of the political elite’s communication
network. An important issue here is the tradeoff between the efficient policy
learning of individual decisionmakers and a potential policy bias in the whole
network that induces negative effects on overall economic performance. Political
agents learn efficiently about the impacts of policy decisions on the economic
system if they choose communication partners similar in political interests to
themselves. Festinger (1954) argues that similar others offer relevant information
and that similarity in interests is a well-known determinant of, for instance,
friendship. In terms of policy learning, having communication ties with organiza-
tions that have similar interests to oneself reduces biased information signals and
allows for an individually efficient communication process. However, such indi-
vidually rational information-gathering routines also lead to policy distortions in
favor of the group with the same interests as the political decisionmakers.
We suggest an empirical approach allowing for quantitative analysis of the
informational value and the distorting nature of real-world knowledge diffusion
within a country’s political elite.1 Theoretical and observational studies suggest that
political actors choose ties with others in a rational and predictable manner (Car-
penter et al. 1998, 2004). In particular, the study tackles the following set of
questions in order to provide valuable information for designing evidence-based
policy formulation processes. Is the network-generating process individually or
globally efficient, i.e., is it not distorted in favor of special interests with regard to
policy learning? Do structural factors, similar political views, or the level of an
alter’s expertise determine the choice of contact? Do individual levels of political
expertise lead to higher connectivity with other organizations?
We address these questions based on data collected via a series of face-to-face
interviews with Malawi’s political elite in 2010. This survey has already been
described in detail in Chapter “A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participa-
tory Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi” of this volume. The
methodological challenge in assessing determinants of elite communication net-
works with survey data is dealing soundly with missing data. Despite the highest
efforts in fieldwork, survey data is almost inevitably subject to item and unit
non-response. Our estimation strategy addresses the mentioned data features by
adapting the Bayesian estimation scheme for binary probit models based on the
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methodology, namely Gibbs sampling, as
suggested by Albert and Chib (1993). Based on a sample from the posterior
distribution of the model parameters, obtained via iterative sequential sampling
from the full conditional distributions, parameter estimates are given as sample
moments. This estimation technique, using the device of data augmentation pro-
posed by Tanner and Wong (1987), is well suited to deal with missing values in
1We focus on expert information networks because our main interest lies in understanding
information-gathering routines of a country’s elite. Studying determinants of political support
networks and evaluating the nature of non-informative lobbying is left.
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explaining factors and missing values within the dependent network relationship.
The vector of model parameters subject to posterior inference is augmented to also
include the missing values of explaining variables and missing network relation-
ships, where draws for the missing values within explaining factors are then
obtained via sequential regression trees, providing non parametric approximations
of the underlying full conditional distributions (Burgette and Reiter 2010). The
proposed modeling thereby accounts for the uncertainty within parameter estima-
tion due to missing values, as discussed in Butts (2003). We provide a model fitness
criterion that allows for gauging the predictive capability of the suggested empirical
framework and comparison of non-nested model specifications.
Empirical results suggest that common meeting opportunities and political
influence are important determinants of the probability of observing a tie between
a pair of organizations, while knowledge is an important but not leading determi-
nant of communication. There is no evidence that information diffusion is affected
by interest bias in Malawi. In terms of designing a political communication process,
the results suggest that supporting umbrella organizations should increase informa-
tion flow in the elite network.
This chapter proceeds as follows. We first describe determinants of political
communication and corresponding empirical data. Next, we introduce the estima-
tion strategy and the approach to model comparison. This is followed by study
results and conclusions.
2 Determinants of Political Communication Networks
In this section, we first review determinants of elite communication structures as
typically discussed in literature on political influence of interest groups and social
network formation. Next, we provide a description of the variables used to assess
empirically the determinants of communication.
2.1 Theoretical Considerations
Models used to describe the evolution of ties within networks commonly fall into
two groups: preference-driven models and structure-driven models. To accommo-
date both approaches, we propose three main categories of determinants of political
communication: (i) homophily in political interests, (ii) political knowledge or
expertise, and (iii) structural factors (see Fig. 1). The first two categories rely
upon the preference-driven approach to explain tie formation, while the third
category summarizes the structural constraints organizations face in making
contacts.
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With regard to the first two categories, it is important to consider the two main
roles of lobbying, i.e. informing and distorting. Several studies argue for the
informational role of lobbying based on theoretical derivations from signaling
games (Austen-Smith 1993; Ball 1995; Lohmann 1993). They emphasize that
politicians are better able to choose efficient policies if they are being lobbied.
Thus, it is rational for political agents to contact nongovernmental organizations
with high expertise in a specific policy domain in order to reduce the uncertainty
inherent in policy choices. For example, a political goal of agricultural policy is to
achieve food security. Based on the dominance of knowledge in tie choice,
policymakers should seek advice from organizations with high expert knowledge
on, e.g., how a fertilizer subsidy affects food production, household income, and
food prices, in order to launch goal-oriented policies.
With regard to expertise as a driver of nongovernmental–nongovernmental
relations, consider that expert information is costly and not always publicly avail-
able. Nevertheless, an organization’s influence on the beliefs of decisionmakers
depends primarily on the organization’s expertise. Therefore, an organization has
the incentive to invest in contact making with experts to reduce uncertainty in their
policy beliefs and to increase their reputation as well-informed communication
partners.
However, getting informed comes with a price, according to lobbying theories.
Information is seldom unbiased and mostly reflects an organization’s position,
which is biased according to political interests. This bias component leads to policy
distortions at the expense of the public interest, if interests are not represented
equally. Additionally, it determines a political actor’s information-gathering rou-
tines. The latter results from the fact that receiving information from sources
with similar interests to oneself lowers the likelihood of receiving information
that does not match one’s own interests in the state of the world (Festinger 1954;
Fig. 1 Determinants of network evolution. Source: Authors
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Austen-Smith 1993).2 Accordingly, communicating with organizations with similar
political interests reduces the fiscal, emotional and processing costs of policy
learning. It becomes rational for individuals to systematically choose alters that
are similar in interests. Therefore, a commonly accepted determinant of tie choice,
homophily, can also be applied to understand policy network evolution (for exper-
imental evidence on political homophily as a driver of tie choice, see Knoke (1990),
Pappi and Henning (1999), andMoody (2001).3 In summary, political homophily as
a determinant of political communication lowers the likelihood of biased signals for
the receiver of information but, assuming an unequal representation of interests and
a negative correlation between knowledge and bias, increases the probability of
biased, low-value information diffusion in the overall network.
Structural approaches argue that contact opportunities influence an actor’s ties.
Consider overlapping membership in organizations as well as formal and perceived
political influence and human resources as structural determinants of communica-
tion choices. Theoretical arguments for overlapping membership in organizations
as determinant are twofold. First, we lean onMcPherson et al. (2001), who point out
that meeting opportunity determines the formation of friendships in school. Trans-
ferring this idea to political communication, membership in umbrella organizations
or common membership in organizations, as indicators for meeting opportunities,
increases the probability that a pair of organizations forms a communication tie. At
the same time, a common worldview might determine membership in an (umbrella)
organization and thereby increase the trust an organization has in the information of
other organizations with the same memberships. That is, an organization will seek
information from another organization if a third party links them both (Holland and
Leinhardt 1971).4
Another important determinant is an organization’s power to influence legisla-
tion (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Knoke et al. 1996). Given the purpose of
lobbying as an interest-mediation mechanism, lobbying organizations contact
highly influential actors within the political elite in order to ensure that their
members benefit from final policy decisions. We therefore expect that the higher
the perceived influence of an actor receiving information is in a specific policy
domain, the more likely it is that organizations will contact this actor. We choose
perceived influence and not formal political power for two main reasons. First, we
argue in line with Shepsle and Weingast (1987) that formal institutional rules
cannot explain observed power distributions. With regard to developing countries,
2Austen-Smith and Wright argue for the contrary effect of preference similarity in tie creation.
Interest groups, i.e. organizations try to contact organizations with whom they disagree in order to
convince them.
3On the concept of homophily in network evolution theories, see Lazer et al. (2008), McPherson
et al. (2001) or Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995).
4The informational efficiency model contradicts the idea that a common link to a third party
increases the likelihood of information exchange between a pair of organizations. On the contrary,
this model states that organizations will drop ties to organizations with whom they are linked by a
third party due to information redundancies (Carpenter et al. 2004).
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consider also the work of Bratton (2007), who argues that the rule of law is often
weakly developed even if it is not completely absent in developing countries.
Political power tends to be intensely concentrated around the president, and as a
result his cabinet becomes more powerful in policymaking (van der Walle 2003).
Further, considering only formal political power would dismiss the informal influ-
ence of international organizations in developing countries. Second, we argue that
using perceived influence instead of formal power will not bias results. Formal
political power usually is highly correlated with the perceived influence of actors
endowed with formal power. Moreover, employing the concept of perceived influ-
ence has the advantage of reflecting both informal and formal political power
distributions with one measure.
Finally, consider networking time as a scare resource of an organization, as
hiring and paying staff is cost intensive and budgets are usually constrained. Given
the time-consuming nature of forming and maintaining relationships, the number of
staff, therefore, determines the contact opportunities that exist between a pair of
organizations (Carpenter et al. 1998, 2004).
In summary, theoretical considerations offer two insights on the evaluation of
participatory policy processes. First, as network formation can be preference-
driven, bias in favor of a specific group can occur and resulting policy decisions
will be at the expense of the public. Nevertheless, expertise can be a major
determinant of tie formation, as all actors seek to reduce uncertainty inherent to
policy belief formation. Second, according to structuralist approaches, exogenous
actors can influence the network structure by means of increasing meeting oppor-
tunities, e.g., joining umbrella organizations and increasing the number of staff.
2.2 Empirical Determinants of Communication
According to our theoretical considerations, our set of empirical variables is
differentiated into three classes: (i) variables describing political homophily,
(ii) variables indicating individual knowledge, and (iii) variables related to struc-
tural factors. For further information on the study that collected data for these
variables, see Chapter “A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory
Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi”.
Political Homophily We approximate political homophily by a distance index of
political interests (distance). Such an index provides dyad-specific information on
the probability of observing communication between elite members due to simi-
larity in policy interests. The index summarizes the distances in interest between
two actors concerning the preferred dimension of the state of the world. We selected
eight dimensions for representing the state of the world that actors address with
designing agricultural policy programs (see Table 1). The index is calculated as a
Euclidean distance function based on the policy interests of actor i and actor j in
dimension X(z) with z¼1,..,8:






i  X zð Þj
 2
ð1Þ
Official policy documents provide the basis to extract the dimensions of the state
of the world in a respective country. In the case of Malawi, consider the Malawi
Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) and the Agriculture Sector Wide
Approach (ASWAp) as important policy programs (Government of Malawi 2006,
The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Republic of Malawi 2010). Table 1
describes which policy interests evolve in society that drive political behavior
according to these two major policy documents. Interests are listed in descending
order of average interest over interviewed organizations. Further, Table 1 lists
common interests and conflicting positions that occur within one specific dimension
of the state of the world. While common interests will drive political homophily and
thereby communication, conflicting positions increase the potential for policy
deadlocks but allow also for policy learning. Consider, for example, the welfare
of smallholders. Actors might be equally interested in reducing hunger and malnu-
trition but have different experiences and information about the political strategy to
reach their common aim. One actor might favor input subsidies to increase maize
yields, the other one might consider budget spending on extension services as a
more efficient policy strategy. Information exchange between these two actors can
help to choose a strategy that best fits their common interests.
Knowledge Our strategy to identify an organization’s level of knowledge is two-
fold. First, as knowledge is hardly observable, we use the age of the organization
Table 1 Description of interests: state of the world





Political market interventions 21





Foreign currency earnings Political market intervention 14
Budget Development of the
agricultural sector







Budget priority of environmen-
tal sustainability
12







Economic growth Political market intervention 6
Welfare: urban
consumers
Food provision to urban
population
Level of food prices 5
Source: The Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security, Republic of Malawi (2010), Government
of Malawi (2006), own data
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(age) and the organization’s degree of specialization in agriculture (specialization)
to approximate political knowledge. In our study, age equals 2000 minus year of
foundation, and specialization relates to an organization’s effort spent on agricul-
tural issues.
Second, we use an alternative indicator that directly measures the technological
knowledge of actors regarding the transformation of CAADP policies into policy
outcomes based on a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. In particular,
Henning (2012) models the impact of different CAADP policies on the eight
relevant policy concerns within an extended CGE approach calibrated for Malawi.
As described in detail in Chapter “Whither participation? Evaluating participatory
policy processes with the CGPE approach: The case of CAADP in Malawi” of this
volume, based on this CGE approach, the optimal CAADP policy positions from
the viewpoint of different governmental and nongovernmental organizations can be
identified—where optimality involves maximizing the organizations’ political sup-
port functions—while modeling the technical translation of CAADP policies into
policy concerns evolves according to the extended CGE. Comparing the theoreti-
cally derived optimal policy positions with the policy positions stated by organi-
zations during our interview implies a measure of an organizations’ political
knowledge. In particular, Henning (2012) calculates the Euclidean difference
between the theoretically implied and empirically stated policy position (see
Chapter “A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes:
An Application to CAADP in Malawi”). We use this measure as a direct indicator
of the political knowledge of an organization (expertise) in our econometric
analysis. As documented in detail in Chapter “A Network Based Approach to
Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi”,
on average, farm and civil society organizations have the highest political knowl-
edge, while politicians and, in particular, political parties have the lowest political
knowledge. Donor organizations take a middle ground in political knowledge.
Structural Factors Because the perception of an organization as influential in
policymaking will influence its probability of forming ties, we use a reputation
network for identifying an organization’s political reputation (reputation). This
variable will further serve as a proxy of an organization’s legislative power. Please
note that reputation is highly correlated with the lobbying power calculated in
Chapter “A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes:
An Application to CAADP in Malawi” based on simulated support network data.
To account for the meeting opportunities between two organizations, we include the
number of staff working on agricultural policy issues (staff) in our analysis.
Information about organizational membership allows us to calculate a dyad-specific
count variable that indicates how often two organizations were members of the
same umbrella organization (same). Examples of umbrella organizations in Malawi
are the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN) and the Civil Society Agricul-
ture Network (CISANET).We include the determinants as dyad-specific character-
istics into our econometric model, i.e., sender- and receiver-specific individual
220 C. Aßmann et al.
variables are transformed into pair-wise distances. In addition, the individual
determinants enter the model as sender- and receiver-specific variables.
Since homophily is a key term of interest in this analysis, we calculate Euclidean
distance measures between sender- and receiver-specific values of specialization,
age, staff, reputation and policy concerns (distance). The larger the values of these
distance measures, the more organizations differ in terms of the respective issue. A
negative value of the parameter estimate indicates that the probability of forming a
tie increases with homophily in the respective dimension. A positive value suggests
that heterophily has positive impacts on the probability of communication.
3 Study Design and Econometric Model Framework
3.1 Study Design
Identified relevant governmental and nongovernmental organizations are reported
in Table A1 in the appendix. While Chapter “A Network Based Approach to
Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi”
describes the study design in detail and presents the data collected from parts (a),
policy network data, and (b), policy preferences of the policy network survey
conducted in Malawi, data collected from part (c) of the questionnaire is described
below.
First, however, we explain the measurement of political homophily (distance) in
more detail, as this variable is important within the analysis of network formation.
Given our theoretical framework, political homophily relates to an organization’s
interests in specific policy concerns. Hence, in this study we use the interview data
from the questions about interest, X
zð Þ
i in the eight policy concerns, i.e. z ¼ 1,. . .,8.
Interests are ascertained by distributing 100 points across the eight dimensions of
the state of world (identified in Table 1). For information on the data used to
calculate expertise, please see Chapters “Modeling and Evaluation of Political
Processes: A New Quantitative Approach” and “A Network Based Approach to
Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi”.
Part (c) of the survey asks questions about organizational attributes that inform
about an organization’s degree of specialization in agriculture (specialization), the
year of foundation (to calculate age), and the number of staff engaged in agricul-
tural issues (staff). Further, we asked organizations to name all umbrella organiza-
tions of which they are a member. With this information in hand, we calculate the
dyad-specific count variable same, which informs about overlapping memberships
in umbrella organizations between a pair of organizations. The mean of this
variable reveals that, on average, two organizations in Malawi are jointly members
of 1.3 organizations.
Summary statistics for all exogenous variables under consideration are given in
Table 2.
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3.2 Econometric Model
We design an empirical model capturing key elements of the communication
process between local elite members related to individual characteristics influenc-
ing the formation probability of a network tie. Individual characteristics are con-
sidered as important network determinants in terms of the prevailing homophily of
network agents. For analyzing the process which establishes communication ties δji
or δij between local elite members i¼ 1 , . . . , n and j¼ 1 , . . . , n with i 6¼ j for the
considered directed dichotomous network relationships, determinants of commu-
nication relationships are assessed within a probit framework, i.e. δij¼ 1, if δ∗ij > 0
and δij¼ 0 else. Following Hoff and Ward (2004), the latent variable δ∗ij relating
determinants of communication with the observed network tie δij is thereby param-
eterized as
δij
∗ ¼ Wijβ þWiκs þWiκr þ hij þ eij ¼ Qijθ þ eij, ð2Þ
where Wij is a set of dyad specific variables, Wi denotes a set of sender specific
characteristics for individual i, Wj is a set of receiver specific characteristics for
individual j. hij is assumed to capture distance effects and thus homophily and is
hence parameterized in such a way to allow the aggregation of individual specific
characteristics to the dyadic level, i.e.
hij ¼j Wi Wj j γ, ð3Þ
and θ¼ {β, κs, κr, γ} summarizes all model parameters. Using a probit link, which
corresponds to the assumption of a standard normal distribution for the latent error,
i.e. eij ~N(0, 1), allows for establishing a Bayesian estimation routine facilitated by
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques. Parameter inference within a
Bayesian setup is performed based on the posterior distribution defined via
p θjdatað Þ / L datajθð Þπ θð Þ, ð4Þ








Source: Calculated by authors from own data
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where L(data| θ) denotes the model likelihood and π(θ) the assumed prior distribu-
tion of model parameters. Parameter inference is based on moments and quantiles
of the posterior distribution. These are obtained on the basis of sample trajectories
drawn from the posterior distribution. Sampling of parameters from their joint
posterior distribution is achieved via iterative sampling from the full conditional
distributions. The model likelihood is then given as
L datajθð Þ ¼
Y
i 6¼j





whereΦ() denotes the cumulative standard normal distribution function. Given the
above model structure, we adapt conjugate priors for all model parameters, i.e. a
multivariate normal prior for parameter vector θ with the corresponding mean set to
zero and diagonal covariance with variance set to 100 for each element. More
details on Bayesian estimation via Gibbs sampling for this kind of models are given
in Aßmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2011). Next to parameter estimates, interpretation
of results is provided by calculation of marginal effects, where the corresponding
uncertainty is directly accessibly by means of the Gibbs output, see Aßmann and
Boysen-Hogrefe (2011) for a more general discussion.
In addition, the use of Bayesian estimation allows for a conceptually straight-
forward treatment of missing values within both, the observed network relationship
and the explaining variables. As empirical network data is most often based on
personal interviews and survey data, missing values occur despite tremendous
effort in fieldwork and questionnaire design. Missing values are especially trouble-
some, as a single missing value for a considered explaining characteristic for
individual i causes the potential loss of n 1 observed network relationships for
assessing the link between the formation probability of a network tie and the
considered individual characteristics as determinants thereof. Additionally, the
parameter estimates would no longer reflect information on all network constitu-
ents. Thus proper estimation routines facilitating the use of variables with single
missing observations are needed to perform proper statistical analysis incorporating
the uncertainty in parameter estimation stemming from missing values. Dealing
with missing values is performed using the MCMC device of data augmentation as
suggested by Tanner and Wong (1987). The parameter vector θ is augmented to
include the missing values in the explaining factors. Sampling from the full
conditional distributions for these missing values is then incorporated within the
iterative sampling scheme providing draws from the posteriori distribution p(θ|
data). For the considered probit model allowing for analysis of a directed dependent
network relationship, the sampling proceeds by iterating the following basic steps,
see Albert and Chib (1993).
1. Sampling of the latent variable δij
∗ from truncated normal distributions with
means given by the linear regression setup and variance of one. The truncation at
zero from above is δij¼ 0 and from below if δij¼ 1, see Aßmann and Boysen-
The Formation of Elite Communication Networks in Malawi: A Bayesian. . . 223
Hogrefe (2011) for details on the corresponding moments of this full conditional
distribution.
2. Sampling of the parameters β , κs , κr and γ from full conditional distributions
underlying the linear regression setup for latent variable δij
∗, see Aßmann and
Boysen-Hogrefe (2011) for details on the corresponding moments of this full
conditional distribution.
3. Sampling from the full conditional distributions of missing values.
a. In case of missing values in one of the explaining variables, these are obtained
using non-parametric approximations for the full conditional distributions as
suggested by Burgette and Reiter (2010). Note that for this class of empirical
network models, where the set of individual characteristics is assumed to
explain the formation probability of a network tie, only few observations are
at hand to provide a realistic approximation of the full conditional distribu-
tion. If the number of observations required by the non-parametric approach
of Burgette and Reiter (2010) is not reached, draws for the missing values are
obtained from the observed unconditional distribution as the only approxi-
mation of the full conditional distribution at hand to obtain draws for this
variables.
b. In case of missing values in the dependent variable, sampling from a binary
distribution with success probability ϕ(Qijθ) yields a draw from the full
conditional distribution.
Successive sampling from the outlined full conditional distributions establishes
a sample from the posterior distribution facilitating inference with regard to param-
eters based on the empirical moments. Although parameter estimates allow for
direct assessment of the direction in which explaining factors influence the forma-
tion probability of a communication tie, marginal effects provide a quantification of
the effect of a change in determining factors on the probability of a communication
relation. Marginal effects are conceptually given as
∂Pr δij¼1~Qð Þ
∂~Q
, where ~Q denotes a
particular state of the considered control variables, e.g., the mode. An estimate of






ϕ ~Qθ sð Þ
 
θ sð Þ, ð6Þ
where ϕ() denotes the standard normal density and θ(s), s¼ 1 , . . . , S, denote the
sampled trajectories of all considered model parameters. In general estimates will
be based on 10000 draws, i.e., S¼ 10000, where discarding the initial 2000 draws
have been found sufficient to mitigate the effect of burn-in.
However, whilst the necessity to deal with missing values within the explaining
factors is inherent given the considered empirical network model for the surveyed
network data, it is nevertheless important to check carefully the adequacy of the
considered empirical model. While valid point and interval estimates are readily
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available for the above suggested approach for dealing with missing values, other
standard measures for gauging model fitness, like e.g. F tests, are not readily
available. Note that this applies also to alternative approaches allowing for handling
of missing data, see Raghunathan et al. (2001). As a natural approach to gauge
model fitness is based on the capability of the empirical network model to provide
accurate forecasts, the following outlines one possibility to calculate an overall
measure of model fitness. The situation of a network observed with missing values
poses a methodological challenge, as the benchmark for assessing the prediction
accuracy, i.e. the true relationship between network members, remains
unobservable. As a formal prediction criteria, we use the area under the curve
(AUC) measure derived from the receiver operator characteristics (ROC) curve
approach proposed by Egan (1975). In order to function as a valid criterion of
model fitness, the AUC measure has to be combined with a pseudo out-of-sample
experiment gauging against possible overparameterization, see Aßmann and
Boysen-Hogrefe (2011) for a review of this approach in cross validation experi-
ments for binary panel data. One possibility to design the out-of-sample is to split
the network constituents into four quarters forming a partition of the set of network
constituents, where other splits are also possible. Parameter estimation is based on
the network formed by three quarters of the network constituents, where parameter
estimates are then used to predict the network formed by the left quarter of network
constituents. Adapting a fourfold split yields a total of four possible combinations.
Since in our situation the underlying network involves missing data, the predicted
network resulting from complete sample estimation serves as a prediction refer-
ence. Note that this approach allows for a comparison of even non-nested model
specifications.
4 Empirical Results
Estimation results concerning the explanatory factors suggested by theory are
provided in Table 3 below. Although parameter estimates show the direction in
which explanatory factors influence the probability of tie formation between two
organizations, regression coefficients (columns 3 and 4) provide no correct quan-
titative description of the relationship between the probability of communication
ties and changes within the explanatory factors. The relative importance of the
different explanatory factors can be gauged based on marginal effects (columns
6 and 7). The in-sample AUC measure reveals that our approach to dealing with
missing values and the suggested model specification result in high prediction
accuracy of communication ties between organizations. Using the random graph
model as an illustrative benchmark (corresponding AUC measure of 0.5), the out-of
sample AUC measures point to the significantly increased prediction accuracy due
to the considered set of explaining factors.
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4.1 Homophily in Interests and Other Determinants
In Table 3, estimated parameters and marginal effects show that homophily in an
organization’s attributes increases the probability that it will interact. All significant
variables have a negative sign. If organizations are similar in terms of specializa-
tion, staff, and reputation, the probability of forming a tie increases. Inspection of
the marginal effects reveals no high quantitative effect of an increase in the
difference of staff between two organizations on the probability of forming a
communication tie, while increasing homophily in reputation and specialization
has a high quantitative impact. These findings point at the need to look not only at
parameter estimates but also at marginal effects to assess the quantitative effects
correctly. We find no significance for homophily in age or expertise.
Table 3 Estimation results (dependent variable is: if A ! B, tie ¼ 1; 0 otherwise)
Parameter estimates Marginal effects
Mean SD 2.50% 97.50% Mean SD
Constant 1.254 0.468 2.185 0.341 – –
Homophily
Specialization 0.672 0.201 1.068 0.281 0.223 0.065
Age 0.001 0.004 0.007 0.009 0.000 0.001
Expertise 0.423 0.372 0.315 1.147 0.144 0.128
Staff 0.01 0.003 0.016 0.004 0.003 0.001
Reputation 0.949 0.346 1.619 0.266 0.316 0.116
Distance 0.41 0.366 0.295 1.141 0.142 0.129
Structural
Same 0.814 0.116 0.585 1.043 0.274 0.054
Sender-specific
Specialization 0.3 0.246 0.776 0.189 0.105 0.087
Age 0.006 0.004 0.002 0.013 0.002 0.001
Expertise 1.593 0.392 2.329 0.786 0.53 0.128
Staff 0.02 0.003 0.014 0.026 0.007 0.001
Reputation 0.241 0.336 0.413 0.896 0.078 0.111
Receiver-specific
Specialization 0.339 0.17 0.005 0.662 0.111 0.054
Age 0.007 0.003 0.014 0.001 0.002 0.001
Expertise 0.062 0.293 0.517 0.642 0.023 0.099
Staff 0.02 0.003 0.014 0.026 0.007 0.001
Reputation 4.591 0.325 3.93 5.23 1.539 0.191




Source: Calculated by authors from own data
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Political homophily (distance) is not an important determinant of communica-
tion. With regard to the distortionary effects of political homophily, this finding
suggests less biased policy decisions. Nevertheless, organizations need to adopt
efficient information-processing routines to filter received information in terms of a
sender’s special-interest bias.
4.2 Knowledge
Next, we take a closer look at knowledge as a determinant of tie formation. We start
with the proxy for an organization’s level of knowledge: specialization. A
receiver’s probability of gaining information by communication increases with its
level of specialization. A sender’s level of specialization is not significantly
associated with tie formation. The negative and significant sign of the difference
in specialization implies that communication partners are likely to be similar in
their level of specialization and thereby in their level of knowledge. With regard to
expertise transmission in the network, this result points at isolated clusters of
knowledge that prohibit the spread of knowledge, where receivers are already
well informed about policy impacts.
Age as another proxy reveals that the younger an organization, the higher the
probability of receiving information from others. If we now put great age on a high
level with knowledge, the process enables transmission of knowledge from the
long-established, more experienced organizations to the younger and less experi-
enced ones. Please note that similarity in age does not significantly prohibit tie
formation.
As these variables are at best proxies for knowledge, we consider a further
advanced indicator expertise, which is derived from our own survey data and
Malawi’s CGE. Note that low values of expertise indicate a high level of knowledge
about impacts of policy decisions on the state of the world. A sender’s high value
for expertise is especially associated with a greater probability of communication.
Since homophily in expertise has no significant impact on the probability of
forming a communication tie, knowledge will not circulate within a cluster of
highly informed organizations. Consequently, less-informed organizations are
able to receive information from experts ceteris paribus, and well-informed policy
decisions are likely to happen.
We summarize for knowledge as a determinant of communication that young
organizations receive information from older ones and that knowledge is spread
among organizations with divergent levels of knowledge. In fact, the marginal
effect of sender-specific expertise states that knowledge highly influences the
probability of senders to form ties. However, if specialization in agriculture is
well correlated with knowledge, homophily in specializationwould prohibit knowl-
edge transmission. In our case, we observe the contrary. Specialization is not highly
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correlated with expertise (correlation equals 0.069). Hence, we suggest discussing
the variable specialization more generally in terms of an organization’s main
activity field. That is, organizations with heterogeneous activity fields but high
capacity can still be well-informed organizations. Good cases in point are donor
organizations. It is well recognized that donors rarely specialize in a sector but
handle several problem areas in a developing country. With this example in mind,
the negative impact of homophily in specialization does not trigger information
transmission but simply reveals that organizations with similar activity fields will
form ties more often ceteris paribus.
4.3 Structural Factors
Turning now to structural factors as determinants of communication, we observe
several significant variables. One factor that determines an organization’s proba-
bility of participating in elite communication is the number of staff (staff). This
finding is in line with other studies, see for instance Carpenter et al. (2004). For
senders and receivers an increase in the number of staff increases their probability
of communicating with others. We again observe homophily among organizations.
That is, organizations of about the same size are more likely to communicate with
each other. However, inspection of the marginal effects reveals no high quantitative
effect of an increase in the number of staff or in the difference of staff between a
pair of organizations on the probability of communicating.
A receiver’s perceived influence (reputation) appears to increase the probability
that actors will contact highly influential others. Consider here that reputation is
highly correlated with formal and informal political power. The result is intuitive,
since it suggests that senders try to increase the probability that legislation will
favor their interests by providing expert information to highly influential organiza-
tions. The observed marginal effect of receiver-specific reputation reveals a great
influence of this determinant on network evolution. The negative sign on the
difference in reputation suggests that organizations similar in reputation form
communication clusters. Consequently, less influential organizations are less likely
to form ties to powerful actors.
Another determinant of communication is overlapping membership in umbrella
organizations between a pair of organizations (same). The more umbrella organi-
zations are connecting A to B, the more likely organization A is to communicate
with organization B. Inspection of marginal effects reveals a high quantitative
impact of overlapping membership in umbrella organizations on the probability
of communicating. This finding is in line with the theoretical considerations.
Common membership in umbrella organizations increases the trust between orga-
nizations and thereby increases the probability that the two exchange information.
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Further, common membership is a proxy for the opportunity structure to meet and
communicate.5
5 Discussion
Based on the empirical assessment, we conclude that overlapping membership in
organizations and political influence are more important determinants of elite
communication ties than knowledge in Malawi. We do not infer that knowledge
can be neglected as a determinant or that an elite network does not spread infor-
mation among actors. However, the high marginal effects of same and homophily in
reputation narrow the impact of knowledge on tie formation, even if expertise
significantly influences the probability of sending information. For illustration, the
following calculations are performed to describe how overlapping membership in
organizations (same) and their level of knowledge (expertise) influence the proba-
bility of forming a tie for senders. In fact, we calculate the effect of a change in
same (expertise) from the minimum value to the maximal value observed in our
sample. Therefore, probabilities to communicate are computed for each of the two
determinants at these extreme positions averaging over all other determinants
observed within the sample. The minimum of same corresponds to no overlapping
organizations, the maximum to four overlapping organizations. The minimum level
of knowledge is given by a value of 1.098 for expertise in our sample, while a value
of 0.445 for expertise denotes the highest level of knowledge among the actors.6 An
inspection of effects, see Table 4, reveals that increasing overlapping membership
in organizations increases the probability of observing a tie between a pair of
organizations by 29%. However, if an uninformed sender gains as much knowledge
as the best-informed actor in the sample, the probability of forming ties, with all
other determinants fixed at their means except homophily in expertise, increases by
22 percentage points. Hence, joining other organizations would be ceteris paribus a
better means than accumulating knowledge to increase the probability of sending
information.
In terms of the bias/information tradeoff of participatory policy processes,
results show that political homophily is not a significant determinant of communi-
cation. Therefore, at least regarding fundamental policy concerns, participatory
policy processes allow for unbiased information diffusion in Malawi. However, two
qualifications of this result are necessary. First, although political homophily does
5Please note that literature suggests that homophily in attributes might affect the opportunity
structure to meet (see Lazer et al. 2008). We leave it to future work to disentangle the effect of
meeting opportunity and homophily in interests and remind the reader to interpret the results
carefully. Nevertheless, we think that our detailed measure of political homophily is neither
correlated with overlapping membership in organizations nor affected by the same factors as the
latter. Therefore, our estimations are not plagued by endogeneity or multicollinearity.
6Please note that we measure political knowledge via the Euclidian distance between stated and
optimal policy position of an organization, i.e. the higher the distance the lower the knowledge.
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not play a role, homophily in general is still an important structural determinant of
the network-generating process of political communication among Malawi’s polit-
ical elite. In particular, homophily in reputation as well as in specialization clearly
discriminates communication between types of organizations. For example, our
estimation results imply that, based on reputational homophily, international donor
organizations have a significant higher probability of sending information to central
ministries, i.e., the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of Agriculture and
Food Security (MoAFS), when compared to an average national civil society
organization. Second, despite homogeneous interests in fundamental policy con-
cerns, heterogeneity of preferred policy positions among organizations can still
result due to biased political beliefs. Hence, to limit policy biases due to wrong
beliefs it is important that communication ties are determined by the political
knowledge of the sender. Here, the strong marginal effect for sender-specific
political knowledge certainly works in favor of unbiased political beliefs, but
overall this effect is alleviated by structural factors as well as homophily effects
determining the network-generating process. Thus, overall, only suboptimal polit-
ical communication structures result.
6 Conclusion
This study analyzes the communication patterns among governmental, local stake-
holder and international organizations in Malawi. We present an approach that is
novel within network estimation as well as within political science. In terms of
econometric analysis of surveyed network data, our approach is based on an
extended binary regression framework. In fact, the model relies on a Bayesian
estimation framework to handle missing data due to survey non-response. For
political consultants, the framework enables learning about political communica-
tion processes in a country. Findings will enable them to design communication
processes that increase the probability of well-informed, unbiased policy choices.
In addition to this, we explicitly analyze the information/distortion potential of
participatory policy processes by employing two variables. First, we use an external
measure of an actor’s knowledge about policy impacts derived from a CGE model
and survey data of the actor’s policy preferences in order to analyze the impact of
the actor’s knowledge on its probability of communicating with others. Second, we
employ an index of homophily in policy interests between a pair of organizations to
Table 4 Simulation of
marginal effects: same and
expertise
Same Expertise
Min/max Pr(δij¼ 1) Min/max Pr(δij¼ 1)
0 0.700 1.098 0.571
4 0.997 0.445 0.790
Source: Calculated by authors
Notes: All other variables, except the distance in expertise for the
effect of expertise, are fixed at their means
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describe the distortion potential. Insights about this tradeoff are valuable in order to
evaluate the potential of participatory policy processes to increase the likelihood of
improving total welfare delivering undistorted policies.
Empirical findings are presented for a case study in Malawi. Data was gathered
in face-to-face interviews with local stakeholders, international organizations, and
politicians in 2010. We find strong support for explanatory factors suggested by the
two strands of literature about determinants of communication—the preference-
driven and structure-driven models. Overall, the most influential determinants of
communication processes are an actor’s reputation, overlapping membership in
organizations and knowledge about policy impacts.
In terms of well-informed policy decisions, it is highly appreciated that knowl-
edge about policy impacts increases a sender’s probability of forming communica-
tion ties. Nevertheless, this positive result for the potential of participatory policy
processes to increase well-informed policy choices is narrowed by the high influ-
ence of homophily in reputation on the probability of forming ties. Homophily in
reputation will disable well-informed but less influential players to convey valuable
information into the policy process. Further, joining other organizations increases
the probability of communicating with elite members more than accumulating
knowledge ceteris paribus. That is, promoting membership in umbrella organiza-
tions is a means to increasing information flow between groups. As overlapping
membership in organizations relates to sharing common communication platforms,
the CAADP approach of creating working groups on priority issues to work on
policy proposals for pro-poor growth policy programs is an adequate intervention in
the communication process to increase communication opportunities among orga-
nizations. However, at time of the interview round, an effective institutional
organization of dialogue among stakeholders and between government and stake-
holders was still not implemented.
The empirical analysis also shows that the probability of forming ties does not
increase with homophily in relative interests in fundamental policy goals, e.g.,
poverty reduction via economic growth. Hence, although the identified network-
generating process clearly discriminates between types of nongovernmental orga-
nizations, it still follows that policy decisions will not be fundamentally biased in
favor of special interests. Nevertheless, policy bias might result since organizations
have different levels of political knowledge, which is not fully reflected in the
probability of sending information to powerful politicians. The latter results espe-
cially from the fact that, beyond knowledge, structural factors such as meeting
opportunities, as well as reputational homophily, determine communication ties
among organizations.
Moreover, even communication ties perfectly determined by political knowl-
edge can still result in biased policies if average level of knowledge is rather low,
i.e., political beliefs for all organizations are systematically biased. This point will
be further elaborated in Chapter “Whither participation? Evaluating participatory
policy processes with the CGPE approach: The case of CAADP in Malawi” below.
Finally, the perceived influence of organizations affects tie evolution in the elite
network. Organizations are more likely to be contacted if they are highly influential.
This finding is intuitive since organizations want to ensure that final policy
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decisions consider their knowledge about policy impacts, so that their members
benefit from implemented policies.
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Voter Behavior and Government Performance
in Malawi: An Application of a Probabilistic
Voting Model
Christian Henning, Laura Seide, and Svetlana Petri
1 Introduction
A review of the burgeoning literature on participatory policy processes reveals that
scholars typically focus on the involvement of stakeholder organizations and
interest groups as a prerequisite of efficient development policies and ignore the
role of voters and elections (World Bank 2011). This situation is at odds with
political theory, which interprets electoral competition as a fundamental democratic
mechanism for guaranteeing that governmental policies reflect society’s interests.
A theoretical justification for neglecting electoral competition and the role of the
voter can be found in Becker’s seminal contribution to political economy theory,
which focuses on interest group competition based on the assumption that voters’
electoral choices are completely controlled by interest groups e.g., via campaign
spending. Another micro-political foundation for the neglect of voters can be
derived from socio-structural theories of voting, i.e., following the theory of
Lazarsfeld et al. (1968) or Lipset and Rokkan (1967), voters’ electoral choices
are completely determined by their social classes; hence, electoral competition does
not imply any incentives for elected politicians to perform (i.e., to serve the needs
and desires of their electorate). For example, following a socio-structural theory of
voting, most scholars of African politics agree that ethnic voting dominates vote
choice in multiethnic and nascent African democracies (Horowitz 1985; Bratton
et al. 2011; Hoffman and Long 2013).
However, interesting work addressing the impact of voter behavior on govern-
mental performance was recently published in political economy theory (e.g.,
Keefer and Khemani 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2002). According to this
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theory, electoral competition is often restricted in reality, leading to biased policy
outcomes. In general, policy biases result from two major mechanisms: government
capture and a lack of government accountability. The latter mechanism corresponds
to a lack of sufficient electoral incentives for elected politicians to implement
policies that benefit their constituencies; instead, politicians serve their self-
interests. The former mechanism corresponds to the bias of electoral competition
in favor of special interests. The application of an extended Baron-Grossman and
Helpman (1996) model demonstrates that imperfect government performance in
terms of government capture results if one assumes that voters apply different
mechanisms to choose between political parties or candidates based on their level
of information on politics. In particular, while informed voter base their vote
choices directly on observed party platforms or on observed policy outcomes,
e.g., economic well-being observed under a specific governmental policy,
uninformed voters base their vote choices on non-policy factors, e.g., on socioeco-
nomic characteristics like ethnicity, regional origin, or social class or rely on
performance evaluation communicated by mass media or other social peer groups.
Hence, politicians seeking for reelection have significantly different incentives to
serve the interest of their electorate depending on the share of informed and
uninformed voters. Thus, to the extent that the share of informed voters varies
across social groups, governmental policy is biased in favor of more informed voter
groups. However, although existing theoretical work convincingly emphasize the
impact of voter behavior on governmental performance, central conclusions rest on
the assumption that people apply different mechanisms to evaluate different parties
and candidates running for elections, while a comprehensive empirical analyses
that explicitly measure voter behavior to test these assumptions have not yet been
performed. Hence, Bardhan and Mookherjee accurately conclude that future work
is needed to test their assumptions with respect to voter behavior. On the other hand
inspired by the Michigan School (Campbell et al. 1960) as well as the Columbia-
School (Lazarsfeld et al. 1968) nowadays a large body of empirical voter studies
exists that analyzes the relative importance of different voting motives for specific
voter groups, e.g. policy-oriented voting (e.g., Downs 1957a, b; Enelow and Hinich
1984), non-policy oriented voting (Miller and Shanks 1996), as well as retrospec-
tive voting (Fiorina 1981). However, these empirical voter studies do not yet relate
identified difference in voter behavior with induced governmental performance.
This paper integrates existing political economy approaches that explain the
impact of voter behavior on government performance and advanced empirical voter
studies that focus on voter behavior to derive theoretical hypotheses that will be
empirically tested by estimating a probabilistic voter model. In particular, we
provide a theory that relates the relative importance of different voting motives
for different social voter groups to induced electoral incentives for politicians and
subsequently to government performance. Based on our theoretical model, we
derive indices of government accountability and capture that are defined in political
equilibrium and measure the government’s incentives to implement policies that
serve pure self-interest or special interests at the expense of the general public.
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In the empirical part of the paper, we estimate a probabilistic voting model by
applying a mixed conditional logit (MCL) approach using Afrobarometer data for
Malawi. Based on the estimated model, we calculate theoretically derived indices
of government accountability and capture. Moreover, we derive indices that mea-
sure the relative importance of different policy- and non-policy-oriented voting
motives for a number of socioeconomic groups. Further, we evaluate the relation-
ship between the relative importance of different voting motives and government
performance (i.e., accountability and capture).
2 Related Literature
The role of the voter in African politics has been addressed by two strands of
literature: theoretical analyses of the impact of voter behavior on government
performance and empirical studies on voter behavior, respectively. Regarding the
former strand of theoretical literature Keefer and Khemani (2005) and Bardhan and
Mookherjee (2002) focus on the voter’s role to explain the redistribution gap from
the wealthy to the poor. These authors identify three aspects that support political
market imperfections: (a) asymmetric voter information, (b) social polarization and
(c) missing accountability of political actors. The basic theory that explains
distorted electoral competition by citing imperfectly and asymmetrically informed
voters is based on Baron (1994) and Grossman and Helpman (1996). Baron (1994)
distinguishes between informed and uninformed voters. Informed voters vote in a
policy-oriented manner, and uninformed voters rely heavily on non-policy indica-
tors (e.g., party loyalty, ethnicity or perceived competence) to evaluate parties.
Accordingly, the votes of uniformed voters can be influenced by campaign expen-
ditures that are unrelated to political decisions. Particularly in developing countries,
people are only coarsely informed about policies. This lack of detailed knowledge
occurs due to illiteracy, limited mobility, restricted media access and a number of
other factors. Without information, people are unable to adequately assess politi-
cians based on their political performance; instead, they use proxies to assess
politicians. These proxies are typically easily observable policies or previously
existing party loyalties. Khemani (2004) finds that policy actions that are easily
observable increase the closer a country moves to Election Day. The influence of
party loyalties is described by Bardhan and Mookherjee (2002), who assume that a
higher level of voter loyalty reduces electoral competition, increasing capture and
decreasing government accountability. As a consequence, Mani and Mukand
(2002) demonstrate that politicians who maximize their political support have
strong incentives to focus on targeted and visible policies at the cost of broad social
services. First, this situation occurs because only a small number of voters have
enough specific and substantial information to evaluate whether policies have
actually contributed to better quality services. Second, measurable benefits may
not emerge until several years after a policy has been implemented, which increases
voters’ difficulties in rewarding or punishing politicians within a particular policy
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cycle. Third, providing service jobs or building roads and buildings can be easily
targeted to the politicians’ own constituencies; thus, these policies are highly visible
for even poorly informed voters. Gazdar (2000), the World Bank (1998, 2001), and
Keefer (2002b) provide empirical evidence for this phenomenon. Another line of
evidence for the importance of information for voter behavior and induced govern-
mental performance comes from the literature on electoral cycles in fiscal and
monetary policies. Cross-country analyses indicate that electoral cycles in mone-
tary and fiscal policies are significantly larger in developing countries (Block 2002;
Schuknecht 2000; Shi and Svensson 2000). Schuknecht (2000) and Shi and
Svensson (2000) establish a direct link between electoral budget cycles and the
limited availability of information to voters, with the latter factor being measured
via access to free media. Analogously, Besley and Burgess (2003) demonstrate that
state governments in India respond to declines in food production and to crop flood
damage by increasing public food distribution and calamity relief spending in
locations that have greater newspaper circulation. Thus, external interventions,
such as information campaigns by civic society organizations, may be useful in
promoting the diffusion of information that is needed for political accountability,
particularly in poorer countries. Further, in line with the Columbia-School of voting
(Lazarsfeld et al. 1968) Keefer and Khemani highlight social polarization as
another mechanism by which voter behavior impacts governmental performance.
Interpreting social polarization as expressive or instrumental voting, a dominance
of non-policy voting based on ethnicity or social class might also explain why in
many developing countries, where the population is divided into heterogeneous
groups, suboptimal policies continue to be executed. However, to the best of our
knowledge, a comprehensive empirical test of these hypotheses based on voter
survey studies is not currently available in the literature. Keefer and Khemani
highlighted a third imperfection of political markets that corresponds to the inabil-
ity of politicians to make credible promises in elections. Persson and Tabellini
(2000) demonstrate that when pre-election premises are not credible, elections
become less effective as instruments for holding politicians accountable. When
retrospective voting is more important (i.e., the more voters base their votes on their
own economic welfare that was realized when a party was in government), politi-
cians’ incentives c.p. to implement policies that serve the interests of their elector-
ate are higher. Of course, the more elected politicians discount future benefits from
being reelected, the lower is the impact of retrospective voting on accountability. In
this context, the existence of stable political parties is highlighted as an institutional
environment that decreases political discount factors, as stable political parties
correspond to an organizational commitment device for honoring future benefits
from reelection. Keefer (2002a) demonstrates that in countries where political
parties are weak or not established, politicians tend to make credible promises
only to voters with whom they have built a personal reputation. Such ties emerge
most clearly as the patron-client relationship that is identified with politics in
developing countries by a large body of literature. Several studies provided empir-
ical evidence for clientelistic policies (e.g., Glewwe and Jacoby 1994; Sanmartin
2001; Glaeser and Shleifer 2002).
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Overall, interesting theoretical work has been published concerning the impact
of voter behavior on government performance, where the theoretical hypotheses of
Keefer and Khemani and Bardhan and Mookherjee relate directly to empirical
hypotheses on voter behavior, In particular, limited information induces voters to
rely less on policy indicators (i.e., policy-oriented voting) and more on non-policy
indicators that are based on ethnic, religious, social or political characteristics
(i.e. party identity), party competence based on perceived performance (i.e.,
approval voting), or based on observed economic performance (i.e., retrospective
or economic voting). In particular, an assessment of the relative importance of
different voting motives for different social groups and of the corresponding
implications for government performance is of interest. However, although some
empirical evidence concerning the impact of voter behavior on government perfor-
mance is available, a comprehensive micro-politically founded empirical confir-
mation of central theoretical hypotheses has not yet been provided. Hence, Bardhan
and Mookherjee (2002, p. 38) accurately say: “We conclude by stressing the need
for empirical research. Are local governments more subject to capture? What are
the determinants of absolute and relative capture? Are assumptions and implica-
tions of our model validated by data? Perceptions of capture by voters may perhaps
be elicited from careful design of voter surveys.”
As mentioned above, there exists a second strand of literature focusing on
empirical studies of voter behavior. Especially, a large body of empirical voter
studies analyzed African voters (For example, see the literature overview of
Hoffman and Long 2013; Ferree and Horowitz 2010 or Bratton et al. 2011). But
these empirical voter studies mainly focus on the relative importance of different
non-policy factors, e.g. ethnicity and regional origin, in determining African vote
choices, while these studies do not relate different voting motives with induced
government performance (Ferree and Horowitz 2010; Bratton et al. 2011; Hoffman
and Long 2013). At the methodological level, the majority of the empirical African
voter studies apply socio-structural theories (e.g., the theory of Lazarfeld et al. 1968
or Lipset and Rokkan 1967) or social psychological theories of voter behavior
(Campbell et al. 1960). Hoffman and Long (2013) published one of the few studies
of voter behavior in Africa to mention the importance of policy issues and the
spatial theory of voting (Downs 1957a, b as well as Enelow and Hinich 1984).
However, although these authors mention the relevance of policy distances as
variables of party choices, they fail to include these factors in their empirical
model (see Hoffman and Long 2013). The neglect of policy-oriented voting in
African election studies is surprising since spatial theory of voting (Enelow and
Hinich 1984) has become the workhorse model of election studies in industrialized
countries (Adams et al. 2005).
Moreover, the few existing African voter studies that explicitly consider differ-
ent voter motives (e.g., economic versus ethnic voting or approval voting) only
provide a test of statistical significance without providing a measure of the relative
importance of different voting motives. One notable exception is the study by
Bratton et al. (2011), who computed the marginal effects of different indicators
of ethnic and economic voting. In particular, Bratton et al. (2011) provide empirical
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evidence from a cross-country panel analysis that includes 16 African countries that
in addition to ethnic identification, voters’ perception of the economic development
achieved under the government is a particularly important determinant of voters’
electoral choices.
In this context, this paper contributes to the literature by closing existing
research gaps, i.e. we combine the theoretical work on voter behavior and govern-
ment performance with the existing empirical work on voter behavior. In particular,
we apply a Baron-Grossman-Helpman model (BGH) as a theoretical framework to
derive theoretically founded indices that measure government accountability and
capture. At methodological level to combine the original BGH-model with empir-
ical voter studies we need to extend the former via applying the more general Local
Nash equilibrium concept to the electoral equilibrium as suggested by Schofield
(2007). Further, based on our theoretical framework, we derive indices that measure
the relative importance of different policy and non-policy voting motives. Finally,
we apply our theory empirically by using data from the Afrobarometer voter survey




Following the literature on the theory of voting, we assume that people vote for
different parties based on the utility a voter ascribes to the different parties. Let
v2NV denote the index of an individual voter, NV denote the set of voters and n is
the total number of voters. Further, let NP denote the set of political parties that run
for election, where k2NP denotes the index of an individual party and p is the total
number of parties. Then each voter can be described by a vector vv¼ {vvk , . . , vvp),
where it holds:
vvk ¼ Vvk þ εvk ð1Þ
Here, Vvk denotes the observable utility that voter v associates with party k, and
the terms εvk are the stochastic errors. Following the literature, we assume that each
εvk is drawn from the same probability distribution. The cumulative distribution of
the errors is denoted as Ψ. Because of the stochastic assumption, voter behavior is
modeled by a probability vector, where the probability that a voter v votes for party
k is:
Pvk ¼ Pr Vvk  Vvl; for all l 6¼ k½  ¼ Fvk vvð Þ ð2Þ
The expected vote share of a party k results as:






Pr[] stands for the probability operator associated with Ψ; this probability is a
function of the vector of observable utilities that voters associate with the different
parties. The specific function F depends on the assumed distribution Ψ. In this
regard, different distributions are assumed in the literature, implying different voter
models. For example, many theoretical studies assume a uniform distribution in a
two-party setup, as these assumptions facilitate formal analyses (for example, see
Grossman and Helpman 1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2006 or Persson and
Tabellini 2000). However, the workhorse model that is applied in empirical voter
studies corresponds to the logit model, assuming an extreme value distribution for
Ψ. In particular, assuming that each εvk is independent and identically extreme
value-distributed allows the derivation of an analytical form for Fvk vvð Þ (McFadden
1974):




Following the voter theory, the utility that a voter v associates with a party
k incorporates different components (i.e., a valence (VNP), a retrospective (VR), and
a policy-oriented (VP) component):
Vvk ¼ βvV Pvk þ δvV Rvk þ αvV NPvk , ð5Þ
where β, δ and α are the relative weights of the different utility components. In a
perfect political world, electoral competition would be based on the policy plat-
forms, say γA and γB, suggested by candidates A and B, respectively. Voters would
evaluate candidates based on their policy platform (i.e., voters would transform
policy platforms into their individual welfare according to the political technology,
T(Z, γ),1 and vote for the candidate whose policy platform implies their highest
utility). Hence, in a perfect world, vote choice is only based on the policy-oriented
componentVPvk γkð Þ. The motive of policy-oriented voting goes back to the classic
voting theory created by Davis et al. (1970) and Enelow and Hinich (1984). The
spatial voting model formulates voter’s utility as a loss function of the weighted
distance between a voter’s own ideal point xdv on a specific policy dimension d and
the position taken by a party k , γdk.
1See Chapter “A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes: An
Application to CAADP in Malawi” in this book for the definition of the political technology T
(Z, γ).




βd γdk  xdvð Þ2 ð6Þ
However, because in the real world, the transformation of policies into welfare is
rather complex, the calculation of expected utility is also rather complex from the
viewpoint of individual voters. Hence, voters apply simple heuristics to estimate
their expected utility. Basically, voters apply different types of policy and
non-policy indicators to estimate the future utility they expect assuming a candidate
is elected. Non-policy oriented indicators correspond to the concept of valence
(Schofield 2007), which holds that based on specific characteristics z, such as
appearance, charisma, occupation and ethnicity, voters perceive a specific compe-
tence or popularity of candidates and parties. Moreover, following Grossman and
Helpman (1996), we also assume that voters are at least partially swayed by the
relative campaign spending of different parties. This effect may reflect the influence
of election advertisements or other efforts made to mobilize support (e.g., election
rallies, door-to-door visits by campaign workers, etc.):







where Cl denotes the campaign spending of party l and c is the vector of campaign
spending of all parties. Parties collect campaign funds from different sources.
According to Magee et al. (1989) or Grossman and Helpman (1996), organized
interest groups have incentives to provide resources to parties for campaign spend-
ing. However, Magee et al. (1989) assume that campaign spending by interest
groups is mainly governed by electoral motives, while Grossman and Helpman
highlight the influence motive of interest groups (i.e., interest groups provide
resources to parties expecting that in exchange, parties will adapt their platforms
to the ideal points of the interest groups). In addition to campaign spending by
special interest groups, especially in developing countries international donor
organizations also provide financial resources to politicians (e.g., via development
aid). Development aid is often granted conditional on the implementation of
specific policies (Dollar and Easterly 1999). Moreover, financial aid gives national
politicians some leeway to generate benefits for their electorate. Thus, from the
viewpoint of national politicians, development aid is similar to campaign spending.
Therefore, we formally include development aid in Ck, although we are aware that
campaign spending by national interest groups and development aid are fundamen-
tally different in many other respects.
A third set of indicators corresponds to the concept of retrospective voting
(Fiorina 1981; Katz and Katz 2009) (i.e., voters use observable welfare indicators
Z rv , such as income growth or other well-being indicators realized in the incum-
bent’s last election period, to update their evaluation of the incumbent’s compe-
tence and popularity). From the viewpoint of the incumbent party, the welfare
indicator is determined by implemented policies, Z rv ¼ zvr γð Þ. Hence, the retrospec-
tive component of voters’ perceived utility is also a function of governmental
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policy,VRvk zvr γGð Þð Þ, where γG indicates the governmental policy. Assuming a linear











Please note that following the empirical voting literature, we assume that
perceived economic performance has an impact not only on voters’ evaluations of
governmental parties but also on all other nongovernmental parties.
3.2 Parties and the Government
Parties choose their policy platform, γk, to maximize their representation in the
legislature. Based on this objective, a party chooses its policy platforms to maxi-
mize its vote share, Sk. Due to voter behavior, parties choose their policy platforms
recognizing that their policy endorsements will affect their popularity among voters
in different ways. First, voters evaluate party platforms based on their policy-
oriented utility component (i.e., voters compare party positions on different policy
dimensions to their own ideal points; the closer a party’s platform to a voter’s ideal
point, the more she adores this party). Second, parties choose their platforms while
considering organized interest groups, which vary their support contributions to a
party according to the position a party takes. The parties know that any contribu-
tions they collect from interest groups can be used to finance campaign activities.
Following Grossman and Helpman (1996) and Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006), we
assume that in political equilibrium, interest groups donate locally truthful cam-
paign contribution schedules to parties (i.e., the total contributions collected by a




ρJkWJ γkð Þ ð9Þ
whereWJ(γk) denotes the average per capita welfare of an individual member of the
interest group J and ρJk denotes the weight of interest group J. Please note that the
sum of the interest group weights is generally lower than one (see Grossman and
Helpman 1996).2 Moreover, we formally treat international donor organizations as
2Please note that compared to Grossman and Helpman (1996), our set-up is more general (i.e., we
allow for more than two parties and allow the assumption of a non-uniform distribution for Ψ).
Therefore, the equilibrium results of Grossman and Helpman (GH) do not directly apply to our
more general setup. However, at this stage, we do not prove that the essential results of GH also
hold for our more general set-up but instead assume this point exogenously. We leave a rigorous
proof of this assumption for future work.
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interest groups (i.e., the amount of financial aid provided by these organizations
corresponds to their intrinsic policy preferences, Wj(γ), with j ¼ donor).









Fvk γkð Þ ð10Þ
Finally, parties have also intrinsic policy preferences (i.e., we understand poli-
ticians not as pure office-seeking agents who maximize their political support Sk but
also as parties with intrinsic policy preferences). Let uk(γk) denote the intrinsic
policy preferences of party k. Then the total utility of a party results as:
Uk ¼ Sk γkð Þ þ ϑkuk γkð Þ ð11Þ
ϑk is a party-specific weight that reflects the relative importance of rents received
from political office versus the intrinsic utility derived from a policy. Accordingly,
the policy platform chosen by a governmental party k¼G to maximize its total
utility derived from political support and its intrinsic political utility results from













































































































It follows from Eq. (13) that the optimal policy platform chosen by a govern-
mental party G, given the platforms of all other parties, satisfies the necessary
condition for maximizing a weighted sum of the average welfare of voters, the
aggregated welfare of all interest group members and the intrinsic policy prefer-
ences of a party.
3.3 Political Equilibrium
Following Schofield (2001), we apply the concept of Local Nash Equilibrium
(LNE); a strategy vector γ*¼[γ*1,. . .,γ*p] 2 Γ is a local weak (strict) Nash
equilibrium of the profile function S :Γ!R if, for each party k, there exists a






   Sk γk; γ∗k  for allγk 2 Γk ð17Þ
The LNE is strict (LSNE) if the inequality holds strictly; otherwise, it is a weak
LNE. As Schofield demonstrates nicely, assuming an extreme value distribution for
Ψ implies that the first-order condition in Eq. (13) is a necessary but not sufficient
condition for an LNE. In particular, second-order conditions must be fulfilled to
guarantee that a strategy vector γ is an LSNE.
However, in contrast to our approach, Schofield incorporated neither lobbying
behavior nor retrospective voting.
3.4 Voter Behavior and Government Performance
Before we present our empirical estimations, we derive indices that describe the
implications of voter behavior for government performance. As described in the
introduction, according to the relevant literature (e.g., Keefer and Khemani 2005
and Bardhan and Mookherjee 2002), less electoral competition implies incentives
for the government to implement policies that do not correspond to the needs and
desires of the majority of society (i.e., government performance is c.p. lower).
Given our derivations above, the more c.p. voters rely on non-policy indicators
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when evaluating parties, the less a political support-maximizing government con-
siders voters’ preferred policy position when it formulates governmental policies.
Formally, the larger the α-parameter in relation to the β—and δ -parameters, the
more voters base their vote choice on non-policy factors; thus, more electoral
competition implies that the government orients its policy towards organized
interest groups and ignores voters. Accordingly, we define an index of governmen-
tal accountability (GA) vis-a-vis the voter as the following relation:
GA1 ¼ βG þ δG
αG þ βG þ δG
ð18Þ
While GA1 measures the relative accountability of the government vis-a-vis the
voter, a low value for GA1 does not necessarily imply that the government is not
accountable to society because a high α-value only implies that the electoral
outcome is significantly driven by campaign spending. Thus, as long as campaign
funds are generated primarily by national interest groups, elected politicians might
still have strong incentives to represent society’s interests, as organized interest
groups are constituted by members of society. Only if campaign spending is derived
primarily from other organizations (e.g., international donors) does a high α-value
imply low government accountability. This effect occurs because international donor
organizations do not represent society members. In many cases, donor organizations
act in the interest of a specific society group, but from a society perspective,
donor-driven policies are at best derived from imposed welfare functions.
Further, as demonstrated by Eq. (13), the larger ϑG is in relation to the sum
(αG+ βG+ δG), the larger is c.p. the incentive of the government to pursue its self-
interest. Hence, we derive GA2 as a second index of government accountability:
GA2 ¼ ϑG
αG þ βG þ δG
ð19Þ
A third intuitively conceivable measure of government accountability corre-
sponds to the incentive for the government to diverge from the policy outcome that
results from a perfect electoral competition. Following Schofield (2007), we define
the electoral center (γ∗∗) as the policy position that maximizes the electoral support
of the government, assuming that no lobbying influence occurs and that the
government is solely office-seeking (i.e., the government derives no own intrinsic






v γð Þ ð20Þ
wv denotes the political weight of a voter v and is defined below in Eq. (24). Given
the definition of the electoral center, a straightforward measure of government
accountability corresponds to the change of party platform a government can
make in comparison to the electoral center without losing the elections, as follows:
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S Δγ þ γ∗∗ð Þ  0:5 ð22Þ
β denotes the vector of the normalized weights of the different policy dimensions
taken as the average across all voters. Expressing Δγ as a percentage of γ∗∗
indicates the leeway of the government to select a policy that pursues its own
interests against society’s will without losing the election. Thus, the larger this
percentage, the lower is c.p. the government accountability (GA3):
GA3 ¼ 1 Δγ
γ∗∗
ð23Þ
Moreover the relative weight of the policy position of an individual voter






βG þ δGð Þ
ð24Þ
As explained in detail below the relative political weight of individual voters
depends on the relative importance of policy and non-policy voting motives. Please
note that a perfect democratic vote corresponds to an equal relative weight for all
voters (i.e., the weight of each voter equals 1n if n is the total number of voters). If
voters differ in the relative importance of voting motives, they also have different
voting weights; in particular, the relative importance of the valence component in
comparison to the policy-oriented and retrospective voting component determines
the relative weights of voters.
Further, we can also derive the relative political weight of social groups. We
define social groups as partitions of the total society (e.g., rich versus poor or rural





Based on the political weights of social groups, we define governmental capture
as the average weight of a member of a social group T compared to the average
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The relative weight of an individual voter and hence of a social group is
determined by relative voting behavior, i.e., the relative importance of non-policy
versus policy voting motives.
Further, government capture results from the lobbying activities of vested
interest groups. Particularly when not all society members are equally organized
into interest groups (Grossman and Helpman 1996) or when the relative political
weight of different interest groups deviates from the corresponding population
shares of the society members organized in these interest groups (Bardhan and
Mookherjee 2002). Capture that results from the asymmetric political influence of
organized interest groups is analyzed in Chapter “A Network Based Approach to
Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi”,
and we do not further explore this subject here. However, please note that given our
general theoretical framework, it follows that biased electoral competition might
compensate for biased incentives of politicians induced by asymmetric lobbying
activities and vice-versa. Thus, at least theoretically, although both channels of
interest mediation, election and lobbying, are biased still a unbiased policy might
result.
To measure the relative importance of different voting motives, we proceed as
follows. First, for voting motives based on indicator variables controlled by parties
(i.e., policy-oriented voting based on party platforms and retrospective voting based
on observed economic development that is indirectly controlled by governmental
party choices), we use relative marginal effects of the different indicator variables.
In particular, we define the marginal effect of an indicator variable κ, controlled by
a governmental party, as follows:
MEkκ ¼ ∂Sk∂κ ð27Þ









Accordingly, the importance of a utility component corresponds to the sum of
the absolute marginal effects of the indicator variables that determine this compo-
nent. If we mean-scale all indicator variables, the sum of the absolute marginal
effects corresponds to the change in the reelection probability that is induced by a
100% change of all indicator variables in a direction that increases the reelection of
a party k. In contrast to policy-oriented and retrospective voting, non-policy
indicator variables that are used by voters to evaluate a candidate’s competence,
such as appearance, ethnicity, etc., cannot be easily changed by a party in the short-
or medium-run. Hence, non-policy indicator variables determine a constant utility
that voters assign to parties. To measure the relative importance of the non-policy
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utility component, we compute the change in the reelection probability of a party
that is derived under the assumption that voters would not apply non-policy
indicators to evaluate parties. Technically, this change corresponds to the change
in the reelection probability of a party assuming αv equals zero, e.g. Sk(vv, av)
Sk(vv, av¼ 0). Accordingly, we can approximate this absolute difference in the
reelection probability by the following marginal effect. For notational convenience











The relative importance of voting motives results as the relation of the marginal






With respect to content, the index RRINP indicates the percentage change by
which a governmental party would need to adapt its policy platform to compensate
for the electoral advantage or disadvantage implied by non-policy voting.
Analogously, we define the relative importance of retrospective voting vis-a-vis





RI corresponds to the rate of substitution (i.e., the percentage change in the
policy position of the governmental party that is needed to compensate for a 1%
change in the economic satisfaction perceived by a voter). Finally, to assess the
relative importance of different voting motives empirically, we relate calculated
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4 Econometric Models and Estimation Strategy
Following the probabilistic voter model, we assume that the probability (Pvk) that a




exp Vvl  Vvkð Þ
" #1
ð34Þ
where Vvk denotes the utility that voter v derives from party k. As described above,
we assume different policy and non-policy utility components (i.e., a valence VNP
component, a retrospective VR component, and a policy-oriented VP component):
Vvk ¼ βvV Pvk þ δvV Rvk þ αvV NPvk ð35Þ
However, because we cannot observe all of the relevant variables that determine
a voter’s utility empirically, we use different indicator variables to approximate a
voter’s utility. In particular, we approximate the different utility components using













Technically, we estimate a probabilistic voter model by taking policy distances
as party-specific variables and voter characteristics as individual-specific variables.
In particular, xdv denotes voter v
’s ideal point regarding a relevant policy dimension
d, while γdk denotes the party position on the policy dimension d. Further, we
approximate a voter’s non-policy utility using a party-specific constant,α0k , and a set
of voter-specific variables, Zv, for which we estimate a set of party-specific coef-
ficients, α zk . zv is a vector of voter-specific characteristics, including socioeconomic
variables (e.g., age, sex and ethnicity). In the context of this specification, we
assume that voters have a common belief regarding the competence valence of
parties, which is captured in the party-specific constants. However, we further
assume that beyond this common belief, specific voter groups might share a
common evaluation bias for a party k. Thus, as described above, to capture potential
heterogeneity in a voter’s perception of party valence competence, we introduce the
vector of socio-demographic characteristics, zv. Moreover, we use a direct mea-
surement of a voter’s perception of government performance,3 i.e. voter’s approval
of the work of specific governmental bodies, e.g. the president. We consider this
3Please note that a more flexible way to control for potential heterogeneity corresponds to the
estimation of a latent class model. We also undertook latent class estimation of the corresponding
voter model for Malawi, which basically implied the same results. Therefore, to keep the analyses
simple, we focus on a standard logit model in this paper.
250 C. Henning et al.
measure as an indicator for non-policy voting, as the perceived approval of the
quality of the work of a governmental body, like the president, is highly dependent
on characteristics, which are not related to policy issues. Furthermore, we assume
that perceived approval can be strongly influenced by campaign spending and other
interest group activities. Finally, we approximate a voter’s retrospective voting
component using a set of voter-specific indicator variables, Rv, that corresponds to a
voter’s retrospective perceptions of the economic well-being realized in Malawi.
Equation (34) allows us to calculate probabilities and marginal effects for each
individual party. The derived coefficients will be used to calculate the different
indices of government performance and the relative importance of different voting
motives.
4.1 Data
Before we present our the data used in the estimation, we first briefly describe the
party system of Malawi in the next subsection, as an understanding of the historical
development of the country and its party system facilitates the interpretation of the
estimation results.
4.1.1 The Party System and Elections in Malawi
Malawi is still a young democracy, with its first free multiparty elections held in
1994. Since 1994, four additional elections took place. During the nineteenth
century, Malawi was colonized by the British Empire; until 1964, Malawi was
part of the British Commonwealth, when it became independent under the leader-
ship of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda. Banda was the first president of Malawi; he
ruled the country with the support of his MCP. In the first multi-party elections in
1994, Bakili Muluzi from the UDF won the majority with 47% of the votes and put
an end to the regime of Banda after nearly 30 years. Muluzi succeeded again in the
second elections, which occurred five years later. Although by constitution, a
two-term limit for presidents exists, Muluzi tried to run for presidential elections
a third time. He did not succeed, and was instead forced to choose Bingu Wa
Mutharika to become his successor. Mutharika likewise proved to be a very
successful leader and won the elections in 2004 and the subsequent elections in
2009. However, Mutharika separated from the United Democratic Front (UDF)
shortly after his first electoral success and founded his own party: the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP). To date, the DPP remains very successful in Malawi,
holding 114 of the total 160 seats in the national assembly. The opposition is once
again led by the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), with 26 seats, and the UDF, with
17 seats. All other parties in Malawi are negligible, gaining only a marginal
percentage of votes in the last elections.
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Given the relatively short democratic experience in Malawi, the political parties
in this country are rather weak (e.g., parties are easily formed and dissolved based
on the availability and need of powerful political leaders). Mutharika proved to be a
prominent example of this behavior. Nevertheless, three parties (i.e., the MCP, the
UDF and the DPP) are currently established as political parties in Malawi. Inter-
estingly, although the political parties appear to be weak, the party identity of
Malawian voters appears to be high (i.e., two thirds of the Malawian citizens feel
affiliated with a political party). However, the principal reason that people are
attached to a political party is not the party itself but the party leader. The
Afrobarometer survey demonstrated that while only 50% of respondents trust the
DPP as a party, 64% trust Mutharika as the president.
4.1.2 Afrobarometer Voter Survey
After analyzing voting behavior theoretically, the following sections will empiri-
cally derive voting behavior in Malawi. A major challenge of estimating probabi-
listic voter models is the availability of adequate data. For case studies in Africa, the
Afrobarometer survey offers such data. Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpar-
tisan research project that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere
in Africa. Afrobarometer surveys have been conducted since 1999, when 12 coun-
tries were questioned in a first round. To date, five rounds have been completed,
with the last round covering 22 Sub-Saharan African countries. Malawi was part of
the survey from the beginning. The data set used in this paper is from the fourth
round of the survey, which was conducted in 2008 (Afrobarometer 2008). In round
four, 1200 Malawians were interviewed. Using random selection methods and
sampling with probability proportionate to population size (PPPS), the sample is
a representative cross-section of all citizens of voting age in Malawi. Most of the
questionnaires were employed in rural areas (85%), and only 15% were employed
in urban areas, which corresponds to the real distribution. The respondents included
equal numbers of women and men, with a mean age of 35; the oldest respondent
was 88 years old, and the youngest respondent was 18 years old. An evaluation of
the educational background of the respondents reveals that 18% of the questioned
Malawians have no formal schooling. The majority (43%) had some formal school-
ing, and approximately 38% completed at least primary school. General census data
is confirmed by the Afrobarometer survey. Malawi is one of the poorest countries in
the world, listed at rank 171 of 187 in the Human Development Index of 2011. The
per capita income was 310 U.S. Dollars in 2010, with 50.7% of the population
living below the national poverty line (World Bank 2013a, b).
To analyze voting behavior, the most important variable of the dataset is vote
choice. Accordingly, respondents were asked to answer the following question: “If
a presidential election were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote
for?”
Table 1 shows this variable’s distribution compared to the results for the three
major parties from the elections in 2009. Compared to the Afrobarometer survey,
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the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gained even more votes and won the
presidential elections in 2009 with more than two thirds of the vote, although the
Malawi Congress Party (MCP) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) formed an
electoral alliance. While vote choice will be the dependent variable, the indepen-
dent variables can be classified as indicators of policy-oriented, retrospective and
non-policy-oriented voting, as explained above. Additionally, to address heteroge-
neity, we included several socioeconomic variables of voters.
In particular, to capture policy-oriented voting, policy distances between the
voter and each party for relevant policy issues are used as indicators. Unfortunately,
Afrobarometer did not ask for policy positions on specific policy issues. However,
Afrobarometer included a set of policy-related statements and asked individual
respondents to indicate their degree of agreement or disagreement with the different
statements. The following statements are examples of the policy-related statements
used in the Afrobarometer survey:
Statement 1: Government should be able to ban any organization that goes against
its policies
Statement 2: We should be able to join any organization, whether or not the
government approves of it (Afrobarometer 2008, question Q19)
Overall, we used 12 policy statements (i.e., Q16, Q19, Q20, Q21, Q31, Q32,
Q35, Q36, Q37, Q29A–C) and applied a principal component analysis to identify
relevant policy issues as underlying factors. Empirically, the conducted factor
analysis implied a one factor solution. Based on the factor-loading matrix of
different statements, we interpreted high positive factor values as a preference for
a strong state (i.e., a more autocratic political leadership of the government); in
contrast, low and negative factor values can be interpreted as a preference for a
weak state (i.e., a more participatory leadership of the government).4
Based on the factor analysis, we calculated individual factor values for each
voter, which we interpreted as voters’ preferred policy position (xdv). To calculate
the corresponding party positions (γvd), the mean policy position of all voters who
voted for a particular party was obtained. This method is known as partisan
constituencies and has been used widely by political scientists (e.g., Schofield
2011). Finally, following the classical proximity model of Downs, the distance
between the voter’s and the party’s policy positions were calculated as the quadratic
distance between the voter’s policy position and the policy position of a given party
Table 1 Election results DPP MCP UDF
Afrobarometer (2008) 77.14 8.32 14.53
Presidential election (2009) 66.17 30.49
Source: Afrobarometer (2008), African Elections Database (2014)
4Further details on the results of the factor analysis are available from the author on request.
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(POL-DIST). We took this distance as our principal indicator of policy-oriented
voting.
To measure retrospective voting, we constructed an indicator variable based on
the following question from the Afrobarometer questionnaire: “In general, how
would you describe: The present economic condition of this country?” Possible
answers were: “Very bad,” “Fairly bad,” “Neither good nor bad,” “Fairly good” and
“Very good” (Afrobarometer 2008, question Q4A). To construct an indicator of
retrospective voting (RETRO), we scaled the answer from 1 ¼ Very bad to 5 ¼ very
good. To incorporate non-policy voting into our empirical model, we estimated a
party-specific constant (CONST). Moreover, to capture potential heterogeneity in a
voter’s perception of party competence, we introduced the following socio-
demographic characteristics zv as alternative specific variables. First, we included
regional dummy variables (NORTH, CENTRAL) for voters living in the northern or
central regions of Malawi, respectively; the southern region is used as the default
region. Second, we included ethnicity (YAO, LOMWE, CHEWA), gender (GENDER) and
living in a rural or urban area (RURAL) as additional dummy variables in our
econometric estimations. In particular, YAO, LOMWE, or CHEWA ¼ 1 implies that a
voter belongs to the corresponding ethnic group, while gender ¼ 1 indicates a male
respondent and rural ¼ 1 indicates a respondent living in a rural area. EDUCATION is
measures on an ordinal scale (1 ¼ no formal education – 9 ¼ University com-
pleted), and AGE is measured in years. To measure income, the Afrobarometer
survey provides data to apply the LPI index (LPI) (Mattes 2008).
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for all variables included in the
preferred model. High LPI values correspond to higher poverty levels, while low
values indicate lower poverty levels. Please note that we included all socioeco-
nomic variables as alternative specific variables, where we take the incumbent party
DPP as reference party. Moreover, we use the Afrobarometer question, “Do you
approve or disapprove of the way the following people have performed their jobs
over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say:
President Bingu wa Mutharika” (Afrobarometer 2008, question Q70A) to obtain a
direct measurement of a voter’s general perception of government performance
(PRES_APPR).
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Goodness of Fit and Model Selection
To further analyze voting behavior in Malawi, we estimated a probabilistic voter
model using a mixed conditional logit approach. The results are presented in
Table 3. We estimated different specifications. In model 1, we began by using
only the party-specific constant and policy distance as explanatory variables. In
model 2, we include voters’ evaluation of the current economic condition of
Malawi, corresponding to the retrospective voting motive, and in model 3, we
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included voters’ approval of the president as a non-policy voting motive. Finally, in
model specifications 4 and 5, we included additional voter characteristics to take
potential heterogeneity in voting behavior into account. In particular, in model
4, we include regional dummy variables, as they were a major explanatory factor
during past presidential elections. Moreover, in model specification 5, the socio-
economic variables ethnicity, gender, education, age, income and rural were
included. Please note that we included all of the additional variables that describe
specific voter characteristics as alternative specific variables, with the incumbent
party DPP as reference party. As demonstrated in Table 3, goodness of fit signif-
icantly increases from model 1 to 5, with McFadden R2 improving from 0.01 in
model 1 to nearly 0.3 in model 3. Thus, the party choice of the average Malawian
voter is significantly driven by non-policy factors. We interpret the voter-specific
constant as party loyalty, which is a more stable perception of party competence. In
contrast, the perceived performance of the president is influenced by time-specific
shocks, including lobbying activities. Moreover, we identify significant heteroge-
neity in party loyalty, where party identity is significantly influenced by ethnicity,
as well as regional origin and income. In particular, voters from the central region
strongly identify with the MCP (see the estimated parameter of 2.422 for MCP-
CENTRAL in model 5), while people living in the northern region of Malawi clearly
identify with the incumbent party DPP, as indicated by the strongly negative
coefficients for both MCP-NORTH and UDF-NORTH. Finally the south represents a
stronghold of the UDF, with a high and significant UDF-CONST of 5.657. Furthermore,
for the Yao ethnic group, a significant party loyalty for the UDF, which is the
former presidential party, can be observed. The MCP is primarily supported by the
Chewa tribe, with parameter estimations of 1.404 for UDF-YAO and 0.843 for MCP-
CHEWA in model 5 (see Table 3).
Table 2 Descriptive statistics
N Mean sd se CI-left CI-right min max
POLICY POSITION 805 0.000 0.881 0.031 0.061 0.061 1.185 2.676
POL-DIST-DPP 805 0.777 1.018 0.036 0.706 0.847 0 6.959
POL-DIST-MCP 805 0.775 1.052 0.037 0.703 0.848 0 7.157
POL-DIST-UDF 805 0.777 1.092 0.039 0.701 0.852 0 7.373
RETRO 805 2.965 1.253 0.044 2.879 3.052 1 5
PRES_APPR 805 3.429 0.916 0.032 3.365 3.492 1 4
CHEWA 805 0.322 0.467 0.016 0.289 0.354 0 1
YAO 805 0.130 0.337 0.012 0.107 0.154 0 1
CENTRAL 805 0.398 0.490 0.017 0.364 0.431 0 1
NORTH 805 0.145 0.353 0.012 0.121 0.170 0 1
LPI 805 1.318 0.887 0.031 1.257 1.380 0 3.800
GENDER 805 0.471 0.500 0.018 0.436 0.505 0 1
AGE 805 34.584 13.234 0.466 33.670 35.498 18 87
EDUCATION 805 3.612 1.554 0.055 3.505 3.720 1 9
Source: own calculation
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The negative coefficients for MCP-LPI and UDF-LPI in model 5 imply that poor
people tend to vote for the DPP with a higher probability than rich people. Other
socioeconomic variables (i.e., age, gender and rural) have no significant impact on
voting behavior. Therefore, we excluded these insignificant variables to improve
the efficiency of our estimation. Accordingly, model 6 corresponds to our preferred
model specification, which has the highest statistical fit when compared to all other
model specifications (see the log-likelihood values presented in Table 3).
4.2.2 Voting Behavior in Malawi
It follows directly from our estimation results that all voting motives are significant
determinants of the party choices of Malawian voters. However, the importance of
different voting motives varies. To evaluate the absolute importance of non-policy
voting, we approximated the marginal effect by setting the weight of the voting
motive equal to zero. Neglecting non-policy voting (αv¼ 0) implies that the vote
shares of parties would significantly change. Interestingly, Malawian voters feel
strongly affiliated to their governmental party, although the party only exists for
10 years compared to the well established parties UDC and MCP that exist for
22 and 55 years respectively. Accordingly, ignoring non-policy voting implies that
the vote shares of the UDF and the MCP increase by 6% and 13%, while the vote
share of the governmental party (i.e., DPP) would decrease by 18% points to just
59%. Economic voting (i.e., retrospective voting based on voters’ perception of
economic development) has only a moderate impact on election outcomes. Assum-
ing that voters’ perception of the economic development under the government
increases from ‘very bad’ to ‘very good’ implies an increase of the vote share of the
DPP by 14% points; the corresponding vote shares of the UDF and the MCP
decrease by 8% and 6%, respectively. Thus, in contrast to the findings of Bratton
et al. (2011), our estimation results for Malawi imply only a moderate, though
certainly significant, importance of retrospective economic voting.
In addition to party identity and economic voting, policy-oriented voting is also
an important voting motive of the Malawian voter. At a first glance, this finding
appears to be a paradox due to the fact that the policy distances have a rather low
explanatory power when compared to other non-policy indicator variables (see
Table 3). Competing parties tend to adopt the same party platforms; thus, from the
viewpoint of the voter, parties hardly differ in their policy-oriented utility compo-
nent. This observation underlies the relatively low explanatory power of policy-
oriented voting. However, the importance of policy voting is nicely demonstrated
by Fig. 1. Assuming that the governmental party shifts its present moderate
ideological policy position of 0.038 to an extreme position favoring an extremely
weak (3) or strong (+3) state implies that political support for the DPP decreases
from 77% to nearly 0% and only 20%, respectively.
Interestingly, an extreme position favoring a strong state would be less harmful
for the DPP than an extreme position favoring a weak state (i.e., an extreme
participatory policy style). Regardless, these simulation results demonstrate that
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Malawian voters discipline support-seeking parties to adopt ideological policy
positions that correspond to the preferences of the median voter, as predicted by
the Downsian theory of voting.
Furthermore, we calculated the relative marginal effects (RIP,RINP,RIR) based
on our preferred model specification (i.e., model 6). In Fig. 2, we present the Kernel
distribution of the relative marginal effects of different voting motives. The motives
differ strongly in their relative importance. While retrospective voting always has a
share lower than 10%, the relative importance of policy and non-policy voting is
distributed far more widely, which shows that voting behavior is heterogeneous
within a population. Taking the mean relative importance shows that non-policy
voting is most important with 66%, followed by policy voting (30%) and retro-
spective voting with only 4%.
Finally, as described above, the estimation results indicate that significant


































Fig. 2 Relative importance of different voting motives in the 2008 election in Malawi. Source:
Authors
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party competence varies significantly with ethnicity, regional origin and income.
Moreover, the estimation results imply that the importance of non-policy voting, varies
significantly across ethnic groups and regions. As demonstrated in Figs. 3 and 4,
non-policy voting is relatively important for the northern region and plays a compar-
atively minor role for the Yao and Chewa Ethnic Tribes.
However, despite the identified heterogeneity, for most Malawian voters, the
second most important voting motive corresponds to policy-oriented voting. This
result is remarkable, as most voter studies on African countries that are in the
published literature highlight the fact that policies play only a minor role in the






















































Fig. 4 Relative importance of non-policy voting according to region. Source: Authors
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However, at the methodological level, our study differs from existing
approaches, as we are estimating a probabilistic voter model by applying a condi-
tional logit specification that takes ideological policy distances between individual
voters and parties into account as party-specific attributes. Therefore, future work
that empirically tests the extent to which the importance of policy-oriented voting
also applies to other African countries or stands as a specific characteristic of the
Malawian voter is of interest.
4.2.3 Voter Behavior and Government Performance
We first analyze government capture. Given our expositions above, government
capture results from the different average voting weights of different social groups.
Individual voting weights are calculated according to Eq. (24):
ŵvG ¼ PvGð1 PvGÞ








vbwvG  PvG 1 PvGð ÞPvPvG 1 PvGð Þ ð38Þ
In Eq. (37) svk denotes the estimated relative vote share of party k. In Fig. 5, we
present the relative distribution of the calculated voting weights. As indicated by
the Lorenz curve in Fig. 5, the effective voting weights are rather unequally
distributed, with a corresponding Gini-coefficient of 0.461.5
Given the 805 individual voters in our survey, the average voting weight is
1/805. It follows from the approximation of the individual voting weights in
Eq. (38) that swing voters (i.e., voters with a probability to reelect the governmental
party that is close to 0.5) have a particularly high voting weight (Fig. 5).
Thus, the higher the share of swing voters in a specific social group, the more
government is captured by this social group (i.e., the higher the incentives for a
government seeking reelection to deliver policies and policy outcomes that benefit
social groups with a high share of swing voters). However, a determination of
whether voting weights vary systematically across voter groups is also of interest,
e.g., in the literature, it is often assumed that poor people are less represented in the
political process than rich people or that rural populations are less represented than
urban voters (Keefer and Khemani 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee 2002). In Fig. 6,
we present the calculated capture indices for different social groups. The govern-
ment of Malawi is significantly captured by the Central region at the expense of the
Northern region and the South. Moreover, the Yao and Chewa ethnic tribes are also
5The Gini-coefficient measures the relative share of the area between the Lorenz curve and the
angle bisecting plane and the total area under the angle bisecting plane. The latter measurement
corresponds to a perfect equal distribution. Accordingly, a Gini-coefficient of 1 indicates a
maximally unequal distribution, while a Gini coefficient of 0 indicates a perfect equal distribution.
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capturing the government significantly. In contrast, there exists only moderate
capture of the government by the rich voters compared to the poor, as indicated
by a capture index of 1.19, i.e., compared to a rich voter, the average weight of a
poor voter is 19% lower. Interestingly, political representation appears not to be
biased against neither the rural population nor women. In detail, comparing the
political weight of the rural and urban population based on the calculated capture
index of 1.09 implies that political representation of a rural voter is only slightly
lower when compared to an urban voter. Analogously, comparing the average
political weights of men and women a higher weight for women results given a
capture index of 0.93. The results are quite surprising as it is usually assumed that in
developing countries both women and rural citizen, respectively, are heavily under-
represented in the political process.
Furthermore, as can be seen from Fig. 6 political representation varies signifi-
cantly across ethnic and regional groups, where the Chewa and Yao tribes as well as
the central region seem to be politically overrepresented, while the Northern region
of Malawi seems to be politically underrepresented when compared to the average
Malawian Voter. Thus, at first glance, our own results appear to confirm the
hypothesis that ethno-regional party identity determines the vote choice in multi-
ethnic and nascent African democracies. However, the resulting impact of specific
ethno-regional voting patterns on government incentives and on the political
representation of social groups is far more complex. For example, in the northern
region, voters strongly identify with the governmental party (i.e., DPP), while in the
central region, voters significantly identify with the MCP and in the southern
region, voters identify with the UDF. But, while party identity with the MCP in
the central region is compensated by a strong positive perception of the perfor-
mance of the president, resulting in a large number of swing voters in the central
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DPP and lowers electoral competition and government incentives to deliver policies
benefiting Northern voters. Accordingly, the average voter weight is rather low in
the northern region and high in the central region. Moreover, please note that a
significant variation in voter behavior and in individual voting weights within
regions and tribes can still be observed in Figs. 3 and 4 above.
While government capture corresponds to different political weights across
social groups, government accountability measures the degree to which electoral
competition implies that governmental policies correspond to the needs and desire
of voters as a whole or the extent to which these policies are determined by
lobbying activities or the intrinsic policy preferences of politicians. Based on our
estimation results for our preferred model specification (i.e., model 6), we calcu-
lated an accountability index GA1¼ 0.39, which indicates that the total political
weight of lobbying groups is 61% of the sum of the political weight of all voters and
lobbying groups. Hence, in Malawi lobbying plays a major role as a political
mechanism for communicating society’s interest to politicians. This figure matches
with results of the empirical policy network study we conducted in Malawi, where
politicians indicate that when formulating their political position, they weight
external positions communicated by interest groups between 5 and 90% when
compared to their own intrinsic position, with an average weight of the external
positions of lobbying groups of approximately 50% (see Chapter “A Network
Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes: An Application to
CAADP in Malawi”). However, compared to industrialized countries relative
importance of lobbying appears to be significantly higher in Malawi, i.e. for EU
countries policy network studies of Pappi and Henning reveal an average relative
weight of the external positions of lobbying groups of approximately 35% (Pappi
et al. 1995; Pappi and Henning 1999; Henning 2009). Thus, the results show that
although Malawi has been a democracy for quite some time, the election process is
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Fig. 6 Government capture by different social groups based on the 2008 elections in Malawi.
Source: Authors
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not the most important mechanism in the political process, but interest groups and
lobbying activities have the strongest influence. However, to measure the leeway of
the government to select policies that do not correspond to the will of the electoral
majority, we additionally calculate the accountability index GA3. The latter is
identified as the maximal divergence of the governmental policy position that still
guarantees that the government will be reelected (i.e., achieve a vote share higher
than 50%). Simulation analyses of the political response function of the govern-
mental party imply that a majority is sustained over the interval [1.003, 0.8395],
where the empirically observed policy position of the DPP is 0.038. Hence, given a
maximal policy range of 6, the government can adapt its policy position between
approximately 17% and +13% without losing the electoral majority. Hence,
conclusion of a low accountability of the government vis-a-vis its electorate
drawn from the calculated GA1 index seems at least to be moderated based on the
index GA3.
4.2.4 Relating Government Performance and Voting Behavior
While we related governmental performance with voting behavior theoretically in
the beginning of the chapter, we did not yet provide quantitative empirical evidence
for our theoretical considerations. Therefore, we computed non-parametric regres-
sion analyses by regressing the normalized voting weight on the total sub-utility
that voters derive from non-policy indicators VNP. The latter factor results as the
sum of a voter’s party-specific constant and the sub-utility derived from the voter’s
approval of the government. As demonstrated in Fig. 7, a curve-linear relation
exists between non-policy voting and voting weight. In particular, based on
Eq. (38), it follows that the voting weight roughly corresponds to the term
PvG(1PvG) (i.e., the more a voter is committed in favor of or against a party at
the LNE, the lower is her effective voting weight). Further, as long as the LNE
corresponds to a convergent equilibrium in party platforms (i.e., all parties have the



























Fig. 7 Non-policy voting and voting weights. Source: Authors
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same or very similar policy positions), the effective voting weights are solely
determined by non-policy voting. Hence, the larger the differences between the
non-policy utility components among parties, the more a voter is committed
towards a specific party and the lower is c.p. her voting weight. Please note that
the party to which a voter is committed is unimportant (i.e., a large absolute
difference in the non-policy utility component among parties implies a high or
low probability to vote for the governmental party). Hence, in both cases, a low
value for the term PvG(1PvG) and a low voting weight result. Given the logistic
response function, these results make sense, as a voter’s local electoral response to
political favors is higher when she assesses lower utility differences among political
parties.
Beyond lobbying, politicians might also follow their intrinsic policy positions;
we capture the relative importance of intrinsic policy preferences using our
accountability index GA2. However, the index GA2 cannot be calculated based on
our empirical estimation because we have no data on politicians’ intrinsic policy
preferences, parameter ϑ. However, we can estimate the extent to which the relative
weight of intrinsic policy preferences would decrease if we assume that voters do
not engage in non-policy voting. To this end, we recalculate the parameters
αG , βG and δG, assuming party identity and approval voting is zero for all voters
and divide the sum of these recalculated parameters by the sum of the originally
estimated parameters. This ratio corresponds to the percentage of accountability
that is achieved in comparison to the optimal accountability that would be achieved
if all voters based their vote choice on policy indicators and observed economic
performance. In the Malawi case, the ratio of actual to optimal accountability is
1.52, indicating that based on actual voting behavior the relative political weight of
intrinsic policy preferences of the government is 1.52 times higher when compared
to the relative political weight of government’s intrinsic preferences induced
assuming a perfectly policy-oriented voting behavior. However, without a further
cross-country comparison including established democratic systems this account-
ability measure is hard to interpret. We leave this interesting topic for future
research.
5 Conclusion and Outlook for Future Work
This paper integrates theoretical political economy approaches that explain the
impact of voter behavior on government performance. We use advanced empirical
voter studies to derive and test hypotheses on how the relative importance of
different voting motives for different social groups induces electoral incentives
for politicians, to serve the needs and desires of their electorate. Based on our
theoretical model, we derive different indices of government performance, namely
government capture and accountability that measure government incentives in
political equilibrium to implement policies that serve special interest or pure self-
interest at the expense of the general public.
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In the empirical part of this paper, we estimate a probabilistic voting model by
applying a mixed conditional logit (MCL) approach using Afrobarometer data for
Malawi. Based on the estimated model, we calculate the theoretically derived
indices of government accountability and capture. Moreover, we derive indices
that measure the relative importance of different policy and non policy oriented
voting motives for the electorate as a whole and several socioeconomic groups.
Further, we test how the relative importance of different voting motives is related to
government performance (i.e., accountability and capture). The principal empirical
results are:
1. Beyond party identity Malawian voters apply different policy and non-policy
indicators to evaluate parties and candidates, while retrospective voting only
plays a minor role.
2. Voter behavior, i.e., the relative importance of non-policy versus policy oriented
voting varies significantly across ethnic and regional groups. Accordingly, the
estimated voter models imply that government is strongly captured by specific
regional and ethnic groups, for which electoral choices are primarily determined
by policy-oriented voting and far less by non-policy voting when compared to the
average Malawian voter. In particular, the Central region and the Chewa and Yao
ethnic groups are able to capture government at the expense of the Northern
region and the Ngoni and Lomwe ethnic groups. However, contradicting common
assumptions in the literature (Keefer and Khemani 2005; Bardhan and
Mookherjee 2002), our estimation results imply that government is not captured
by specific socioeconomic groups. Thus, neither the rich nor the urban voters and
vice-versa neither the poor nor the rural voters are able to capture government
significantly. Interestingly, our estimation results further imply that alsoMalawian
women are not underrepresented in the political process when compared to men.
3. Government accountability vis-a-vis the Malawian voter is strongly limited by
lobbying activities. However, this result is moderated by our third accountability
index, i.e., assuming constant campaign spending the Malawi government can
only shift its current policy by roughly 15% within the feasible policy space
without losing its majority.
4. We provide quantitative empirical evidence for our central theoretical hypoth-
esis that government performance is determined by the relative importance of
non-policy voting, where applying a non-parametric regression we could per-
fectly explain observed individual voting weights as a nonlinear function of the
sub-utility a voter derives from non-policy indicators.
Finally, the following qualifications of our main conclusion are necessary:
5. Our results clearly imply that the less voters rely on non-policy indicators and
the more they base their electoral choices on party policy platforms and evaluate
the competence of the government based on observed economic development,
the more electoral competition induces incentives for the government to imple-
ment policies that correspond to the policy preferences of the majority of the
society. However, this definition of government performance in terms of low
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governmental capture and high government accountability does not necessarily
imply that the government implements the most efficient policies. The latter
conclusion results from the fact that voters’ policy preferences might be biased.
For instance, Beilhartz and Gersbach (2004), Bischoff and Siemers (2011) and
Caplan (2007) emphasize the role of biased voter beliefs about policy impacts as
a main determinant of inefficient policy choices. Voter beliefs are defined as
agents’ simplified mental models to approximate the complex true relation
between policy instruments and induced policy outcomes. The work of Caplan
is highly recognized in the public choice literature, as he collects an impressive
amount of evidence for persistently biased voter beliefs. Based on his empirical
findings, Caplan draws the rather pessimistic conclusion that democratic mech-
anisms of preference aggregation naturally lead to the choice of inefficient
policies. Interestingly, taking biased voter beliefs into account, a high impor-
tance of lobbying in combination with governmental leadership that is driven by
its own intrinsic political vision might induce more efficient policy choices
while simultaneously decreasing governmental performance, as defined in
terms of capture and accountability. Hence, the analysis of voter beliefs is an
important topic of our future research.
References
Adams, J., B. Grofman, and S. Merrill. 2005. A Unified Theory of Party Competition. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
African Elections Database. 2014. Election Results Malawi Database. http://africanelections.
tripod.com/mw.html. Accessed 8 Jan 2014.
Afrobarometer. 2008. http://afrobarometer.org/. Accessed May 2016.
Bardhan, P., and D. Mookherjee. 2002. Relative Capture of Local and Central Governments: An
Essay in the Political Economy of Decentralization. Working Paper C99-109. Center of
International and Development Economics Research.
———. 2006. Decentralisation and Accountability in Infrastructure Delivery in Developing
Countries. The Economic Journal 116: 101–127.
Baron, D.P. 1994. Electoral Competition with Informed and Uniformed Voters. American Polit-
ical Science Review 88: 33–47.
Beilhartz, H.-J., and H. Gersbach. 2004. General Equilibrium Effects and Voting into a Crisis.
CEPR Discussion Paper 4454. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
Besley, T., and R. Burgess. 2003. The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory
and Evidence from India. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (4): 1415–1451.
Bischoff, I., and L.-H.R. Siemers. 2011. Biased Beliefs and Retrospective Voting: Why Democ-
racies Choose Mediocre Policies. Public Choice 156: 163–180.
Block, S.A. 2002. Political Business Cycles, Democratization, and Economic Reform: The Case of
Africa. Journal of Development Economics 67 (1): 205–228.
Bratton, M., R. Bhavnani, and T.-H. Chen. 2011. Voting Intentions in Africa: Ethnic, Economic or
Partisan? Working Paper No. 127. South Africa: Afrobarometer.
Campbell, A., P.E. Converse, W.E. Miller, and D.E. Stokes. 1960. The American Voter.
New York: Wiley.
Voter Behavior and Government Performance in Malawi: An Application of a. . . 267
Caplan, B. 2007. The Myth of the Rational Voter—Why Democracies Choose Bad Politics.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Davis, O., H.J. Melvin, and P.C. Ordeshook. 1970. An Expository Development of a Mathematical
Model of the Electoral Process. American Political Science Review 64: 426–448.
Dollar, D., and W. Easterly. 1999. The Search for the Key: Aid, Investment and Policies in Africa.
Journal of African Economies 8 (4): 546–577.
Downs, A. 1957a. An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Brothers.
———. 1957b. An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. Journal of Political
Economy 65 (2): 135–150.
Enelow, J.M., and M.J. Hinich. 1984. The Spatial Theory of Voting: An Introduction. New York:
Cambrigde University Press.
Ferree, K. 2004. The Micro-Foundations of Ethnic Voting: Evidence from South Africa.
Afrobarometer Working Papers 40.
Ferree, K.E., and J. Horowitz. 2010. Ties that Bind? The Rise and Decline of Ethno-Regional
Partisanship in Malawi, 1994–2009. Democratization 17: 534–563.
Fiorina, M., ed. 1981. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale
University Press.
Gazdar, H. 2000. State, Community and Universal Education: A Political Economy of Public
Schooling in Rural Pakistan. London School of Economics: Asia Research Centre.
Glaeser, E. L., and A. Shleifer. 2002. The Curley Effect. NBER Working Paper 8942. Cambridge:
National Bureau of Economics Research.
Glewwe, P., and H. Jacoby. 1994. Student Achievement and Schooling Choice in Low-income
Countries: Evidence from Ghana. Journal of Human Resources 29 (3): 843–864.
Grossman, G.M., and E. Helpman. 1996. Electoral Competition and Special Interest Politics.
Review of Economic Studies 63 (2): 265–286.
Henning, C.H.C.A. 2009. Networks of Power in the CAP System of the EU-15 and EU-27. Journal
of Public Policy 29: 153–177.
Hoffman, B.D., and J.D. Long. 2013. Parties, Ethnicity, and Voting in African Elections. Com-
parative Politics 45: 127–146.
Horowitz, D. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
Katz, J.N., and G. Katz. 2009. Reassessing the Link between Voter Heterogeneity and Political
Accountability: A Latent Class Regression Model of Economic Voting. Paper presented at the
Poster Session of the 26th Annual Summer Meeting of the Society for Political Methodology.
Keefer, P. 2002a. Clientelism, Credibility and Democracy. Journal of Law, Economics and
Organization 24: 371–406.
———. 2002b. The Political Economy of Public Spending Decisions in the Dominican Republic:
Credibility, Clientelism and Political Institutions. Report prepared for the Public Expenditure
and Institutional Review, the Dominican Republic. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Keefer, P., and S. Khemani. 2005. Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding
Political Incentives for Providing Public Services. The World Bank Research Observer 20 (1):
1–27.
Khemani, S. 2004. Political Cycles in a Developing Economy: Effect of Elections in the Indian
States. Journal of Development Economics 73 (1): 125–154.
Lazarsfeld, P., B. Berelson, and H. Gaudet. 1968. The People’s Choice. How the Voter Makes Up
His Mind in a Presidential Campaign. 3rd ed. New York: Columbia University Press.
Lipset, S.M., and S. Rokkan. 1967. Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspec-
tives. New York: Free Press.
Magee, S.P., W.A. Brock, and L. Young. 1989. Black Hole Tariffs and Endogenous Policy Theory:
Political Economy in General Equilibrium. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mani, A., and S. Mukand. 2002. Democracy, Visibility and Public Good Provision. Mimeo.
Williams College: Williamstown.
268 C. Henning et al.
Mattes, R. 2008. The Material and Political Bases of Lived Poverty in Africa: Insights from the
Afrobarometer. CSSRWorking Paper No. 216. Centre for Social Science Research, University
of Cape Town.
McFadden, D., ed. 1974. The Measurement of Urban Travel Demand. Journal of Public Econom-
ics 3: 303–328.
Miller, W.E., and J.M. Shanks. 1996. The New American Voter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Pappi, F.U., T. K€onig, and D. Knoke. 1995. Entscheidungsprozesse in der Arbeits- und
Sozialpolitik. Frankfurt. Campus: New York.
Pappi, F.U., and H.C.A. Henning. 1999. The Organization of Influence on EC’s Common
Agricultural Policy: A Network Approach. European Journal of Political Research 36:
257–281.
Persson, T., and G. Tabellini. 2000. Political Economics—Explaning Economic Policy. Cam-
bridge: MIT Press.
Sanmartin, M. 2001. Linearity of the Return to Education and Self-Selection. Applied Economics
33 (1): 133–142.
Schofield, N. 2001. In Generic Existence of Political Equilibrium, ed. M. Lassonde. Heidelberg:
Physica.
———. 2007. The Mean Voter Theorem: Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergent
Equilibrium. Review of Economic Studies 74: 965–980.
———. 2011. Leaders, Voters and Activists in the Elections in Great Britain 2005 and 2010.
Electoral Studies 30: 484–498.
Schuknecht, L. 2000. Fiscal Policy Cycles and Public Expenditure in Developing Countries.
Public Choice 102 (1–2): 113–128.
Shi, M., and J. Svensson. 2000. Political Budget Cycles: Do They Differ between Developed and
Developing Countries? Washington, DC: World Bank, Development Research Group.
World Bank. 1998. A Framework for Civil Service Reform in Pakistan. Technical Report,
Washington, DC: World Bank, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, South Asia
Region.
———. 2001. Nepal: Priorities and Strategies for Education Reform. Technical Report,
Washington, DC: World Bank, Human Development Unit, South Asia Region.
———. 2011. Participation at Project, Program and Policy Level. Washington, DC: World Bank.
———. 2013a. Poverty Headcount Ratio at National Poverty Line. Data retrieved November
15, 2013, from World DataBank: World Development Indicators database.
———. 2013b. GNI Per Capita, Atlas Method. Data retrieved November 15, 2013, from World
DataBank: World Development Indicators database.
Christian Henning is professor and chair of agricultural economics, University of Kiel (Ger-
many). He studied economics, agricultural economics, sociology, political science and mathemat-
ics. He earned a PhD in economics, in agricultural economics and in political science. His main
areas of specialization are applied political economy and applied economic modelling of agricul-
tural policies. To date he has published five books and various articles in refereed journals
including PLoS ONE, American Journal of Agricultural Economics, European Review of Agri-
cultural Economics, Journal of Public Policy, Journal of Mathematical Sociology and Journal of
Theoretical Politics.
Laura Seide works as a commodity trader at Cargill Germany. She studied agricultural econom-
ics and earned a PhD in agricultural economics at the University of Kiel (Germany). Her main
areas of specialization are Voting Behaviour in Developing Countries, Evaluation of Rural
Development Policies and Social Capital and Political Network Analysis.
Voter Behavior and Government Performance in Malawi: An Application of a. . . 269
Svetlana Petri is a senior researcher in agricultural policy department of agricultural economics,
University of Kiel (Germany). She studied agricultural economics and mathematics. She earned a
PhD in agricultural economics. Her main research interest is probabilistic election models and
modelling of capture and accountability of local and central Governments.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
270 C. Henning et al.
Whither Participation? Evaluating
Participatory Policy Processes Using the CGPE
Approach: The Case of CAADP in Malawi
Christian Henning, Johannes Hedtrich, Ligane Massamba Sène,
and Eva Krampe
1 Introduction
In response to persisting policy failure in many developing countries, participatory
and evidence-based political processes are increasingly promoted as an omnipotent
mechanism for guaranteeing unbiased and efficient policies. Scholars who advocate
participatory policy processes emphasize two points. First, higher stakeholder
participation implies that elected politicians have stronger incentives to represent
public interests. Second, stakeholder organizations have an improved understand-
ing of the actions required to promote economic growth and improve the welfare of
the poor. Alternatively, some scholars highlight the fact that the development of
national economies is a complex process and promote evidence-based policy
processes because politicians lack the relevant political knowledge and analytical
skills to develop an adequate political strategy for promoting economic growth and
reducing poverty. Accordingly, scholars who favor evidenced-based policy pro-
cesses advocate the active participation of national and international research
organizations in policy processes and promote the use of economic modelling for
providing adequate political knowledge to responsible political agents. Overall,
participatory and evidence-based policy processes are designed to induce more
efficient policy decisions. However, in political practice, designing effective and
efficient participatory and evidence-based policy processes is challenging. On one
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hand, the ability of stakeholder participations to increase the incentives for respon-
sible politicians to implement policies that favor the interest of the general public is
questionable. On the other hand, economic modelling is often criticized by political
practitioners as a purely academic exercise that fails to provide practical tools for
understanding or designing optimal real-life economic processes (Geurts and
Joldersma 2001). Accordingly, scholars promote participatory policy analysis that
is characterized by an interaction between economic theory and political praxis to
combine the ‘objective’ knowledge derived from economic theories and empirical
data with the ‘subjective’ knowledge of stakeholder organizations as political
practitioners (Durning 1993; Joldersma 1997; Geurts and Joldersma 2001). More-
over, inadequate communication between scientific policy analysts and political
actors is proposed to be a principal cause of the limited impact of research on
policymaking. For example, the ‘utilization of knowledge school’ emphasizes the
fact that policy analysts and policymakers live in two separate communities (Geurts
and Joldersma 2001). Hence, to become more efficient, the relationship between
scientific experts and policy actors must be redefined. For example, Duke (1974)
discusses the role of the interaction between scientific experts and political practi-
tioners within the theoretical perspective of policy learning.
In this context, we suggest the evolutionary Computable General Political
Economy Equilibrium Model (eCGPE) as a quantitative approach to modeling
and evaluating policy processes. In contrast to standard political economy
approaches that focus on political incentive problems and have primarily ignored
imperfect political knowledge as a source of inefficient development policies (for
example, see Persson and Tabellini 2000), the CGPE approach explicitly allows a
quantitative assessment of the impact of both imperfect political incentives and
imperfect political knowledge.
While the theoretical CGPE approach has already been introduced in the chapter
“Modeling and Evaluation of Political Processes: A New Quantitative Approach”
this chapter provides an empirical application of the CGPE approach to the case of
the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) reform in
Malawi. CAADP reform in Malawi is a good case in point. First, despite some
positive trends, high levels of poverty, poor health, malnutrition and hunger con-
tinue to plague Malawi. Second, while it is commonly agreed that these disappoint-
ing outcomes are caused in large part by suboptimal public policies, the causes of
the continuing failure of the Malawi government to provide optimal public policies
remain unknown. Is the Malawi government unwilling to implement the right
policies due to biased political incentives or is the government simply unable to
implement effective policies due to inadequate political knowledge? For example,
by adopting CAADP, the Malawian government, in agreement with the govern-
ments of 21 other African countries, committed to a strong role of agriculture in
economic development. The pursuit of a 6% annual growth rate in agriculture via the
allocation of at least 10% of public resources to the agricultural sector is one of the
main principles of CAADP. However, although there is a general agreement among
African development specialists that any poverty reduction strategy in Africa must
consider rural development and incomes, the role of agriculture in African develop-
ment is controversial (Brzeska et al. 2012). First, the optimal allocation of public
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resources to agricultural and non-agricultural policy programs is a complex task,
which depends on the specific framework economic conditions of a country and
must be supported by adequate evidence-based research. In particular, the extent to
which technical progress in agriculture is more effective than progress in
non-agriculture in inducing substantial economic growth and poverty reduction
remains unclear. Moreover, the optimal allocation of scarce public budget resources
among different policy programs that promote technical progress in the agricultural
and non-agricultural sectors remains unknown. Finally, beyond the relevant question
of which sectors are the most important engines of growth in the Malawi economy
(i.e., agriculture versus non-agriculture or within agriculture, food crops versus export
crops), another important question relates to the optimal allocation of public resources
across different policy programs (e.g., extension services versus fertilizer subsidies) or
infrastructure programs to promote maximal technical progress.
Overall, using the CAADP reform in Malawi as a case study, we demonstrate in
this paper that the eCGPE is an adequate model framework that not only enables a
political diagnosis (i.e., the identification of existing incentives and knowledge
gaps) but also facilitates the development of a political therapy (i.e., the identifi-
cation of adequate strategies for reducing the identified political performance gaps).
The structure of this chapter is outlined here. In the next section, we explain the
manner in which the eCGPE approach is implemented within GAMS and briefly
describe how the different eCGPE modules are empirically specified. In particular,
we focus on the derivation and empirical estimation of the PIF module and on the
econometric estimation of the policy beliefs and political knowledge of different
stakeholder organizations. We then describe the principal results of our political
diagnosis using the eCGPE model. We also present different simulation analyses
that apply the eCGPE to assess different participatory and evidence-based political
decisionmaking processes. The chapter concludes by providing an outlook on
future work.
2 Technical Implementation and Empirical Specification
of the CGPE model
2.1 Technical Implementation in GAMS
The model is implemented in GAMS as a mixed-complementary problem and
solved using PATH. The program is a straightforward extension of the existing
recursive dynamic CGE of IFPRI type 2 and is structured as described in Fig. 1.
In its current version, the eCGPE includes four modules: a sequentially dynamic
CGE model (CGE), the policy impact function module (PIF), the political belief
formation module (PBF) and the political decisionmaking module (PDM). The
voter module described in Chapter “Voter Behavior and Government Performance
in Malawi: An Application of a Probabilistic Voting Model” has not yet been fully
implemented. We leave that task for future work. The sequentially dynamic CGE
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model translates exogenous economic and technological settings into a path of
economic outcome variables. For notational convenience, let β denote the eco-
nomic and technological parameters of the CGE. Relevant outcome variables are
denoted by the vector z. Thus, it holds: z¼ z(β). Because we are using a quasi-
dynamic CGE, all exogenous and endogenous variables evolve over time, where Zt
and βt denote the variable values in time period t. Accordingly, we denote by the
matrix ZT¼ [zt] the development of the relevant outcome variables, where the
vector zt corresponds to the sequence of values of the outcome variable z over the
time periods t¼ t1 , . . , tT. Analogously, the matrix βT is the matrix of the devel-
opment of exogenous CGE parameters over the period t¼ t1 , . . . , tT. A standard
CGE application simulates the impact of exogenous policy shocks on the CGE
equilibrium path (i.e., on the development path of Z). In particular, policy param-
eters (γ) are incorporated into the CGE model. Technically, this incorporation is
accomplished via a policy implementation function, which transforms policy
parameters into CGE parameters: β¼ β(γ). Using the PIFs, a sequence of
policy shocks (γt) is transformed into a sequence of exogenous parameter shocks
βt¼PIF(γt), which are translated into a development path of outcome changes dZT
when solving the sequential CGE. A CGPE model extends the standard CGE model
by incorporating a policy-decision module (PDM). The PDM determines endoge-
nously the policy choices γt that occur over time. In particular, according to our
theoretical CGPE approach the PDM corresponds to a two-stage decision-making
model, where at a first stage relevant political actors select a direction, ΔγM, in
which the status-quo policy is shifted and at a second stage political actors vote on a
distance (λ) the status quo policy is shifted towards the agreed direction. Let
i¼1, . . ., nI denote the index of relevant political actors including a subset of
legislators and a subset of stakeholders, while g¼1, . . ., ng denotes the index of
Fig. 1 Model structure of an evolutionary CGPE. Source: Authors
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legislators. Each political agent has spatial policy preferences U(γ). Policy prefer-
ences are derived from political support maximization.
According to the mean voter decision rule legislative bargaining implies:
ΔγM¼ Σg φg Yg, while the distance results as median, λmed of the individually
preferred distances of legislators, λg.
To include lobbying influence prefered policy positions of legislators result as:
Yg ¼ Σj Mgj Yj:
Accordingly, lobbying implies an extended mean voter rule:
ΔγM ¼ Σj CjYj, Cj ¼ ΣgφgMgj:
The final policy choice is gradually implemented for a sufficiently small dλ:
γt ¼ γ0 þ t dλ ΔγM, if λmed > t 1ð Þ dλþ γ0
γt ¼ γ0 þ t 2ð Þ dλ ΔγM, if λmed < t 1ð Þ dλþ γ0
However, we do not assume that politicians have perfect information regarding
the political technology (i.e., the transformation of policies into policy impacts);
instead, agents are unaware of the true PIF and CGE model.
Hence, we assume that policy choices depend on political beliefs ~At
 
. Assum-
ing that beliefs are perfectly exogenous implies that initial beliefs perfectly deter-
mine all future policy choices. However, as explained above, politicians engage in
policy learning processes, i.e. politicans update their beliefs based on observed
policy outcomes and policy beliefs communicated by other actors. Belief-up-dating
via communicational and reinforcement learning is modeled in the belief updating
module (PBD), which is also incorporated in the eCGPE approach. In particular,
communication learning is modeled applying the Friedkin model, while reinforce-
ment learning is applied to the individual preferred distance λi and is based on
agents’ political support, Si(z). All CGPE modules are programmed in GAMS and
integrated into a sequentially linked eCGPE model, as described in
Chapter “Modeling and Evaluation of Political Processes: A New Quantitative
Approach” above.
2.2 Empirical Calibration of the eCGPE and Data
Empirical calibration of a eCGPE model includes the calibration of all four
modules (i.e., the CGE model, the policy impact function [PIF], the belief forma-
tion model [PBF] and the political decisionmaking model [PDM]). Because the
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empirical calibration of the CGE model is a well-known standard procedure, we
only describe the empirical calibration of the other three models, including the
required empirical data. A detailed description of the empirical estimation pro-
cedures for the Malawi case has already been described in Chapters “Modeling and
Evaluation of Political Processes: A New Quantitative Approach” and “A Network
Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes: An Application to
CAADP in Malawi.”
As described in detail in Chapter “A Network Based Approach to Evaluate
Participatory Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi,” the main
parameters of the PBF and PDM can be specified based on data collected via a
policy network survey. This type of survey is a standard approach in political
sociology and empirical policy network studies (Henning 2009; Knoke et al.
1996; Pappi and Henning 1999; Pappi et al. 1995). In the first step of the policy
network study, the set of relevant governmental and nongovernmental organiza-
tions (N ), the set of relevant policy concerns (z) and the set of relevant policy
instruments (γ), are identified via expert interviews and document analyses.
In the second step of the policy network study, personal interviews will be
conducted with all identified relevant organizations. Within the personal interview,
policy network relations with other organizations, including political communica-
tion, are collected. Based on the stated network relations of all interviewed orga-
nizations, the corresponding global networks can be derived directly (Laumann and
Knoke 1987; Henning 2009; Knoke et al. 1996; Pappi and Henning 1999; Pappi
et al. 1995). Alternatively, an advanced econometric approach can be applied to
estimate global network structures based on the stated network relations of the
involved agents (Assmann et al. Chapter “The Formation of Elite Communication
Networks in Malawi: A Bayesian Econometric by Approach”, Snijders 2002). This
approach facilitates the identification of the underlying network-generating process
and allows an adequate imputation of missing data. Moreover, this approach allows
for the identification of determinants of the structure of policy networks and the
identification of possible strategies for designing network structures that imply
more efficient policy processes. Further, the stated policy preferences of organiza-
tions are collected. In the first stage, organizations state their relative interests (X)
and their preferred positions ðbZÞ, with respect to identified policy concerns. In the
second stage, organizations state their relative interests (Θg) and preferred positions
with respect to identified policies bγð Þ.
Based on the stated policy positions of all relevant organizations, the underlying
macro policies (γP) can be identified as latent variables by conducting a principal
component analysis (see below for details). The stated relative interest in policy
concerns is used to specify the Cobb–Douglas parameters of the individual support
functions (Xi¼ [Xik]).
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2.3 Estimation of the Policy Impact Function
The core of a standard CGE application corresponds to a simulation of exogenous
shocks. With respect to content, shocks are changes in economic or political
framework conditions. Technically, the impact of exogenous shocks is modeled
via shifts of exogenous CGE parameters. However, when specific policy shocks are
simulated, policies must be incorporated into the CGE model (i.e., shocks must be
transformed into changes in CGE parameters). Technically, this transformation is
implemented via PIFs. Some policies (e.g., direct and indirect taxes or tariffs) are
already directly implemented in the standard CGE model. However, other policies,
such as structural adjustment policies, must be translated into CGE parameters. In
particular, reducing poverty and promoting overall economic growth is a key factor
for achieving the first MDG goal (Diao et al. 2007; Fan and Rosegrant 2008). A
range of policy instruments exist that governments can use to promote the required
overall economic growth (e.g., technical progress [t.p.] and improving market
access by lowering transaction costs). One key factor for sustainable economic
growth is t.p. Thus, following Benin et al. (2012), we focus our policy impact
analyses on the promotion of t.p. Please note that the PIF approach can be easily
extended to include policy impacts on market access and direct transfers to enter-
prises or households. However, because this chapter aims to demonstrate how a
CGPE approach can be applied empirically and to describe the generated results,
we restrict the PIF to t.p. When focusing on policy impacts on the promotion of t.p.,
two questions arise. First, the sectors in which t.p. has the largest impact on the
achievement of the envisaged political goals (e.g., poverty reduction or economic
growth) remain unknown. Second, the optimal distribution of scarce financial
resources across different policy programs for inducing the largest increase in
t.p. (e.g., extension services or interest rate subsidies, etc.) must be determined.
With respect to the first question, Fan and Rosegrant (2008) emphasize that
many African countries spend too little on promoting agricultural growth compared
to non-agricultural growth. Further, with respect to the second question,
budget allocations to different agricultural policy programs significantly affect
the effectiveness of total budget expenditures. For example, within the Compre-
hensive Agricultural Development Plan, four different pillars are specified as policy
subdomains. Moreover, beyond agricultural growth, overall welfare development is
also determined by economic growth in non-agricultural sectors and by the provi-
sion of public goods, such as health, education and other social services. Therefore,
at the country level, an overall budget allocation must include the allocation of total
financial resources for the promotion of economic growth in the agricultural and
non-agricultural sectors and the allocation of financial resources for the provision of
public goods. For example, Badiane et al. (2011) state that budget allocation to
programs that promote future economic growth and the provision of public goods
has a significant impact on present and future welfare allocations.
Thus, to identify optimal government budget allocations for promoting eco-
nomic growth within our CGPE framework, we suggest the following PIF
approach. Total government expenditure (Btot) results as the sum of total spending
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across policy programs: Btot ¼
P
p
γp. Total government spending determines
t.p. realized in the economy, and the effective impact on technical progress (tps)
that is realized in a specific economic sector s depends on the allocation of
governmental spending across policy programs. To capture the importance of
different policy programs p to the impact on technological progress that is realized
in a specific sector s, the following two-stage policy impact functions (PIFs(γ)) are
defined for each sector (s):











" # 1þρsð Þ
ð3Þ
In the lower stage Eq. (2), budget allocation is transformed into effective
budget allocation according to a CES function specification. In the upper
stage Eq. (1), an effective budget is translated into t.p. according to a Cobb–
Douglas function (i.e., the marginal impact of additional effective budget spending
is diminishing and approximates zero for a sufficiently large effective budget). α0s is
a normalization parameter that implies that Es is the maximal rate of t.p. that can be
achieved with empirically relevant total budget expenditures for policy programs γ.
The suggested PIF basically follows the work of Fan and Zhang (2004). How-
ever, in contrast to the original approach, the PIF approach is more general and
implies a nonlinear relationship between governmental spending and induced
technical progress in economic sectors. Moreover, this approach explicitly con-
siders the composition of budget spending for different policy programs. Finally,
please note that optimal budget allocation to different agricultural and
non-agricultural policy programs varies across different economic sectors (i.e.,
the same budget allocation translates into different effective budgets that induce
different t.p. in different sectors).
In general, an empirical estimation of the PIF function demands a large database
of budget expenditures for different policy programs and empirical observations of
induced technical progress achieved in different economic sectors. Such a large
database is not available for most countries. Accordingly, Diao et al. (2012)
estimated an aggregated function that relates the total budget expenditures for
agricultural and non-agricultural policy programs to the average t.p. realized in
the total agricultural sector.
In this context, we suggest a different approach for estimating detailed and
sector-specific PIFs. In particular, we apply a Bayesian estimation procedure that
uses interview data from political experts to estimate the parameters of the PIFs.
According to our theory, governmental and nongovernmental organizations derive
their preferred policy positions bγð Þ from the maximization of their political support
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S(z), where support is generated via policy outcomes z. These outcomes are induced
by policy choices, giving the underlying political technology T(z, γ). As described
above, in the CGPE approach, the political technology corresponds to the CGE
model and the PIFs, where the CGE model translates the exogenously given t.p. of
different economic sectors into the growth rates of different policy concerns z. Let
wz denote the vector of the annual growth rates of relevant policy concerns that are
induced by a vector of technical progress changes (Δtp). Then we can approximate
the vector of the annual growth rates of policy concerns implied by exogenously




ξCGEzs Δtpþ w0z þ ξ0γ ð4Þ
w0z is the vector of the growth rates that results in the base run, assuming technical
progress would not change, while ξCGEzs denote the CGE elasticities and ξ
0 denotes
the vector of direct policy impacts on outcomes. Both ξCGEzs , ξ
0 andw0z can be derived
via CGE simulations.







ξCGEzs ðΔtpÞ þ w0z þ ξ0γ
tp ¼ PIFðγÞ
ð5Þ
The solution of the maximization problem results in the optimal policy positionsbγ ið Þ and the induced preferred policy outcomes (i.e., the growth rates of policy
concerns ðbwziÞ) of a political agent i. Accordingly, based on the observed optimal
policy positions and the preferred policy outcomes of a set of political agents, the
PIF parameters could be estimated econometrically. However, given the large
number of parameters, one would need a large set of relevant political agents.
Because the set of relevant political agents is rather small (e.g., 36 governmental
and nongovernmental organizations in Malawi) a direct estimation of the PIF
parameter is impossible because the econometric model is underdetermined (i.e.,
the number of parameters is larger than the number of observations). To address the
specification of underdetermined models, Golan, Judge and Miller suggested the
Generalized Maximum Entropy (GME) and Generalized Cross Entropy (GCE)
techniques. In a very interesting paper, Heckelei et al. (2008) discussed an alterna-
tive Bayesian estimation approach to the GME and GCE techniques. To understand
the Bayesian approach for estimating the parameters of an underdetermined model,
let χ denote the vector of the parameters of our PIF functions. Hence, the first order
conditions of the political support maximization problem of all relevant political
agents correspond to an underdetermined equation system, which we denote FOC
(χ). Further, let V(χ) denote any prior distribution among the set of PIF parameters
χ. Then a solution to the original equation system FOC(χ) can be obtained from:
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MaxχV χð Þs:t:FOC χð Þ ¼ 0 ð6Þ
As long as the prior distribution has a unique maximum within the feasible set of
parameters (FOC(χ)¼ 0), the original parameter estimation problem has a unique
solution. Moreover, HMJ demonstrates that the parameter vector χ that maximizes
V(χ) within the subset of feasible parameter solutions is the mode of the posterior
distribution and corresponds to the Highest Posterior Density (HPD) estimate of χ
(Heckelei et al. 2008). Furthermore, we can also add noise to the first order
conditions (i.e., FOC(χ) + ε, where ε is a vector of error terms). Then assuming







s:t:FOC χð Þ þ ε ¼ 0 ð7Þ
where pe(.) is the standard normal univariate density. Finally, one can also add
further restrictions on the parameters χ, which correspond to further prior informa-
tion regarding the parameters χ. This prior information might correspond to theo-
retical constraints of the parameters χ or to further empirical information (e.g.,
expert information regarding minimal or maximal values for specific parameters).
Let RES(χ)¼ 0 denote any further parameter restrictions. Then the HPD estimator







FOC χð Þ þ ε ¼ 0
RES χð Þ ¼ 0
ð8Þ
Overall, an HPD estimation follows from Eq. (8) using interview data from the
policy network survey if a prior probability density function of the model param-
eters χ, V(χ), has been specified and if additional relevant parameter restrictions
RES(χ) have been specified.
In particular, we assumed that individual parameters are independently nor-
mally distributed [e.g., the corresponding prior density function results as: vec(χ) ~
N(χ0,∑)]. We derived the prior means χ0 based on existing estimations in the
literature (Benin et al. 2012), while the covariance matrix was set equal to the
diagonal matrix with the elements [vec(χ0)2]. The specification of the variance of
the prior parameters corresponds to the assumption that the coefficient of variance
is 1 for all parameters with a non-zero prior mean. If the prior mean was equal to
zero, we set the diagonal element to 0.01.
Given these assumptions regarding the prior density function, the HPD estimator
of χ results as:
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Minx vec χð Þ  vec χ0ð Þ½ 0
X1





FOC χð Þ þ ε ¼ 0
RES χð Þ ¼ 0
ð9Þ
Wε is the relative weight of the interview data in relation to the expert prior
information, which we set exogenously. A high relative weight implies that the
estimated PIF parameters are more driven by the interview data from the political
agents, while a low weight implies that the final parameter estimations are more
driven by the prior information obtained from existing studies. The Bayesian
estimation procedure was also implemented in GAMS.
2.4 Estimation of Individual Policy Beliefs and Political
Knowledge
We understand the policy beliefs of individual political agents as simple mental
models for how CAADP policies translate into changes in policy concerns. To
capture policy beliefs within the CGPE framework, we estimate for each stake-
holder organization the set of PIF parameters and the CGEmultiplier that imply that
individual political support maximization exactly replicates the policy positions (bγ
and bZ ), that an organization stated in the interview of the policy network survey.
Basically, we apply the same Bayesian estimation approach described above using
only the data and the first order conditions of the political support maximization of
one individual stakeholder. Accordingly, we obtain for each individual political
agent an estimation χ∗i of the parameters χ. Hence, the estimated parameters χ
∗
i
incorporate the individual policy beliefs of a stakeholder organization. Further, we
aggregated estimated individual political technology parameters to common policy
beliefs by applying factor and cluster analyses. In particular, we first derived the









approximation of the estimated individual political technology. Based on the
individual matrix elements (aij), we first conducted a factor analysis. Based on
the factor scores derived for individual stakeholder organizations, we conducted a
cluster analysis to identify organizations that hold similar policy beliefs.
Beyond policy beliefs, we are interested in the level of political knowledge of
relevant stakeholder organizations (i.e., the degree to which stakeholders’ policy
beliefs correspond to the true political technology). In the CGPE framework, we
measure political knowledge as the level of political support an individual organi-
zation i realized based on its stated policy position (γi) compared to the maximal
political support this organization would achieve given the true political technol-
ogy. If we denote the optimal policy position of an organization as the policy
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position that maximizes its political support given the true political technology bybγ opti , it follows for individual knowledge-gaps:
Know gapi ¼ 1
Si bγ ið Þ
Si bγ opti  ð10Þ
Obviously, individual political knowledge gaps depend on the congruence of
stakeholders’ policy beliefs and the true political technology. Because it is difficult
to identify the true political technology empirically, we will calculate knowledge
gaps by simulating different political technologies.
3 Results
3.1 Political Incentives
Empirically, we derive the political incentives of relevant political agents from their
relative interest in different policy concerns, which we collected via personal
interviews within the policy network survey. As shown in Fig. 2, the main political
interest is the welfare of small-scale farmers (Z1), followed by poverty reduction
(Z2) and interest in general public services (Z3). In contrast, interest in the welfare
of agribusiness (Z4), urban consumer welfare (Z5) and interest in the welfare of
























Fig. 2 Interest in policy concerns according to organizational category. Source: Authors
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protection (Z7) occupies a middle ground between the high interest concerns Z1–
Z3 and the low interest concerns Z4–Z6. Of course, interest group associations that
are specialized in the representation of the particular interests of a specific socio-
economic group (e.g., agribusiness and farmer organizations) have extremely high
interest in the welfare of their clientele (e.g., farmer associations in Z1 and
agribusiness organizations in Z4) (see Fig. 2). In comparison to socioeconomic
interest groups, government and international donors and civic society organiza-
tions have a relatively higher interest in poverty reduction (Z2) and environmental
sustainability (Z7).
Further, we derive a social welfare function based on the collected stake-
holder interests. In particular, we set the relative weights of the welfare of
particular economic interests (i.e., Z4 and Z6) to zero, while we calculate the
relative welfare weights of the remaining policy concerns Z1–Z3, Z5 and Z7 as
the average interests of stakeholder organizations. Overall, the following welfare
weights result: Xw1¼ 0.299 ,Xw2¼ 0.259 ,Xw3¼ 0.189 ,Xw4¼ 0 ,Xw5¼ 0.08 ,
Xw6¼ 0 ,Xw7¼ 0.173.
3.2 Policy Beliefs and Political Knowledge
As described above, based on stated policy positions and the achievement of policy
goals, we estimated the individual parameters of the PIF and the CGE multipliers
that imply that the stated policy positions of relevant governmental and
nongovernmental organizations can be replicated from the corresponding political




as a linear approximation of the political technology, which we interpret as the
policy beliefs of an individual organization. We conducted a factor analysis based
on the 7  9 ¼ 63 matrix entries for the 36 interviewed organizations and derived
the factor scores for the organizations. Based on the computed eigenvalues, we
preferred a 7-factor solution.
Moreover, we conducted a cluster analyses of the calculated factor scores of all
36 political organizations, where we preferred a 4-cluster solution. The cluster
membership of different organizations is presented in Table 5 in the Appendix,
where the identified clusters correspond to similar policy beliefs. To illustrate the
estimated policy beliefs, we present a two-dimensional policy belief factor space in
Fig. 3. Moreover, we also mapped the factor scores calculated for the original prior
parameters of the PIF and the CGE multipliers and for the factor scores derived for
the empirically identified political technology (labelled new-prior in Fig. 3). As
explained above, the latter parameter was estimated based on the stated policy
positions and the targeted policy concern achievements of the interviewed political
organizations by applying the Bayesian estimation approach described above.
Figure 3 demonstrates that we can identify a governmental belief cluster (clus-
ter1, colored in green) that includes the most powerful political actors: MoFAS,
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MOF and the president, as well as the governmental party MCP, the MOIWD and
the governmental agencies LU and ADD (Organization labels are explained in
Chapter “A Network Based Approach to Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes:
An Application to CAADP in Malawi”). In addition to the governmental belief
cluster, we identified a specific agricultural belief cluster (cluster 3, colored in dark
gray in Fig. 3) and a civil society belief cluster (cluster 4, colored in blue in Fig. 3);
most donor organizations and Bunda College (BC), as the principal national
research organization, form a separate donor belief cluster (cluster 2, colored in
orange in Fig. 3).
However, not all donor organization appear to hold similar policy beliefs (i.e.,
USAID is grouped into the farm cluster 3, while the Norwegian donor organization
NORAD is grouped in the civil society cluster, e.g. cluster 4, colored red in Fig. 3).
Moreover, for comparison, we also mapped the factor scores of the original prior
parameters (labelled prior-old in Fig. 3) and the estimated parameters using the
stated policy positions of all interviewed organizations (labelled prior-new).
Because Fig. 3 only presents the factor scores of the first two factors, while the
clustering was conducted using all 7 factors, we will describe the differences
between the identified policy beliefs clusters and the prior political technology in
more detail in the discussion that follows.
Basically, the impact of CAADP polices on policy outcomes can be separated in
three different aspects. First, the relative impact of a specific policy program on the
induced technical progress in a specific sector is captured by the CES parameters
(μsp). The second aspect corresponds to the efficiency of effective budget expendi-
ture in the generation of t.p. This aspect is captured by the CD parameters α s1
 
,
which represent the budget elasticity in the production of t.p. (i.e., the percent
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Fig. 3 Factor space of policy beliefs. Source: Authors
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to promote t.p. in a specific sector s). The third aspect corresponds to the impact of
increased t.p. in a specific sector on the change in the achievement of different
policy goals. This aspect is captured by the CGE elasticities, where the value of
ξCGEZS denotes the change in the annual growth rate of a policy concern z that is
induced by a change in the rate of t.p. in the sector s. Hence, the larger a sector in
terms of the employment share or the share in GDP, the larger will be c.p. the effect
of the CGE elasticities on income growth or poverty reduction, respectively.
However, beyond the size of an economic sector, the corresponding CGE elastic-
ities are also determined by interlinkages with other sectors and households. The
average estimated parameters are reported for all four belief clusters in Table 5 in
the Appendix. Moreover, we also report the original prior parameters and the
parameters estimated using the complete policy position data for all of the
interviewed stakeholder organizations (labeled new-prior in Table 5). Comparing
the estimated parameters of the policy belief clusters to the original prior param-
eters, we can draw the following conclusions:
1. The political beliefs of all stakeholder organizations differ systematically from
the prior parameters derived from economic modeling.
2. Interestingly, although some differences exist across belief clusters, we find a
remarkably homogeneous pattern of divergences from the prior technology
across all belief clusters. In particular, compared to the prior technology, the
policy beliefs of all stakeholders correspond to a significantly higher efficiency
of policy programs in promoting technical progress. Specifically, while the prior
values of the budget elasticity equal 0.35 for all sectors, the policy beliefs of
stakeholders correspond to significantly higher values that range between 0.36
and 0.7, where stakeholders commonly believe in a high political potential to
induce t.p. in the agricultural crop and livestock sectors as well as in the
industrial sector. In contrast, for the trading sectors and the public service sector,
stakeholder beliefs frequently correspond to slightly lower budget elasticities
when compared to the corresponding prior values (see Table 5). Moreover,
stakeholders have common beliefs regarding the impact of t.p. that is realized
in different sectors on policy concerns. For example, all stakeholder organiza-
tions believe that t.p. in both the livestock sector and the public service sector
have a significantly higher impact on poverty reduction (Z2), farm incomes
(Z1) and the welfare of urban consumers (Z5) when compared to the prior
political technology. With respect to the t.p. in the crop, agribusiness and trading
sector, stakeholders believe in a comparatively lower impact when compared to
the prior technology. For the industry sector, stakeholder beliefs are mixed. For
poverty reduction (Z2), a larger impact of t.p. in the industry sector is commonly
believed, while for farm income and urban consumer welfare, a comparatively
lower impact of the industrial sectors is believed (see Table 5). Finally, with
respect to the importance of different policy programs in the generation of t.p. in
specific sectors, a remarkably homogenous pattern results for all belief clusters.
For example, according to all belief clusters, general fertilizer subsidies (γ2) and
non-agricultural policy programs are considered to be much more effective in
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generating t.p. in the agricultural sectors, especially the livestock sector, when
compared to the prior technology. Moreover, compared to the prior political
technology, investment in general infrastructure (γ4) is much more effective in
generating t.p. in the trading and public service sectors, according to the policy
beliefs of all stakeholders. Analogously, for generating t.p. in the industrial
sectors, stakeholder beliefs commonly indicate a comparatively high efficiency
of pillar IV policies (e.g., the promotion of extension services (γ7) and R&D
activities (γ8) (see Table 5 in the Appendix).
3. However, some divergences in policy beliefs also exist between different stake-
holder organizations. For example, the civil society cluster (4) believes in
contrast to all other stakeholder clusters that investment in infrastructure and
the promotion of R&D activities are especially effective in generating t.p. in the
agribusiness sector (see Table 5 in the Appendix).
4. Overall, based on our analyses, we conclude that two worlds exist: the scientific
world of economic modelers that corresponds to the prior political technology
and the world of stakeholders operating as practical experts in Malawi, which is
encapsulated in the observed common policy beliefs. These two worlds are
nicely illustrated in Fig. 4, where we plotted the factor scores of stakeholder
organizations derived from a factor analysis of their stated policy positions, first
assuming that policy positions are derived from policy beliefs (blue dots on the
left) and second assuming that policy positions are derived from political support
maximization assuming that stakeholders adopt the prior political technology as
the true political technology (red dots on the right). Hence, our analyses imply a
cleavage between the world of economic modeling and the world of political
practice.
Fig. 4 Preferred CAADP policy positions of Malawi stakeholders in two worlds. Source: Authors
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5. The estimated political technology parameters correspond to a compromise
between these two worlds, as shown in Fig. 5. Accordingly, assuming this
compromise corresponds to the true political technology, the implementation
of more research-based policies can hardly be achieved via increased stake-
holder participation, because none of the stakeholder organizations hold policy
beliefs that correspond with the scientific world of economic modelling. Inter-
estingly, even international donor organizations fail to hold policy beliefs that
closely correspond with the wisdom derived from economic modelling. Given
the common assumption in the literature on participatory policy analysis (for
example, see Greuts and Joldersma 2001, p. 302) that scientific policy analysts
and policymakers exist in two separate communities in reality, we consider this
finding to be a remarkable result from our analyses that confirms this common
assumption.
A determination of which of the three identified worlds best fits reality is of
interest (i.e., is the true political technology better represented by the prior param-
eters derived from scientific models, by the parameters derived from the policy
beliefs of stakeholder organizations as political practitioners or by a compromise
between these two worlds, as suggested by arguments of the participatory policy
analysis?). The latter possibility corresponds to the PIF parameters estimated using
the prior parameter distributions and the complete set of stated policy positions of
all involved stakeholder organizations. This question is difficult to answer without
further empirical data on specific policy strategies and their impact on realized
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Fig. 5 Preferred CAADP policy positions of Malawi stakeholders in three worlds. Source:
Authors
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however, is crucial for evaluating policy processes, particularly the impact of
stakeholder participation structures on political performance. Therefore, we will
assess political knowledge and incentive gaps by assuming different political
technologies corresponding to (a) the prior parameters derived from scientific
models, (b) the parameters that result from the Bayesian estimation using prior
information and expert data from the policy network survey, as well as the political
technologies corresponding to the estimated policy beliefs of the four identified
stakeholder belief clusters (labelled a–d for belief clusters 1–4 in the text that
follows).
3.3 Assessing Political Knowledge
In the CGPE framework, we measure political knowledge as the loss of political
support that an individual organization i realizes by comparing the political support
achieved under its stated policy position (γi) to the maximal political support this
organization would achieve if it knew the true political technology. Let bγ opti denote
the optimal policy position of an organization (i.e., the policy position that maxi-
mizes its political support given the true political technology). Then we can
calculate the individual political knowledge gaps of each stakeholder organization
as defined in Eq. (10) above. In Table 1, we present the average political knowledge
gaps calculated for different stakeholder categories for the PIF-Scenarios (a–f)
assuming different political technologies. As shown in Table 1, assuming that the
true political technology corresponds to the prior-PIF derived from economic
modelling, the average political knowledge gaps of stakeholder organizations are
high ranging from 30 to 71% with an average gap amounting 60%. However,
knowledge gaps are significantly smaller for the PIF-scenarios assuming that
stakeholder beliefs match true political technology (scenarios a–d in Table 1).
Table 1 Political knowledge gaps of stakeholder organizations, assuming different political
technologies
Assumed PIF—scenario
Category (a) Cluster1 (b) Cluster2 (c) Cluster3 (d) Cluster4
(e) Estimated
PIF (F) Prior_PIF
AGIND 18.2 17.4 16.5 16.8 23.1 30.4
Res 9.9 8.3 10.1 6.9 29.8 66.6
Farm 15.5 26.2 9.9 11.3 30.1 57.7
Don 21.3 7.6 15.2 9.7 32.7 56.5
CSO 26.1 18.2 22.1 14 36.3 60.9
Leg 29.2 40.5 29.1 32 38 57.2
PUB 20.2 37.9 17.9 27.4 43.4 61.6
gov 18.8 27.1 23.7 22.2 46.3 70.7
Average 21.8 23.7 19.3 18.1 37.3 60.2
Source: Author’s own calculations, based on the CGPE model for Malawi
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Accordingly, average political knowledge gaps significantly decrease from 60 to
37% when assuming that the estimated PIF parameter corresponds to the true
political knowledge. However, as shown in Table 1, political knowledge gaps
vary also significantly across stakeholder categories. On average, the lowest polit-
ical knowledge gaps are found for national research organizations (Res), followed
by national farmer (Farm) and agribusiness organizations (AGIND). Relatively
high political knowledge gaps can be found for the central governmental organi-
zations (Gov), particularly MoFAS and MOF, e.g. for the estimated PIF scenario
(e) an average knowledge gap of 46.3% results for governmental organizations.
Only for the PIF-scenario (a) assuming the true political technology corresponds
directly to the policy beliefs of the governmental organizations a relatively low gap
of 18.8% is found.
Hence, the political participation of nongovernmental organizations increases
the political knowledge used in the political process. In addition, also the political
influence of international donor organizations would significantly increase the use
of political knowledge. Interestingly, these central results holds true independently
of the assumed PIF-scenario with the exception of scenario a.
4 Political Diagnosis
4.1 Assessing Political Performance
The first indicator of the overall political performance of the political system in
Malawi corresponds to the difference between the actual budget allocations decided
under the CAADP reform in 2010 and the optimal budget allocations derived from
social welfare maximization. To this end, we calculated the optimal
budget allocations across CAADP programs and non-agricultural policy programs
from social welfare maximization assuming different political technologies. More-
over, we calculated the share of budget expenditures for economic policies in total
state budget including additionally expenditures for the provision of public good
services. As shown in Table 2, observed budget allocations under the status-quo
differ significantly from optimal budget allocations derived for all political tech-
nology scenarios. In particular, assuming that the prior PIF corresponds to the true
political technology implies a rather low efficiency of economic policy programs in
generating t.p.. Accordingly, social welfare maximization implies that the state
budget is primarily used to provide public services, such as education, health or
social security with an optimal budget share of only 2.5% for economic policy
programs. Although the optimal budget share of total spending for economic policy
programs increases significantly, assuming true political technology corresponds to
stakeholder beliefs (scenarios cluster1–4 in Table 2), optimal expenditure shares for
economic policy remain low when compared to the status quo. Only following the
governmental belief (scenario cluster1) implies a significant higher total state
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budget share of 45% for economic policy (see Table 2). Interestingly, CAADP
budget shares derived for the different PIF-scenarios (cluster1–cluster4) vary also
significantly ranging from only 6% under the cluster4 scenario to 30%
(64.7%  0.459) following governmental beliefs (cluster1 in Table 2), while
under the status-quo policy Malawi spends 13% of total state budget for CAADP
policies (0.432  30%, see Table 2). Further, the allocation of budget expenditures
across different CAADP pillars differs significantly among political technology
scenarios; in particular, spending on subsidy programs under pillar I is drastically
reduced under the optimal budget allocation compared to status-quo allocations.
Specifically, under the status-quo policy, a share of over 27% of total expendi-
tures for economic policy programs is allocated to input subsidies under pillar I (γ1
and γ2). The corresponding optimal budget shares range from nearly 0% for the
Prior-PIF scenario to 10.5% for the PIF-scenario corresponding to the beliefs of the
civic society cluster (i.e., cluster 4). Vice versa, budget resources allocated to pillar
II, particularly resources allocated to improving the general infrastructure (γ4), will
be much higher according to optimal budget allocations, where the optimal budget
shares of pillar II programs range from 10% for the civic society cluster beliefs to
over 37% for the donor belief cluster (cluster2). Interestingly, the optimal budget
share for pillar II is remarkably higher based on prior and estimated political
technology parameters; when compared to the status-quo with a comparatively
low budget share of only 6.4%.
To assess the impact of misallocated public budget resources across policy
programs, we compare the t.p. induced in different sectors of the Malawi economy
under optimal budget allocations to the t.p. induced based on present allocations, as
implemented under CAADP by the Malawi government in 2010. In Table 3, the
average t.p. rates calculated for different sectors are presented. As demonstrated in
Table 3, compared to the status quo scenario, an optimal allocation of public
resources across CAADP programs and non-agricultural policy programs implies
a significant increase in induced t.p. for most scenarios. Specifically, based on the
policy beliefs of stakeholders, the potential t.p. rates that can be maximally induced
given optimal budget allocations across policy programs are high for the
Table 2 Budget shares under status-quo policy and optimal policy under different political
technology scenarios in %
Scenario
Pillar I Pillar II Pillar III Pillar IV Non-agr Total
γ1 γ2 γ3 γ4 γ5 γ6 γ7 γ8 γ9
SQ 20.7 6.9 2.4 4.0 2.3 3.8 1.5 1.9 56.8 30.0
Cluster1 1.0 3.3 0.3 26.0 1.2 3.1 1.6 28.2 35.3 45.9
Cluster2 1.5 7.4 0.1 36.6 1.9 6.3 1.5 13.1 31.7 17.5
Cluster3 0.6 3.3 0.2 34.6 1.0 2.8 1.1 27.3 29.2 21.2
Cluster4 2.9 7.5 1.5 8.2 2.3 5.2 2.9 1.8 67.5 19.9
Estimated PIF 0.5 1.7 0.0 53.1 0.6 4.7 0.5 8.4 30.4 8.9
Prior_PIF 0.0 0.0 6.7 40.3 0.5 1.7 1.3 24.8 24.8 2.5
Source: Authors
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agricultural and agribusiness sectors, as well as the industry sectors, with t.p. rates
ranging between 3.5 and 16.4 (see Table 3). In contrast, following stakeholder
beliefs, the potential t.p. rates are comparatively lower for the trading sector and the
public service sector, with values ranging between 1.3 and 3.2. In contrast, based on
prior PIF-parameters, the optimal t.p. rates are much lower, even lower than under
the status quo policy. This follows directly form the fact that for the Prior PIF
investments in t.p. are rather inefficient. Accordingly, optimal budget allocations to
agricultural and non-agricultural policy programs would be rather low (i.e., only
2.5% of the total state budget), while a major share of the state budget will be more
efficiently used to provide public services.
4.1.1 Knowledge or Incentive Gaps?
When using the CGPE framework as a relevant theoretical background, the empir-
ically observed CAADP policies differ from optimal policies (i.e., social welfare-
maximizing policies) for two reasons. First, relevant political agents have biased
incentives [i.e., S(z) differs from the social welfare function SW(z)]. Second,
political agents have biased policy beliefs (i.e., agents’ simple mental models
approximating the political technology differ from the true political technology).
Within the CGPE approach, we can not only estimate the individual policy beliefs
and the political incentives of involved stakeholder organizations that determine
their stated policy positions, but we can also simulate agents’ preferred policy
positions derived by assuming different policy beliefs or political incentives.
Hence, we can simulate final policy choices by assuming that the policy beliefs
of all involved stakeholders correspond perfectly to the true political technology.
Comparing the social welfare derived for this scenario to the maximal social
welfare derived for optimal policy choices allows us to measure the political
incentive gap (i.e., the impact of biased political incentives on political perfor-
mance). Vice versa, comparing social welfare derived under the assumption that all
relevant stakeholder organizations maximize social welfare while maintaining their
individual policy beliefs to the corresponding maximal social welfare provides a
Table 3 Simulated technical progress gaps implied by the CAADP reform in Malawi
Scenario Crop Livestock Agri-business Industry Trade Public service
Cluster1 14.9 16.4 7.7 15.8 2.6 3.2
Cluster2 10.8 7.8 3.5 3.9 1.8 2.6
Cluster3 6.4 7.5 4.3 6.6 1.9 3.1
Cluster4 3.6 7.6 3.6 5.3 1.3 2.4
Estimated PIF 2.5 3.1 2.9 2.7 2.7 2.6
Prior PIF 1.3 1.3 1.5 0.9 0.9 0.9
Status-quo 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Source: Authors
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measure of the knowledge gap (i.e., the political performance gap induced by the
lack of political knowledge).
Because we are unaware of the true political technology, we calculated the total
political performance gaps and the incentive and knowledge gaps that result for the
status-quo policy (i.e., the CAADP reform in 2010 in Malawi) for all six political
technology scenarios defined above. Figure 6 presents the calculated performance
gaps for different political technology scenarios. As demonstrated in Fig. 6, the
political performance of the Malawi governmental system crucially depends on the
assumption of the true political technology. In the scientific modeling world,
political performance is rated low, with a total political performance gap of 72%
(i.e., compared to the optimal budget allocation, the status-quo CAADP policies
imply a social welfare that is 72% lower than the maximum achievable social
welfare). Moreover, low political performance results from low political knowl-
edge, where the corresponding knowledge gap also amounts to 72%. The social
welfare losses induced by biased incentives amount to only 3.7% of the maximum
social welfare. In contrast, in the world of stakeholder beliefs, political performance
would be significantly higher, with total political performance gaps ranging from
7.5 to 19.4%. Moreover, in contrast to the scientific world of economic modeling, in
the world of stakeholders’ beliefs, political performance gaps result from both
incentive and knowledge gaps.
For example, assuming that governmental policy beliefs (cluster 1) match real








































Prior-PIF Estimated-PIF cluster1 cluster2 cluster3 cluster4













Fig. 6 Total, knowledge and incentive political performance gaps for different political technol-
ogy scenarios. Source: Authors
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due to biased incentives, while political knowledge gaps are negligible and corre-
spond to only 0.9% of the maximum social welfare (see Fig. 6).
However, we trust that the Bayesian estimation using both prior information
from economic modelling and practical expertise from stakeholder organizations
best fits the true political technology. Hence, based on the estimated PIF, we
identify significant political performance gaps that correspond to social welfare
losses of nearly 35% compared to an optimal policy decision. The political knowl-
edge gaps are much more important, with corresponding social welfare losses of
nearly 34% in comparison to incentive gaps that correspond to a social welfare loss
of only 7.4% (see Fig. 6).
Moreover, an analysis of the differences in realized growth rates with respect to
the achievement of different policy concerns that are induced by political perfor-
mance gaps is of interest. In Fig. 7, the differences between the growth rates of
different policy concerns achieved under the optimal policy and the status-quo
policy are presented, assuming that the estimated PIF parameters correspond to the
true political technology.
As shown in Fig. 7, performance gaps imply significant differences in realized
achievement levels for different policy concerns. In particular, Fig. 7 demonstrates
that the status-quo policy implies that the achieved growth rates in agribusiness
welfare (Z4), reduction in poverty (Z2) and farm income (Z1) are too high when
compared to the optimal achievement levels induced by the optimal policy. In
contrast, the increase of total budget expenditures (Z3) for public services and the
achieved growth rate in urban consumer welfare are too low when compared to the








































Fig. 7 Total, knowledge and incentive gaps in the achievement of policy goals: Differences in the
achievement of policy goals as percentages of the optimal policy. Source: Authors
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that a rapid reduction of poverty does not necessarily correspond to a maximization
of social welfare. This follows intuitively from the fact that a rapid poverty
reduction might be realized at the expense of a significantly lower income growth
or at the expense of a low growth of the public service sector.
4.2 From Diagnosis to Political Therapy: Simulating
Political Performance Gaps with Increased Stakeholder
Participation
To assess the impact of increased stakeholder participation on political perfor-
mance, we first analyze the changes in final policy decisions and induced political
performance that occur when we exogenously assume that specific stakeholder
groups have higher political power. In a second step, we analyze the impact of
different formal and informal institutional reforms on the political power of differ-
ent stakeholder groups. Overall, the first simulation experiment reveals changes in
participation structures that could improve political performance and the second
simulation identifies potential institutional reform strategies for realizing these
changes. At the methodological level, the political decisionmaking module of the
CGPE approach integrates a modified legislative bargaining model of a Baron/
Ferejohn type with a lobbying model that corresponds to an extended Grossman/
Helpman model. Accordingly, as described in detail in Chapter “Modeling and
Evaluation of Political Processes: A New Quantitative Approach,” we simulate the
impact of different constitutional rules via corresponding changes in the legislative
decisionmaking power of relevant political agents (i.e., governmental departments
and legislative parties in the parliament). We simulate changes in informal lobbying
and communication structures via corresponding changes in political network
multipliers (for technical details, see Chapter “A Network Based Approach to
Evaluate Participatory Policy Processes: An Application to CAADP in Malawi”).
4.2.1 Simulation Scenarios
I. To analyze the impact of stakeholder participation on political performance, we
run the following simulation scenarios:
A. Increased political power of international donor organizations (Don).
B. Increased political power of farmer organizations (Farm).
C. Increased political power of civic society organizations (Civic).
D. Increased political power of national research organizations (Res).
E. Increased political power of agribusiness organizations (Agind).
The political power of stakeholder groups in the base run and in the participation
scenarios A–E is reported in Table 4.
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To analyze the influence of different formal constitutional rules and informal
policy network structures on policy decisions and outcomes, we run the CGPE
approach under the scenarios described below.
4.2.2 Benchmark Scenarios
1. Base run scenario: The base run scenario corresponds to the institutional set-up
that implies the best fit between the CAADP decisions predicted by the CGPE
and the observed CAADP allocations in 2010. The best fit results assuming that
policy decisions are solely determined by the government (i.e., the parliamen-
tary parties have effectively no legislative decision-making power). Within the
government we assume the PF-scenario, i.e., the finance ministry has agenda-
setting power vis-a-vis the president, the MoA and all other involved ministries.
With respect to the informal influence of nongovernmental organizations, the
weak state scenario delivers the best prediction (i.e., political agents are highly
interested in the political support of lobbying groups, and average interest in
political support is 50%). Moreover, under the weak state scenario, the own
control of political agents (i.e., the weight of own political knowledge in
comparison to the knowledge of political peer networks) is comparatively low,
with an average own control of 50% assumed under the weak state scenario.
2. Status-quo: Assuming that CAADP budget allocations correspond to the status-
quo allocations for all years from 2010 to 2020.
3. Optimal: Assuming that CAADP budget allocations correspond to the
budget allocations across CAADP programs that maximize a social Nash wel-
fare function over the true political technology.
4.2.3 Simulating Constitutional Reforms
4. PF: For the PF-scenario we assume that the finance ministry has agenda-setting
power vis-a-vis the president, the MoA and all other involved ministries.
Table 4 Simulated political power of stakeholder groups in the CAADP policy domain of Malawi
Group
Participation scenario
Base run (%) A (%) B (%) C (%) D (%) E (%)
Gov 69.6 43.5 46.4 40.9 51.5 46.4
Leg 2.3 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.6
PUB 7.7 4.8 5.1 4.5 5.7 5.1
Don 6.1 41.3 4.0 3.6 4.5 4.0
Farm 6.1 3.8 37.4 3.6 4.5 4.1
CSO 2.6 1.6 1.7 42.7 1.9 1.7
Res 1.9 1.2 1.3 1.1 27.3 1.3
Agind 3.8 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.8 35.9
Source: Authors
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5. PDR: For the principle of departmental responsibility (PDR) scenario, we
assume that the legislative organization corresponds to a presidential system,
as in the base run scenario, but the government operates under the principle of
departmental responsibility, where within the cabinet, the MoA has the total
formal legislative decisionmaking power for agricultural policy.
6. PA: For the PA scenario, we assume that the president has the total formal
decisionmaking power within the government.
7. Parl: For the party leadership (Parl) scenario, we assume that the legislative
organization corresponds to a parliamentary system, where the parliamentary
parties exert total legislative decision-making power.
4.2.4 Simulating the Informal Political Influence of Nongovernmental
Organizations
8. Autarkic (a): Under the autark scenario, we assume that political agents have
neither interest in the political support of lobbying groups (i.e., interest in
political support is zero) nor interest in the political knowledge of other
stakeholders (i.e., own control is one).
9. Strong state (s): Political agents have 50% lower interest in political support
and political knowledge when compared to the base run scenario. Technically,
it is assumed that political interest in the political support of lobbying groups is
50% lower, while the own control of political agents is increased by up to 20%
for the strong state scenario when compared to the corresponding stated values
that were empirically collected in the policy network survey.
10. Weak state (w): Own control and interest in political support correspond to the
stated values of stakeholder organizations, which are comparatively high, with
an average interest in political support of 50% for all relevant political agents
and an average own control of 70%.
For all scenarios except the status-quo and the optimal benchmark scenarios, we
assume that political agents engage in reinforcement and communication learning
(i.e., based on marginal political support, stakeholders update their policy beliefs as
described in Chapter “Modeling and Evaluation of Political Processes: A New
Quantitative Approach”). In particular, as a result of the legislative bargaining
process, the direction in which the status quo policy is shifted is determined as the
mean voter position, where the constitutional decision-making power, which is
measured using the generalized Banzhaf index, corresponds to the weight of individ-
ual agents. Before the formal political decision is made, agents engage in communi-
cation learning, where agents update their preferred direction according to the
communicated positions of other agents with whom they communicate. At the
stationary point of political communication, each agent’s preferred policy direction
results as the weighted average of the agents’ initial policy positions, where the
weight of agent j’s initial position in agent i’s final position is determined by the
communication network (see the theoretical section above for further details).
Accordingly, simulating the impact of formal institutions, we assume different formal
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decision-making power of governmental organizations according to the calculated
Banzhaf indices. To simulate the impact of political influence of nongovernmental
organizations, we assume different interest in political support and different own
control values for the weak, strong and autarkic state scenarios, as described above.
4.3 Whither Participation?
As demonstrated in Fig. 8 below, it is nearly impossible to identify a vision of
participation that could significantly increase political performance. In particular,
irrespective of the assumed political technology, neither increased participation of
any stakeholder group nor increased participation of international donor organi-
zations implies a significant increase of total political performance when com-
pared to the base run scenario. This result appears surprising at first glance;
however, given the fact that the preferred policy positions of stakeholder organi-
zations are primarily determined by policy beliefs, while heterogeneous interests
among stakeholders have a comparatively low impact on their preferred policy
positions, it follows that any change in participation structures has little impact on
policy performance.
The latter conclusion follows directly, because changed participation struc-
tures only shift the relative political power of stakeholders and the relative
weight of individual stakeholder positions in determining the final policy deci-
sion. Thus, because stakeholder positions are empirically similar when com-
pared to the scientific world of economic modelers that is encapsulated in the






















Fig. 8 Total political performance gaps in % under different participation scenarios. Source:
Authors
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participation structure that corresponds to a linear combination of preferred
stakeholder positions merely maps into the world of stakeholder beliefs sepa-
rated from the scientific world of economic modelers. Hence, assuming that the
true political technology corresponds to stakeholder beliefs implies a relatively
high political performance for any linear combination of policy positions in the
world of stakeholder beliefs. Vice versa, assuming that the true political tech-
nology corresponds to the prior parameters derived from economic modeling
implies that any linear combinations of policy positions in the subspace of the
world stakeholder beliefs is rather distant from the subspace defined by the
scientific world of economic modeling.
Hence, political performance is low for the base run, but it can barely be improved
by any vision of increased stakeholder participation. Basically, this situation drives
the results presented in Fig. 9. Hence, if we assume that the estimated PIF parameters
correspond to the best representation of the true political technology, one fundamen-
tal implication of our simulation analyses is that the interaction between political
practice and theoretical modeling implies a particularly successful strategy for
improving political performance in Malawi and likely in many other African
countries.
In contrast, increased participation of any stakeholder group, such as national
farmer associations, civil society organizations, research institutions or interna-
tional donor organizations, exerts little if any impact on political performance.
Basically, this fundamental conclusion does not change if the political perfor-
mance gaps of constitutional reforms are analyzed. As shown in Fig. 10, the total

















Fig. 9 Total, knowledge and incentive gaps in Malawi (in % of maximum social welfare). Source:
Authors
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5 Conclusion and Outlook on Future Research
The common observation that governments persistently fail to implement effective
policy and investment strategies that translate into the achievement of development
goals in most African countries raises questions about government performance. In
particular, low government performance occurs in two forms. First, low govern-
ment performance occurs as a political incentive gap (i.e., elected politicians lack
sufficient incentives to serve public interests and instead serve particular interests or
pursue their own interests). Second, low government performance occurs as a
political knowledge gap (i.e., the government lacks adequate knowledge and the
capacity to identify and implement efficient policies).
In this paper, we develop and apply the CGPE model as a new quantitative
approach to analyzing the performance of policy processes with respect to the
production of efficient policy choices. In contrast to existing political economy
models focusing on biased government incentives the CGPE approach incorporates
explicitly the lack of adequate political knowledge as another important source of
low government performance. Within the CGPE approach participation of stake-
holder organizations is modeled in two ways. First, as classical lobbying influence
and second as informational influence within a model of political belief formation.
According to our model, the main determinants of the accumulation of political
knowledge and the speed of policy learning correspond to policy network structures
that reflect the communication and interaction patterns between governmental and
nongovernmental organizations.
An empirical application of the CGPE model analyzing the policy processes that




















































Fig. 10 Total, knowledge and incentive gaps in Malawi (in % of the maximum social welfare).
Source: Authors
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1. In contrast to standard CGE applications, within the CGPE approach the impact
of specific policy programs on induced sectoral t.p. is explicitly captured by
policy impact functions (PIFs). Empirically, PIFs are specified in a two-step
estimation procedure. At a first stage a prior-PIF is specified bases on available
statistical data and existing studies in the literature. In a second step a Bayesian
estimation procedure is applied to estimate PIF parameters based on expert data
collected from relevant governmental and nongovernmental organizations
involved in CAADP reform process in Malawi using PIF- parameters estimated
at the first stage as priors. Moreover, applying the Bayesian estimation procedure
also allows us to identify individual policy beliefs for each stakeholder organi-
zations as the set of PIF parameters that replicates the stated policy positions and
desired goal achievements from individual political support maximization.
2. Our estimation results imply that the estimated policy beliefs of stakeholders
differ significantly from the corresponding prior parameters. Hence, we con-
clude that in the context of the CAADP policies in Malawi, practical
policymakers and economic policy analysts exist in two separate worlds. In
particular, following the prior PIF-parameters, the political technology of
Malawi is characterized by a rather low efficiency of policy programs in
promoting technical progress. Accordingly, based on the objective knowledge
of scientific modeling, the optimal budget spending under CAADP would be
rather low, amounting to only 2.5% of the total state budget, compared to an
observed agricultural budget share of 30% under the status quo policy in 2010.,
while the majority of budget resources would be efficiently used for the provi-
sion of public services. Moreover, investments in infrastructure and
non-agricultural policy programs are most effective in generating t.p. in both
the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. In contrast, based on estimated
stakeholder beliefs, CAADP policies are much more effective in promoting t.p.,
particularly in the agricultural, agribusiness and industrial sectors, ranging
between 3.5 and 16.4%. Accordingly, following stakeholder beliefs, total budget
spending under CAADP is significantly higher when compared to prior param-
eters and ranges between 17.5% based on donor beliefs and even 45% based on
governmental beliefs. Finally, combing both worlds, i.e. estimated PIF param-
eters using expert data from stakeholders and scientific knowledge from prior
economic studies implies public investments in t.p. that take a middle ground,
with an optimal agricultural budget share of nearly 10% and induced t.p. ranging
between 2.5 and 3.1%.
3. Moreover, in the scientific world of economic modeling identified political
performance gaps are extremely large, i.e. these amount to nearly 73% of the
maximally achievable social welfare. In contrast, performance gaps are small
based on stakeholder beliefs, ranging between 7.5 and 17.5%. Again, in the third
world of estimated PIF parameters that combines the scientific world with the
world of stakeholder beliefs, achieved political performance occupies a middle
ground, with a total gap of 35%. Interestingly, based on prior and estimated
political technology parameters, low political performance results primarily
from a lack of political knowledge, while incentive gaps play only a minor role.
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4. Interestingly, changing political influence across governmental and
nongovernmental organizations has no impact on political performance, regard-
less of the assumed political technology scenario. Hence, neither assuming an
extremely high political influence of national farm or civic society organizations
nor assuming an extremely high political influence of national research or
international donor organizations would imply a significant change in political
performance. This result appears surprising at first glance, especially because the
estimated political knowledge of governmental organizations is low when com-
pared to that of nongovernmental organizations. However, the fact that the
estimated policy beliefs of policymakers and stakeholders are comparatively
homogenous implies that any combination of preferred stakeholder policy posi-
tions still maps into the same world of stakeholder beliefs. Therefore, if this
world corresponds to the true political technology, political performance is high
under the status-quo and remains high for any participation scenario. Vice versa,
if the world of stakeholder beliefs does not correspond to the true political
technology, any policy position derived from this world does not intersect with
the true political technology; thus, political performance remains low for any
participation scenario.
5. Therefore, our analyses of the Malawi case establish the following general and
fundamental result: if neither the policy beliefs of policymakers nor the prior
parameters correspond to the true political technology, adequate political knowl-
edge does not yet exist in the scientific system or in political praxis and must be
created in the political process. Therefore, the only effective political therapy
corresponds to the application of adequate tools that facilitate interactive com-
munication and policy learning among stakeholders and economic modelers.
However, the most effective organization of this interactive communication in
political praxis is an interesting question that we leave for future research.
Finally, the following two limitations of our presented CGPE approach must be
considered:
First, in its present version, the CGPE does not yet incorporate the voter module (i.e.,
political support functions are derived exogenously from interview data). Basi-
cally, this setup implies that political support is driven by retrospective and
non-policy voting only, while policy-oriented voting is neglected. However, as
demonstrated in Chapter “Voter Behavior and Government Performance in
Malawi: AnApplication of a Probabilistic VotingModel,” policy-oriented voting
is an important determinant of voter behavior. Hence, voters’ policy beliefsmight
effectively restrict politicians’ policy choices. This aspect is not fully reflected in
the presented CGPE analyses. Thus, incorporating the voter module and deriving
political support endogenously from estimated voter behavior might imply that
observed political performance is actually more restricted by biased political
incentives than implied by the presented CGPE analyses.
Second, by construction, we assume that budget spending for a specific policy
program (γi) is homogenously effective in promoting t.p. in different subsectors.
However, in reality, it appears more realistic that even within specific policy
programs (e.g., investments in infrastructure), different subprograms can be
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formulated by focusing on specific subsectors. For example, investing in the
infrastructure of specific regions or investing in the railroad system versus the
road system might be more or less effective for different subsectors. These
differences occur because subsectors might be regionally concentrated or depen-
dent on specific infrastructure systems. Thus, including a third stage in our PIF
function that allows for sector-specific subprograms within a specific policy
program would imply that preferred policy positions across stakeholder organi-
zations become more heterogeneous; hence, c.p., the induced incentive gaps
would also be higher. Again, we leave a more detailed three-stage modeling of
PIF functions for future research.
Appendix




PIF bcluster1 bcluster2 bcluster3 bcluster4
CGE-Elasticities
ζCGESZ Z1
Crop 0.233 0.455 0.256 0.138 0.204 0.248
Livestock 0.631 0.053 0.878 0.443 0.658 0.904
Agribusiness 0.216 0.422 0.222 0.212 0.214 0.207
Industry 0.206 0.270 0.207 0.191 0.187 0.212
Trade 0.448 0.461 0.465 0.459 0.458 0.451
Public 0.018 0.001 0.018 0.018 0.018 0.018
Z2
Crop 0.409 0.455 0.543 0.382 0.384 0.405
Livestock 0.271 0.053 0.344 0.366 0.294 0.240
Agribusiness 0.216 0.422 0.222 0.228 0.218 0.194
Industry 0.557 0.270 0.579 0.567 0.560 0.432
Trade 0.236 0.461 0.241 0.236 0.237 0.240
Public 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Z4
Crop 2.612 0.225 2.339 4.169 3.095 2.548
Livestock 2.475 0.050 3.193 3.774 3.747 3.028
Agribusiness 4.834 4.668 5.291 5.833 5.782 2.675
Industry 2.556 0.113 3.533 2.747 3.398 2.598
Trade 0.400 0.364 0.398 0.399 0.398 0.399
Public 2.569 0.138 2.653 2.541 2.766 2.564
Z5
Crop 0.233 0.455 0.215 0.195 0.220 0.228
Livestock 1.389 0.053 0.589 0.747 0.867 1.084
Agribusiness 0.216 0.422 0.212 0.213 0.212 0.200
(continued)





PIF bcluster1 bcluster2 bcluster3 bcluster4
Industry 0.140 0.270 0.134 0.138 0.137 0.137
Trade 0.236 0.461 0.235 0.236 0.236 0.236
Public 0.005 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
Z6
Crop 0.166 0.159 0.179 0.189 0.185 0.174
Livestock 0.612 0.023 0.287 0.348 0.257 0.381
Agribusiness 0.129 0.149 0.131 0.131 0.133 0.138
Industry 0.666 1.006 0.447 0.573 0.440 0.421
Trade 1.407 2.194 1.397 1.515 1.421 1.602
Public 0.189 0.367 0.187 0.187 0.182 0.185
Z7
Crop 0.385 0.770 0.342 0.399 0.374 0.366
Livestock 0.743 0.010 0.531 0.359 0.531 0.418
Agribusiness 2.709 0.418 2.519 1.922 2.127 3.882
Industry 2.494 0.029 2.564 2.647 2.441 3.471
Trade 2.613 0.226 2.622 2.529 2.605 2.576
Public 0.024 0.048 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024
α1S
Crop 0.525 0.350 0.700 0.700 0.591 0.538
Livestock 0.363 0.350 0.641 0.643 0.585 0.604
Agribusiness 0.525 0.350 0.542 0.542 0.508 0.675
Industry 0.469 0.350 0.672 0.447 0.561 0.621
Trade 0.309 0.350 0.271 0.242 0.251 0.240
Public 0.312 0.350 0.288 0.283 0.309 0.281
μPS Crop
γ1 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
γ2 0.138 0.006 0.123 0.108 0.122 0.136
γ3 0.050 0.086 0.049 0.037 0.047 0.047
γ4 0.249 0.238 0.246 0.341 0.293 0.261
γ5 0.107 0.103 0.097 0.035 0.064 0.090
γ6 0.094 0.189 0.104 0.115 0.113 0.099
γ7 0.089 0.079 0.077 0.037 0.053 0.082
γ8 0.131 0.262 0.148 0.183 0.171 0.134
γ9 0.139 0.032 0.152 0.148 0.134 0.148
Livestock
γ1 0.097 0.037 0.111 0.098 0.080 0.106
γ2 0.105 0.031 0.142 0.174 0.149 0.148
γ3 0.018 0.036 0.020 0.023 0.020 0.022
γ4 0.121 0.241 0.112 0.121 0.131 0.119
γ5 0.052 0.104 0.076 0.095 0.085 0.080
γ6 0.247 0.174 0.145 0.153 0.139 0.126
γ7 0.040 0.080 0.059 0.067 0.057 0.055
(continued)





PIF bcluster1 bcluster2 bcluster3 bcluster4
γ8 0.177 0.265 0.121 0.082 0.120 0.185
γ9 0.144 0.032 0.214 0.186 0.219 0.160
Agribusiness
γ3 0.160 0.183 0.193 0.225 0.209 0.043
γ4 0.286 0.256 0.292 0.300 0.315 0.346
γ7 0.068 0.060 0.080 0.086 0.087 0.043
γ8 0.416 0.403 0.362 0.316 0.311 0.512
γ9 0.070 0.098 0.072 0.072 0.078 0.066
Industry
γ3 0.051 0.103 0.052 0.056 0.049 0.071
γ4 0.297 0.343 0.261 0.300 0.302 0.244
γ7 0.049 0.023 0.048 0.054 0.048 0.066
γ8 0.359 0.075 0.365 0.306 0.369 0.309
γ9 0.243 0.457 0.274 0.283 0.231 0.310
Trade
γ3 0.051 0.103 0.052 0.053 0.052 0.053
γ4 0.671 0.343 0.668 0.668 0.667 0.668
γ7 0.011 0.023 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
γ8 0.038 0.075 0.038 0.037 0.038 0.038
γ9 0.228 0.457 0.231 0.230 0.232 0.230
Public
γ3 0.051 0.103 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.052
γ4 0.488 0.343 0.480 0.484 0.467 0.486
γ7 0.011 0.023 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
γ8 0.038 0.075 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.038
γ9 0.411 0.457 0.419 0.415 0.433 0.413
Source: Authors
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Many sub-Saharan African countries today have committed to the continent-wide
goals of the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme
(CAADP) of the Africa Union and New Partnership for Africa’s Development
(NEPAD). The goals draw attention towards a shared commitment of allocating
at least 10% of their national budgets to agriculture in order to achieve a 6% annual
sector growth rate and meet the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving
poverty by 2015. As a result, policymakers have been called on to allocate more
resources and design strategies to accelerate agricultural growth in order to meet
these goals. The challenge now is ensuring that selected policies and investment
strategies are effective in producing their intended goals of sustaining broad-based
growth and poverty reduction.
The desire for more effective policy and investment strategies that translate into
the achievement of shared CAADP goals has revived questions about capacities for
policy analysis and participatory processes of designing and implementing devel-
opment strategies in Africa. Many past studies in the region have documented the
failure of past central planning or top down approaches of implementation
(Brinkerhoff 1996; Crosby 1996; Killick 1976; Montjoy and O’Toole 1979;
Wildavsky 1973). Such inadequacies led to calls for more decentralized,
evidence-based, and participatory processes, to be complemented by strong mon-
itoring and evaluation (M&E) systems that allow for adaptation to changing
conditions over time given the nonlinear and dynamic nature of designing and
implementing development strategies.
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Recognizing the complexities of formulating and implementing effective poli-
cies and investment strategies requires a lot of evidence to accurately assess the
choices available to a government and the tradeoffs inherent in any choice they
make.1 To supply this evidence, the country must have a solid foundation of
analytical capacity throughout its planning agencies and academic institutions. In
addition, governments need policymakers who have the motivation and ability to
demand and use the information (Omamo 2004). The intersection of these two sides
and the knowledge generated describes the state of a national knowledge system,
defined here as the existing stock of knowledge and established links between
people and organizations on both the supply and demand side in influencing the
type of knowledge products generated and utilized in policy dialogue and
decisionmaking.
How effective a national knowledge system is in generating and promoting the
use of evidence depends on many factors: the perceived credibility and relevance of
the evidence generated; the type of relationships and linkages that develop among
all individual actors and organizations involved; capacities to comprehend and
utilize the evidence, the local policy process and political climate; and local beliefs
and norms (Young 2005; Cash et al. 2003). Often, it is the linkage among individ-
uals and organizations that help to bridge the supply and demand for evidence
which is especially weak. It requires establishing effective mechanisms by which
both sides can be more closely tied as part of ongoing dialogue and decisionmaking
processes. These mechanisms effectively link suppliers and users of knowledge
through the creation and use of knowledge products.
For many African countries, the state of their national knowledge systems
remains very weak and poses a serious challenge for strengthening the effectiveness
of future strategy design and implementation efforts. Data collection and analysis
continues to suffer from a shortage of attention and resources. Knowledge sharing is
often minimal, with planning ministries that operate in isolation and uncoordinated
ministries, research institutes, and statistical bureaus. Government agencies, NGOs,
and development partners carry out parallel and overlapping processes of informa-
tion gathering. Often development partners have more input into the strategy
process than legislative bodies or the national civil society does. The M&E frame-
works of many strategies rarely deal with issues of causality and attribution
between investments, policy changes, and outcomes.
The large capacity gaps also exacerbated an inherently weak link between the
supply and demand of evidence. For example, local universities rarely undertake
research directly relevant to local decisionmaking needs while national institutions
and agencies seldom have sufficient capacities and experience to provide relevant
information needed to guide strategy formulation and implementation.
1By evidence we mean data statistics and analysis of past trends, economic analysis of future
policy alternatives, impact assessment of past investments, research findings from a number of
disciplines (public policy, socioeconomic and political sciences, and the biophysical sciences), and
lessons from practice and experience.
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The Strategic Analysis and Knowledge Support System (SAKSS) concept was
developed in direct response to these serious capacity gaps in many African
countries. Its principle goals are to: (a) bring quality and strategic analysis to bear
on identifying key investments, institutional mechanisms, and policy options, as
well as the implementation of selected options for agricultural policy and invest-
ment strategies (this includes harmonizing and generating standardized information
for development planning and M&E, and to be available as global public goods);
(b) build and strengthen national and regional capacities for policy analysis, M&E,
while helping to bridge the research and policy divide; and, (c) broker the dialogue
and links between institutions and individuals who supply and use data and infor-
mation related to agricultural strategies by establishing network for information
exchange and knowledge management.
The SAKSS was developed around two key concepts—‘strategic analysis’ and
‘knowledge support systems’ which have since defined its overall purpose and
utility for supporting CAADP implementation. The ‘strategic analysis’ concept
describes generating information that is not only scientifically credible but has
important relevance to the range of questions and issues being faced by
policymakers in formulating and implementing their country’s agricultural devel-
opment strategies. The ‘knowledge support system’ concept defines a network of
individuals and institutions that are linked in ways intended to help bring strategic
analysis and research evidence to bear during the design and implementation of the
agricultural development strategy. We now review these in more detail.
2 The Strategic Analysis Concept and Approach
Strategic analysis describes a logical series of analyses which help identify policy
and investment options for achieving growth and poverty outcomes, beginning with
a broader, economywide perspective and ending with a more targeted sector and
community level perspective. This type of integrated analysis is intended to guide a
credible action plan of development priorities in agriculture which contribute the
most to the achievement of desirable targets for growth and poverty reduction. Such
prioritization implies finding answers to a range of strategic questions such as:
What is the role of agriculture in promoting overall economic growth and poverty
reduction in the different stages of development given a country’s natural resource
endowments? How should public resources be mobilized and allocated among
different sectors, sub-sectors, and regions? What have been the lessons and effect
of agricultural policies and investments on outcomes and impact? Answers to these
questions can help arm policymakers with useful evidence on the kinds of tradeoffs
and outcomes associated with their policy and investment choices.
The analysis is considered ‘strategic’ so long as it contributes to the narrowing
down of investment options that will help lead to the achievement of these high-end
development targets. It means weighing in the costs and benefits for undertaking
one strategy over another. For example, should government focus on promoting a
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rapid expansion in food staples production? It will definitely benefit consumers, but
producers could be devastated if prices drop too fast following a bumper harvest.
Or, governments may wish to introduce a policy that is designed to target the poor
and yet undercuts private sector participation and long term sustainability, such as
in the case of output procurement and the provision of modern inputs.
The sequence and types of analysis are not fixed, however. Different local
contexts may require a different set of analyses. Because SAKSS has been primarily
developed for African countries with a large agricultural sector, the analysis is
focused on identifying options for agriculture as a source of economic growth and
poverty reduction. Various economic tools and methodologies exist, but which
tools and approaches are used will not only depend on the question being asked
but on many other important considerations as well, such as: the availability of data
and expertise, time to undertake the analysis, cost, access to analytical tools and
economic models, and underlying assumptions and limitations. Johnson and
Flaherty (2011) provide a review of some of these tools, as well as a guidance on
which tool is most appropriate under what conditions with respect to a range of
factors such as data availability, cost, and time to complete the analysis.
To illustrate, we offer a number of very broad but logically sequenced series of
‘strategic analysis’ type questions to consider when assessing the policy and
investment alternatives for achieving goals of agricultural growth and poverty
reduction. These include: How can agriculture contribute the most to overall
development objectives? How should resources be mobilized and allocated more
efficiently? How can individual policies and interventions be better targeted? How
can lessons be monitored and evaluated during and after implementation? We
review each of these below.
2.1 How Can Agriculture Contribute the Most to Overall
Development Objectives?
From the outset, it is useful to first establish the country’s current situation and
whether its trajectory will lead to the achievement of the CAADP goals. It should
do so within the context of the country’s overall economy in order to highlight a
broad set of strategic options and tradeoffs—e.g. whether simply promoting faster
growth is more important than considering poverty and food security, or even
environmental degradation. This context is needed because policies at the macro
level, such as trade and market liberalization, can have a profound impact on
growth, and even more so on agriculture, the rural economy, and poverty (Dorward
et al. 2004). At the same time, policies that directly affect rural areas and agriculture
can have an impact on the overall economy and in turn have feedback effects on the
rural sector. By examining many of these policy options within the context of the
broader economy, key relationships and welfare implications can be assessed in
ways that lessen any potential adverse impacts on the poor.
314 M.E. Johnson
The economywide perspective permits other higher-level strategic questions to
be posed for shaping an agricultural strategy within the context of overall national
development goals, and in so doing, provides the greatest strategic leverage to
priority setting (Byerlee 2000). The potential role of agriculture, including individ-
ual subsectors in agriculture, can then be explored with respect to how they
contribute to economywide growth and national development priorities, such as
reducing poverty. Within this normative mode of analysis, questions regarding the
long-term distributional consequences of alternative investment and policy choices
for meeting these targets can also be explored. Specific to rural sector strategies,
sectorwide investment options should be examined more closely, especially with
regard to how they affect the incentives for rural agricultural production and
commercialization.
Various economic analysis tools can be used. For example, the Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) model is particularly well suited for analyzing a
country’s progress towards achieving its national development goals through agri-
culture. CGE models help analyze the effects of policy shifts and alternative sector
growth scenarios on overall economic growth and poverty reduction. They have the
advantage of capturing both direct and indirect effects of policy changes on poverty
and income distribution given a country’s overall economic structure. The effects
are channeled through changes in employment, wages and relative prices while
considering forward and backward linkages in the economy. From this,
policymakers can weigh the costs and benefits associated with focusing attention
on stimulating growth in different sectors and subsectors.
Existing examples that apply this level of analysis involve the work that has been
undertaken by IFPRI researchers in a number of countries in Africa (e.g. Ethiopia,
Ghana, Mozambique, Rwanda, Zambia and Malawi). From these studies, for
example, it became quickly evident that most countries could not meet the MDG
poverty target of halving poverty by 2015, with the exception of Ghana, Mozam-
bique and Uganda. Model results further showed that the additional growth would
need to be driven mostly by food staple sectors as these have a larger impact on
poverty reduction than similar growth in export-oriented crops (see example for
Zambia in Fig. 1). This impact occurs because yield improvements in food crops
not only benefit households directly, by increasing incomes from agricultural
production, but also by allowing farmers to diversify into higher-value crops.
Food crops also typically have stronger growth-linkages to non-agriculture, which
stimulates broader economywide growth and poverty reduction.
2.2 How Should Resources Be Mobilized and Allocated More
Efficiently?
An essential component of a development strategy is its plan for prioritizing
investments and mobilizing resources. A strategy grounded in country-specific
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context must be based on a thorough assessment of the public investment situation
and potential to contribute to the development goals. Public investments can be
thematic (e.g. roads, marketing institutions), sectorwide (e.g. research and exten-
sion, irrigation), and subsector specific (e.g. commodity-based research).
All these investments affect rural poverty through many channels. For example,
public investment in agricultural research, rural education and health, and infra-
structure increases farmers’ income directly by increasing agricultural productivity
and lowering transaction costs of both inputs and outputs, which in turn reduces
rural poverty. Indirect impacts come from higher agricultural wages and improved
nonfarm employment opportunities induced by growth in agricultural productivity
and increases in market opportunities. Growth in agricultural output from rural
investment often yields lower food prices, again helping the poor indirectly because
they are often net buyers of food crops. Redistribution of land caused by higher
agricultural growth also has important impacts on rural poverty. In addition to their
productivity impact, public investments in rural education, health, and infrastruc-
ture directly promote rural wages, nonfarm employment, and migration, thereby
reducing rural poverty. For example, improved infrastructure access will help
farmers set up small nonfarm businesses in rural areas such as food processing
and marketing enterprises, electronic repairs shops, transportation and trade, and
restaurant services. A key underlying assumption is that public and private invest-
ments are complements (Anderson et al. 2006), so that an increase in public goods
and accumulation of capital stock raises the productivity of all factors in agricul-
tural production, which in turn leads to higher farm wages and incomes and poverty
reduction.
Zambia will surely miss MDG-1
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Fig. 1 Example of ‘strategic analysis’ results of investment options for Zambia. Source: CAADP
Modeling results from Thurlow et al. (2008b)
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Investments in the rural sector not only contribute to growth, more employment
opportunities, and higher wages in rural areas, but also help the development of the
national economy by providing labor, human and physical capital, cheaper food,
and markets for urban industrial and service development. This type of growth in
the national economy can then help reduce poverty in both rural and urban sectors.
Understanding these different effects provides useful policy insights to improve the
effectiveness of government poverty reduction strategies. In particular, it provides
information on how public investment can be used to strengthen links between
poverty reduction channels to increase efficiency in targeting public resources on
poverty reduction. More efficient targeting has become increasingly important in an
era of macroeconomic reforms in which governments are under pressure to reduce
budgets. For examples of tools and approaches to measure the impact of invest-
ments, see Appendix A.5 and Benin et al. (2008b).
The question of how resources should be mobilized and allocated across the
different economic sectors and geographic regions is essentially answering a range
of high-end questions that inform the design and evaluation of a development
strategy, such as: (a) What have been the trends of government expenditures by
sector, and what have been the reasons for their changes? (b) How has public
investment been financed, and how has the burden of financing investment policy
been distributed in society? (c) What have been the economic rates of return to
various types of government expenditures, including their impact on growth and
poverty reduction? (d) What level of effort in public spending is required to achieve
targeted goals for agriculture and overall economic growth?
Analyzing these series of questions not only helps identify the kinds of public
sector investments which offer the highest economic rate of return (for an example,
see Fan et al. 2004 for Uganda), but they also help assess the extent to which past
investments have impacted on overall development goals (a topic covered next). It
requires sufficient subnational data on the level and distribution of public sector
expenditures and investments over time. A public expenditure review is especially
useful as a first step in compiling the required data. It will also help determine the
extent to which actual resource allocations are consistent with a country’s strategy
and goals. Combining this information with other data, such as household survey
data on consumption, production, and welfare measures, will allow for more
sophisticated analyses. For example, using econometric tools, more detailed anal-
ysis can be carried out, drawing on the cross-sectional variation of the data, to
measure and attribute differences in outcome variables such as growth and poverty
to the accumulated stock of past investments and other socioeconomic variables.
Where time series data are also available on the same cross-sectional data, the
dynamics and lagged effects of public investments can also be analyzed. When
combined with independent estimates of the unit costs of different investments,
cost/benefit ratios can be calculated.
Results from the econometric analysis can be further translated into unitless
elasticity estimates. An elasticity measures the sensitivity or marginal effect of a
1% change in one variable on the percent change in another variable. For example,
an expenditure-to-growth elasticity would measure the effect of a 1% change in the
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stock of investments (or expenditures) on the change in growth outcomes, whether
at the sector or economywide level. This becomes useful for estimating future
growth requirements in public investments for generating desired sector and eco-
nomic growth targets. Using estimates of both an expenditure-to-growth elasticity
and a growth-to-poverty elasticity, one can then estimate the level of resources
required to achieve desired growth and poverty goals (see Fan et al. 2008). A
number of country case studies that have estimated resource requirements for
meeting the CAADP goal of 6% include Benin et al. (2008a) and Thurlow et al.
(2008a, b).
2.3 How Can Individual Policies and Interventions Be Better
Targeted?
Many of the challenges and opportunities that national development strategies must
negotiate are geographic in nature and affect different communities on the ground.
For example, economic opportunities can vary widely by location depending on
other important factors such as the natural resource base (e.g. agriculture potential),
population density, and access to markets and rural services (e.g., education, health,
agriculture extension). Development options would be quite different for more
remote and food insecure areas versus those areas located in close proximity to
large market centers. Thus any interventions should be specifically targeted towards
the unique characteristics of the area and depending on the severity of the prob-
lem—such as quantifying the extent and distribution of poverty and malnutrition
across geographic areas and population groups is an important first step (Babu and
Pinstrup-Andersen 1994).
With the increasing availability of spatially disaggregated data and tools to
understand those data, it has become increasingly possible to map indicators of
biophysical and socioeconomic indicators showing local comparative advantage for
different agricultural and rural development options (see example of Uganda in
Fig. 2 below). Agroclimatic factors, access to markets, and population density are
some of the more important dimensions for assessing agricultural development
potential (Pender et al. 2001). By viewing how these conditions correlate and
overlap each other spatially with local welfare measures, assumptions can be
made about how different development investments will impact the poor and how
changing agricultural land uses may have environmental costs. Taken together,
these conditions provide an enhanced picture of the costs and benefits of different
investments, allowing better targeting towards the goals of sustainable growth,
poverty reduction, and environmental sustainability (see Wood and Chamberlin
2003; Wood et al. 1999).
Taking on a spatial perspective helps to seek answers associated with targeting
interventions. For example, a range of questions it may help answer include:
(a) What are the distribution and extent of income, poverty and malnutrition across
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different locations in the country? (b) What kinds of opportunities and challenges
affect rural economic livelihoods in different parts of the country? (c) For agricul-
ture, what are the key development domains based on agriculture potential, market
access and population density? (d) Which development domains offer the greatest
potential for high investment impact among the key subsectors and economic
activities identified as key sources of growth in the economywide analysis above?
(e) What kinds of interventions (e.g. infrastructure, R&D and extension, institu-
tional) are needed to spur productivity and income growth among select domains?
(f) Among the poorest of the domains, in terms of limited resource assets and
livelihood options, what are the alternatives for poverty reduction and food
security?
Exploring answers to these questions can be answered with tools such as
Geographic information Systems (GIS) and remote sensing. Having access to
spatially oriented data, including agroclimatic conditions, land-use, production,
urban and markets centers, infrastructure, household consumption, and welfare, is
particularly critical but often lacking in many African countries. However, with
increasing sophistication of computer technologies and satellite imagery, filling in
some of the gaps is increasingly possible. For example, You et al. (2007) recently
used a cross-entropy approach to make plausible allocations of crop production by
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Fig. 2 Mapping out development domains in Uganda. Source: Johnson and Flaherty (2011)
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A number of examples illustrate the usefulness and application of spatial anal-
ysis for targeting investments in agriculture. At the country level, useful examples
include the work undertaken by Pender et al. (2001) and Bolwig et al. (2002) for
mapping out development domains in Uganda. The more recent work by Cham-
berlin et al. (2006) builds on this concept. At the regional level, the studies by
Omamo et al. (2006) and Johnson et al. (2008) are especially noteworthy. Spatial
analysis tools were complemented by various economic analyses to assess future
agricultural growth options and research priorities in the Eastern and Western
regions of sub-Saharan Africa.
2.4 How Can Lessons Be Monitored and Evaluated During
and After Implementation?
A critical part of any agricultural strategy is to be able to determine at some point
whether the strategy is on track to achieving its goals, or whether at the end of its
life, people’s lives have been positively or negatively impacted on. It helps to
justify resource investments and ensure accountability. It also provides the option to
adjust the strategy as new evidence becomes available on what has (or has not) been
working. From the perspective of the goals of SAKSS, therefore, helping to provide
credible and relevant analysis and information related to M&E is a fundamental
prerequisite to promoting evidence-based policymaking. And although the impor-
tance of M&E systems is well-documented (see for example, Mackay 2007 and
Dalal-Clayton and Bass 2002), it is often the most difficult part to set up and
maintain. This is because agricultural strategies operate within a broader and
complex environment that is inherently dynamic with respect to constantly chang-
ing domestic and global economic conditions, social and political trends, climatic
shocks, and participatory and political processes associated with designing and
implementing policies and investment strategies.
Ultimately, therefore, an M&E system seeks to answer questions that determine
whether development objectives are being fulfilled and if there is impact in order to
help revise and improve futures strategies, such as: (a) Is the allocation and level of
inputs (e.g. spending, investments, policy interventions) of the agricultural strategy
(or project) on target? (b) How can the impact of these investments be traced to
improvements in outputs (e.g. productivity, viability of production systems, food
processors, agro-industries, markets, and trade)? (c) Have these improvements
affected outcomes (e.g. incomes and the poverty status of target populations)?
(d) What factors have shaped (positively and negatively) the level of impact
achieved to date? What needs to be altered? (e) What was the distribution of
these intermediate impacts, e.g. on smallholders, on equity, on gender, on other
spillover impacts? (f) Are there key ingredients of success or failure based on past
experience and lessons learned? What role for public versus private sector?
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A desirable M&E system is one that can encompass not only the monitoring of
progress among key inputs, outputs and outcome indicators, but evaluates the
magnitude and distribution of impact. For the former, simple descriptive narratives
of trends among the indicators help to answer the adequacy question: “have
expectations in terms of investment flows and achievement of the growth and
poverty reduction targets been met so far?” However, it does not answer the key
hypotheses on: “how effectively have different types of policies and investments
impacted on the goals so far?” and “what factors have shaped the level of impact
that has been achieved?” These last two questions are more concerned with the
evaluation or impact assessment part of M&E. Addressing all three provides key
information that can help guide decisions on what to adjust, as well as the scale and
mix of investment priorities needed, in order to keep a country’s agricultural
strategy on track. In this way, it is a critical component of the strategic analysis
agenda of a SAKSS, by coming full circle to helping inform and strengthen future
design and implementation of agricultural strategies.
In order to find answers to questions a good M&E system seeks to provide, there
are three challenges facing many African countries: the availability and quality of
data from national statistical systems from which to gather baseline information and
set future targets; having a clear M&E framework in place that describes the
interrelationships (or causality) between inputs, outputs and outcomes; and integral
to the development of the M&E framework itself, having in place sufficiently
robust methods and tools for evaluating impact over time.
2.4.1 Ensuring Availability and Reliability of Underlying Data Systems
The poor availability of reliable data in most African countries makes it particularly
challenging for setting up a national M&E system, just as it is for the other types of
strategic analyses discussed in this chapter. Especially problematic is the frequency
of data collection and quality on agricultural production and marketing. Most
African countries have only undertaken a handful of these surveys since the
1970s. In Ghana, for example, the last comprehensive agricultural census was
carried out in the early 1970s followed by a smaller sampled survey in 1986.
Other socioeconomic surveys, such as the living standards measurement surveys
(LSMS), population and housing census, and demographic and health surveys
(DHS) have occurred more frequently, but these vary across countries.
Even if there is data available, its quality is often poor due to overall weak
technical and managerial capacities of national statistical systems. Explanations for
this have included a generally low regard for statistical information by
policymakers; poor links between statistical systems and policy processes; inade-
quate government spending and technical assistance for statistics over long periods
of time; and outdated statistical systems and legislation (Kiregyera 2008;
Wingfield-Digby 2007). Another weak data area is having timely and sufficient
information on the flows of public sector expenditures and investments in agricul-
ture—especially from public expenditure tracking surveys or PETS (Dorotinsky
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and Floyd 2004). Such information can serve as key input for setting baselines and
targets for investment spending and for undertaking impact studies later on, in
addition to helping improve accountability and public sector management more
generally. Typically, much of this information is found within finance ministries,
with details of agricultural expenditures available from the sector ministry.
There are increasing efforts to improve data systems for agriculture in general
for many African countries (see Kiregyera 2008). One recent effort being led by the
World Bank is the Living Standards Measurement Study and Integrated Surveys on
Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) to improve household level panel data on agriculture in
sub-Saharan Africa. According to the World Bank’s website on this initiative, six
African countries will initially benefit from this. In time, and once scaled out to
other countries, this should help improve and complement existing data sets for
purposes of monitoring performance and impact of ARD strategies in Africa.
Another is the introduction of the AU/NEPAD budgetary tracking system for
agricultural expenditures to monitor the national compliance of the Maputo decla-
ration. This has begun to make information on total agriculture spending available
(AU/NEPAD 2005). However, because it doesn’t cover disaggregate flows by
subsector and type of investment it is less useful for impact evaluation (see Benin
et al. 2010).
2.4.2 Developing an M&E Framework
Simply having sufficient access to data does not guarantee a good M&E system. It
also requires having a credible M&E framework in place, as well as the tools to
monitor progress and assess impact. As a start, either a logical or theoretical
framework can be useful in this regard. Both seek to layout a simple structure
which describes the causal relationship between inputs (e.g. investment flows),
outputs (e.g. productivity), and outcomes (e.g. growth and poverty), and from
which critical corresponding indicators can be identified for the purpose of moni-
toring and evaluating impact.
The logical framework (or logframe) approach helps describe a simple flow
chart of how inputs will achieve intermediate and final outcomes. Performance
indicators are selected as part of a results-oriented log frame matrix, measuring
performance in terms of input delivery, implementing activities, producing outputs,
and achieving targeted outcomes (World Bank 2004; Kusek and Rist 2004;
Crawford and Bryce 2003). The measurement of outputs can also include specify-
ing the extent of coverage among target groups, including non-target groups if
spillovers are expected and measurable. Performance indicators are then selected at
each stage along a simple causality chain, with assumptions about associated risks
and other confounding factors which can influence performance and outcomes.
Adaptations to improve the basic logframe have occurred over time by seeking to
introduce more participatory approaches and/or theory and analytical rigor along
the entire length of the causal chain (White 2006; World Bank 2004). The most
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popular have included the impact chain analysis, outcome mapping, and impact
pathway approaches.
Based on the logframe, the impact chain analysis approach essentially maps out
the links in the causal chain based on underlying economic theory and evidence. It
allows for a more in-depth theoretical understanding of the cause-and-effect rela-
tionships or impact pathways between variables and the confounding effects of
other potentially influencing factors. And so long as sufficient data exists, empirical
evaluations of impact using econometric techniques can also be modeled as
discussed further below. Its main disadvantage is that it can easily become unnec-
essarily complex, data intensive, and costly.
An alternative is the outcome mapping approach, which is more participatory
and qualitative in nature, focusing on changes in development processes and out-
comes (Earl et al. 2001; Smutylo 2005). Essentially, it identifies expected impacts
and outcome indicators based on a map of interrelated factors from intervention to
outcomes within a group session. Given the complexity of considering many other
noneconomic factors which can influence outcomes, the approach adopts visuali-
zation techniques to instill participants to think through the different factors, their
direct and indirect effects, as well as causal linkages. This is especially useful for
tracing out qualitative changes in development processes which are not easily
measurable (e.g. human behavior). A disadvantage of this approach is that it is
limited by the complexity of causal relationships that arise as more factors and
stakeholders are identified in the process.
More recently, the impact pathway approach was introduced to try and deal with
some of the shortcomings of both outcome mapping and impact chain analysis
approaches (see Spinger-Heinze et al. 2003 and Douthwaite et al. 2003). The
approach recognizes the presence of a number of impact chains and sequences in
explaining the overall change process. The analysis of multiple impact pathways
can be quite useful for impact evaluation as they avoid the pitfall of assuming a
simple linear relationship between an investment and outcome. The analysis of
development domains discussed earlier in this chapter, for example, constitutes the
existence of multiple but distinct impact pathways. This is because how invest-
ments ultimately lead to outcomes depends on the type of combinations among
multiple factors—such as agricultural potential, market access and population
pressure (Spinger-Heinze et al. 2003; Pender et al. 2001). While it is an improve-
ment, it shares the same drawbacks of outcome mapping and impact chain analysis
as it can easily become unnecessarily complex. Additionally, it can quickly become
very data intensive and costly when too many other factors and distinct pathways or
outcome mappings are introduced.
No matter which approach is adopted, the real challenge from a practical
perspective is maintaining sound theory and rigor while at the same time limiting
the degree of complexity in drawing out the causality chain and in selecting a
minimum set of indicators for which reliable data exists. Depending on the strategy
goals and underlying programs, a balance needs to be struck between the need to
attribute impact to program interventions and having in place a cost efficient M&E
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system, one that has the least likelihood for measurement errors and is simple
enough to interpret the information that comes out of it.
Despite various approaches to M&E systems, their basic structure and utility are
principally intended to serve as a performance management tool: to help adapt
policies and investments during the course of strategy implementation in order to
stay on track towards achieving targeted output and outcome goals. An additional
advantage of such systems is that they can be developed in a participatory fashion
involving broader stakeholder groups. The main drawbacks are that they are less
reliable for undertaking a credible impact assessment as they tend to be too static,
rigid, and rely only on theoretical assumptions when linking between inputs, out-
puts and outcomes.
2.4.3 Undertaking Impact Assessment
In order to effectively assess the impact of a strategy (or its underlying projects)
after it has been in place for some time requires additional tools, both quantitative
and qualitative. A number of quantitative tools exist for analyzing impact at the
sector or economywide levels and at the project level. The evaluation of sector or
economywide impacts of public sector interventions is particularly useful when the
goal is to assess effects on aggregate welfare outcomes (e.g. poverty) and their
distribution. Where there is sufficient information on past investments and other
key factors which influence outcomes, econometric and statistical methods can help
test for the contribution of past changes in investments (e.g. agricultural research,
infrastructure, health, and education) on changes in outcome variables. This is very
much the same approaches described in the previous section on ‘How should
resources be mobilized and allocated across the different economic sectors and
geographic regions?’ emphasizing how ex-post impact evaluation is particularly
relevant for informing the design of future strategies.
Given the poor availability and quality of data in many African countries,
econometric techniques may not be feasible. Under these conditions, simulation
and programming models are useful alternatives. For agricultural R&D, for exam-
ple, economic surplus models can be used to estimate economic rates of return to
investment so long as sufficient information on key technology and behavioral
parameters exist (see Alston et al. 1995). Additionally, programming techniques
can also be used to estimate changes in agricultural performance (as measured by
total factor productivity) that is due to technical change and thus past investments in
R&D (see Farrington et al. 1997). For broader categories of investments, it is also
possible to apply economywide simulation models as in the earlier section on ‘What
are the economywide options for reaching high-end agricultural development
goals?’ if such models already exist. This can be particularly useful for capturing
the impact of broader sectorwide investments on overall economic growth.
The application of economic simulation models to the evaluation of impact after
the fact (or ex-post) essentially involves simulating how much an actual change in
investments or policy may have affected outcomes. A number of indicators that
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serve as input into the models can be monitored periodically to assess their potential
impact on outcomes. As data on outcome variables becomes available, model
results can be compared with actual values. If the model predicts an outcome that
is below or above the actual observed outcome, it is possible a number of
confounding factors could explain the difference, if data and model specification
errors are assumed minimal. Results can also be compared against a baseline
scenario wherein the intervention is removed to describe a situation ‘with and
without’—as a type of counterfactual analysis (see example of Bell et al. 1982).
An emerging area is the use of spatial analysis tools for impact assessment. This
has become possible as GIS tools, satellite imagery, and computer hardware and
software, have advanced over the years. As a result, for example, an increasing
number of countries are able to produce high resolution poverty maps. Knowledge
of this kind which show disparities in poverty across geographic space, including
associated livelihoods and assets, is not only relevant for targeting future invest-
ments (as discussed in the section ‘How can individual policies and interventions be
better targeted?’) but can also serve as a monitoring and evaluation tool. Statistical
techniques can be applied where there is sufficient data to be able to associate a
number of key geographic and socioeconomic factors to changes in welfare over
time (e.g. see Minot and Baulch 2005 and Pender et al. 2001).
Impact assessment at the sector or economywide level has its limitations. The
effects between investments and outcomes are typically too aggregate to be linked
back to any particular intervention (Maredia 2009). The common problem of
insufficient data makes econometric and spatial analysis methods difficult and
often impractical. While economic simulation models are more feasible under
these conditions, their accuracy depends on how well the underlying data, model
specification, and behavioral assumptions represent the real world. In many
instances, behavioral parameter estimates in a model are drawn from different
periods in time and/or different locations.
Impact assessment at the project level, on the other hand, is far more feasible if
necessary steps are undertaken from project design to implementation. At this level
of analysis, experimental or randomized approaches are more desirable because
they can directly test for attribution and causality. This is because randomization
allows for measuring impact against some counterfactual or control variable
(“before and after,” or “with and without,” the intervention), while guarding against
problems of selection bias in the process. In other words, it can answer questions of
how individuals who participated in a program would have fared in the absence of
the program, or, how those who were not exposed to the program would have fared
in the presence of the program (Duflo et al. 2008; Maredia 2009; White 2006). To
ensure sufficient information is collected for randomization, however, early prep-
arations and resources for monitoring and evaluation must be in place when the
project is in its design phase—to later provide the “before and after” and/or the
“with and without” intervention comparisons.
The experimental or randomization approach is not without its critics. Some
question its usefulness at the level of informing policy and strategy design alto-
gether (Ravillion 2009). An obvious limitation is that typically the desire for
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undertaking an evaluation occurs when a project has already ended which makes
the condition for randomization impossible. Another is the ethical question of
excluding from treatment a control group when it involves welfare improving
interventions. Other problems include: the limitations for scaling up to general
equilibrium effects that occur at higher levels of impact but unaccounted for at the
project level; the existence of uniquely defined local conditions which affect out-
comes but are not always present in other locations; and, the observation that simply
identifying ‘what’worked from a project is not as useful for policy if it also does not
answer ‘why’ it worked (Deaton 2009). Finally, its high costs may not always be
justifiable, especially if they do not contribute much of anything to policy consid-
erations. Weighing in the cost for experimental impact evaluations with the infor-
mation expected from them should always be considered before undertaking such
evaluations.
In most cases, non-experimental and practical alternatives are more suitable
when projects are already underway. Among them are commonly accepted statis-
tical and econometric techniques that compare outcomes between project partici-
pants and non-participants within a target population, such as controlling for
observables, regression discontinuity design estimates, difference-in-differences
and fixed effects approaches, as well as the use of instrumental variables (Duflo
et al. 2008; Maredia 2009). In other cases, simple economic cost-benefit analysis
(or rate of return studies) are just as useful, but only so long as there is sufficient
underlying information on costs and behavioral assumptions associated with the
project (see Gittinger 1984; Alston et al. 1995, 2000; and Masters et al. 1998).
The choice of economic tools ultimately depends on many factors: whether
impact is being evaluated at the project or sector or economywide level; the type
of questions being asked to ensure policy relevance; data availability and type;
pre-existing models; resources and time available for analysis; and the capacity or
skills of the evaluator. Ravillion (2008) offers some useful steps for evaluators to
consider in selecting the most appropriate methods and approaches.
Finally, not all impact assessments are amenable to a quantitative set of eco-
nomic analyses, such as projects that provide services or have a strong social
dimension to them. Even when it is, other more qualitative social and political
dimensions can also help explain impact. For example, collecting vital information
about the social and political context, including the underlying policy landscape
and processes, under which impact is being evaluated, can be particularly useful at
answering questions about “why” and “how” a strategy or project may have failed
or succeeded—rather than simply “what” caused it. In this context, the efficiency
and effectiveness of program interventions and projects can also be evaluated.
Some examples of qualitative approaches for impact evaluation include rapid
appraisal techniques (e.g. through civil society report cards), surveys of targeted
beneficiaries to measure perceptions of impact (Maredia 2009; White 2006); use of
impact pathway approaches to better understand processes and behavior; and the
application of a sustainable livelihoods framework that considers a broader set of
social and political explanations, in addition to the economic ones, in assessing a
project’s impact on welfare outcomes (Adato and Meinzen-Dick 2007).
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Unfortunately, the subjective nature of gathering information, including the lack of
good statistical properties in validating results, often implies that the information
generated and lessons learned are not always easily transferrable (Maredia 2009).
Given the range of approaches to developing an M&E framework and ultimately
assessing impact, the choice of what to use will always depend on: the agricultural
strategy and corresponding range of policies and investments underlying it; the
questions being asked; level of complexity in the known causal relationships; data
availability, frequency, and type; existing tools; the skills of the analysts involved;
the budget and costs allocated for M&E; the time horizon for data collection and
analysis; and individual country circumstances with regard to the social and
political landscape and policy processes. With this knowledge, decisionmakers,
technical analysts, and the key stakeholders involved, must together decide on
which approach and what tools provide the most robust and cost effective M&E
for the particular agricultural strategy in mind. This is where the ‘knowledge
support system’ concept and approach of SAKSS becomes more relevant.
3 The Knowledge Support System Concept and Approach
The ‘knowledge support system’ component of SAKSS describes a network of
individuals and institutions that service the need for strategic analysis and infor-
mation during the formulation and implementation of agricultural strategies. The
network includes a range of individuals (researchers, policymakers, and develop-
ment practitioners) and organizations (government agencies, research institutes,
universities, development organizations, and private and civil society groups).
These individuals and organizations are linked through this network under the
shared interest of seeking tangible solutions to the challenges facing the agricultural
sector.
Three core activities undertaken by the SAKSS network include collaborative
strategic analysis, capacity strengthening, and dialogue. Through these activities
relevant information from research findings and data analysis is compiled, synthe-
sized, and packaged into evidence that enriches the dialogue on future agricultural
priorities in a timely reliable fashion. The collaborative and participatory manner
involved is intended to: help validate the relevant questions being asked by
policymakers and civil society and the tools of analysis, data sources and assump-
tions, needed to address such questions; instill confidence in the evidence gener-
ated; and ultimately, enrich the capacity to generate and utilize analytical tools and
evidence in the process of formulating and implement agricultural strategies.
Applications of this at the country and regional level exist. For example, a
number of regional SAKSS nodes (or ReSAKSS) have focused much of their
attention in mobilizing networks of individuals and organizations associated with
the CAADP agenda at the regional level. Through these networks and a number of
workshop forums, the nodes are helping to fill critical knowledge gaps, as well as
bringing together a stock of knowledge, expertise, and tools, as countries begin to
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shape and align their agricultural strategies within the CAADP framework. A
website brings together the information being collected to promote peer review
across countries and updates on the progress of CAADP implementation (see www.
resakss.org). The networks are in turn helping to establish country SAKSS nodes
that are intended to strengthen a country’s own ability to generate and provide
strategic analysis, monitor key indicators, and assess impact of ongoing efforts
against the principals and goals of CAADP.
3.1 Linking Evidence with Policymaking
The unknown question within an individual country’s own social and political
context is whether there is sufficient room to maneuver in order to bring evidence
to bear in local policy processes during the formulation and implementation of their
agricultural strategy. How research or evidence feeds into the policy process in
developing countries is not yet fully understood. Yet, the importance of it so critical
given the observation that many developing countries rely very little on scientific-
based evidence when making policy decisions (Juma and Clark 1995). While there
is a growing body of literature that seeks to explain the research-to-policy gap in
Africa, few have come up with a testable hypothesis. Case study narratives are more
common. The ongoing work by the International Development Research Centre
(IDRC) in Canada and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) in the UK are
particularly noteworthy. Another team of researchers from Harvard University also
offer a few African examples (see Cash et al. 2003).
The common accepted viewpoint in the African literature, as elsewhere in the
world, is the observation that policymaking in general is a dynamic and complex
process, sometimes simply explained as a chaos of purposes and accidents (Clay
and Schaffer 1984). This is because the process involves multiple actors (individ-
uals and organizations) which are defined by local political, social (cultural and
belief systems), and institutional realities (bureaucratic structures and capacities).
And being about people, vested interests among a few powerful elite, corruption,
and external influences, can also play a distinctive role, as they still do in many
African countries (Juma and Clark 1995). Power relations (people) and ideas (based
on both tacit and explicit knowledge) are therefore particularly important. In fact,
scientific knowledge often only plays a marginal role in the decisionmaking process
(see Sabatier 2007).
Getting a good handle of a country’s own policy process, and no matter its
shortcomings, is therefore an important first step to understanding how evidence-
based information can play any particular role in it. The question is not simply
about how to improve the transfer of research into policy and vice versa, but more
so about understanding the peculiar conditions under which links between the two
can be made more effective.
Although various theoretical explanations of the policymaking process offer
useful perspectives and frameworks on how research becomes embedded in the
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policy process, we do not cover this here but refer the reader to the expanded review
in Johnson and Flaherty (2011). Here we focus more is describing how the ‘knowl-
edge support system’ component of SAKSS is intended to help strengthen the links
and capacities for greater evidenced-based dialogue and policymaking, while also
ensuring quality in the evidence generated.
Essentially, the ‘knowledge support system’ component of SAKSS generally
describes a network of individuals and organizations that effectively connect those
who know with those who need to know. How effectively this helps to bring
evidence into the policy process depends on how well the individuals in the network
(both the actors who know and those who need to know) and the organizations they
represent (e.g. research institutions, nongovernmental organizations, private orga-
nizations, and government agencies) are linked to promote dialogue around the
knowledge products (i.e. information and results of research) and policy issues.
How the SAKSS network, in particular, can serve as a ‘knowledge support
system’ in the context of an agricultural strategy is best illustrated using the Context
Evidence and Links Framework developed by ODI (Crewe and Young 2002; Court
and Young 2003). The framework involves four key elements: external influence,
political context, evidence and links. It is appropriate for our purpose because it
describes the complex interrelationships among a diverse group of actors, given a
local political context and external environment, and thus the manner in which
evidence can play a role in contributing to policymaking. Nevertheless, it should be
underscored that the complexities of the research and policy interface cannot be
adequately represented in a single framework as it involves many other dimensions.
We only use it here for illustration purposes.
From Fig. 2 below, the processes and outcomes of the planning, implementation,
and M&E activities are themselves greatly influenced by the interrelationships
among the three spheres in the center, including the external environment surround-
ing them. Leadership and governance at the top emphasizes the principal role this
plays in managing the agricultural strategy process itself, which is inherently
influenced directly by the political context and external environment. Usually, the
leader and manager of the agricultural strategy sits in the Ministry of Agriculture or
other government agency/department charged with this responsibility. The biggest
challenge for leadership and governance of the agricultural strategy is to improve
the integration across all three activities—planning, implementation and M&E. But
also potentially influencing the outcome of this is the evidence that is being
generated in the center, the links that influence the national debate, and the
emergence of any changing political and socioeconomic realities. In other words,
as new evidence becomes available (e.g. lack of progress or impact), or as socio-
economic and political realities change, or as new and emerging issues are brought
to the forefront (e.g. via civil society groups, media), the priorities of the agricul-
tural strategy may have to be altered.
Among the inner circles, the political context is the most critical as it describes
the environment and process under which policies are made, and thus greatly
affects how evidence plays any role in it (if at all). This includes factors such as
political culture, extent of civil and political freedoms, vested interests, capacities
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of government to respond, and attitudes and incentives among officials (Young
2005). Here, the overlap of political context with evidence describes the process of
“strategic analysis,” drawing ideas and information from both government and the
research community, past research, and the experience and knowledge of actors
involved. How the two become more closely linked also depends on how well they
both overlap with where ‘the rubber hits the road’—the beneficiaries and interest
groups of agricultural strategies, such as: development practitioners, farmers and
trader groups, media, and civil society in general. On the other hand, the intersec-
tion between evidence and links can be viewed as one of discourse and dialogue
(e.g. through publications, seminars, and media), while the one between the links
and political context is more about advocacy (e.g. the world of campaigning and
lobbying among local interest groups, media, and the broader electorate or civil
society). Finally, the external environment, including the overall socioeconomic
environment, as well as the influence of regional and international actors
(e.g. donors), can be quite significant in the African context.
Effective linkages between evidence, dialogue, and policymaking are supposed
to occur at the intersection of all three spheres, and it is here that evidence is
expected to influence a policy change. The assumption is that when such links are
established early enough, the evidence generated and discussed at this intersection
is likely to be viewed as relevant and salient to the local context (Young 2005; Cash
et al. 2003). The big challenge in most African countries is getting all three to
intersect, given the poor state of evidence generation (from poor quality data, poor
training and incentives, weak peer review systems), poor links (from poor commu-
nications, capacities), political context (power play, vested interests, top down
bureaucracies, and elitist attitudes among officials), and external environment,
especially the exaggerated influence of donors.
This is what the ‘knowledge support system’ component of a country SAKSS
strives to achieve, in setting up an active network of key local actors (individuals
and organizations) who intersect from all three spheres. Through extensive consul-
tations and interactions in the network, activities involving strategic analysis,
capacity strengthening, and dialogue are laid out. The scope of work under each
of these activities draws on the active input of all stakeholders: local research
partners and analysts (evidence), key government actors and agencies (political
context), and stakeholder groups (links).
3.2 Supporting CAADP Implementation
The SAKSS concept was adopted in 2006 to support CAADP and its principles for
promoting progress review at country level, peer review at the regional level, and
mutual review at the continental level. This has involved establishing three regional
SAKSS nodes (or ReSAKSS) in each of the major regional economic communities
(RECs): Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Economic
Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS), Southern Africa Development
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Community (SADC). The ReSAKSS nodes are hosted and led by the International
Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Ibadan, Nigeria for West Africa; by the
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) in Nairobi, Kenya for Eastern and
Central Africa; and by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI), with
the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), in
Pretoria, South Africa for Southern Africa. IFPRI is helping to coordinate a
common agenda across the three nodes, providing technical and analytical support,
and helping maintain and strengthen links with a broad network of CAADP
partners. An Africa-wide steering committee provides overall oversight to ensure
the ReSAKSS agenda remains relevant and useful in supporting CAADP
implementation.
Generally, the ReSAKSS nodes focus their activities in three main areas:
Strategic analysis, Knowledge management and communications, and Capacity
strengthening. The strategic analysis activities help fill critical knowledge gaps in
assessing progress toward realizing the CAADP goals of allocating 10% of the
national budget to agriculture, achieving a 6% annual agricultural growth rate, and
meeting the first MDG of halving poverty and hunger by 2015. As part of this, the
ReSAKSS helped develop a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework for
CAADP (see Benin et al. 2010).
Under the knowledge management and communications component, ReSAKSS
and its network of partners collect data on key indicators such as public spending;
integrating and building upon existing data, analytical tools, and knowledge; and
facilitating timely access of the knowledge by African policymakers and develop-
ment partners to allow for more evidence-based decisionmaking. To this end,
ReSAKSS has launched a website to share the information it generates and com-
piles, on these key indicators and on ARD in general (see www.resakss.org).
A number of country level analyses were also undertaken by ReSAKSS to
inform country CAADP Roundtables involving Rwanda, Malawi, Kenya, Uganda,
and Zambia in 2006 and 2007, and a number of West Africa countries in 2008. The
results served as critical input into the stakeholder dialogue and preparations
leading up to the signing of a CAADP Roundtable compact within each country
(as Fig. 1 previously illustrated). Further support was also provided in helping
inform each country’s investment plans during the post-CAADP compact period.
By the end of 2011, according to the online ReSAKSS Newsletter (resakss.
wordpress.com), 22 countries had signed their country CAADP compacts,
18 have developed national agricultural investment plans, and 15 countries have
held their technical reviews, out of which five (Ethiopia, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra
Leone and Togo) received a total of $223.5 million from the Global Agriculture and
Food Security Program (GAFSP) fund. Other countries continue to sign on to the
CAADP framework, including Mozambique, which just formally launched the
process on December 13th. Djibouti is the most recent country to sign on in 2012.
In 2010, ReSAKSS began a second phase of its support to CAADP implemen-
tation. Much of its activities have been have been focused on consolidating
ReSAKSS as a leading knowledge platform for agricultural policy planning and
implementation in Africa, more fully operationalizing the CAADP monitoring and
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evaluation (M&E) system it helped develop at the country level, and providing
technical assistance for the establishment of country SAKSS nodes. Because
CAADP is meant to be implemented at the country level according to a country’s
own compacts and investment plans, a goal of the M&E system is to not only help
strengthen country capacities for monitoring progress and assessing impact through
their SAKSS network of partners, but ensure the adoption of standardized and
measurable indicators that are consistent across different countries and regions to
facilitate cross-country peer review and mutual learning.
Figure 3 provides a schematic diagram which describes the M&E system of
CAADP as set up by the ReSAKSS. Developed around a theoretical framework that
is described in more detail in Benin et al. (2010), the system uses a number of
indicators to monitor progress of CAADP implementation: inclusive of
process, policy, investment and outcome indicators being targeted at all three
levels—country, regional and continental. Several important processes associated
with CAADP implementation include the signing of CAADP compacts, finalizing
investment plans and resource commitments. Other important milestones in the
process include tracking and assessing the sorts of policy and strategic issues being
raised through stocktaking exercises, reviewing the plans to address them, and
assessing the roles of different stakeholders and their capacities to provide and
utilize the knowledge.
In many cases, for example, capacity gaps may need to be filled through the
provision of appropriate skills training and mentoring for undertaking M&E and
policy analysis. These milestones, among others, are represented by the eight
circular steps in the country CAADP implementation process at the bottom of the
Fig. 3 The ‘knowledge support system’ framework. Source: Johnson and Flaherty (2011)
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figure. These help lead to increased and more efficient allocation of resources, and
in turn, outputs and outcomes (Fig. 4).
The full operationalization of the CAADP M&E system is going to depend a lot
on the establishment of country SAKSS nodes, particularly in those countries that
have signed their country compacts and validated their investment plans. The
generic setup of a country SAKSS node is intended to strengthen the capacities of
national knowledge systems to undertake their own strategic analysis, M&E, and in
promoting greater evidenced-based decisionmaking. A secretariat is best hosted by
a local institution in order to serve the primary function of supporting its country’s
own need for reviewing progress of CAADP implementation. As a member of the
ReSAKSS network of partners, the node is able to draw on a wide range of expertise
and knowledge, as well as contribute to the ReSAKSS regional and continental
efforts for CAADP M&E. Figure 5 below illustrates the generic structure of a
country SAKSS node, showing the relationships between the SAKSS secretariat, in
country key stakeholders, funding sources (government and development partners),
and links with the broader ReSAKSS network.
3.3 Ensuring Effective Knowledge Support Systems
The process of establishing the ReSAKSS and country SAKSS nodes in support of
CAADP implementation has relied on a number of practical principles that serve to
Fig. 4 Supporting the M&E of the CAADP implementation process. Source: Sam Benin,
ReSAKSS slide presentation of support to CAADP M&E, 2011
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ensure an effective “knowledge support system” among its networks of partners.2
These have been distilled from both literature surveys and IFPRI’s own experiences
to date with the setup of several ‘country strategy support programs’ in Africa;
including principles of participation and collaboration, flexibility, high level dia-
logue and brokering, credibility and legitimacy, sustainability, and capacity
strengthening.
3.3.1 Participation and Collaboration
From the beginning, the establishment of a country SAKSS node should be country-
owned and driven, and its processes participatory and transparent. For example, any
‘strategic analysis’ and knowledge management activities should be undertaken in a
collaborative manner to promote local involvement and ownership. This ensures
that the evidence generated is both relevant and salient to the perspectives, con-
cerns, and issues, of both local researchers as ‘suppliers’ and policymakers and their
stakeholders as ‘users,’ and thus increasing the chances of policy impact (Cash et al.









































































Fig. 5 A generic country SAKSS node. Source: Johnson and Flaherty (2011)
2While we only focus on the principles here, practical steps on how to go about setting up a country
SAKSS node are discussed in more detail in Johnson and Flaherty (2011).
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3.3.2 Flexibility
Because there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ development model, SAKSS should always
remain flexible enough to adapt to different country conditions involving institu-
tional capacity and political context, especially as it relates to the ongoing process
of strategy design and implementation. The structure of the programs and networks
established must also be allowed to vary, depending on existing stock of institu-
tional capacity and knowledge, political context of government and donor relations,
level and source of funding, and awareness of the value of scientific evidence for
policymaking.
3.3.3 High Level Dialogue and Brokering
Policymakers must be actively involved in helping to review and laying out the
scope of work of a SAKSS node in their own country. There should be room for
close overlaps between researchers/analysts and policymakers to ensure attention is
paid to continuous dialogue by analysts and researchers with key policymakers,
executive government officials, as well as parliamentarians. The degree of prox-
imity of outside research institutions to in-house policy analysis units (e.g. within
legislative and executive branches of government) has been found to have an
important effect on how well research results are communicated and received by
policymakers (Ryan 1999). At the same time, the existence of close, personal links
between individuals (researchers and policymakers) can also be just as effective
(Court and Young 2003; Timmer 1998). A potential disadvantage is when too close
a relationship marginalizes the contributions of other researchers and research
institutions, limiting the diversity of views to which policymakers have access
(Stone et al. 2001).
3.3.4 Credibility and Legitimacy
Knowledge systems and formal knowledge networks should be structured in a way
that adheres to the same criteria for credibility and legitimacy that is applied to
policy research (Cash et al. 2003). Knowledge networks are credible when the
participants represent shared and common institutional mandates rather than per-
sonal research interests. The degree of credibility is only enhanced when member-
ship is limited to those institutions with a strong local reputation for their expertise
and for their capacity to influence the policy process (Ryan and Garrett 2003).
Depending on the current state of a country’s own capacity for policy analysis
and research, it may be necessary to rely on foreign experts and institutions, but
close links must be established with a local institutions and individuals who have
the respect of the domestic policy-making community. They not only offer critical
local knowledge, but are more cognizant to domestic policy concerns, and may also
be viewed as being less ideologically driven as foreign institutions (Jayne et al.
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1999; Wangwe 2005). On the other hand, foreign institutions can provide a basis for
enhancing the credibility of the research, bringing in better access to international
research resources and standards, as well as on-the-job learning, to strengthen
domestic research capacity (Jayne et al. 1999). If sustained over the long term,
together with sufficient higher degree training, such efforts can go a long way in
promoting and sustaining a think tank culture that effectively influences national
dialogue and decisionmaking about future policies and strategies.
3.3.5 Sustainability
Policy research and analysis capacity have to be built incrementally and sustain-
ably, which means ongoing support for key government policy agencies as well as
encouragement of a think-tank culture for producing high quality, policy relevant
research products. Therefore, countries ultimately need to have ownership of
SAKSS from the beginning to enable its principals and tools to become institution-
alized within local government agencies and research institutions over time. To
accomplish this, both in-country researchers (as suppliers) and stakeholders (as -
end-users) need to be actively engaged early on to commit to a long-term institu-
tionalization process that involves knowledge synthesis and generation, compiling
lessons from ‘learning by doing,’ institutional arrangements or platform for linking
research to policy, and human and institutional capacity strengthening.
3.3.6 Capacity Strengthening
The SAKSS concept is founded on the recognition that many developing countries
lack the capacity to generate reliable research-based information and analysis
needed to inform and guide development strategies. Therefore, strengthening the
capacity of countries to provide much needed credible information and knowledge
systems for strategy development and implementation must be integral to the
ongoing activities of a country SAKSS node. The core assumption is that as
relevant and timely information is increasingly provided from local sources to the
policy dialogue and design of strategies in each region, a greater appreciation and
reliance on empirical evidence would emerge and lead to sustained improvements
in sector governance and policy impact over time. A SAKSS node, therefore, must
play a catalytic role in developing a capacity strengthening strategy that promotes
and improves the capacities of local partner institutions best placed to undertake
‘strategic analysis’ and bring evidence to bear during dialogue and deliberations
about future development priorities.
Finally, the success of country SAKSS nodes, especially in their role as ‘knowl-
edge support systems’ will ultimately depend a lot on how well they are able to
establish strong ties across a diverse group of actors in their networks—throughout
the process of generating credible evidence, sharing the evidence, and promoting
dialogue around the evidence. It will also depend on how well they are able to
understand the policy landscape and overall external influences at play within their
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respective countries and regions, and how they are eventually perceived by their
network of partners based on the type of activities it supports and the evidence they
generate.
4 Conclusion
The SAKSS concept was developed to provide a framework by which the gaps
between evidence and policymaking can be narrowed through the application of
‘strategic analysis’ and ‘knowledge support systems’ approaches designed to
inform and strengthen the effectiveness of agricultural strategies in Africa, and in
particular, CAADP implementation. The chapter has provided a broad overview of
the SAKSS concept, a review on the type of ‘strategic analyses’ it seeks to address,
the kind of tools and approaches needed to ensure effective ‘knowledge support
systems’ that promote evidenced-based dialogue and decisionmaking, and a guide
on how to go about setting up such systems at country level.
The application of SAKSS in support of CAADP at the country (via country
SAKSS nodes) and regional (via the ReSAKSS nodes) is allowing for lessons to be
drawn and thus improve our understanding of how such systems can be made more
effective in helping to bring evidence to bear during policy dialogue and
decisionmaking processes. While it is still too soon to determine the success of
these systems without a more detailed comparative analysis, especially if it can be
derived from an external and independent evaluation, certain lessons and principles
have emerged over time from the experiences of IFPRI in establishing the
ReSAKSS and several ‘country strategy support programs’ in Africa. We summa-
rize some of these here.
• Local partners must shape the relevance of a SAKSS: Key partner organizations
(e.g. research institutions, government ministries, universities, and NGOs) must
perceive and be engaged to help fashion its relevance and utility. Only through
such levels of institutional engagement will SAKSS be able to provide improved
and commonly accepted approaches that can foster, enhance, and improve
synergies among the varied and multiple development efforts. Dialogue with
the local policymakers, analysts, and existing networks is essential at the early
stages to determine the local needs and capacity.
• Adapts to local conditions: It must be able to be institutionalized and maintained
in ways that enable it to adapt to local conditions and serve as a national and
regional public resource.
• Maintains broad representation of stakeholders: Its organizational and gover-
nance structure must be established in a way that allows a broad representation
of key stakeholders (government, university, think tanks, development practi-
tioners, civil society, farmer organizations, and development partners) to main-
tain its relevance.
• Establishes strong links with a local partner(s): It must be able to develop strong
links with local partner institutions and organizations to help strengthen their
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capacities to provide and sustain the SAKSS in the long run. Strong ties with
local partner institutions and government bodies help maintain the relevance of a
SAKSS program as country-led and owned.
• Produces collaborative quality products: The ability to maintain quality products
that have been produced in close collaboration with network partners and
institutions raises the credibility of the program while maintaining its relevance
and utility among partners and stakeholders.
• Has a local champion: The presence of an active champion within the Steering
Committee helps to establish stronger ties among the network data and analysis
suppliers, as well as the relevance of its outputs among users (e.g. government
agencies, policymakers, development partners).
• Inherits multiple donor support: The existence of multiple donors and a suffi-
cient level of resources strengthen the perception of SAKSS as a general public
good in support of local interests and capacity needs.
• Build credibility and trust among competing partners: A SAKSS network is not
the only player in providing strategic analysis and information for informing
agricultural strategies. It is therefore important to maintain a degree of transpar-
ency in reaching out to other experts who may have comparative advantage in a
particular area. A SAKSS should utilize this expertise with sufficient incentive
structures in place for collaboration. This could also be done in the form of
organizing seminars to encourage broader participation by experts outside the
network. SAKSS should refrain from giving the impression its network of
partners has sufficient expertise in all areas.
Of course there is no single blueprint of a country SAKSS. The experience of
existing programs highlights the unique conditions that exist within each country
with respect to stakeholder needs, human and institutional capacity, current stock of
knowledge, funding levels, data availability and quality, and existing relationships
between government, donors, and the research community. We also emphasized the
many factors that can influence the effectiveness of a SAKSS for promoting
evidence-based dialogue and decisionmaking, including the political context, exter-
nal influence, and relationships among individual champions and their organiza-
tional links. These ultimately shape the SAKSS each country with respect to its
governance and institutional structure, relationships with local partners, and ana-
lytical agenda, for instance. Despite these differences, however, we laid out some
basic principles, definitions, and objectives underlying the SAKSS concept and the
process of establishing a country SAKSS. We also offered a step-by-step guideline
for setting it up, drawing on the experience of existing efforts and lessons from the
literature.
Finally, the operational aspects of SAKSS offer a real world opportunity to test
the concept and its principles. For example, certain institutional and political
economy issues, including individual and organizational interactions, emerge out
of the collaboration and networking inherent in a SAKSS. From this, a number of
important questions arise—what drives the interactions in such networks? What
factors constrain their ability to function well (such as incentives, institutional
affiliations and tensions, transaction costs, competitiveness, different underlying
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development paradigms, values, and approaches)? Does the type of membership
mix in the networks affect the credibility of the analysis? Other challenging
questions that can also arise and worth exploring further include—how can a
SAKSS balance the supply of credible information (which is limited) with its
demand (which is almost endless)? Can those who seek the information most also
pay for it? If not, what are the tradeoffs for accepting external donor involvement
and influence?
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Lessons Learned and Future Challenges
Christian Henning and Ousmane Badiane
“Until we understand why our society adopts its policies, we
will be poorly equipped to give useful advice on how to
change those policies.”
George J. Stigler in “The Citizen and the State.” Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, p. ix, 1975
This book started with the key challenges for African leaders endorsing the
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) to make
CAADP work. These challenges include at least two aspects. First, to identify,
among the programs that do work, those that provide the best value for money.
Second, to achieve political feasibility (i.e. to effectively implement identified
evidence-based policies). These challenges are not only relevant for political
practitioners, but also imply methodological challenges for scientists for at least
two reasons. First, linking economic analysis to policy formulation and outcome is
a very complex and tedious process. The problem is not just one of applying
rigorous economic theory to high-quality data in order to tackle relevant questions.
This is difficult enough but may still be the easiest part. A greater challenge is for
the knowledge and insights generated from policy research and analysis to find their
way into the decision-making process. And even when it does, science-based
evidence forms only one part, and often not the most important part, of the
understanding that influences the decision-making process, where imperfect polit-
ical competition often induces biased incentives for politicians, thereby impeding
the implementation of available best-practice politics.
In this context this book examines the methodological challenges to analyze and
understand simultaneously both which policies work best and why and how these
policies can be effectively implemented given the political and economic
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framework conditions in a country. Overall, the following main results can be
summarized from the different contributions to this volume.
1 Growth-Poverty Linkages
In line with existing studies (e.g. Diao et al. 2012), the applied CGE modeling
approaches highlight the importance of agricultural growth in achieving pro-poor
growth in Africa. However, extended linked micro-macro approaches also show
that understanding the relative importance of agricultural versus nonagricultural
growth also depends on the analysis of economic interlinkages between poor
households and the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. These linkages can
be rather complex. In particular, they include household labor market responses to
economic shocks as well as nutrition-growth-poverty linkages. Moreover, analyz-
ing public investments that promote technical progress to achieve poverty reduction
reveals that agricultural subsectors are key, because investments promoting t.p. in
these subsectors are comparatively productive, while vice versa many
nonagricultural sectors are characterized by a high potential for achieving
pro-poor growth (i.e. assuming exogenous growth for these sectors implies a high
impact on poverty reduction) but the investment required to achieve growth is much
higher when compared to investments in agriculture. Nevertheless, analyses imply
that the classical agriculture-nonagriculture nexus is too simple (i.e. an efficient
pro-poor growth [PPG] strategy needs to target specific agricultural and
nonagricultural sectors).
2 Policy-Growth Linkages
Promoting pro-poor growth in Africa demands public investment. In particular, to
achieve the Millennium Development Goals, public investment in agriculture needs
to be significantly increased in almost all African states analyzed in this book,
though to different degrees. However, beyond total public investments in agricul-
ture the composition of the agricultural budget is also crucial to guarantee an
optimal investment strategy. The latter applies not only to the allocation of budget
resources across agricultural and nonagricultural policy programs, but also to the
allocation of resources across different CAADP policy programs. For example,
microeconometric analyses undertaken for Uganda highlight the importance of
agricultural extension services. Furthermore, extended econometric approaches
undertaken for Malawi reveal that optimal composition of public investments
crucially depend on specific policy-growth and growth-policy linkages, which are
country specific. Accordingly, it is impossible to identify a set of key policies that
fits all African countries, but rather each country needs to identify its own optimal
PPG strategy. Thus, while a focus on investment in agricultural extension may work
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for Uganda, making CAADP work in Malawi requires major investments in rural
infrastructure as well as in water and land management. Beyond the identification
of optimal pro-poor growth strategies, the understanding of the political processes
involved in formulating and implementing these policies is essential.
3 Incentives Versus Knowledge Gaps
Based on analyses undertaken in this book, political decision-making regarding
public investment in agriculture and nonagriculture are determined by three com-
ponents: first, political incentives of governments to invest and second, political
knowledge regarding the impact of different policies on growth and poverty
reduction. Thirdly, beyond incentives and knowledge realized, PPG strategies
also depend on financial resources available to national governments. Accordingly,
the persisting inefficient policies observed in many African countries is the result of
a lack of both adequate incentives and political knowledge and also lack of
sufficient financial resources. In contrast to existing political economy studies
mainly focusing on incentive gaps, e.g. biased incentives in favor of special
interests at the expense of the poor, the application of a CGPE approach to the
CAADP reform process in Malawi implies that inefficient policies mainly result
from knowledge gaps, while biased incentives play only a minor role. In particular,
at least in the Malawi case, adequate political knowledge does not presently exist
either in the political system or the science sector, but must be generated in a
dynamic policy learning process.
4 Stakeholders Play an Important Role in Participatory
Policy Processes Determining Governmental
Performance
Stakeholders influence governmental incentives to invest in specific programs and
sectors via lobbying. Moreover, stakeholders also impact final policy decisions via
influencing the political beliefs of politicians (i.e. their applied political knowl-
edge). Politicians apply policy beliefs (i.e. simple mental models) to understand the
impact of different policies on poverty and growth, where politicians update their
beliefs via communication learning through policy networks. Especially, national
research and international donor organizations take a central position in political
communication networks and hence exert a strong influence on the final policy
beliefs of powerful politicians. In contrast, private interest groups (e.g. farm orga-
nizations), which are not as central to political communication networks, influence
the political incentives of governments to invest in specific CAADP policy pro-
grams mainly via lobbying.
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However, given the fact that none of involved stakeholder and governmental
organizations cumulates the total political knowledge (i.e. perfectly understands
which specific combination of policies works best for Malawi), shifting political
power to the research, donor or national stakeholders would not imply more
efficient or effective policy outcomes. What is needed to find practical solutions
is an institutionalized communication process that allows for a productive combi-
nation of individual knowledge among stakeholders via an interactive exchange of
ideas especially among political practitioners and scientific researchers.
5 Voter Behavior Is Another Important Determinant
of Governmental Performance
Closing the knowledge gap is a necessary but not sufficient condition to make
CAADP work. However, given the fact that most African states nowadays are truly
democratic, the political feasibility of development policies depends on the elec-
toral responses of the voters. Hence, any comprehensive understanding of the
political economy of major policy reforms like CAADP has to take into account
the electoral responses of different social groups.
In this book we show that understanding how voter behavior impacts governmen-
tal incentives means understanding how voters cast their votes. Analyzing voter
behavior (i.e. electoral responses to governmental policies and induced policy out-
comes) implies that electoral responses of voters to governmental policies are
determined by the relative importance of non-policy oriented voting motives in
comparison to policy-oriented voting motives. The more voters base their votes on
non-policy issues, the more they can be influenced by campaigning. Hence, elected
politicians have high incentives to deliver policies that serve the interests of influen-
tial interest groups (i.e., the latter are influential in the sense that they control the
voting behavior of their clientele). Hence, governmental policy is highly influenced
by the lobbying activities of special interest groups. However, if voters engage in
retrospective voting (i.e. base their votes on observed economic performance), the
government has a high incentive to deliver good policies (i.e. policies that really
work and serve the public interest). As a corollary, retrospective voting implies a high
incentive for governments to engage in policy learning. Finally, beyond non-policy
oriented voting, voters engage in policy-oriented voting (i.e. they base their evalua-
tion of parties competing in election on party platforms). Policy-oriented voting
implies an incentive for elected politicians to deliver policies desired by a majority
of voters. However, policy-oriented voting does not necessarily imply efficient policy
outcomes. To the contrary, compared to politicians and stakeholders, the average
voter is a layman when it comes to development policies like CAADP. Accordingly,
policy positions preferred by voters are based on naı̈ve beliefs about how different
policies work and therefore can be extremely inefficient. Nevertheless, in political
reality the more voters base their votes on non-policy issues, the less is their joint
political weight vis-a-vis organized interest groups in determining governmental
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policy choices. Moreover, to the extent that the relative importance of non-policy
voting varies systematically across social groups (e.g. poor versus rich), the relative
political weights of social groups also differ. Hence, government capture basically
results from the relative importance of non-policy voting.
Empirical analyses of voter behavior undertaken for Malawi implies that the
electoral choices of Malawian voters are mainly driven by non-policy issues with an
average importance of 66% followed by policy-oriented voting with an average
importance of 30%. Very little importance resulted for retrospective voting with an
average importance of only 4%. Therefore, governmental incentives are mainly ori-
ented towards interest groups with a total weight of 60% compared to only 40% for the
total voter population. However, voter behavior varies systematically across social
groups implying different relative political weights across voters. Interestingly, empir-
ical estimations imply that the Malawian government is less captured by rich versus
poor or rural versus urban populations, but rather by specific regional and ethnic
groups. In particular, the North is significantly underrepresented, while the Chewa
and Yao tribes as well as the central region seem to be politically overrepresented.
Nevertheless, based on our empirical results, the political feasibility of CAADP
options in Malawi still significantly depends on voters’ choices given the fact that
policy-oriented voting counts for 40% of voters’ electoral responses. Our results
clearly imply that the less voters rely on non-policy indicators and the more they
base their electoral choices on party policy platforms and evaluate the competence
of the government based on observed economic development, the more electoral
competition induces incentives for the government to implement policies that
correspond to the policy preferences of the majority of the society.
However, our analyses also reveal that a high political representation of voters’
policy preferences by the government does not necessarily imply that the government
implements the most efficient policies. The latter conclusion results from the fact that
voters’ policy preferences might be biased. Interestingly, taking biased voter beliefs
into account, a high importance of lobbying in combination with governmental
leadership that is driven by its own intrinsic political vision might induce more
efficient policy choices while simultaneously decreasing governmental performance,
as defined in terms of capture and accountability. The highly recognized work of
Caplan draws the rather pessimistic conclusion that democratic mechanisms of
preference aggregation naturally lead to the choice of inefficient policies. Hence,
the analysis of voter beliefs is an important topic of our future research.
6 Donor Funding Can Contribute to Ensuring the Political
Feasibility of Efficient Pro-Poor Growth Strategies
Promoting pro-poor economic growth strategies in the future requires investments
today. These investment have to be financed. Ensuring there is sufficient funding is a
major concern in most African countries (see Benin and Yu 2012). In Malawi, as in
most African countries, a large share of financial resources used for project funding is
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provided by development partners. If donors neglect their commitments, funding by
the government only would result in far lower allocation of the total budget to policy
programs promoting growth in both agriculture and nonagriculture. In contrast, the
large part of the state budget is spent on the provision of public good services such as
social and health services. Naturally, the latter has strong political implications. Thus,
donors play a key role in determining political feasibility of an optimal PPG strategy,
since governmental incentives for public investment are crucially determined by
external funds provided by donors.
7 From Political Diagnosis to Therapy
If policy failure is dominated by knowledge gaps, while biased political incentives
have only minor importance, formal political institutions (e.g. constitutional rules
like electoral rules or legislative procedures) have little impact on political perfor-
mance. By the same argument, a simple increase in the political influence of any
stakeholder organization will also be ineffective. Furthermore, if neither the policy
beliefs of policymakers nor the parameter specifications of scientific models corre-
spond to the true political technology, adequate political knowledge does not yet
exist neither in the scientific system nor in political praxis and thusmust be created in
the political process. Designing effective observational policy learning is facilitated
by an effective monitoring and evaluation system. However, even with an appro-
priate M&E system, observational learning often takes a long time and hence is
extremely costly. Therefore, beyond observational learning, communication learn-
ing is also important. The latter requires an interactive exchange between scientific
modelers, politicians and stakeholders. To facilitate this exchange, innovative
communication tools, such as computer-based policy toolkits like CAADP-lab, or
participatory policy processes including politicians and stakeholders as well as
research and donor organizations are required.
8 Innovative Methodological Approaches
The challenge of empirically analyzing and designing participatory and evidence-
based policy processes is the development of an applicable model framework that
first enables a comprehensive political diagnosis (i.e., the identification of the prin-
cipal source of low political performance in terms of incentives and knowledge gaps).
Such a framework should then enable the derivation of an effective political therapy
(i.e., provide tools that allow the identification of adequate strategies for reducing
existing political performance gaps). The derivation of a political therapy requires
quantitative modeling of the political decision-making and policy learning processes,
including the endogenous formation of legislators’ political preferences and policy
beliefs (i.e., agents’ simplified mental models for approximating the complex true
relationship between policy instruments and induced policy outcomes).
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Facing these methodological challenges this book develops and applies a CGPE
model as a new quantitative approach to analyzing the performance of policy
processes with respect to the production of efficient policy choices. In contrast to
existing political economy models, which highlight the biased incentives of politi-
cians as a principal cause of persisting inefficient policies, the CGPE approach
incorporates explicitly the lack of adequate political knowledge as another impor-
tant source of inefficient policy choices. Within the CGPE approach, a model of
political belief formation and updating explains how political agents organized a
combination of observational and communication learning processes in networks to
improve their political knowledge. According to the CGPE model, the main
determinants of the accumulation of political knowledge and the speed of policy
learning correspond to policy network structures that reflect the communication and
interaction patterns between governmental and nongovernmental organizations.
Moreover, in principal a voter module can be incorporated in the CGPE approach
allowing the calculation of political feasibility indices for given policy options.
Beyond efficiency, political feasibility is another important aspect of evaluating
policy options that work in political praxis.
9 Future Outlook and Challenges
Although we think that the work presented in this book makes a significant
contribution to the modeling and evaluation of policies and political processes, it
clearly has limitations which should be tackled in future work.
First, economic modeling is still rather restrictive, e.g. labor market restrictions
as well as price volatility, weather shocks and other exogenous shocks including
farmers’ risk perception are still excluded from applied economic models. Another
important aspects that should be included in future work is the interrelations of
agriculture production and sustainability.
Second, although the PIF approach is certainly an improvement in modeling
policy-growth linkages, present approaches are still limited. By construction, we
assume that budget spending for a specific policy program (γi) is homogenously
effective in promoting t.p. in different subsectors. However, in reality, it appears
more realistic that even within specific policy programs (e.g., investments in
infrastructure), different subprograms can be formulated by focusing on specific
subsectors. For example, investing in the infrastructure of specific regions or
investing in the railroad system versus the road system might be more or less
effective for different subsectors. These differences occur because subsectors
might be regionally concentrated or dependent on specific infrastructure systems.
Thus, including a third stage in our PIF function that allows for sector-specific
subprograms within a specific policy program corresponds to a potential extension
of the PIF to deal with subsector specific effectiveness of policy programs.
Moreover, the presented PIF function does not explicitly allow the assessment of
implementation efficiency. Evaluation of specific budget allocations across differ-
ent policy programs depends on how programs are finally implemented. For
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example, investment in rural road infrastructure via building fancy roads to remote
villages where no real business exists to take advantage of these roads would not
have a real impact on growth. Moreover, buying cars for extension officers who
have low capacities to advise farmers would also not make a big contribution to
promoting farm productivity. A possible extension of the PIF approach taking
implementation efficiency into account would be to incorporate a third or fourth
stage corresponding to different implementation mechanisms that determine effec-
tive budget uses under various subprograms in the second or third stage.
Regarding political economy modeling, the following aspects are limitations of
the current CGPE approach:
First, in its present version, the CGPE does not yet incorporate the voter module
(i.e., political support functions are derived exogenously from interview data).
Basically, this setup implies that political support is driven by retrospective and
non-policy voting only, while policy-oriented voting is neglected. However, as
demonstrated in Chapter “Voter Behavior and Government Performance in
Malawi: An Application of a Probabilistic Voting Model”, policy-oriented
voting is an important determinant of voter behavior. Hence, voters’ policy
beliefs might effectively restrict politicians’ policy choices. This aspect is not
fully reflected in the presented CGPE analyses. Thus, incorporating the voter
module and deriving political support endogenously from estimated voter
behavior might imply that observed political performance is actually more
restricted by biased political incentives than implied by the presented CGPE
analyses. Furthermore, understanding how voters update their policy beliefs
within public opinion formation (e.g. what is the role of mass media versus
political campaigning and stakeholder communication within this process) is a
very important and interesting aspect that needs to be analyzed in future
research.
Second, although it has been demonstrated by applying the CGPE approach that
interactive communication among politicians, stakeholders and researchers is
important for effective policy learning, the concrete institutional organization of
such interactive communication has not been analyzed yet. Thus, this is another
important aspect we leave for future research.
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